


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A
HISTORY
OF
THE ROMANS
UNDER THE EMPIRE.

VOL. I.

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A
HISTORY
OF
THE ROMANS
UNDER THE EMPIRE.

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VOL. I.

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P R E F A C E.

THE portion of this history now offered to the public embraces the period from the first Triumvirate to the death of Julius Cæsar. The life and times of the great man by whose name it might fitly be designated, present on the one hand the close, on the other the commencement of an era. Cæsar prostrated the Roman oligarchy, and laid the foundations of the Empire in the will of the middle classes. He levelled the barriers of municipality, and infused provincial blood into the senate and people of Rome. Preceding Imperators had annexed provinces, Cæsar began to organize the conquests of the commonwealth. From an early period of his career he was fully conscious of the real nature of the revolution on which he was embarked; but if it was his hand that moulded and directed it, the change he effected was in fact demanded by his party and enforced by circumstances. Though the structure of his personal ambition perished with him, the social foundations on which it rested remained firmly rooted in the soil; and the comprehensive imperium of his successors rose majestic and secure from the lines originally drawn by the most sagacious statesman

of the commonwealth. The career of Cæsar is the prelude to the history of four centuries.

I have stated in my first chapter the limits I venture to assign to the work, namely, the transfer of the seat of empire from Rome to Constantinople. I shall endeavour to trace throughout the long period before me the effects of conquest and supremacy upon the Roman people; the reaction of the provinces upon the capital; the struggles of the conquered nations to assert for themselves a share in the dignities and privileges of the conquering race; and the gradual fusion into one mass of Italians, Britons, Africans, and Orientals. I shall have to inquire how far the boast of the Romans themselves was true, who, when they beheld the result of this universal fusion and settlement, exclaimed, that their city alone had been wise and just enough to promote this beneficent revolution of her own accord.¹ For we shall see that her concessions were in a great degree extorted from her; and the crowning event which obliterates the last vestige of Roman sentiments, the establishment of Christianity, was in fact the conquest of Rome by her own subjects.

¹ Claudian. *de Cons. Stilich.* iii. 150.:

“Hæc est in gremium victos quæ sola recepit,
Humanumque genus communi nomine fovit,
Matris non dominæ ritu; civesque vocavit
Quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit.”

Rutilius, *Itiner.* i. 63.:

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam,
Profuit injustis, te dominante, capi:
Dumque offers victis proprii consortia juris,
Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat.

The records we possess of the period to which these two volumes are confined, are more ample than those, perhaps, of any other portion of ancient history; but the course of this work will lead us over many long and dreary tracts, diversified by few objects, and admitting of little detailed description. Bearing this in mind, I have studied not to lose sight altogether of the proportions suited to a long historical work, and have sought to compress my materials to the utmost limit consistent with perspicuity. At the same time, the remarkable deficiency of our recent literature in any complete narrative of the most interesting period of Roman annals, has constantly tempted me to expatiate; and I have been unwilling to forego the opportunity of supplying it substantially, in case circumstances should prevent the further prosecution of my general design.

The scanty illustration of these times by English writers has been amply compensated by the abundance and copiousness of the contributions of continental scholars. The volumes of Michelet, Amedée Thierry, Duruy, Hoeck, Abeken, and others, have lain open before me throughout the course of my own studies; and the elaborate work of Drumann, in which he has amassed every notice of antiquity, and connected them all together with admirable ingenuity and judgment, has supplied me with a storehouse of references, to which I have not scrupled to resort freely. But without affecting originality, which could only have been extremely

defective, I believe that much of my reading, and most of my conclusions, may lay claim at least to independence.

My obligations to Dr. Arnold's History of the Later Commonwealth are acknowledged in another place. The rapid sketch he has given of the times of Julius Cæsar deserved to be retraced by the same pen; the armour in which he made his first literary essay he would doubtless have furbished anew for a riper achievement. If he had lived to continue his general history of Rome to the period before me, it is needless to say that my ambition would have been directed elsewhere; and that, as his admirer and friend, I should have joined the public voice in hailing his extended work as worthy of himself and his subject.

“ Si mea cum vestris valuissent vota, Pelasgi,
Non foret ambiguus tanti certaminis hæres,
Tuque tuis armis, nos te poteremur, Achille.”

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CORRIGENDA IN VOL. I.

- P. 54. note, line 3. from bottom. For "*An. Nat.*" read "*Natur. Quæst.*"
 367. l. 17. For "*Æsulæ*," read "*Æsula*."
 489. l. 5. Dele "numbered the First." I cannot recover the authority on which I have assigned this number to the legion in question, which is inconsistent at least with Dion's statement, xxxviii. 47. See Vol. II. p. 81., where Dion should have been referred to.
 503. l. 8. from bottom. For "second," read "third."

HISTORY

OF

THE ROMANS

UNDER THE EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN HISTORY ILLUSTRATED BY THE
 LEGEND OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE CITY. — EXCLUSION :
 COMPREHENSION. — ROMANS ; PATRICIANS, PLEBEIANS. — RO-
 MANS ; LATINS. — ROMANS ; ITALIANS. — ROMANS ; PROVINCIALS.
 — TYRANNY OF THE ROMANS : WRONGS OF THE PROVINCES ;
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 RECOGNITION. — DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF UNITY, MORAL
 AND POLITICAL. — CHRISTIANITY : MONARCHY. — EXTINCTION
 OF ROMAN IDEAS. — SCOPE OF THE WORK.

THE Romans regarded the Palatine as the cradle of the City of the Seven Hills. It was from the opposite slope of the Janiculum that they delighted to behold the chain of eminences which surrounded this central summit, and comprehended within its circuit the most interesting sites and monuments of their history.¹ The configuration

Contrast
between the
Palatine and
Aventine
hills as sites
for a city.

¹ "Hinc septem dominos videre montes,
 Et totam licet æstimare Romam." Martial. iv. 64.

CHAP.
I.

of the six exterior heights, from the Capitoline on the left to the Aventine on the right, presented an almost continuous ridge of unequal elevation, abutting at either extremity on the channel of the Tiber. Between the Aventine and the Cælian a small stream made its way into the inclosure, and a depression in this natural rampart between the Quirinal and the Esquiline was replaced by the mound of Servius¹; but it was not till the time of Trajan that an opening was excavated between the Capitoline and the Quirinal. Where the Tiber first fell under the shadow of the Servian walls, the Capitoline descended abruptly into the hollow, and sustained on its precipitous summits the defences of the city to the north. The Aventine, presenting the opposite horn of the ridge, sloped gradually to the water's edge, and might seem from its position to invite the commerce of the world to the widest and richest valley south of the Apennines, teeming with the products of Etruscan civilization. Its aboriginal monsters were exterminated by the Tyrian Hercules, the genius of commercial enterprise.² But in the depths of antiquity, before the foundations of Rome were laid, the single outlet to the waters which collected

¹ "Ut unus aditus qui esset inter Esquilinum Quirinumque montem maximo aggere objecto fossa cingeretur altissima." Cic. *de Rep.* ii. 6. The Viminal lies between these two hills, a little behind the agger of Servius, which connects their bases. There is very little depression in the ridge now perceptible in this quarter. It is remarkable that Cicero makes no mention of the hollow through which the Aqua Crabra flowed into the city; but he was thinking only of defences against invasion from the north.

² See the Legend of Cacus, Virg. *Æn.* viii.

"Cacus Aventinæ timor atque infamia sylvæ." Ovid. *Fast.* i. 551.

round the base of the Palatine, was choked by a desolate morass, and the rank growth of primitive forests buried the central eminence in almost impenetrable concealment. Such a position was admirably adapted for a place of retreat, and offered an impregnable shelter to crime and rapine. It seemed created by Nature herself to be the stronghold of a people of reserved character and predatory habits. It was destined to become the den of the wolves of Italy.¹ The legend of the foundation of the Eternal City, which affirmed that the divine omens decided the contest of the brothers and the pretensions of the rival summits, furnishes a striking illustration of the subsequent fortunes of the Roman people. They chose between a career of conquest and plunder, and of discovery and commerce. Romulus founded Rome, Remus might have founded a Carthage.

Nor is it only in the local features of its original birthplace that the isolation of the Roman character is thus vividly depicted. The native ferocity of the people is stamped upon its earliest traditions. The author of the race, it was said, was rejected and exposed by his natural guardians. The sustenance denied him by man was afforded him by the most savage beast of the desert. He grew up to slay his oppressor, to summon the injured and the outlawed to his standard, and wreak with them wild vengeance upon mankind around him. In the same manner, the morose

Antipathy
of the Ro-
mans to
foreigners.

¹ Such was the expression of Telesinus the Samnite: "*Nunquam defuturos raptores Italicæ libertatis lupos, nisi sylva in quam refugere solerent esset excisa.*"—Vell. ii. 27.

CHAP.

I.

pride of the Roman people, and their antipathy to foreign habits, are strongly marked on every page of their history. They scorned the humanizing pursuits of commerce, and the genial tendencies of social refinement. They were inflamed by a passion for destroying the monuments of their conquered enemies, their arts and literature. They established the most odious distinctions between themselves and their subjects, insulted them by their legislation and defamed them in their histories.

The policy of comprehension is forced upon them.

The Roman polity, however, presents another side which lays much greater claim to our interest. However selfish and exclusive the sentiments were which constituted its basis, necessity compelled it at sundry periods to admit aliens and even enemies into alliance and association with itself. The annals of the Roman people affords us the most perfect illustration of the natural laws which seem to control the rise and progress of nations. The almost uninterrupted succession of their triumphs, the enormous extent of the dominion they acquired, and the completeness of the cycle through which they passed from infancy to final decrepitude and decay, combine to present them to us as the normal type of a conquering race. One principle seems to be established by their history, namely, that it is the condition of permanent dominion, that the conquerors should absorb the conquered gradually into their own body, by extending, as circumstances arise, a share in their own exclusive privileges to the masses from whom they have torn their original independence.

Thus only can they provide a constant supply of fresh blood to recruit their own exhausted energies, and strengthen the basis of their power while they extend the limits of their conquests.

CHAP.
I.

All conquering nations feel an instinctive repugnance to making this sacrifice of pride and immediate interest; all struggle blindly against the necessity; those alone which in due season submit to it retain the permanence of their institutions and counteract the inherent principle of decay. The obstinacy with which the Dorian conquerors of Sparta resisted this necessity checked their career of aggrandizement, and brought their political existence to a premature termination. We are ourselves witnesses at the present day to the consequences of such resistance in the impending ruin of a more magnificent empire, the dominion of the Turks in Greece and western Asia. On the other hand, the latest conquerors of our own island and of Gaul have acknowledged the conditions thus attached to the triumph of their arms; and the effects of their victory, itself long since forgotten, have endured through a succession of many centuries. It was by gradually communicating to their subjects, however reluctantly, the outward badges and privileges of the conquering caste, that the Normans and Franks averted the reaction which must otherwise, sooner or later, have swept away the progeny of a mere handful of adventurers before the accumulating numbers they had for a time coerced. But in relinquishing the privileges extorted by arms, they have retained the ascend-

This policy the necessary condition of permanent dominion.

CHAP.
I.

ancy naturally due to superior genius, and have each impressed their own character indelibly upon the institutions which all the inhabitants of the soil now regard equally as their own. Again, the time may arrive in the social progress of a nation when the incorporation of its component elements has become complete, but the struggle of races has been succeeded by a struggle of ideas; the conflicting interests and feelings of different classes may require a similar system of timely concession; the rise, for instance, of new religious convictions may threaten to act with explosive force in the bosom of society, and demand a new social combination at the hands of prudent statesmen. In this respect also the history of the Roman people in its latest developments furnishes a manual of experience to the philosophical inquirer.

The principle of assimilation traced in the earliest legends of Rome.

The spirit of this assimilative principle, if we may so denominate it, may be traced in the venerable legend which related the deed of violence by which the founder of the city sought to multiply the numbers of his subjects. The contest with the Sabines, who resented the rape of their women, ended in the association of the hostile tribes in the bonds of kinship and alliance. The divided throne of Romulus and Tatius was a type of the double chairs of the patrician and plebeian consuls, and of the successive extension of the Roman franchise to the Latins, the Italians, and the Provincials. The infant colony, thus recruited, sprang rapidly into vigorous adolescence. The city of Romulus spread from the Palatine over the surrounding ridge, and connected with a single wall the fortresses which

were planted on its heights.¹ The development of the commonwealth consisted in the periodical repetition of this original experiment; it was by carrying out this principle of incorporation that it rose to empire.

Nevertheless, a large portion of the history of Rome is no other than a record of the desperate resistance she offered to the claims of her subjects for comprehension within the pale of her privileges. The timely amalgamation which took place so repeatedly between the conquerors and the conquered, is to be attributed to the good fortune of the commonwealth, rather than to the wisdom and foresight of her rulers. Under the regal government, indeed, as far as we may trust the records which have descended to us, the principle of equal association was admitted and practised liberally. Romulus shared his throne with the king of the Sabines. Tullus transplanted to Rome the citizens of Alba. The most ancient enumerations of the Roman people seem to indicate, by their rapid increase, that they carried out this policy systematically as long as they were governed by a line of kings. But as the monarchical form of government is generally favourable to the obliteration of distinctions between the various elements of which a nation is composed, so the oligarchical, which followed upon the expulsion of the Tarquins, evinced, as it always does, an opposite tendency. As the light begins to brighten about the cradle of the Roman institutions, we discover distinct traces

Struggle between the patricians and plebeians.

¹

"Septemque una sibi muro circumdedit arces."

Virg. *Georg.* ii. fin.

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of the existence within their pale, not of two classes only, the warriors and their subjects, but of a third also, occupying a position between the others, sharing in the name and in an inferior degree in the rights and privileges of the dominant class. The patricians and plebeians of Rome represent, at this early period, two races of different origin, the former of which has admitted the other, whether on compulsion or by concession, after a fruitless resistance, or by spontaneous arrangement, to a certain prescribed share in the privileges of government and the rights of conquest. It exacts, in return, a strict alliance against the unruly subjects and jealous enemies common to both. During a century and a half of republican government, while the external policy of the state is developing its tendency to universal aggression, and the work of aggrandizement and self-defence seem, to the eye of the mere bystander, to be animated by a common instinct, there exists, nevertheless, internally a strong under-current of hostility between these half-reluctant yokefellows. The plebs is resolutely working its way to the attainment of a complete equality with the populus, to the common enjoyment of all public honours and emoluments, and a full guarantee for the personal liberty of its members. Its numbers are gradually, although slowly, augmented by the admission into its ranks of the class of freedmen, those individuals whom compassion, self-interest, or great public services, elevated occasionally from the herd of slaves to the rank of Roman citizens. In some cases the whole free population of an allied

or friendly city was admitted in a body to the rights of Roman citizenship. It was enrolled in one of the existing plebeian tribes, or added another to the number, thus directly increasing the power and influence of the inferior order, while at the same time, as the clientele of some patrician house, it reflected additional lustre upon the privileged class. At last the commons attain their object. They acquire an equal share in the public offices and honours, participate in the same system of law, in the same rites of religion, in the common enjoyment of the fruits of conquest. The two nations coalesce into one. From this era, the body politic appears to be animated with new vigour. The career of victory is no longer checked by the defection of the commons at some important crisis. The hostility of the enemy is no longer encouraged by the suspicion that the councils of his adversary are divided. The course of another century witnesses the extension of the Roman dominion over the whole of Italy, and the vigorous republic is already prepared to contest the sovereignty of the West with the long-settled and deep-rooted power of Carthage.

We find, however, that the Romans do not enter upon this mortal conflict in exclusive dependence upon their own resources. The burghers and the commonalty together are already far outnumbered by the multitude of their subjects, whom they continue to treat as aliens, who are jealous of their sway, and may be expected to turn against them at any favourable opportunity. The strength of the Romans must be invigorated, that of the

The Latin franchise, and comprehension of the allies in the Roman state.

CHAP.

I

Italians reduced. Accordingly, we remark the institution of a new form of qualified citizenship conferred upon certain dependent communities, either as a reward for good service to the republic, or as a sop to appease their cravings for union with it. The Latin franchise, as it was termed from the people to whom it was first assigned, placed its possessor in a state of subordinate communion with the Roman people. The principal advantage which it conferred related to the means of holding and disposing of property; but the Latin was not deemed worthy to mingle his blood with the Roman, and the child of a mixed marriage became a Latin, and not a Roman citizen. Nor did the republic concede to these dependants the complete right of suffrage; to which, however, she half-opened her jealous portals by allowing the discharge of certain local magistracies to confer a title to enrolment in a plebeian tribe, and the full acquisition of her privileges. On the other hand, however, she required the recipients of her favour to enlist in her service. To be admitted, even on such unequal terms, to partnership with the victorious republic was an honour much esteemed, and one which, as it was gradually extended to a considerable number of Italian towns, particularly in Samnium and Campania, and afterwards beyond the sea, conciliated many doubtful friends and materially contributed to the strength of Rome.

Contest of
patricians
and ple-
beians
transferred

It was obvious, however, that in giving her subjects this foretaste of her own freedom, the republic was directly encouraging the demand for its full

and entire enjoyment. In the mean while, not only was her genuine blood drained by constant warfare, but every new conquest required a fresh graft from the parent stock to garrison or to colonize it. Whilst she strove to repair the losses of war in her dependencies, she enhanced the injury which it had inflicted upon herself. The inevitable consequence, the claim of citizenship, was hastened by internal dissensions. Within the walls of Rome itself, the old contest of the burghers with the commonalty had been insensibly transferred to the richer and poorer classes, the nobility and the populace. Undoubtedly many families of the plebs were as noble and as wealthy as any of the patrician order; but the latter were all ennobled by birth and station, and the political advantages, of which they enjoyed so large a share, had as yet allowed few to descend into poverty. The mass of the plebeians, on the other hand, comprehended all the citizens of obscurer birth, and nearly all of inferior means. Accordingly, when a struggle arose between the upper and lower classes, old names and old jealousies were appealed to on both sides; the contest assumed the title of one between patricians and plebeians, and the name probably conduced to give a false colour and illegitimate tendency to the thing. The poorer classes claimed certain rights with regard to the public property, of which they had been dispossessed, not as plebeians, but simply as citizens; but their cause was advocated by the tribunes of the plebs; the prejudices of the plebs, of every one enrolled in a plebeian tribe, whether noble or mean, rich or poor, were invoked

CHAP. :
I.

to the richer
and poorer
classes.

CHAP.
I.

in its support. It was the sympathy of old association, rather than any actual participation in injury, that drew the members of the plebeian nobility into a quarrel altogether apart from their personal interest, or rather one which was contrary to it. The attraction was not universal; many of the richer plebeians fell into the ranks of the patrician aristocracy which generally opposed these claims; and in the subsequent phases which the contest assumed, individuals were found to fluctuate reciprocally between the one side and the other. But the struggles of the privileged and the unprivileged continued to be described by the old party designations, and the popular faction might be astonished to see themselves triumphing under the leadership of the patrician Julius, while the nobles accepted with distaste and reluctance the services of a plebeian Porcius and Pompeius.

Proprietary enactments: the Licinian rogations: the Agrarian laws of the Gracchi.

The Licinian rogations, enacted in the year 389 of the city, had laid the foundations of a virtual equality between the patrician and plebeian orders. The principle of the most important of these measures was to destroy the actual monopoly of the use of the public lands which the patricians enjoyed, and to limit the occupation of each individual to a certain number of acres. Since that time, however, the rich and powerful had again gradually encroached upon this regulation, and while they grasped at immense tracts of land, which they could not profitably occupy, had left a vast proportion of the poorer citizens without their rightful means of subsistence. The law in fact had fallen entirely into desuetude. Ti-

berius Gracchus, alarmed at the progressive depopulation of Italy, and perceiving how the enormous disproportion of properties was tending to the extirpation of the class of free citizens, fixed his eye upon these obsolete enactments as the legitimate means of restoring the balance between the rich and poor. His immediate object was, not the enrichment or elevation of the plebeians, but simply the restoration of the poor and needy citizens to a state of honourable independence. The actual law was doubly favourable to his views of re-distribution; for not only had the Licinian rogations never been abrogated, but the title by which alone public land could be occupied was always, strictly speaking, revocable by the state. It was not the nobility of Rome only who were alarmed by the project of this new agrarian division. The Italians also combined with them in determined opposition to it.¹ The senates of the Italian towns were at this time even more aristocratical than that of Rome itself; for amidst all the popular modifications to which her own constitution had been subjected, it had always been the policy of the republic to stifle democratic movements in her dependencies. It is probable, therefore, that the Italian governments were attached to the Roman nobility by mutual interests and sympathies. The nobles repaid their goodwill with kindly offices, and to many of the allies the use of portions of public land, so jealously withheld from the democracy at home, was

¹ "Nobilitas noxia atque eo perculsa, modo per socios et nomen Latinum . . . Gracchorum actionibus obviam ierat."—Sallust, *B. J.* 42. Comp. Prosper Mérimée, *Etudes sur l'Histoire Rom.* i. 48.

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The state
derives
strength
from this
concession.
Claims of
the Italian
allies to the
Roman
franchise.
Resistance
of the
Romans.
The Social
war. Tri-
umph of
the Romans,
but eventual
concession
of the
claims.
A. U. 666,
B. C. 88.

conceded by special enactment, to more, perhaps, by favour and connivance.

Notwithstanding this foreign support the aristocracy were foiled by the courage and patriotism of the Gracchi, who acted with that thorough faith in the truth and justice of their cause, which affords the surest promise of success. The agrarian laws were carried, though their authors perished in the struggle, and their enactments proved to be too intricate and impracticable to be ever fairly put in execution. But, imperfectly as they were administered, their salutary effect may be gathered from the extraordinary energy which the republic put forth during the thirty years that followed, signalized by the destruction of Jugurtha and the Cimbri, and the repeated triumphs of Marius and Metellus, of Fabius and Scaurus. Meanwhile, the Italians had been brooding in secret over the ideas which the late reformation had suggested to them. Upon reflection, they acknowledged that the precarious enjoyment of a few acres of the public land was a privilege far inferior to the franchise of the city.¹ The popular party in Rome were still restless, and agitated the state with demands for new agrarian laws to remedy the inefficiency of the former. They encouraged the demands of the Italians, who began forthwith to knock at the gates of the constitution.² Great was the outcry of the

¹ Appian (*B. C.* i. 18.) describes how they were harassed by the commissioners who attempted to carry out the appointed re-distribution of land. Ταῦτά τε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τούτοις τῶν δικαζόντων ἐπιείξεις οὐ φέροντες οἱ Ἰταλιῶται. . . .

² Καὶ τινες εἰσηγοῦντο τοὺς συμμάχους ἅπαντας, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῆς γῆς μάλιστα ἀντίλεγον, εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἀναγράψαι, ὥς μείζονι

nobles against the treachery of the citizens who were prepared to level the barriers of exclusion. As usual in popular struggles, moderate concessions were refused, and the cry only grew the louder for extreme measures.¹ The nobles flew to arms with a spirit that cowed domestic treason, while it maintained its ground no less resolutely against foreign aggression. The apprehensions entertained by the ruling class of the personal loss which would ensue to them from the admission of such a host of competitors to the scramble for public honours and emoluments, not less, perhaps, an honourable though mistaken abhorrence of the dilution which Roman blood and Roman sentiments would suffer from this foreign influx, united both the patricians and plebeians which composed it in one stern and indomitable phalanx. Alone, amidst every possible combination of internal dissension and treachery, did the old Roman nobility, a few hundred families at most, maintain the struggle by their courage and wealth, against the whole force of Italy, precipitated into arms by the brilliant prospects revealed to them by the popular intriguers. As the contest proceeded, the claim to citizenship was exchanged for the deadliest vows of extermination, and it was for their existence rather than their prerogatives that the Romans had to contend. The result of the contest was in every way worthy of their military and political reputation. Successful everywhere in the field, they paused at the

χάρτι περὶ τῆς γῆς οὐ διανομένους. καὶ ἐδέχοντο ἄσμενοι τοῦθ' οἱ Ἰταλιῶται, προτιθέντες τῶν χωρίων τὴν πολιτείαν.—App. B.C. i. 21. cf. i. 34.

¹ Val. Max. ix. 5. 1.; Merimée, i. 60.

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moment of victory, and to each nation, as it resigned its claims, presented the boon of citizenship as a free gift. The whole of Italy received the full franchise of the city.¹

Retrospect.

The Romans had now arrived at that period in their career as a nation, at which the existing generation begins to reflect upon the past, and to trace the steps by which it has arrived at its actual development. They could not fail to recognise the peculiar feature which distinguishes their history from that of all the popular governments of the ancient world, the principle of expansion and association, which had carried them triumphantly through every crisis, and strengthened year by year the foundations of their magnificent empire. Sallust hails with satisfaction the early application of this happy policy by the founder of the city²; and it is to this pre-eminently that Cicero attributes the extent and vitality of the Roman dominion.³ Dionysius, in the striking passage in which he enumerates the principal causes of the grandeur of the people, who had mortified the vanity of his countrymen by their easy overthrow of the descendants of Leonidas and Themistocles, contrasts the humane and liberal policy of the

¹ Appian. *B. C.* i. 49.; Vell. ii. 17. The principal enactments by which the franchise was extended to the Italians were the *Lex Julia* (A. U. 664.) and the *Lex Plautia Papiria* (A. U. 665.). But the actual process of enfranchisement was more gradual than has generally been supposed. Many difficulties were thrown in the way of individuals seeking to be enrolled; the acquisition of the metropolitan required the relinquishment of the local franchise. Several states declined the honour. See Duruy's elaborate note, *Hist. des Rom.* ii. 213. and Niebuhr, *Lect. on Rom. Hist.* i. 387.

² Sallust. *B. C.* 6.

³ Cic. *pro Balbo*, 31.

Romans with the feeble jealousy and exclusiveness of the Greeks.¹ "What was the cause," says Tacitus, "of the fall of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, but that, powerful as they were in arms, they spurned their subjects from them as aliens?"²

The nobles, although they had given way to their opponents on the vital point of the right of suffrage, still clung to the hope of maintaining their superiority. At first they tried to limit the preponderance of new voters by arbitrarily restricting them to a small number of the tribes.³ But amidst the violence of the civil wars, which assailed the most sacred landmarks of the constitution, such invidious distinctions could not long be maintained. On the first triumph of the popular party, its leader hastened to reward the services of the Italians by abolishing these injurious restrictions. The whole of the tribes were now thrown open to them, and from this time it was evident that they had it in their power, by acting with steadiness and concert, completely to master

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Triumph of the popular party in Rome contemporaneously with the enfranchisement of the Italians.

¹ Dionys. *Ant.* ii. 16, 17.

² Tac. *Ann.* xi. 24.; where the remark is put in the mouth of the Emperor Claudius, when he urged the senate, according to his uniform policy, to extend the franchise to the mass of the Gaulish people. He adds, "At conditor noster Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes dein cives habuerit."

³ The original arrangement lasted so short a time that its nature seems to have been speedily forgotten. Velleius (ii. 20.) says that the Italians were enrolled in eight tribes, apparently eight of the existing thirty-five; on the other hand, Appian (*B. C.* i. 49.) affirms that ten new tribes were created for them. In either case they were liable to be overwhelmed by the old Roman citizens in the comitia, where questions were decided by the majority, not of votes, but of tribes.

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the Roman element in the comitia. But many causes combined to avert this result. The Italians had no longer any distinct interest at variance with that of the Romans, while they retained many causes of jealousy and disunion among themselves. The distance at which they lay from the centre of action made it impossible for them to watch the shifting currents of the Roman forum, and the inactivity to which they were thus condemned by their position soon bred in them a total indifference to questions of temporary interest. The apprehension, therefore, that the introduction of the Italian element into the constitution would have the effect of Italianizing Rome, was totally groundless. Nevertheless, it is certain that from this time the denationalization of Rome began, though we must look to another quarter for its origin. The city became from henceforth the common resort of all that was neediest and vilest in the suburban population. There grew up a multitude of reckless adventurers, eager to sell themselves to the demagogues of any party, controlling the elections by corruption or violence, obstructing the peaceful march of public affairs, rendering law impotent and justice impracticable. Conscious of their strength and services, these hungry mercenaries claimed and obtained a subsidy from the state. They quartered themselves on the government, which was compelled to tax the industry of the provinces for their maintenance. The misfortune or error of the statesmen of the day lay in their failing to invent a system by which the votes of the distant municipals might be brought

to bear against the mob of the forum. The idea of popular representation was altogether foreign to the mind and habits of the age: but under Augustus the elections were conducted by taking the votes severally in the different towns.¹ We may imagine that the introduction of this plan by a strong government, like that of Sulla, might have infused a new element of stability into the tottering machine of the republican constitution.

Marius was wafted into power with the full tide of the Italian confederacy. He was the first to set the example of proscribing and massacring the leaders of the party opposed to him²: but his views were narrow and sordid, and he took no measures to secure the ascendancy of the popular faction. Satiated with the acquisition of a seventh consulship, he was snatched away by a timely death from the disgrace and ruin with which his friends were speedily overtaken.³ The return of Sulla, the champion of the nobility, with his victorious army from Asia, surprised them without plans or resources. The younger Marius threw himself into the arms of the Samnites, still the implacable enemies of Rome, and was ready to transfer to their country the seat of empire. The views of Sulla, on the other hand, were thoroughly na-

Oligarchical reaction under Sulla, and ascendancy of the exclusive or Roman policy.

¹ Suet. *Oct.* 46.: "Excogitato genere suffragiorum quæ de magistratibus urbicis decuriones colonici in sua quisque Colonia ferrent, et sub diem comitiorum obsignata Romam mitterent."

² Sulla indeed was the first who decreed a proscription by law; and on this account Velleius assigns him the ignominy of inventing this mode of carrying on the struggle. "Prinus ille exemplum proscriptionis invenit." ii. 28.

³ Merimée thinks that Marius committed suicide, i. 247.; see Plut. *Mar.* 45.

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tional. The massacres by which he decimated the Italian races, the proscriptions by which he swept off the leaders of the popular party in the city, together with his vigorous exercise of the extraordinary powers which the gratitude of the triumphant nobles conferred upon him, in abrogating laws which had fixed, for more than a generation, the balance of the constitution, all tended to the same end, the restoration and defence of the aristocratic supremacy. Even his introduction of a multitude of soldiers and slaves to the franchise, revolutionary as it was in principle, found its excuse in the aim he had in view, that of counter-acting the suffrages of the Italians, which even he dared not directly annul. He abridged the power of the tribunes¹, who, in addition to their original office of protecting the interests of the plebs, had usurped considerable control over the deliberations of the senate. He restored to that body the *judicia*²; that is, the exclusive right of sitting in judgment, by the appointment of the prætor or other magistrate: a right which was most eagerly coveted and jealously guarded, for the sake of the influence it conferred, and, not less, of the opportunity it offered for reaping the fruits of corruption. The popular party was cowed, and the nobles promised themselves a long enjoyment of

¹ Liv. *Epit.* lxxxix.; Vell. ii. 30.; Appian. *B. C.* i. 100.; Cic. *de Leg.* iii. 9.: "In ista quidem re vehementer Sullam probo, qui tribunis plebis sua lege injuriæ faciendæ potestatem ademerit, auxilii ferendi reliquerit."

² Pseudo-Ascon. in Cic. *Divinat.* 8.: "Victor Sulla legem tulerat ut Senatorius ordo judicaret, et judicavit per decem annos turpiter." Comp. Cic. in *Verr.* i. 13. 37.

the new oligarchical constitution. Their gratitude for his services, together with the devotion of his veterans, and the terror of his own name, maintained the dictator in undisputed power, and continued to protect his person after his abdication.

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The course of events will lead us, on some future occasions, to trace the remains of resentment and antipathy to Rome which lingered long in some regions of the peninsula: but, for the most part, the ambition of the Italian races was now quelled; they were content to regard the city of Romulus as their own metropolis, and, while they enjoyed the fruits of her wide-wasting domination, gradually learned to take pride in her name. We must now extend our view beyond the limits of Italy, and estimate, from the condition of the provinces, the good fortune of Rome, which had thus acquired new strength and resources in a momentous crisis of her external affairs.

Acquies-
cence of the
Italians in
Sulla's po-
litical set-
tlement.

The provinces of the republic occupied the whole northern coast of the Mediterranean, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Bay of Issus, excepting the region which lay between the frontier of Macedonia and the Euxine Sea. The barbarous wilds of Thrace were indeed repeatedly traversed by the Roman armies on their expeditions to the East¹, but no attempt was made to subjugate them till after the death of Sulla, nor were they occupied permanently with a civil establishment till the reign of Augustus.² The Narbonensis did not

The Roman
provinces.

¹ Cicero, *De Prov. Cons.* 2., makes mention of a permanent military way through Macedonia to the Hellespont.

² Comp. Mannert, *Geogr. der Griech. und Röm.* vii. 61. M. Lu-

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extend far into the interior of Gaul, and one half of Asia Minor was withheld from the grasp of the Roman conquerors by Mithridates, king of Pontus. On the other coasts of the great inland sea, the domain of Carthage, a tract comparatively small, was the only country which acknowledged their domination. The extent of their empire, under Sulla, was hardly one half of that to which it attained under Augustus and Trajan.

Relation of
the pro-
vincials to
Rome.

The various relations in which the different classes of the provincial population stood to the ruling city, admit of a parallel with the members of a Roman household. The colonies of Roman citizens planted in the provinces, with the full exercise of all their national rights, and presenting a miniature of the metropolis herself, held the position of the son towards the paterfamilias: the conquered peoples, who had thrown themselves on the mercy of the victor, were subjected to his dominion as unreservedly as the slave to that of his master: those among them whom the state had restored to the enjoyment of their own lands and institutions, occupied a place analogous to that of freedmen. Some cities or nations had voluntarily sought a connexion with Rome on terms of alliance, but with acknowledged inferiority; others, again, stood on a more independent footing, offering a mutual interchange of good offices and of citizenship; and, lastly, there were some which entered into con-

cullus triumphed over the Thracians, A. U. 683, Eutrop. vi. 10. M. Crassus subjugated them A. U. 724, Dion. ii. 23. For reasons of policy Augustus refrained from reducing the country to the form of a province.

federacy with the republic with perfect equality of rights on both sides. All these had their prototypes respectively in the clients, the guests, and the friends of the Roman noble. Within the limits of each Roman province there were generally some states which stood in these several relations to the Republic; and the severity of the military and civil administration of the country was maintained or relaxed towards them according to their respective claims. But, after all, the mass of the provincial population belonged to the class of *dediticii*, that is, those who had originally submitted without conditions, the slaves, as they may be termed, of the great Roman family. They were subjected to the severest fiscal and other burdens, enhanced by the rapacity of their rulers, who, from the consul or prætor to the lowest of their officers, preyed upon them without remorse and without satiety.

It was the general rule that the consuls and prætors, after serving their year of office in the city, should proceed to administer for one or sometimes three years the affairs of a province. The state placed large standing armies at their disposal, threw enormous patronage into their hands, and their ambition, avarice, or mutual rivalry, far more than any sense of the public interests, impelled them to exert themselves, during their brief career, in reducing frontier tribes, in quelling insurrections which their own injustice constantly excited, and whenever they could find an excuse for it, in annihilating the ancient liberties and privileges still retained by the more favoured

Government of the
provinces
by pro-
consuls, &c.

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classes of the provincials. Surrounded by an army of officials, all creatures of their own, all engaged in the same work of carving out fortunes for themselves, and abetting their colleagues, the proconsuls had little sense of responsibility to the central government, and glutted their cupidity without restraint. The tithes, tolls, and other imposts, from which the public revenue was drawn, were farmed by Roman contractors, belonging generally to the order of knights, who had few opportunities of rising to the highest political offices at home; and the connivance of their superiors in the province, backed by the corrupt state of public feeling in Rome, shielded, to a great extent, the sordid practices by which they cheated both the state and its subjects. The means of enrichment which the provinces afforded to the nobility became the ultimate object of many of the deepest political intrigues. A man of ruined fortune looked to the office of proconsul, as the sole means of retrieving his affairs. To obtain it, he allied himself with the individual or the party by whose influence he might hope to rise successively through the various steps which led to the consulship. He first obtained the post of quæstor, from thence, after a due interval, he might hope to be elected ædile, next prætor, and ultimately consul. His grand object was then obtained, for upon the expiration of his term of office he departed as governor to a consular province; he calculated on repaying the expenses of his various contests, on liquidating the debt of gratitude to his adherents, and accumulating a vast fortune for his own gratification, or the advancement of his party.

The cupidity which animated individuals was in fact the mainspring of the political factions of the time. The spoil of the provinces was the bait with which the popular leaders had lured the Italians to their standards. All the legal rights of citizenship had been conceded, but the old oligarchic families, dignified by historic associations, and revelling in the wealth accumulated by centuries of conquest, still hoped to maintain their grasp of the larger share of honours and emoluments which they had contrived to make generally accessible only to the richest. They still looked with scorn, and infused the same sentiment into the people, on the New Men, the men of talents and education, but of moderate origin and fortune, who were striving on all sides to thrust themselves into public notice. The judicia, or occupation of the bench of justice, was the great instrument by which they protected their monopoly; for by keeping this in their own hands they could quash every attempt at revealing, by legal process, the enormities of the provincial administration. This was the battle field to which, as we shall see, the instinct of the orator led Cicero to transfer the contest; and when, by a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, he found the means of exposing to the eye of day the glaring iniquity of the system, the nobles were forced to surrender, if not their prerogatives, at least their impunity in abusing them. But as far as each party succeeded in retaining or extorting a share in the plunder, the same system was carried on by both. It would be unfair to point to either as having exceeded the other in rapacity and tyranny. The distress and

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Wrongs and
discontent
of the pro-
vincials.

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consequent alienation of the provinces became the pressing evil and danger of the times. Adventurers sprang up in every quarter, and found a floating mass of discontent around them, from which they were certain of deriving direct assistance, or of meeting at least with sullen approbation. Powerful antagonists to the dominion, even to the existence of the conquerors of the world, rose out of the schools of gladiators and the holds of pirate vessels. The fuel was heaped for the burning, and any spark was sufficient to set it in a blaze. The first use of power which the Emperors made, was to control the fiscal tyranny of the proconsuls and publicani. The revolution of Drusus and the Gracchi opened the spoils of the world to the Italians; but those of Julius and Octavius closed them again, and restored them to their rightful owners. The luxuriance of Roman oppression flourished but for a century and a half; but in that time it created, perhaps, the most extensive and searching misery the world has ever seen. The establishment of the imperial despotism placed in the main an effective control over these petty tyrants; and notwithstanding all the crimes by which it won its way, and the corruptions which were developed in its progress, it deserves to be regarded, at least in this important particular, as one of the greatest blessings vouchsafed to the human race.¹

Their dis-
content

The retirement of Sulla proved how necessary

¹ We may indeed infer, from a remarkable passage in Cicero, that even the fiscal oppression of the Romans was not so galling as that which the provincials sometimes exercised upon one another, when they had the power. See Cic. *ad Qu.* i. 1. 11.: "Non esse autem leniores in exigendis vectigalibus Græcos quam nostros publicanos

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breaks forth
in various
quarters.

his energy and reputation had been to sustain the weight of empire upon the slender basis of the oligarchical faction. In the west the whole Spanish nation rose against its oppressors. In the farthest east the ability of Mithridates was seconded by the good will of the conquered races of Asia Minor. Wherever he showed his ensigns, the people rose without hesitation, and welcomed him as their deliverer. At the same time the oppression of the conquerors of the world had driven thousands from honest and peaceful occupations to resort to piracy for vengeance or subsistence. The roving corsairs of the Cilician coast found their resources multiplied by the conflux of these restless and discontented adventurers, and their vessels penetrated all the gulfs, and insulted every harbour in the Mediterranean, with a system of organization co-extensive with the great sphere of maritime traffic.¹ Such was the disordered state of Italy itself, that a mere handful of gladiators having escaped from their prisons, and fled into the hills to avoid pursuit, collected around them a multitude of miserable or turbulent men, and were elevated, even against their will, into rebels and enemies to the commonwealth. It was not till these various combinations of her foes and subjects against her were successively suppressed, that the power of

hinc intelligi potest, quod Caunii nuper, omnesque ex insulis, quæ erant ab Sulla Rhodiis attributæ, confugerunt ad Senatum, nobis ut potius vectigal quam Rhodiis penderent." Comp. Liv. xli. 6. The ingenuity of the Greeks in the art of fiscal extortion is signalized in a long series of instances by Aristotle, *Æcon.* ii.

¹ App. *B. M.* 92.: Οὐ μόνως ἔτι τῆς ἐώας θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐντὸς Ἑρακλείων σπηλῶν ἀπάσης.

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Rome was finally established throughout her dominions.

Revolt of the Spanish provinces in combination with the remnant of the popular or Marian party. Sertorius.

1. Sertorius was a Sabine by birth, a Roman citizen, who had served with distinction in the armies of Marius against the Cimbri, and again with great success and reputation in Spain.¹ In the civil war he attached himself to the popular party, and enjoyed a share in the government with Marius and Cinna. His moderation and disinterested patriotism contrasted advantageously with the selfish principles of his colleagues; his name was untainted with the guilt of their proscriptions. After their deaths he despaired of resisting successfully the reviving fortunes of the aristocracy under Sulla, and having no confidence in the character of the younger Marius, he abandoned the defence of the popular cause², and retired into Spain, not without arms in his hands. The harassed provincials, who seem to have been already attached to him, received him as a deliverer from the tyranny of the proconsular government, which now became identified with the rule of Sulla and the nobility. But the energy with which the dictator proceeded to quell their insurrection was irresistible. The rude barbarians were unable to face his veteran legions, and Sertorius fled precipitately to New Carthage, and thence crossed to Africa. For a short time the Spanish provinces

¹ Plutarch's life of Sertorius, from which these details are principally taken, is one of the most interesting in his series of biographies. The character of the hero is the most romantic in all Roman history, and the traits of humanity and moderation which distinguish it are such as the mild philosopher most loved to paint.

² Plut. *Sertor.* 6.: Παντάπασιν ἀπογνοῦς τὴν πόλιν ὤρμησεν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν.

returned to their obedience, while their champion flitted from place to place, attempting various combinations against the dominant party, but without success. Proscribed and banished from Rome, he proposed to sail for the far-famed islands of the West, and establish his sovereignty in the paradise of Grecian legend.¹ But a native war between rival pretenders to the throne of Mauretania tempted him to remain on the continent of Africa, where he met and defeated a Roman army under one of Sulla's lieutenants. The old sentiment of party animosity thus flattered, he gladly listened to an invitation from the Lusitanians to lead a new revolt against the Roman power. The cause of the oligarchy in Spain was entrusted to the care of Metellus, now aged and unfit to cope with a vigorous antagonist; moreover, the retirement of Sulla soon deprived the Romans of the soul which used to animate their exertions. By successive victories nearly the whole of the peninsula was wrested from the armies of the republic², and acknowledged the chieftainship of the hero of the West. The sway of Sertorius was studiously mild and conciliatory. His views were comprehensive, and not content with his present elevation, he looked forward to the establishment of a permanent sovereignty. He detained the children of the nobles as hostages for their fidelity; but at the same time he educated

¹ Plut. *Sertor.* 9.: Ταῦθ' ὁ Σεργώριος ἀκούσας ἔρωτα θανααστὸν ἔσχευ οἰκῆσαι τὰς νήσους καὶ ζῆν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, τυραννίδος ἀπαλλαγείς καὶ πολέμων ἀπάντων.

² Liv. *Epit.* xc.: "L. Manlius, proconsul, et M. Domitius, legatus ab Herculeio quaestore, victi sunt." Cf. Flor. iii. 22.; Oros. v. 23.; Plut. *Sertor.* 12.

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them in Roman arts and manners, and proposed to breed up a generation which should understand and wield the principles of enlightened government. His military force was now strengthened by the arrival of some veteran troops of the Italian party, who had compelled their general, Perperna, to lead them over to him. His camp became the resort of fugitives from Rome, whose object was to renew the old civil contest on a more favourable field. From this moment the designs of Sertorius seem to have undergone a change. He surrounded himself with the nucleus of a new senate from among his Roman adherents; he aimed at a triumphant return to the imperial city, and the restoration of his party and their principles, and began to treat his Spanish followers rather as faithful allies than as his adopted countrymen. Accordingly, when Mithridates sent ambassadors to him to negotiate a combined attack upon Italy and a partition of her provinces (for Rome, he said, cannot withstand the union of the new Pyrrhus with the new Hannibal), Sertorius haughtily rejected his alliance, and declared he would never allow a barbarian to possess an inch of Roman territory, beyond Bithynia and Cappadocia, miserable countries which had always been ruled by kings, and the sovereignty of which he cared not to dispute.¹

Contest between Ser-

While contemplating these ultimate results, Ser-

¹ Mithridates, according to Plutarch, was content to furnish Sertorius with 3000 talents and 40 ships, in return for this empty acknowledgment of his claim to Bithynia and Cappadocia. The circumstantial account which this writer gives of the whole transaction

torius continued to maintain his position against Cn. Pompeius, who now shared with Metellus the command of the Roman armies. Though a far abler general than his colleague, and though successful in various engagements with the lieutenants of his formidable enemy, Pompeius was baffled by the address and vigilance of a chieftain who compensated for his deficiency in disciplined troops, by availing himself of the desultory mode of warfare for which the Spanish people have been ever famous.¹ There existed also a jealousy between the Roman commanders, and Pompeius suffered a severe check in hastening to give battle before the arrival of Metellus, who eventually saved him from total rout. "If the old woman had not come up," said Sertorius, "I would have whipped this stripling back to Rome." The two generals could not long maintain the field against an enemy who possessed all the communications of the country, and the skill to avail himself of them. Metellus was compelled to retire into Gaul to recruit his forces, while Pompeius took up a defensible position in the country of the Vaccæi, and wrote pressing letters to the senate for further supplies.²

The influence which Sertorius acquired over the Spaniards was unbounded. When, with their usual fickleness and mutual distrust, some tribes were

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torius and
Pompeius.

Death of
Sertorius.
The revolt
quelled by
Pompeius.

seems more worthy of credit than Appian's loose assertion that Sertorius surrendered to Mithridates the whole of the Roman province of Asia. Plut. *Sertor.* 23, 24.; Appian. *B. M.* 68.

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 19.: Διέκοπτε γὰρ αὐτοὺς καὶ δῖστη ποικίλος ὢν ὁ πολέμος, καὶ δεινὸς ἐν βραχεὶ πολλαχοῦ περιφανῆναι, καὶ μεταγαγεῖν ἀπ' ἄλλων εἰς ἄλλους ἀγῶνας.

² Sallust. *Ep. Pomp. Fr. Hist.* iii. 4.

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inclined to return to their obedience to Rome, he recovered by an appeal to their superstition the submission which was due to his genius. He trained a milk-white hind to follow and caress him like a dog, and pretended that it was a gift of Diana, and was his familiar counsellor and protectress.¹ The artifices he made use of, if we may believe the popular tales, to revive the confidence of his followers by means of this creature, were an ordinary kind of imposture; but it is pleasing to think that we may trace, in the fondness he showed for a favourite animal, the same tenderness and humanity for which he was conspicuous in a ferocious age, and which, it was said, impelled him to offer more than once to relinquish the contest, that he might again visit his mother, who was still living a widow and childless in Rome.² It is with pain, however, that we remark, on his part, one, though only one, act of savage cruelty. Jealousies at last arose between his Roman and his native adherents; he was threatened with the desertion of his Spanish nobility, and in a moment of anger or alarm he caused the massacre of their children whom he had retained as hostages. This act, while it sullied his fame, could not fail to ruin his fortunes. His lieutenant Perperna intrigued against him, and in the midst of the dissensions spreading in the camp, was enabled to assassinate

¹ Plut. *Sertor.* 11.; Aul. Gell. xv. 22.

² Plut. *Sertor.* 22.: Καὶ γὰρ ἦν φιλόπατρις καὶ πολλὸν ἔχων ἡμέρου τοῦ κατελθεῖν. . . ἐν δὲ ταῖς νύκτας διεπέμπετο πρὸς Μέτελλον καὶ πρὸς Πομπήιον, ἕτοιμος ὦν τὰ ὅπλα καταθέσθαι καὶ βιοῦν ιδιώτης καθόδου τυχών. . . λέγεται δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῆς πατρίδος ἐπιθυμῆν διὰ τὴν μητέρα τραφεὶς ὄρφανός ὑπ' αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ἀνακείμενος ἐκείνῃ.

him with impunity.¹ The traitor assumed the place of his victim at the head of the allied armies, but their strength was daily weakened by the desertion of the Spaniards. From this moment the success of the arms of Rome, ever patient and vigilant, was no longer doubtful. Perperna was defeated and taken in the first engagement, and vainly attempted to avert the punishment he deserved by betraying the names of his adherents in the city. Pompeius, out of generosity or policy, refused to inspect the list.² Perperna was put to death and his forces entirely broken up, the Spaniards submitting once more to the dominion which they had so nearly succeeded in overthrowing.

2. The long struggle of Mithridates, king of Pontus, with the Roman power, began with his attempts to gain possession of the neighbouring kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia, which had been taken under its protection. The success with which his arms were crowned encouraged him to carry war into the Roman territories in Asia Minor, and throughout those districts the spirit of the people was so favourable to him that he had no difficulty in relieving them for the moment from the yoke of the republic.³ The enthusiasm with

Contest of
Mithridates
with Rome.
His cause
viewed with
favour by
the provin-
cials in the
East.

¹ Plut. *Sertor.* 26. ; Vell. ii. 30. ; Liv. *Epit.* xcvi. ; Oros. v. 23.

² Plut. *Pomp.* 20.

³ This appears incidentally from Appian's narrative, *B. M.* 20, 21, 22. 28. He says expressly in one place: "Ὁ καὶ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐγένετο τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐ φόβῳ Μιθριδάτου μᾶλλον ἢ μίσει Ῥωμαίων τοιάδε εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐργάσασθαι. The clemency which the barbarian conqueror showed to the vanquished, indicates that he came rather as a deliverer than an enemy. Velleius excuses the readiness with which the Athenians received the lieutenant of Mithridates (ii. 23.); but Tacitus brands them as allies of the enemy of Rome, "Mithridatis adversus Sullam socios." (*Ann.* ii. 55.)

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which he was received marks the excessive hatred which that yoke had inspired. It is evident that even the capricious tyranny of Oriental despotism was preferred to all the benefits of European civilization, blighted as they were by the systematic rapacity of the Roman governors.¹ The character of the great king of Pontus has come down to us laden with all the crimes that the malevolence of his rivals could fasten upon it; and in estimating it we must never forget that the sources from whence our historians drew their information, were the contemporary narratives of unscrupulous adversaries. We know of no native documents from which they could have borrowed; and the memoirs of Sulla himself, the personal opponent of Mithridates, were doubtless considered by the Romans the most authentic records of the contest between them. We have too many proofs of the malignity of the Roman writers to pay any respect to their estimate of the character of their enemies. The abilities which the Eastern despot exhibited may naturally raise a prejudice in his favour; and when we consider in addition the moderation and magnanimity which he displayed on several occasions, we shall be the more inclined to look for other explanations of the atrocities imputed to him than the personal cruelty to which the Romans re-

¹ This is strongly expressed in the speech of Mithridates (Justin. xxxviii. 7.), where he makes a direct appeal to the passions of the provincials: "*Tantumque me avida exspectet Asia ut etiam vocibus vocet: adeo illis odium Romanorum incussit rapacitas proconsulum, sectio publicanorum, calumniarum litium.*" Compare Pliny's remark on the infamous character his countrymen had acquired, when speaking of the death of Aquilius, down whose throat molten gold was poured by order of Mithridates. (*H. N.* xxxiii. 3.)

ferred them. The general massacre of the Roman settlers throughout their Asiatic possessions, which followed upon the success of Mithridates, is more likely to have been an act of national vengeance than the execution, as the historians represent it, of a tyrant's mandate.¹

The triumphs of the king of Pontus were not limited to Asia. In Greece the same predisposing cause produced similar effects, and almost the whole of that country was wrested from the Romans with equal ease and rapidity. It is true that the skill and energy of Sulla recovered these provinces after many desperate engagements; but the hostility of the inhabitants, the result of misgovernment, had been amply manifested, and not less the precariousness of the tenure by which their obedience was maintained. Sulla pursued his victorious career into Asia, and compelled the enemy to accept terms of peace, by which the whole of his conquests were wrung from his grasp. The provinces were again subjected to their former servitude. It seems, even from the accounts of the Romans themselves, that during the years that followed, while Sulla was enjoying his paramount authority in Rome, the generals to whom the military occupation and defence of the Asiatic frontier were

Attempt of Lucullus to reform the provincial administration: not supported by Pompeius.

¹ It is worth observing, as an illustration of the carelessness of the Romans in reporting groundless calumnies, that Plutarch (*Pomp.* 37.), speaking of this very subject, mentions Theophanes, a literary contemporary of Cicero, as having asserted that Pompeius discovered among the papers of Mithridates a letter from a certain Rutilius, urging him to the perpetration of this massacre, whereas it appears incidentally from a passage of Cicero (*pro Rabir. Post.* 10.), that it was only by a stratagem that Rutilius himself escaped being made a victim.

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committed, acted with much perfidy in their transactions with Mithridates, trying to provoke him to renew the war, in the hope of turning it to their own glory or emolument.¹ It was not till after the dictator's death, however, that the contest was renewed. Lucullus assumed the principal command of the Roman forces, and he alone perceived the real weakness of the republic, and strove to apply a remedy. The *publicani* or farmers of the revenue had redoubled their exactions to acquit themselves of the obligation they had contracted to defray the expenses of Sulla's campaigns. The new proconsul took immediate measures to relieve the provincials from the fresh burdens imposed upon them on this account²; at the same time he began a series of reforms in the administration, and held forth hopes of permanently ameliorating the condition of the disaffected natives. Nor did he neglect the celebration of festivals and exhibition of magnificent spectacles, at once congenial to his personal taste, and the usual beguilements of provincial servitude. To effect these objects, it was necessary to gain time and re-establish confidence. But the armies of Mithridates had already appeared in the field, and the people had risen to receive him with all their former alacrity. Lucullus strove in vain to repress the impatience of his officers, who despised his prudential measures, and were eager to oppose force to force. The arms of the republic sustained some partial losses; they were magnified

¹ App. *B. M.* 64.: Μουρήνας μὲν. . . πόλεμον ἀφορμὰς ἡρεσχέλει δι' ἐπιθυμίαν Σριάμβου.

² Plut. *Lucull.* 20. 23.

perhaps by the voices of the classes interested in provincial oppression, till the people at Rome began to murmur against the Fabian policy of their general. Though he obtained eminent successes, and restored the domination of his country upon a more solid footing than before, he was charged with delaying, for personal objects, the consummation of his victories, and finally superseded in his command. The brilliant and decisive operations of Pompeius, to whom the conduct of the war was next intrusted, might seem to justify his predecessor's disgrace. But if Pompeius had greater military talents than Lucullus, and if his influence over a soldiery demoralized by alternations of rout and plunder, was more efficient for the restoration of discipline, the views of the other were certainly the nobler and more statesmanlike. It is probable that the triumph of Pompeius was owing as much to the exhaustion of the enemy as to his own prowess; it appears, at all events, that having gained the laurels which it was his ambition to secure, he declined to risk his popularity with the Roman nobles by checking their career of extortion in the provinces.

3. The great traffic which flourished for centuries between Greece, Egypt, and Syria, presented peculiar temptation to the habits of piracy which seem to have prevailed in those seas from the earliest times. The father of history traces the origin of European and Asiatic hostility to the predatory enterprises of lawless adventurers.¹ Such is the natural configuration of the coasts of Greece

Origin of
the Cilician
piratical
confederation.

¹ Herod. i. init.; comp. Thuc. i. 5.

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and Asia Minor, together with the intermediate islands, that this plague of piracy has never been thoroughly eradicated from the waters which flow about them.¹ The sea-line of either continent is broken by innumerable bays and creeks, and bristles with projecting headlands; in such regions the science of navigation requires the aid of peculiar local knowledge. The interior of the country is also generally difficult of access: precipitous mountains alternate with deep valleys; here and there only a broader expanse is opened by a river of more than usual volume. The population of the interior congregated, even in the best times, about spots of isolated fertility, large tracts of impassable mountain territory intervening between them. Under such circumstances, the recesses of every bay formed the surest retreats for piratical adventurers, in which to repair their vessels, enjoy their booty, and riot away the intervals of repose. The policy of the Romans did not allow the provincials to maintain an effective military force to destroy these nests of marauders; during the Mithridatic war the coasts of Greece and Ionia swarmed with them; but it was through the policy of the king of Pontus, that Cilicia became their principal stronghold. Despairing of ultimate success, he determined, it was said², to leave a sting rankling

¹ Compare Mr. Finlay's intelligent work on Greece under the Romans, p. 38.: "It is said that the piracies committed during the late revolutionary war contributed quite as much as the humanity of the allies to the signature of the treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, and to the foundation of a German monarchy in Greece."

² Appian. *B. M.* 92.: Μιθριδάτης, ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαίους ἐπολέμει καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐκράτει, Σύλλα περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποινουμένον, ἡγούμενος οὐκ ἐς

in the vitals of the republic. With this view, having driven in the feeble outposts of the Roman power, he encouraged the piratical hordes of the Eastern seas to collect on the coast of Cilicia.¹ Here they established their docks, arsenals, and magazines: here there grew up an organized system of rapine and defiance, a fleet, a nation, and perhaps a government, of pirates.

The rise of such a power, menacing not only the security of individual life and property, but harassing the communications and clipping the revenues of the state, show how inefficient the government of the provinces must have been, and how alienated the affections of the natives who did not shake off the marauders from their coasts.² Meanwhile, the needy and oppressed, whoever had suffered from the scourge of war or from the rapacity of a foreign official, the most adventurous, at least, and energetic among them, contributed to swell the numbers of this pirate state.³ The commerce between Italy, Greece, Syria, and Egypt, was in a great measure an interchange of necessaries, which war and even anarchy could not materially restrict. Year after year, whole fleets of merchant vessels, with all

It flourishes from the inefficiency of the provincial government, and the disaffection of the provinces.

πολὸν καθέξειν τῆς Ἀσίας, τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα ἐλυμαίνετο, καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν πειρατὰς καθῆκεν.

¹ Appian. l. c.: Ναῦς τε καὶ ὅπλα πάντα ἐτεκταίνοντο μάλιστα περὶ τὴν τραχεῖαν λεγομένην Κιλικίαν, ἣν κοινὸν σφῶν ὕφορμον ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐτίθεντο εἶναι.

² Sulla and Lucullus restored the Roman government in Cilicia, but made no impression upon the piratical establishments on the coast.

³ Plut. (*Pomp.* 24.) says that piracy began to be embarked in as a sphere of honourable enterprise by men of wealth and station: Ὡς καὶ δόξαν τινὰ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος.

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their passengers and cargoes, fell into the hands of the corsairs. Such were their power and audacity that they often dashed as far as sixty miles inland, and carried off not only plunder, but the inhabitants of towns and villas.¹ The ransom of the captives might enrich their coffers; their enlistment in the same cause of lawless resistance to all regular power, and therefore more especially to Rome, would increase their numbers; even their murder, and more particularly that of Roman citizens, struck greater terror into society, and drew the bands of the confederacy closer. Stations and settlements were formed throughout the Mediterranean. It was on the coast of Spain that Sertorius fell in with a fleet of Cilician privateers, and obtained their assistance in reducing the islands named Pityusæ. Another squadron of pirates treated with Spartacus for the conveyance of his followers across the straits of Messina.² Four hundred cities, according to Plutarch³, fell into the hands of these adventurers; they possessed a thousand vessels; their pride and audacity, the splendour of their equipments, and their insolent ostentation of wealth, were more galling to the Roman government than even their violence.⁴

¹ Antonia, the daughter of the orator M. Antonius, was seized by these adventurers on a high road in Italy and ransomed at great cost. (Plut. *l. c.*)

² Plut. *Crass.* 10.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 24.

⁴ Cicero (*pro Leg. Manil.* 12.) enumerates some of their principal exploits:—The seizure of Cnidos, Colophon, and Samos; the sack of Caieta; insults and injuries inflicted within the harbours of Ostia and Misenum; the Roman fleet shut up in Brundisium; the successive capture of twelve Roman prætors. “Etiam Appia via jam carebamus.” Comp. App. *B. M.* 98. Both Julius Cæsar and P. Clodius fell, as we shall hereafter see, into their hands.

Many of the principal temples, the great storehouses of the wealth of the Grecian world, which had escaped the cupidity of so many conquerors, were plundered by these unscrupulous robbers. In some places, they established within their walls the rites of Mithras and secret Oriental mysteries, as if they wished to make war against the religion no less than the civilization of Europe. But their principal delight was in torturing and destroying citizens of the republic, against which their hatred was chiefly concentrated.

The honour and security of the commonwealth demanded a decisive stand to be made against this growing evil. Murena, and after him Servilius Isauricus, while holding commands in Asia, had attempted to check it without success. But the republic had an immense maritime force at its disposal; it required only a controlling genius at the head to bring it all into action. Pompeius, to whom the task was committed, distributed his armament in three divisions so as to sweep the whole of the Mediterranean, and surprized the world by reducing the squadrons of the pirates, together with their strongholds in Cilicia, within the space of three months. He effected his purpose, indeed, as much by negotiation as by force. He admitted the pretensions of the marauders to the dignity of a nation¹, not treating them as outlaws, but condescending to settle many of them in colonies both

Reduction
of the
pirates by
Pompeius.
A.U. 687,
B.C. 67.

¹ App. B. M. 92.: Βασιλεῦσι δ' ἤδη καὶ τυράννοις ἡ στρατοπέδοις μεγάλοις ἑαυτοὺς ὁμοιοῦντες. Velleius discovers to us, by an incidental expression, that the Romans were jealous of this condescension: "Sunt qui hoc carpant." (ii. 32.) Compare the reluctance of Tiberius to treat with Tacfarinas as a *hostis*. (Tac. Ann. iii. 73.)

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in Greece and Asia Minor, while he associated his own name with them, by giving to Soli, which he rebuilt for their occupation, the sounding appellation of Pompeiopolis.¹

The Italians, on the other hand, are conciliated by their comprehension in the Roman state. They lend no countenance to the movements of Lepidus and Brutus. A. U. 677, B. C. 77.

These accounts may suffice to evince the detestation in which the Roman government was held throughout the provinces. We see the natives ready everywhere to throw themselves headlong into any enterprise that seems to menace the fortunes of the republic. We see how passively they regard the rise of a hostile power, even where they are themselves the first to suffer from it. Equally harassed, whether in war or in peace, their distress drives them to despair; they break their ties with society, and plunder even the nations whom they avenge. The energy with which the Romans combated and triumphed over this mass of resistance strikes us with wonder and awe. Their hands were nerved with the strength which the incorporation of the Italians supplied to them. With much partial but smothered disaffection in the districts which had suffered most from the excesses of the civil wars, with many opposing views and wishes, the Italians felt nevertheless, on the whole, that their interests were identified with those of the sovereign power, which revelled in the plunder of the provinces from the east to the west. The deadliest animosities of classes and parties were extinguished in the sense of common danger. The popular faction acquiesced in the superiority which their rivals had acquired, and which it would have been madness to attempt at such a moment to

¹ App. *B. M.* 97.; Plut. *Pomp.* 28.; Strabo, xiv. 5.

overthrow. The selfish ambition of individuals enlisted little sympathy for a time on either side. Upon the abdication of Sulla, M. Æmilius Lepidus, one of the consuls for the year and a man of the highest family distinctions, conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the popular party, and extorting from the republic the same supreme dominion which it had conceded to the military services of their late dictator, and to the necessities of a period of revolution. He calculated upon a supposed reaction in the public mind from the atrocities of the late government, and upon his own conspicuous station and the power attached to it. His schemes were so little disguised, even during his occupation of office, that the senate attempted to bind him by a solemn oath not to make war against his colleague Catulus, upon succeeding to a proconsular government.¹ But he no sooner reached his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, than he collected the legions assigned to him, and marching into Etruria, planted his standard among the remnant of that proscribed nation, burning with a sense of its wrongs and sufferings.² But even there the courage or the strength was wanting to furnish any solid support to his reckless enterprise. Defeated at the Milvian bridge in a desperate attempt to surprise the city, and unable to make head against the forces of the republic, he retired into Sardinia; but the enemy he had pro-

¹ Appian. *B. C.* 107.

² Sallust says: "Etruria atque omnes reliquæ belli arrectæ" (*Fragm. Hist.* i. 14.); but the ardour of the Etrurians was soon extinguished.

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voked pursued him into his retreat, and he perished, unaided by the Italians, in a petty and inglorious warfare.¹ M. Junius Brutus, who embarked upon a similar adventure, was shut up in Mutina, and there taken and put to death.²

Revolt of the gladiators under Spartacus. Supported by multitudes of the discontented in Italy, but quelled, because not countenanced by the Italian states.
A. U. 681,
B. C. 73.

Another remarkable event of this period throws much light upon the condition of Italy; and tends to show both its social corruption and, at the same time, its political vigour. The gladiatorial exhibitions had already begun to form the great national diversion of the Romans and Italians. Slaves, captives, and criminals were the ordinary victims of this barbarous passion: but freemen, and even citizens, not unfrequently hired themselves to the keepers of the schools, by whom the gladiators were paid, well-fed, and instructed in the art, and might at the end of three years obtain a discharge. This, indeed, and other enactments regarding the practice, show that it was not, at least in early times, such a mere bloody butchery as it is generally represented. It happened that a numerous body or family of gladiators was kept at Capua by one Lentulus Batiatus, to be let out, according to the custom of the time, on occasions of public entertainment. A large party of these people plotted to escape, but seventy-eight only out of the number succeeded in breaking prison.³ They began by seizing upon the spits and other implements in the house of a cook: with these

¹ Lepidus died of a fever. App. *B. C.* i. 109.; Florus, iii. 23.: "Ibi morbo et penitentia interiit."

² Plut. *Pomp.* 16.

³ Plut. *Crass.* 8—12.; Appian. *B. C.* i. 116—121. Florus, iii. 20., states the number at thirty.

arms they overpowered the escort of a large consignment of gladiatorial weapons, which they fell in with on the road; took refuge, it is said, in the first instance in the then extinct crater of Mount Vesuvius; and soon made themselves masters of a neighbouring fortress. Having proceeded to the election of officers, their first choice fell upon Spartacus¹, a Thracian by birth, a man of remarkable strength and courage, and endowed with a mildness as well as sagacity of character above his condition. The first success of the insurgents in the field was in an engagement with the troops, which were sent without delay from Capua to check their revolt. This victory supplied them with the arms of a regular soldiery, for which they gladly exchanged their own imperfect equipments. More confident in themselves, and with increasing numbers, they met and defeated a Roman force of 3000 men under C. Clodius, and were now daily joined by bands of fugitive slaves and turbulent marauders.² In the course of three years, during which Spartacus continued to make head against the power of the republic, the numbers of his armies are successively estimated at 40,000, 70,000, and 100,000 men. He was in complete possession of the southern provinces of the peninsula; he sacked some of the principal cities in Campania,

¹ It appears that he had deserted from the army, been retaken, and sold into slavery; if at least we may attach any credit to the violent language of Florus: "De stipendiario Thrace miles, de milite desertor, inde latro, dein in honore virium gladiator." (Flor. *l. c.*)

² The shepherds of the Apulian mountains (see Lucan ix. 182.) were a lawless and desperate class of men, ready to join in any insurrectionary enterprise. Comp. Ascon. in *Orat. in Tog. Cand.* p. 88. Orell.

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and pillaged the farms and villas of the Sabine mountains.¹ In the field he obtained brilliant victories over Cassinius and the prætor Varinius; but at the height of his success he was not deceived as to the real weakness of his resources, and urged his followers to effect their escape across the Alps, and betake themselves to their own homes in Gaul and Thrace, to which countries most of them belonged.² But the plunder of the whole of Italy seemed within their reach, and was too tempting an object to be relinquished in the first flush of victory. The senate was now seriously alarmed, and sent the two consuls, Gellius and Lentulus, with considerable forces, to confront the public enemy.³ But the danger had not yet reached its height: both the consuls were ignominiously defeated. They were deposed from their commands, and Crassus appointed to continue the war. Meanwhile, dissensions arose in the horde itself; parties separated from the main body, and were cut off in detail. The Italian states gave no indication of sympathizing with a revolt of slaves and robbers. The legions of the republic, numerous and well-appointed, closed in upon the motley and disorganized stragglers. Retracing his steps from the north of Italy, Spartacus now contemplated trans-

¹ Hor. *Od.* iii. 14.

² Plut. *Crass.* 8. Ὦν οἱ πολλοὶ Γαλάται καὶ Θράκες. Crixus and Œnomaus, the principal leaders next to Spartacus, were both Gauls. Eutrop. vi. 7.; Oros. v. 24. Liv. (*Epit.* xcvii.) speaks of a large body of the fugitives as mostly Germans and Gauls.

³ Lucan, a faithful depositary of the traditions of the old oligarchical government, dignifies him with the appellation of *hostis*, or foreign foe: "Ut simili causa caderes qua Spartacus hostis," ii. 554.

porting his followers into Sicily, and there reviving the embers of the servile war which had recently set that island in a blaze. A fleet of Cilician pirate vessels lay off Rhegium, and with these bitter enemies of Rome the rebel chief negotiated a passage across the straits. But they, impolitic no less than faithless, secured the stipulated price, and sailed away without performing their agreement.¹ Crassus was now in full pursuit of the insurgents, whom he drove into the town of Rhegium, and there blockaded. By a skilful manœuvre Spartacus made his escape, but only with a portion of his forces; this, however, was enough to terrify the Roman general, who feared that the enemy would outstrip his pursuit, and pounce upon Rome itself before he could be overtaken. Anticipating the worst, he entreated the senate to recall to its defence Lucullus from Asia, and Pompeius from Spain; again, repenting of having invited his rivals to share, perhaps to rob him of the honours of the war, he redoubled his efforts to bring it to a close before their arrival.² But Spartacus was destitute of the means to make the attack upon Rome which was apprehended, and the Italian states continued immovable. He defended himself with obstinate bravery; but after alternate victories and defeats, was slain in a final and decisive battle. The remnant of his followers was exterminated by Pompeius, who arrived in time to put the finishing stroke to the war, and to reap, from the partiality

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 10.

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² App. *B. C.* i. 120.

*D 8

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of the people, a disproportioned share in the glory of its termination. Crassus lavished upon the multitude one-tenth of his immense wealth; he feasted them at ten thousand tables, and fed the citizens at free cost for three months.¹ But Pompeius alone they regarded as their preserver; in him they centered the whole of their gratitude; and it was only through his assistance that Crassus obtained a share in the consulship.

Corruption
of the Ro-
man go-
vernment
at home;
venality and
violence
displayed
at the
elections.

The frightful corruption of the Roman government in the provinces was symptomatic of the general relaxation of public morality at home. On turning our eyes to the great metropolis from whence this stream of profligacy was issuing, we find every act of its senate, its comitia, and its forum, marked with the same stain of selfishness and venality. The senate retained with a convulsive grasp every privilege which Sulla had won for it: the judicia, or tribunals for the cognizance of political impeachments, appropriated by him to that order, were shameless alike in their partiality and corruption.² The favour of the people was sought and gained by profuse largesses; the means of seduction allowed by law, such as the covert bribery of shows and festivals, were used openly and boldly; while others which were expressly interdicted, such as the direct

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 12.

² Cicero allows that the venality of the judices, who presided at the *quæstiones perpetuæ*, cast a stigma upon the whole order: "Totus ordo paucorum improbitate et audacia premitur, et urgetur infamia judiciorum." (i. *In Verr.* 12.) In another place, warming with his subject, he brands the judicia of the senate as regia dominatio. (ii. *In Verr.* v. 68.)

influence of money, were practised not less lavishly in the polling booths, where the restraint of the ballot was worse than ineffectual. Not unfrequently mere violence took the place of bribery: disturbances were purposely created; mobs were formed and drilled, and battles ensued. In the confusion the consuls interfered, and broke up the proceedings. The great public magistracies were left vacant for whole months, from the impossibility of conducting the elections with even a show of legitimate order.

It has already been shown that a large portion of the urban population whom the nobles thus systematically debauched, were no better than a needy rabble, dissolute in morals, and destitute of any sense of national honour. The ready market offered for their votes was attractive to the lowest and vilest of the Italians, and the mob of the comitia was swelled by the worst class of the new citizens. Too proud to work where labour was the mark of the slave, a multitude of free men, steeped in the lowest poverty, found a bare subsistence in their idleness from this annual sale of their highest privilege, and presented ready instruments for any political adventurer who promised either present pay or prospective rapine. But the Romans had a natural genius for the arts by which money is made and accumulated. The cautious and frugal habits of the middle orders in a former age of the republic still survived in that class of the commonalty to which the equestrian families belonged, who had always formed the strength

Dissolute character of the mass of the free urban population. Remains of the ancient parsimonious spirit of the Romans. Moral superiority of the knights to the senators. Growth of a middle class.

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of the Marian party. This was the class which had suffered most in the civil wars. It had been decimated and almost crushed by the massacres and proscriptions of Sulla. The restoration, however, of domestic peace was soon followed by the revival of its fortunes. The nobility struggled in vain to keep it in the state of depression to which it had been reduced. Its members, too, had their family recollections. Their modest patrimonies gave them an hereditary interest in peace and order. They were educated and intelligent, and knew the power which these advantages conferred. The making of money was their first object: to this the bent of their dispositions instinctively impelled them; and the circumstances of the state, overflowing with the wealth poured in from the provinces, gave them a great advantage over their rivals, whose political necessities required them year by year to scatter their fortunes among the mob. This class consisted, 1. Of those who attached themselves to the great families, and hung upon their favours and patronage, whether in the forum, the provinces, or the camp: 2. Of those who, in spite of the ancient prejudices against commerce, and the arts and sciences of polished society¹, engaged with all their energy in those lucrative pursuits, and were not ashamed of ministering to the growing taste for luxury and refinement: 3. Of the government officials, a class hitherto in the infancy of its development, but one which the gradual progress of uniformity and

¹ Cic. *de Off.* i. 42., in *Verr.* ii. 5. 18.; Liv. xxi. 63.: "Quæstus omnis patribus indecorus visus."

system in the administration was slowly raising into an important body.¹ It became evident to the clear-sighted politician that this was the order in which the real strength of the nation lay, and that it was this monied aristocracy which must eventually dispose of the government. An honest and patriotic statesman might hope through their influence to place the commonwealth upon a new and permanent basis; the merely selfish adventurer might combine with him to advance their interests, with the hope of forging them into instruments for his own ends. The course of this history will show how the principal leaders of party leaned successively upon the support of this body, and how important was the part it played in the conversion of the republic to a monarchical form of government. The rise of this middle class, hostile to both the higher and lower, and resolved to control them equally, was the chief internal element in that mighty revolution. One further glance at the provinces will reveal to us a second parallel force co-operating from without, and destined to form the other main support of the Imperial Colossus.

The legal rights of the Roman citizen were of Fiscal im-

¹ The great mass of official writing was conducted originally by slaves or freedmen below the class of citizens. Niebuhr, *Hist. of Rome*, iii, 299. E. T. There can be no doubt that the unfortunate institution of slavery deprived the state of that large class of citizens, of moderate tastes and conservative tendencies, who contribute so much, as inferior dependents on government, to the stability of modern politics. But the superior officers and chiefs of department were, at least in the later periods of the republic, in the enjoyment of the complete franchise.

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munities
imparted by
the Roman
franchise.
Claims of
the pro-
vincials to
comprehen-
sion.

two kinds, social and political: the former consisted chiefly in certain immunities and privileges regarding marriage, inheritance, and the possession of property; the second secured his person from the disgrace of corporal punishment, gave him an appeal from the decision of the magistrates to the people, the exercise of the suffrage and eligibility to public offices, and an escape from sentence of death by voluntary banishment. In later times another immunity was acquired by it, of more substantial, at least of more universal, interest. The reduction of Macedonia by Paulus Æmilius, in the year 585 of the city, supplied such abundant resources to the treasury, that the public domains in the occupation of Roman proprietors were from thenceforth released from the payment of the land tax¹; and, in general, the indulgence which the state evinced to her citizens, as regarded their public contributions, perpetuated an invidious distinction between them and the inferior class of subjects. Accordingly, as the pressure fell more and more upon the provinces, the anxiety to escape from it became proportionally urgent. At the same time this anxiety on the one side was met by ample reasons of policy on the other. The diminution of the free population of Italy was the most notorious evil of the times; and it was viewed with the greater alarm, as the extension of the dominions

¹ Cic. *de Off.* ii. 22. The tax was reimposed in the consulship of Hirtius and Pansa, A. U. 711. (Plut. *Æmil.* 38.); but this seems to have been merely a temporary expedient: see Dureau de la Malle, *Econ. Polit. des Romains*, l. ii. c. 9. The city itself and the whole of Italy were relieved from all tolls by the laws of Metellus Nepos, in 694. Dion. xxxvii. 51.; Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 16.

of the state rendered the permanent augmentation of her armies indispensable.¹

The progressive enlightenment of the Roman statesmen caused the constant addition of new names to the roll of citizenship. Successful generals were allowed the privilege of rewarding their adherents with this precious boon. Fidelity to the state began to constitute a claim to its immunities, which was more graciously conceded, as the benefits of incorporation were more sensibly perceived. As the people became gradually aware that the great revolution of the Social war had brought with it more good and less evil than had been anticipated, the extension of the rights of the metropolis to the distant provinces lost the character of an inconsistency and anomaly in the constitution. Local prejudices died away, in the familiar contemplation of the vastness of the empire and the mutual relationship of its several members. The mind of the nation expanded to the conception of infusing unity of sentiment into a body, which was wielded by a single effort, and from a common centre. One after another there arose political crises, which demanded the central combination of all the powers of the state in a single hand. The success of each experiment became an argument for its repetition, till the idea of submission to the permanent rule of one man first ceased to shock, and was finally hailed with acclamation. The monarchy was at

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Gradual enlightenment of the Roman statesmen.
Tendency towards a general fusion of all the races of the empire.

¹ The most important evidence regarding this depopulation of Italy may be found at the beginning of Appian's history of the civil war. There is no subject on which there is such a complete consent of the original authorities. The discussion of its causes and effects is reserved for a future opportunity.

See II. 414.

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Merivale's Hist. of Rome under the Emperors (Abingdon Edition) ch. 1.

CHAP
I

first veiled under the old republican forms. Gradually the veil was dropped. Lastly, the theory of a republic was dismissed from men's minds, and fell into the same oblivion into which its real forces had already sunk. Under the supremacy of a single ruler all varieties of class became merged together; and when the citizens ceased to be discriminated among one another, there seemed no reason for maintaining distinctions between the constituent races of which the empire was composed.

Anticipations of a new era. Contemporaneous manifestation of Christianity and monarchy. Development of the idea of unity. Its consummation in the political establishment of Christianity.

At the same period there arose in various quarters of the world mysterious voices, of which historians have repeated the echoes, indicating a general but undefined presentiment that an age of social or moral unity was approaching.¹ The East was roused to a fervid anticipation of the advent of some universal conqueror who should melt all mankind into a crude, inorganic mass. Accustomed from its infancy to a succession of monarchical dynasties, it was uneasy under the republican organization and individual development which followed upon the Roman conquest. It sighed for the coming of another Cyrus or Alexander. But these sounds found a responsive chord in the West also.² The sublime vaticinations of the Virgilian Sibyl, bringing the predictions of the Hebrew prophets home to the breasts of the

¹ See the well-known passages of Suetonius (*Vesp.* 4.) and Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 13.), confirmed by Joseph (*B. J.* vi. 5. 4.) and Zonaras (xi. 16.) referring to a lost book of Appian. Comp. Philo, *de Præm. et Pæn.* 16.

² Virg. *Ecl.* 4. Comp. Suet. *Aug.* 94.; Vell. ii. 59.; Senec. *An. Nat.* i. 2., for the prodigies and predictions which regarded the future empire of Augustus.

Italians, foreshadowed a reign of peace, equality, and unity, whether under a political or a moral law. At last, with the birth of the monarchy, there sprang up the germ of the greatest of social revolutions, the religion of Christ. It was this dispensation which seized and developed, with intuition and energy truly divine, the latent yearnings of mankind for social combination. Its essence, from a human point of view, consisted in the doctrine of the fundamental equality of men. As it marched along, it trod under foot all prejudices of race and caste. Persecution might check the growth of its numbers, but only made its principles more conspicuous; and when it counted its converts by thousands, its unconscious disciples were already millions. The task to which the following pages are devoted is that of tracing the expansion of the Roman nation, together with the development of the ideas of unity and monarchy, from the last days of the republic to the era of Constantine. We commence with a period when the senate still fondly imagined that the government of the world was the destined privilege of one conquering race, that its life-source was enshrined in the curia of Romulus and Camillus. The point at which our review may appropriately terminate is the day when the civilized world received its laws and religion from the mouth of an autocrat, whose sole will transferred the seat of empire without a shock from the sacred circle of the seven hills to a village on the Bosporus.

CHAP. II.

POSITION AND POLICY OF THE OLIGARCHY OR SENATORIAL PARTY.—CHARACTER OF ITS PRINCIPAL LEADERS: CATULUS, LUCULLUS, CRASSUS: POMPEIUS, THE FAVOURITE OF THE SENATE: HIS PRE-EMINENT POSITION: HE INTRODUCES REFORMS, AND COUNTENANCES THE CLAIMS OF THE KNIGHTS: RETAINS THE ADVOCACY OF CICERO.—ELEVATION OF CICERO TO THE CONSULSHIP.—CONSPIRACY OF CATILINA.—CICERO'S SERVICES TO THE OLIGARCHY.—THEIR CONTEMPT FOR HIM, AND JEALOUSY OF POMPEIUS.—INFLUENCE OF CATO.—GENERAL IMBECILITY OF THE NOBLES.—CHARACTER AND PRETENSIONS OF THE POPULAR OR MARIAN PARTY.—CRITICAL POSITION OF THE OLIGARCHY.

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II.

Composi-
tion of the
oligarchy of
Rome.

THE loss of its great champion, Sulla, left the oligarchy without any acknowledged leader. It may be supposed that the haughty nobles were not displeased at being released from the domination of a military chieftain, and that, as long as they could maintain their ascendancy without one, they would be little disposed to submit to a second. It was difficult indeed among a body so illustrious for wealth and family honours, and so well trained to public affairs, to select an individual by the influence of whose name and character the rest would be content to be guided.¹ If we would form to ourselves an idea of what was the

¹ The nobility of Rome had universally more or less of a military education; they were hereditary jurisconsults, and were for the most part early initiated into the conduct of public affairs. The author of the treatise *De Corrupt. Eloq.* says of them, "Ex his intelligi potest, Cn. Pompeium et M. Crassum non viribus modo et armis, sed ingenio quoque et oratione valuisse; Lentulos et Metellos et Lucullos et

number of the nobility of Rome, and upon what their influence rested, we must go back for a moment to the origin of the patrician houses, and their subdivision into families. In the earliest form of the constitution, the patres were divided into three tribes, thirty curies, and three hundred gentes or houses. The members of these latter were connected among themselves by identity of name and community of religious rites; whether they were descended originally from a single stock respectively, is a question upon which we need not enter. At all events, we may be assured that any idea of blood-connexion was forgotten from an early period; that the gens was replenished and increased by the introduction sometimes of clients, sometimes of foreigners, so that its original patrician element might in time be completely absorbed in the plebeian admixture; that some houses lost their patrician status by the poverty of their members, or the effect of marriages of disparagement; and that, from whatever cause, the number of the oldest houses had fallen off so considerably, that in the time of Augustus it was reduced to not more than fifty.¹ Those among them, however, that flourished, spread into many families bearing the same name, such as the Cornelii and Æmilii,

Curiones, et cæteram procerum manum, multum in his studiis operæ curæque posuisse; nec quenquam illis temporibus magnam potentiam sine eloquentia consecutum."

¹ Dionys. *Ant. Rom.* i. 85.: 'Ἰκανὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου γινώριμον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ τὸ εὐγενέστατον δὴ νομιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ γενεαὶ τινες ἔτι περιῆσαν εἰς ἑμὲ πεντήκοντα μάλιστα οἴκοι. This claim to Trojan descent was of course a mere affectation; but it would not have been conceded by popular opinion except to families of real antiquity, such as the Julii, Sergii, and others.

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which were distinguished one from another by the cognomen only. Thus among the Cornelii there were Scipios, Sullas, and Lentuli; while the Æmiliï bore the names of Lepidus, Scaurus or Paullus. The plebeian houses were established on the same principle, and were from an early period considerably more numerous. The nobility consisted properly of all who were, in legal phrase, ennobled by their ancestors having served the curule magistracies.¹ All such were entitled to a seat in the senate by the appointment of the censors. The number of this body amounted perhaps to five hundred in the time of Cicero²; and the election which had been made by Sulla had weeded out all those whose poverty rendered them unfit to hold a place in an oligarchy, the influence of which depended, in a great degree, on the wealth of its individual members. The party which attached itself to the senate was no doubt considerably more numerous, and comprised a large portion of the knights, who were bound to that body in many respects by community of interest. It was supported also by a numerous class of clients both in Rome and throughout the provinces; even where the old social feelings attached to that kind of connexion were forgotten, there were still sub-

¹ The curule magistracies were those of the consul, prætor, ædile, and censor; also of the dictator and the master of the horse.

² This may be inferred from two passages in Cicero's works. In a letter to Atticus (i. 14.) he speaks of a division in a very full assemblage of the senate, when there appeared four hundred on one side and fifteen on the other. On another occasion, referred to in the speech *post Red. in Senat.* 10., the house was extremely full, and four hundred and seventeen were present. Allowance must be made for the number of those who were engaged in the provincial administration.

stantial advantages appertaining to it, which made it difficult to be shaken off. Whole cities and states sometimes put themselves under the protection of a senatorial patron. A more direct bulwark of the oligarchy was the army of above one hundred thousand veterans whom Sulla had settled in Italy, who were well aware how insecure was the tenure on which they held their newly-acquired possessions, and were bound by every motive to the cause of the aristocracy.

The consuls for the year 676 of the city, in which Sulla died, were M. Æmilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus. The Æmilian house was divided into a patrician and a plebeian branch; but the blood of either was among the noblest in Rome, and there were few houses that numbered more distinguished names in their annals, or were adorned with more trophies of family pride. Lepidus, we have seen, aspired to be a second Sulla; but he had no hope that the nobility would put him forward above all the rest of his class, and his only resource lay in appealing to the passions of the Marians and Italians, in raising the flames of civil war, and placing himself at the head of a military faction. His colleague, Catulus, on the other hand, was the most moderate and disinterested of all the great men of his day; indeed, there is perhaps no character in the history of the commonwealth which commanded more general esteem, or obtained more blameless distinction in political life. We have no evidence that his talents were of the highest order. Except in crushing the feeble movement of Lepidus, he performed no military exploit. Nor was his

Leaders of
the oli-
garchy.
Catulus.

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eloquence of the character qualified to sway the turbulent democracy of the Forum, or unravel the crafty intrigues of the Senate. But he proved himself useful to his country in throwing the weight of his reputation into the scale of justice and the constitution, and in supporting more ardent and enterprising men in the cause which he deemed the best. He declaimed openly against the corruption of the tribunals and the spoliation of the provinces.¹ He was the firm advocate of the extension of the judicia to the knights and of the restoration of their powers to the tribunes, though both these measures were opposed to the immediate interests of the nobles; while, on the other hand, he combated the bills of Gabinius and Manilius for conferring extraordinary and dangerous powers on Pompeius. He lent all his influence also to strengthen the hands of Cicero against Catilina and his open or concealed adherents. The people offered a marked testimony to their sense of his merits when, in opposing the Gabinian Law, he asked, "If we place such extraordinary powers in the hands of one man, to whom shall we look to save us if he perish?" with one accord the multitude exclaimed, that their resource should be in Catulus himself.² Accordingly, he enjoyed for many years the *principatus*, or primacy of the senate, the most honourable title in the commonwealth, which fell into desuetude upon his death, and was only revived, after the expiration of liberty, to swell the dignities and privileges of Augustus.³

¹ Cic. *in Verr.* i. 15.² Cic. *pro Leg. Man.* 20.³ See the essay of De la Bleterie, *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr.* t. xxiv. p. 261.

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Lucullus

L. Licinius Lucullus was another noble, of high character and immense wealth, whose military exploits evinced talents for command, while his administrative powers were still more conspicuous. But, though ambitious of distinctions, he wanted energy to devote himself to public business, and to court popularity with a jealous and exacting party. His reforms in the government of the provinces in Asia must have been unpalatable to the senate, and it requited the grudge by seizing an opportunity to remove him from his command in the East. He is accused of avarice; and it may give some colour to the charge, that he condescended to accept another appointment in Thrace, instead of returning at once and asserting his natural position in Rome. When he did return, it was rather to enjoy his wealth in ostentatious ease than to enter into the current of public affairs.¹ He may, perhaps, be ranked next to Catulus, though at a long interval, for the real purity and patriotism of his motives, qualities so rare at that period. But he had neither strength of character nor unscrupulousness enough to control the fiendish passions and headlong venality of a Roman faction.

Crassus.

Again, in the general mediocrity of talent among the highest nobility, a distinguished place was occupied by M. Licinius Crassus. He may be remarked as a genuine representative of one side of the old Roman character, which has been already referred to; namely, their shrewdness and sordid diligence in the accumulation of money, which made so many of the national heroes strict domestic

¹ Plut. *Lucull.* 38.

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economists, sullied such illustrious names with the stain of usury and extortion, and impelled so many thousands of a lower class to establish themselves as traders on every coast, and incessantly repair the destruction of their countrymen in the provinces. Crassus was descended from a branch of the Licinian family, to which the surname of Dives¹, or the Rich, had been attached, from the excessive wealth of some of its members. But there was none of the race to whom the title was so justly applicable as to the contemporary of Catulus and Lucullus. His name became proverbial among his countrymen as the richest of the Romans², and the head grows dizzy in estimating his treasures in the minute coinage of the nation.³ The wealth, indeed, which he amassed sinks, after all, into insignificance when compared with some of the fortunes of later times; but it is to be remembered, that his position compelled him to spend almost as fast as he accumulated, and there seems to have been no want of liberality in his mode of dispensing his treasures when his interest required it. But what is chiefly remarkable is, that his acquisitions were made, not by brilliant

¹ Cic. *de Off.* ii. 16., of the father of M. Crassus, "P. Crassus, cognomine Dives."

² Comp. Cic. *ad Att.* i. 4., *de Fin.* iii. 22.; Sallust. *B. C.* 48.; Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. 47.; Plut. *in Crass. Cæs.*; Tertull. *Apolog.* 11.

³ His father's estates had been confiscated by the Marians, and Plutarch (*Crass.* 2.) states that he possessed at first only 300 talents. Before setting out on his expedition to Parthia he estimated his substance at 7000. Pliny (*H. N.* l. c.) gives the sum of 200,000,000 sesterces, which make above 8300 talents. The talent is equal in weight of silver to about 200*l.* of our money. It seems uncertain whether these sums are meant to include the capital invested in slaves, houses, and lands.

successes or glaring extortions, but simply by the sure and steady process of waiting upon the necessities of his friends or rivals¹, of buying at the cheapest and selling at the dearest moments; by the careful and judicious use of accumulating capital, such as laying out large sums on the education of a multitude of slaves, with the view of deriving a profit from their accomplishments. In the disordered state of private fortunes at Rome at the time, we may conceive how a shrewd politician might in this way attach to himself a number of adherents, especially one who had no prominent vices to disgust, or brilliant talents to alarm them. Around him rallied the monied interests of the city; that large class who were silently and cautiously founding fortunes on the spoils of the provinces, while the great chiefs were squandering their means in largesses to the people, and wasting their time and energies in the race of preferment. He repaid their favour by exerting himself for their advancement, and combined with Pompeius to restore to the knights a share in the judicia; but, without yet aspiring to the leadership of the oligarchy, he contrived to secure a large portion of their confidence, and was, in fact, the principal link which continued to bind the senate and the knights together, notwithstanding their mutual jealousy and sometimes conflicting pretensions.

However conscious the nobles might be that their privileges demanded the fostering protection of the

Pompeius.

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 2.: Ταῖς κοιναῖς ἀτυχίαις προσόδῳ τῇ μεγίστῃ χρησάμενος. Some curious modes in which he made his money are there mentioned.

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most able and successful general of his time, it was not without distrust and reluctance that they consented to court the favour of Cnæus Pompeius. This illustrious personage was the son of Pompeius Strabo, a noted captain in the previous civil wars. The name of the father was associated with many of the greatest enormities of that frightful period. Though commanding in the name of the senate, he had been the object of its dislike and suspicion; and the pertinacity with which he followed his own plans, independent of its direction, had marked him as one who possibly aspired to usurp at some fitting season authority over both parties in the state. Bred up under the auspices of such a parent, and familiarized from his childhood with the licentious sentiments of an ambitious soldiery, it would seem that schemes of this kind were fermenting in the head of the younger Pompeius from his early years. Sulla divined and distrusted him; but his followers were powerful, his predilections ostensibly oligarchical; every enterprise he undertook was crowned with extraordinary success; and when at the age of twenty-four he returned victorious from his campaign in Africa against the remnant of the Marians and their Numidian allies¹, the dictator hailed him with the appellation of Magnus², and reluctantly allowed him the honour of a triumph unexampled in so youthful a conqueror. He

¹ Liv. *Epit.* lxxxix.; Eutrop. v. 9.

² The occasion upon which this celebrated title was conferred has been the subject of much discussion. Drumann (iv. 335.), after weighing the various conflicting authorities, acquiesces in the statement of Plutarch (*Pomp.* 13.), which is followed in the text.

soon requited this favour by uniting with Catulus to repress the insurrection of Lepidus. He was not yet of sufficient standing to enter upon the career of civic honours, when the successes of Sertorius demanded the employment of his military talents in the Spanish war. There, as we have seen, his final victory was achieved rather through the treachery of Perperna than by his own prowess; the grateful senate, however, did not scrutinize his merits too closely, but rewarded him with a second triumph, and confided to him, as its most zealous champion, the execution of its policy. Nevertheless, while it was their interest thus to flatter and caress him, the nobles looked with much disdain upon his municipal extraction and his plebeian descent, unennobled by great family honours. He was not suffered to forget that he was in fact but little removed from the despised condition of a New Man, and that the real basis of his fortunes must rest on his personal abilities, not on the love or sympathy of the dominant party. He saw, moreover, the fact, to which that party obstinately blinded itself, that its foundations were too narrow for the permanent maintenance of its power. He felt his own strength, and chose with decision the policy which he maintained consistently through the greater part of his career, as long, perhaps, as circumstances allowed him to choose his own course; namely, that of raising up a middle class to be the bulwark of the nobility and of the state itself against the turbulence of the rabble and the disaffection of the provinces. With this view, he did not hesitate to place himself in direct

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opposition to the wishes of the nobility on points which they considered vital to their interests. Such, especially, was the great measure of raising the knights to their former share in the judicia, which was necessary to elevate the position and enhance the estimation of that important order; and not less so to relieve the nobles themselves from the burden of general odium which was threatening to overwhelm them. Nor, at the same time, did he fail to observe that in carrying out this policy he was gradually removing the superstructure of his fortunes from the basis of the aristocracy generally to that of his own personal adherents, and shifting his ground to a position in which he might be entirely independent of the senate.

Pompeius undertakes a reform in favour of the equestrian order. Prosecution of Verres.

The restoration of the tribunitian prerogatives and the judicia were kindred and connected measures. In his first harangue after his election to the consulship, Pompeius promised to effect both¹, and his declaration was received by the people with the loudest acclamations. But the nobles resisted with desperation, notwithstanding the counsels of the illustrious Catulus and the wisest men among them. It was necessary to daunt their courage by a signal exposure, and the notorious guilt of Verres, who had just returned from exercising the prætorship in Sicily, furnished an occasion. The zeal and eloquence

¹ Pompeius and Crassus were consuls A.U. 684, B.C. 70. Pseudo-Ascon. in *Cic. Divin.* 8.: "Primus Sicinius, trib. plebis, nec multo post Quintius, et postremo Palicanus perfecerant, ut trib. potestatem populo darent consules Cn. Pompeius Magnus, et M. Licinius Crassus." Cf. *Liv. Epit.* xcvi.; *Vell. ii.* 30.; *Plut. Pomp.* 22.

of Cicero were enlisted on the side of justice and substantial power, and the successful issue of the prosecution clothed the cause of the people with irresistible moral influence. The criminal had boasted that the fruits of his three years' occupation of office would be sufficient, those of the first to make his own fortune, those of the second to reward his advocates and partizans, those of the last, and most abundant, to secure the suffrages of his judges. No wonder that Cicero ventured to express his expectation that the provinces would soon come forward of their own accord, and pray for the repeal of the laws against malversation, since they only served to redouble the extortions of their oppressors to ensure the means of corrupting the tribunals.¹ During the forty years, he adds, that the knights had served on the bench of justice, there had not been a single instance even of the suspicion of corruption²; it had now become the rule rather than the exception. But it must be confessed that the change which was now about to take place failed to restore any such golden age of judicial purity.

It was not to be expected, however, under the circumstances, where the judges were so deeply interested in the impunity of members of their own order, whose turn it might be next day to decide upon accusations against themselves, that many instances would occur of criminals being

Pompeius unites with Crassus, and engages the services of Cicero in transferring a share in the judicia to the knights.

¹ Cic. i. in Verr. 13—15.

² Pseudo-Ascon. in Divin. 8.: "C. Gracchus legem tulerat, ut equites Rom. judicarent. Judicaverunt per annos quadraginta sine infamia." See above, p. 20. note 2. But Appian allows that the knights were no better than the senators (B. C. i. 22.).

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brought to the bar of justice. Notorious as was the guilt of numbers, as regarded their conduct both towards the provinces and the allies, we hear of only three cases of trial for malversation before this of Verres, those, namely, of the two Dolabellas, governors of Macedonia and Cilicia, and of C. Antonius, proconsul of Greece. But in the present instance, it is clear that the hands of the prosecutor were strengthened by the determination of the government to bring the question to an issue, both the consuls, Pompeius and Crassus, being equally intent on carrying so popular a measure. The criminal resorted to every possible means to postpone the trial till the next year, when one of his private friends, Hortensius, would be consul, and another, Metellus, the prætor to whose lot it had fallen to preside in such causes as that which was now impending.¹ But the activity and dexterity of Cicero defeated every artifice, and the preliminary oration, with which he opened the proceedings, revealed the general features of so frightful a system, that defence was at once abandoned as hopeless. Verres fled from judgment, self-banished; but the accuser followed up his success by publishing the series of speeches which he had prepared for delivery, in which he gives in detail the whole catalogue of his victim's enormities. The disgrace of these disclosures could neither be evaded nor palliated; the system admitted of no defence; and the senate resigned its contest with the government, which promised to

¹ Cic. i. *in Verr.* 8.: "Cum prætores designati sortirentur, et M. Metello obtigisset ut is de pecuniis repetundis quæreret."

amend it. But it is exceedingly doubtful whether its vices were really checked by the alteration which was made in the constitution of the tribunals. From the subsequent conduct of Pompeius with regard to the reforms of Lucullus in Asia, and from the general character of his colleague, we can hardly indulge in the idea that they took any genuine interest in the cause of honour and justice; and as for Cicero, we find him, the very next year, defending Fonteius against the complaints of the provincials of Gaul, with a recklessness of language and indifference to the merits of the case far exceeding the licence of a hired advocate. But the knights gained by these enactments an important step in political advancement, and the middle class began to coalesce into a firm and compact body, conscious of its unity and strength.

At the same time, the generous assistance of Catulus, and others among the nobles, enabled the consuls to effect a further measure of public benefit. They revived the office of censor, after a long interval in which it had lain in abeyance¹; and the magistrates appointed thereto, L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, undertook their functions in the spirit of better times. They assigned to Catulus the distinguished post of princeps, or leader, of the senate. They made also a rigid inquiry into the means and qualifications of the members of that body, of whom they ejected no less than sixty-four, as either unworthy from their character, or incompetent from their fortunes, to discharge the duties of the order according to the

Progress of
reform; re-
vival of the
censorship.

¹ Cic. ii. in *Verr.* v. 7.; comp. Liv. *Epit.* xcvi. ; Plut. *Pomp.* 22.

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intentions of antiquity. These public acts are important as showing the temper of the times, and the growing sense of the necessity for administrative reforms ; they also throw much light upon the cautious and quiet policy which characterized Pompeius, who threw all his influence into the descending scale of popular opinion.

Reserve affected by Pompeius. Extraordinary powers thrust upon him by the Gabinian and Manilian bills.

Upon the expiration of his consulship, Pompeius did not accept, as was usual, the government of a province. He had already attained the highest ordinary honours of the state, and, pure as he was in his private conduct and moderate in his habits, the emoluments of the proconsulate offered no temptation to him. The overweening confidence which he entertained in the reputation he had already acquired forbade him to conceive any jealousy of Lucullus, Metellus, and the other commanders in the provinces. He remained therefore at Rome, affecting the reserve and retirement of one who would only condescend henceforward to serve the state in great emergencies ; but he well knew that the increasing dangers of the commonwealth must soon call him forth amidst tenfold acclamations. When Gabinius, taking advantage of the general panic caused by the Cilician pirates, proposed to confer upon him extraordinary powers, to invest him with command over the whole of the Mediterranean coasts¹, and every city and district within fifty miles inland, the senate stood aghast. But the cause was not that of the senate and the nobles only. The whole empire was frenzied with

¹ Cic. *pro Leg. Manil.* ; Dion. xxxvi. 6. ; Vell. ii. 31. ; Liv. *Epit.* xcix., A. U. 687, B. C. 67.

alarm, and ready to rush upon any remedy that offered itself. The city trembled for its daily sustenance; the government apprehended the violence of a starving mob. In spite of the strong dissuasions of Catulus and others, the appointment of Pompeius to this enormous command was carried by the general voice of the nation. The skill and vigour with which he conducted himself, the universal confidence which he immediately restored, the rapid influx of provisions into the capital, all seemed to justify the wisdom of the measure. Having taken a short time to make his dispositions, divide his forces, and secure the most important communications, Pompeius set sail with a well-appointed fleet for the principal resort of his roving enemies. In two months the wound was staunch, in six it was healed over¹, by the establishment of the offending marauders in continental colonies: health and strength returned in the natural order of events. The danger of the return to Rome in a private capacity of one who had now tasted so much of absolute power was again staved off by the increasing difficulties of the Mithridatic war. Lucullus was recalled, and another bill was introduced by Manilius, to confer upon the great champion of the republic the command of the whole of the eastern provinces.² Again the nobles

¹ Cic. *pro Leg. Manil.* 12.: "Tantum bellum. . . Cn. Pompeius extrema hieme apparavit, ineunte vere suscepit, media æstate confecit." Comp. Plut. *Pomp.* 28.: Οὐκ ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ τριῶν μηνῶν. Liv. *Epit.* xcix.; Florus, iii. 6., and the Auctor *de Vir. Illustr.* p. 77. shorten the time to forty days.

² A. U. 688, B. C. 66. Cic. *pro Leg. Manil.*; Vell. ii. 33.; Dion, xxxvi. 25.; Liv. *Epit.* c.; Plut. *Pomp.* 30.

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were terrified at the power they had called into existence; again did Catulus and others, the wise and prudent of their party, resist this accumulation of honours. Pompeius was supported by the general voice of the people; by the intrigues of all his friends and adherents in the senate; by Crassus and Cæsar, who looked with favour upon these deviations from the principles of the constitution; and he might command the spirited eloquence of Cicero, who, now rising rapidly into public notice, resolved at once to throw his fortunes into the wake of the great conqueror's.

Cicero.

The merit of striking out the only available line of policy for maintaining the ascendancy of the old Roman families is due to Pompeius; but the development which the industry and sagacity of Cicero gave to these views seems to mark him out especially as their patron and representative. Every circumstance combined to dispose him to assume the position of a moderate champion of the aristocracy. As a New Man, the offspring of an equestrian family in the obscure municipium of Arpinum, he was an object of jealousy to the nobles, who had never allowed one of his class to ascend to the highest offices of the state by the ordinary course of honours. Yet a townsman of Cicero, and one of even inferior claims to civic distinction, had but lately been raised by the civil wars to the enjoyment of seven consulships, and the blood of the young Arpinate was inflamed with ambition by so illustrious an example. Cicero, however, had none of the daring character of Marius; if he ever harboured any

aspirations after military renown, they were satisfied by a single campaign. But as the shocks of civil war subsided, a nobler field was thrown open to the accomplishments of peace; and he felt from an early period, in the consciousness of industry and genius, an earnest of brilliant success in the forum and at the bar. He perceived instinctively that the talents which rendered Pompeius so illustrious in the field must require in the city the co-operation of the orator and the jurist; and he foresaw that by making himself necessary to the military champion of the state, he might command his support in return, and climb to the highest political honours. When the young orator entered public life, the pre-eminence of the great conqueror was unrivalled, and the prospects of his policy highly flattering. Whether, under other circumstances, Cicero would have thrown himself into the arms of the democratic party, and laboured for the subversion of the existing constitution, it is hardly reasonable to inquire. Certainly the moderation and conservative character of the views he uniformly advocated correspond with the natural bent of his temper, always alive to present practical evils, but accustomed to pause at every step, and anxiously weigh the advantages of general over particular expediency.

Having thus chosen his political views, Cicero carried them out through life with a steadiness hardly to be expected even in a firmer man, and conceived an interest in the classes whose cause he advocated, and even an affection for them, which is one of the most pleasing features in his character.

Cicero an
advocate of
reform.

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His great object was to elevate that middle class of which we have already spoken, as a guarantee for the integrity of the constitution. He laboured diligently to soften away the conflicting tendencies of the nobles and commons, of the Romans and Italians, of the victors and the vanquished of the late civil wars. Nor was his political course warped, like that of his leader Pompeius, by any illegitimate hopes of rising above the laws which he administered or defended. His ambition was great and noble, but was honestly limited to the enjoyment of the highest honours of the constitution. He succeeded in attaining the consulship, the most eminent office in the state, and in its discharge performed a service for his country as brilliant as any recorded in the Roman annals. But his career of public usefulness was cut short by the jealousy of his associates, and the selfishness of his early patron. Intoxicated by success, he had allowed himself to forget how unnatural and precarious his elevation really was; and there can be no doubt that his own vanity contributed in a great measure to his fall. But the nobles were willing to prove to the world the inherent weakness of any man, however splendid his abilities, who had not the genuine aristocratic basis of wealth and birth to rely upon; and Pompeius selected Cicero to be the victim of his wrath, when he wished to show his power, and hurl defiance at the senate, yet did not venture to inflict upon it a wound which should really smart.

Apprehen-
sions of a
secret con

While Pompeius was prosecuting the war against Mithridates with all the powers assigned him by the

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Manilian bill, Cicero continued to watch over the interests of their common policy in the city. He had already acquired great reputation as an orator and a pleader. He extended and confirmed his friendships by the causes he undertook to defend. At the same time, he sought and obtained successively the principal civil offices of the commonwealth. In the meanwhile affairs were ripening for a crisis to which many parties seem to have been looking as the signal for a general scramble for power. Pompeius, Crassus, Cæsar, and all the prominent statesmen of the time, were undoubtedly prepared for an outbreak among the needy and reckless men, with whom the ranks of highest birth and station abounded. The most dangerous enemy to the aristocracy was one whom it nourished in its own bosom. The violent changes which had so lately occurred in political affairs had bred up a race of men of ungoverned enmities and desperate resolutions. Public and private life had become one great gambling booth, in which the most abrupt alternations of luck, daily occurring, had rendered multitudes of men equally reckless of good and evil fortune. The city was destitute of any leader of acknowledged pre-eminence in civil or military influence. The moment had come, in the absence of Pompeius, when Italy, and even the world, might become the prey of the most daring adventurer. The return of that general with his legions from the East was too remote a contingency to disturb the hopes of the unsettled heads which met in secret conclave, and divided in imagination the spoils of Rome. Pompeius was awaiting at a dis-

spiracy
against the
existing
order of
things.

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tance the result of the expected commotion, and was well pleased to be removed from the city, where his presence would have stifled it in the cradle, assured that, whatever might be the immediate issue, the substantial power was secure in his hands to mould the ultimate event to his own views. The names of both Crassus and Cæsar were mentioned in the confident rumours of the time as connected with the conspiracy. It was said that the former was to have become dictator, and the latter his master of the horse. When, however, one of the parties implicated stepped forward to give evidence, and included Crassus among the individuals he denounced, the senate declared the charge incredible, and refused to listen to the accuser's testimony.¹ Cicero constantly declined to bring any such charge against Cæsar, though pressed to do so by some of the most powerful of the nobles; and at a later period he was declared by a public act to be free from the slightest suspicion.² If the validity of this evidence in their favour be not altogether beyond question, there are many circumstances which make it extremely improbable that personages of their character and views would mingle in an enterprise of such a nature. There is no reason, however, to doubt that both of them speculated, like Pompeius, not without complacency, on the result of an outbreak which threatened to divide and weaken the nobility.

The original cause of the celebrated conspiracy of Catilina was traced to his disappointment at

First conspiracy of Catilina abortive.

¹ Sallust, *B. C.* 48.

² Suet *Jul.* 17.

being prevented from suing for the consulship, by a charge brought against him by Clodius of malversation in his province. This had taken place in the year *U. C.* 688. A story obtained very general credit, though, as the case never came before the public, its authenticity must always remain uncertain, that upon this repulse Catilina entered into a plot with Autronius Pætus, who had been also deprived of the consulship for bribery, with Calpurnius Piso and others, having for its object the murder of the successful candidates, and seizure of the powers of the state by violence. Piso, who had previously acquired the government of one of the provinces of Spain, was to have organized there a military force to counterpoise the legions of the senate under the command of Pompeius. The scheme, it was said, was detected, and the principal conspirators discovered. Piso himself was cut off by an attack of bandits, or possibly assassins¹; but the proceedings which the senate threatened to institute against the culprits were stopped by the intervention of a tribune, and the circumstances of the plot were never formally revealed.

So great, however, was the influence of Catilina, from his ancient blood and personal connexions, that not only was the executive power unable to bring him to conviction upon this flagrant charge, but he did not shrink from proceeding straightway to canvass for the consulship of the next year, and that too while a charge for malversation was still hanging over him. L. Sergius Catilina is repre-

Character
and machi-
nations of
Catilina
and his as-
sociates.

¹ Sallust, *B. C.* 19. : "Nos eam rem in medio relinquemus."

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sented to us as a reckless voluptuary, bankrupt in fortune and character, supporting his extravagance by pandering to the vices of headstrong and prodigal youth, with the one eminent virtue of personal courage, which he had manifested in his early years in the wars of Marius and Sulla, and one peculiar talent, that of cajoling and influencing even the best and wisest citizens of the state. These qualities sufficed to place him at the head of a faction, which embraced personages of such mark and authority that the ordinary powers of the constitution were not deemed strong enough to suppress their treasonable machinations. The most astonishing circumstance of all is the fact revealed to us in one of Cicero's own letters, that being himself a competitor with Catilina for the consulship, he proposed at one time to undertake the defence of his rival's conduct in his province, with the view of strengthening himself by a coalition with so hateful a character.¹ As it happened, however, the pliant orator had not the disgrace of appearing as the advocate of one whom he was called upon the next year to denounce as the foulest monster, the most universal culprit of the age. Catilina escaped condemnation, apparently by the corruption of his judges.² He was unsuccessful, however, in his suit for the consulship, which was obtained by Cicero and Antonius. The greater part of the ensuing year was occupied with the discussion of various salutary laws proposed by Cicero, while the rejected candidate was resorting once more to his secret machinations

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 2.² Cic. *l. c.*

against the state. The names of his coadjutors again show how noble were the families, how exalted the stations, of the men who were thus ready to plunge into a revolution with little prospect of permanent success, nor, as it appeared to their contemporaries, under the blinding influence of any party enthusiasm. The members of the conspiracy seem, indeed, to have belonged mostly to the faction of Sulla¹, and may have appertained to the class of disappointed aristocrats, disgusted with the policy by which the leaders of their party were breaking them in to a more liberal form of government; but it cannot be doubted that their views were rather personal than political, that they had resolved upon the abolition of debts and a new division of offices and honours, and hardly looked further.² Among them were two nephews of the dictator. Autronius and Cassius Longinus had lately been candidates for the consulship; there was a tribune elect, Calpurnius Bestia; Cornelius Lentulus and Cornelius Cethegus were nobles of high distinction, though lost in character; while the consul Antonius was strongly suspected of looking at least with favour on the designs of the conspirators. Nor did rumour fail again, with, however, little probability, to include both Crassus and Cæsar in the list.³ With this extensive in-

¹ After giving the names of the leaders, Sallust adds: "*Juventus pleraque sed maxime nobilium.*" (*B. C.* 17.)

² Sallust, *B. C.* 21.: "*Tum Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptiones locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas.*"

³ To these were to be added needy people of all classes. Cicero remarks with surprise that some of the victims of Sulla's confiscations had joined in the conspiracy: "*Quam turbam, dissimillimo ex genere,*

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fluence among the highest ranks of the nation, Catilina and his associates counted no less upon the turbulence and spirit of rapine which animated the lower population of the city. They expected, moreover, the armed assistance of large bodies among the Sullan veterans, who had already squandered, with the recklessness of fortunate adventurers, the possessions they had so suddenly acquired.¹ They proposed, further, to solicit and stimulate the hostile feelings still prevalent among some of the Italian races towards Rome.² They even hoped to seize upon the gladiators' schools at Capua, and arm a new insurrection of slaves and criminals against law and property.³ This last measure, indeed, was the only enormity to which Catilina hesitated to assent. He was urged to it more especially by Lentulus⁴; and when so degrading a proposal was discovered in the handwriting of one of the Cornelii, it put the finishing stroke to the horror and indignation of the Roman people.

distinguebant homines perculsi Sullani temporis calamitate." (*Pro Mur.* 24.)

¹ Cic. in *Cat.* ii. 9.: "Hi sunt coloni qui se insperatis repentinisque pecuniis sumptuosius insolentiusque jactarunt: hi qui ædificant, tanquam beati, dum prædiis, lecticis, familiis magnis, conviviis apparandis delectantur, in tantum æs alienum inciderunt, ut si salvi esse velint Sulla sit iis ab inferis excitandus." Comp. Sall. *B. C.* 16. 28.

² Sallust, *l. c.* C. Manlius betook himself to Fæsulæ, in Etruria, Septimius to Picenum, C. Julius to Apulia.

³ Sallust, *B. C.* 30.

⁴ Such was the tenor of the letter of Lentulus to his principal, which was discovered on the person of Volturcius: "Auxilium petas ab omnibus, etiam ab infimis;" which was interpreted by a verbal message, "Quum ab senatu hostis judicatus sit, quo consilio servitia repudiet." Sall. *B. C.* 44.

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 Detection
and defeat
of the con-
spiracy.

The secret of the conspirators, long bruited about by common report, was first revealed to Cicero by Fulvia, the paramour of one of the parties implicated. No sooner did he communicate it to the senate, than a decree was hastily passed, conferring upon the consuls irresponsible power for the suppression of the smouldering conflagration.¹ But the discovery of the plot was only the beginning of their difficulties. In a case of such importance, involving the lives of personages so exalted, with the spirit of the populace so adverse or questionable, and the leaders of the democracy ever on the watch to seize upon the slightest false move, it was necessary to place the affair in such a light as to carry the passions of the people along with the government. Cicero manifested consummate adroitness in the bold and apparently hazardous course which he pursued. He first drove Catilina to despair by proving his own perfect acquaintance with all his designs, and then allowed him quietly to make his escape from the city, and even to take refuge among his armed adherents. As soon as he was gone, and his open defection known, the consul could convene the senate, and cause him to be declared a public enemy. He could then represent him as an invading foe, ready to fall upon the city at the head of the men of Etruria and Picenum; he could revive the old panic of a Gallic outbreak, aggravated by the terrors of a servile war. No cry was more certain to stir the blood of the

¹ Sallust, *B. C.* 29.: "Senatus decrevit, darent operam Consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet."

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Roman people and combine them against the common enemy. From that moment, also, he could convict of treason any citizen who should be discovered merely corresponding with the proscribed outlaw. No further proof of treasonable purposes was required than the fact of having sent him a line of writing, however vague and disguised its import. The consul resorted to further artifices to get documents of such a nature into his hands. He succeeded in securing with letters on their persons some of the messengers employed by the conspirators, and extorted from them at the same time additional verbal communications. When he had made himself master of these instruments, he caused all the conspirators whose names had been already indicated to him to be arrested. He produced them successively before the senate, and confronted them with their own messengers and the evidence of their hands and seals. The proofs which he had already acquired from his creatures Fulvia and Curius were doubtless laid before the senate and fully investigated. These would specify the particular business assigned to each of the associates, the murder of the consul, the burning of the city at various points, the signals which were to pass between the leader and his followers, the final division of the spoil. It is remarkable, however, that in the third Catilinarian oration, which Cicero addressed to the people immediately upon the completion of the examination and the conviction of the criminals, he enters into no judicial proof of their guilt as conspirators against the government. He contents himself with declaring

the evidence upon which they have been convicted as traitors to be their correspondence with Catilina, a public enemy, and their intercourse with certain deputies of the Allobroges, a Gaulish clan who at the moment were objects of great alarm to the Romans.¹ This was enough to brand them as men pledged to succour an invading enemy, to introduce him into the city, and deliver it to be plundered by Etruscans and Gauls. This was enough to justify all the frightful descriptions of fire and slaughter with which Cicero had long kept the ears of the public tingling. But to prove the further guilt of the accused to the world would have involved the disclosure of the degrading means to which the consul had been compelled to resort, his intercourse with the basest of men and women; it would have been unbecoming the dignity of the government, and inconsistent with the politic reserve of an aristocratic assembly.² Nor, perhaps, would it have added to the force of Cicero's arguments to have exhibited proofs of designs against himself, for he was not then a favourite with the populace; nor of the conspirator's intention of sharing the magistracies and priest-hoods, to which it might be wholly indifferent.

¹ Cic. *in Catil.* iii. 9.: "Homines Galli ex civitate male pacata, quæ gens una restat quæ pop. Rom. bellum facere et posse et non nolle videatur."

² The reserve which Cicero maintained in this matter was not unnoticed by his contemporaries; but if it was made a subject of attack by Clodius, it met with the full approbation of graver and better citizens. Cic. *ad Att.* i. 14.: "Me tantum comperisse omnia criminabatur." Comp. *ad Div.* v. 1. This was the phrase with which the consul was accustomed to indicate his knowledge of facts when he refrained from revealing his sources of information.

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The object of the government was fully obtained by the partial disclosures it chose to make; and the presumption which some modern writers have entertained, that the conviction of the criminals was not based on adequate legal proof, is altogether nugatory.

Execution
of the con-
spirators.

The ingenuity and eloquence of the great orator conciliated thus far the favour of the people, and nerved the arm of the aristocracy with a strength to which they had long been strangers. Nine of the principal conspirators had been convicted and were in confinement; the question of their punishment still remained for decision. The old theory of the constitution, as interpreted at least by the patricians, gave the chief magistrate power of life and death as soon as the senate should decree, as had been already done, the famous formula, that "the consuls see that the state suffer no harm." Nor were precedents wanting to support an act of extreme rigour, and the majority of that assembly might be found prepared to justify and applaud it. But Cicero was aware that the commonalty had never formally acquiesced in such a stretch of prerogative; that their power as well as their jealousy of the nobles had much increased since its last exercise in the time of the Gracchi. There existed also a conflicting principle in the Roman law, according to which no citizen could be put to death except by a vote of the people. On the one hand, the nobles still hesitated to appeal to the people, by which they would risk the failure of justice and vengeance altogether; on the other, their delegation of authority would afford no protection to

the consul who should venture to act upon it, if his personal enemies could succeed in raising the passions of the populace against him. Cicero, therefore, in the moment of triumph was too wary to assume at once the responsibility which was thrust upon him. He was anxious to fortify himself by a more express declaration of the commands of the senate, and once again convened it to deliver its collective judgment upon the prisoners. A vivid idea of the interesting debate which ensued may be gathered, partly from the genuine speech of Cicero himself, partly from the historical narrative of Sallust, who places the arguments of the opposite parties in the mouths of Cato and Cæsar respectively.¹ The leaders of the oligarchy were evidently inclined to decree capital punishment, which Cæsar vigorously opposed. The relation in which he was surmised by some to stand towards the conspirators might throw suspicion on the arguments he advanced in their behalf; nevertheless, there was evidently much reason in his favour, and as the champion of the popular party he could not be expected to acquiesce in the assumption by the senate of the power of life and death. Banishment or imprisonment was, he contended, the extreme penalty which the law denounced against any citizen. Cato, on the other hand, maintained that the convicted criminals were no longer citizens, but open enemies of the state,

¹ How near the language which Sallust attributes to his speakers approaches to the words they really uttered is impossible to conjecture; but Plutarch mentions that the speech of Cato was the only one which was preserved, having been taken down in shorthand at the time, by Cicero's directions. *Plut. Cat. Min.* 23.

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who had forfeited every Roman privilege. But neither party did, in fact, lay much stress upon the letter of the law. Policy or expediency dictated the arguments on each side. Cato's opinion prevailed, and the hands of the consul were strengthened by a deliberate vote of the senate in favour of the course which he himself advocated.

Question
concerning
the credi-
bility of the
charge.

The time had long gone by in which the justice and morality of public acts could be measured strictly by the standard of existing laws. The old maxim, that the safety of the state is the highest of all laws, was never more applicable than in the present instance, upon the assumption that the colour which the senate gave to the views of the conspirators was genuine and true. That their representation of the facts of the case is borne out by the concurrent testimony of the records of antiquity admits of no question. But it must be acknowledged, that such writers as Dion Cassius, Appian, and Plutarch, afford us little independent evidence; and that they mainly relied upon the contemporary authorities of Sallust and Cicero, neither of whom can be admitted as unexceptionable witnesses. The first, a member and originally an adherent of the aristocracy¹, had suffered expulsion from the senate for his notorious profligacy, and he had attached himself to Cæsar at the time when he sat down to compose his history of

¹ There is a life of Sallust among the *Vitæ Illust. Grammat.*, attributed to Suetonius, but its authority is far from good. The common anecdotes to his discredit are derived from the testimony of Varro (Gell. xvii. 18.) and the Schol. in *Horat. Sat.* i. 2. His ejection from the senate is mentioned by Dion (xl. 63. A. U. 704), but the pretext is not assigned.

the Catilinarian conspiracy. If we might expect from this circumstance that he would make the most unsparing revelation of any artifices and exaggerations on the part of his personal enemies (supposing them to be really liable to such charges), which he nowhere pretends to do, we must acknowledge, on the other hand, that the character of his mind, as disclosed in his narrative, was totally deficient in any deep insight into the views and motives of his contemporaries. He may, indeed, have been too closely connected with individuals, still surviving and still powerful, to desire to unmask the real features of the case, and discover to us the secret springs of action by which the contending parties were actuated.¹ But, from whatever cause, while the stains upon his own character made him feel a base pleasure in exposing the vices of the times, and especially of the class which had declared him unworthy of its countenance, the sketch which he has given us is remarkable chiefly for its impotent display of events without causes, the worthlessness of which as an historical monument is scarcely disguised by the terseness of its diction and the brilliancy of its imagery. The declamations of Cicero, though far more interesting documents, are of hardly less suspicious authority. It might be easy to represent them as fraudulently devised to enhance the terrors of the ignorant both among the senate and the people, to justify measures of violence and in-

¹ Sallust, as may be supposed, was familiarly acquainted with the principal personages of the republic. Comp. *B. C.* 48.: "Ipsum Crassum ego postea prædicantem audiui."

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justice by the most falsely-coloured pictures of the public danger. For it is certainly a reasonable objection to the view he gives us of the imminence of a revolution, that he represents his enemy as too notorious a villain to be really dangerous to any constituted government.

General
truth of the
charges.
Policy of
the senate
with regard
to them.

It seems, however, on the whole, more probable that the vices of Catilina and the weakness of his associates are overdrawn to suit the vulgar taste of the hearers, than that the reality and magnitude of the peril are seriously exaggerated. But it must be observed, that the position of the senate at the moment was such that it was glad to seize the opportunity to show a front of more than usual daring in the face of the enemies who encompassed it. The patron it suspected and feared had withdrawn from it only to make a bolder leap in his attempt to scale the fortress of its prerogatives. He had left it exposed to the furious attacks of the Marian party, whose courage and bitterness had revived in his absence. The bolder spirits among the nobility conceived that the crisis had arrived at which they might secure themselves against both the open and the secret foe. The conspiracy, they might think, came opportunely to give them a pretext for combining in an act of daring justice, so that the consciousness of their own prowess might inspire them with confidence, and draw forth the energies of those who were fittest to lead them. They may have been making a tool of Cicero even while they most loudly applauded the glaring pictures of impending conflagration, with which he scared the timid into approval of their

measures. The languor with which the consul Antonius conducted the campaign against the public enemy, while it appeared to the uninitiated a symptom of wavering loyalty, may possibly have been the result of secret instructions, in order that a larger force might be collected and disciplined under the officers of the senate. When the appearance of danger was at its height, the moment was seized to fix the resolution of the waverers by an act of violence which cut off from them all retreat. It might be expected that Pompeius on his return would make this stretch of authority a pretext for military interference. The nobles pledged themselves by it to the most desperate resistance. They threw down the gauntlet, and defied the commander of their legions to take it up. Assuredly they miscalculated their own strength, if they thought they could have withstood him for a moment; but perhaps they knew the man they had to deal with, and trusted that their imposing attitude would awe him into acquiescence. Undoubtedly they were fully prepared to sacrifice Cicero, whom they disliked and despised; and he was so far aware, we may presume, of their unfriendly dispositions, as to insist upon implicating them together with himself in all the responsibility of the execution of the conspirators. If such was the secret policy of the nobles, it certainly was not unsuccessful. Their boldness cowed Pompeius, whose vindictive jealousy they so far propitiated by abandoning Cicero, that he interposed once more between them and the Marians; until, with the rise, as we shall see hereafter, of

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Cæsar's influence, the opportunity for claiming an undivided ascendancy passed away, and the former champion of the knights was glad at last to place himself under the orders of the senate, and make the most of such honours and powers as they were willing to dispense to him.

Cato.

The name of M. Porcius Cato has already been introduced as a leader of the aristocratic party. Younger by a few years than any of his political rivals, he entered upon the stage of public life at a somewhat later period. The absence of Pompeius in Asia first made room for him in the councils of the nobility, whose cause, though himself a plebeian (one, however, of most ancient and honourable descent), he embraced with more thorough and exclusive devotion than any of his contemporaries. His character was rigid and untractable, and marked a reaction from that laxity of manners and principles which the circumstances of the time had rendered general, and which unfortunately seemed indispensable for efficient political action. Well read in books, his mind had no power to assimilate the lessons of history; a systematic follower of the Stoic philosophy, the genuine springs of human action were unknown to or disregarded by him. He idolized the name of his great-grandfather, Cato the Censor; and while he studiously formed himself upon that ancestral model, he had in fact already inherited a kindred disposition. But the Censor lived at a time when public opinion still respected the principles at least of old Roman austerity. It was a minority of the extravagant and the speculative, the innovators in

practice and theory, against whom he contended ; and, unsuccessful as he was, he still preserved the reverence of the people, and bequeathed them an honoured name for the admiration of posterity. The younger Cato applied the same rules and maxims to his own times, which were rapidly becoming obsolete above a century before. The poet of the civil wars compares Pompeius to the venerable oak, majestic in its decay, and honoured for its antique associations¹ ; Cæsar to the lightning of Jupiter, which spares nothing venerable, nothing holy, neither the monarch of the forest nor the temples of its own divinity ; Cato he might have likened to the rocky promontory which marks the ancient limits of an encroaching ocean, still resisting the action under which the neighbouring cliffs have mouldered away, and barely attached to the continent by a narrow and diminishing isthmus. Yet even the iron disposition of the Stoic was not unaffected by the change of circumstances since the period which he most admired. The same temper which made the elder Cato a severe master, a frugal housekeeper, the cultivator of his own acres, the man of maxims and proverbs, converted the younger into a pedantic politician and a scholastic formalist. Private life had become absorbed in the sphere of public occupations ; the homely experience of the individual was lost in the recorded wisdom of professional philosophers. The character of the Censor had been simple and true to nature ; that of his descendant was a system of elaborate though unconscious affectations.

¹ Lucan. i. 136. foll.

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Influence of
Cato with
the oligar-
chy. Rup-
ture be-
tween the
senate and
the knights.

When the hopes of the oligarchy began to revive with the long absence of Pompeius, and the influence of more flattering advisers to replace that of the fortunate soldier who had so long been courted through fear, the nobles found in Cato a younger, and, as they conceived, a more efficient leader, of obstinate character and uncompromising devotion to the narrowest views of their party. Cato had been the most urgent of all the speakers in the debate for the capital punishment of the conspirators; a measure which flattered the pride of the senate, and the success of which increased their opinion of their own power. At the persuasion of the same rash counsellor they proceeded to break that union with the equestrian order which had been the aim of all Cicero's policy, and the subject of his most complacent self-laudation. The senate had already bitterly offended this rising interest, the clients of Pompeius and Crassus no less than of Cicero, by resolving to institute inquiries into their malversations in the judicial office, in revenge for their intrusion into those cherished functions, for the prosecution of Verres, and all the insults they had received since the death of Sulla.¹ Soon afterwards certain of the knights, who had contracted with the censors for the revenues of the Asiatic provinces, finding that in their cupidity, as Cicero himself acknowledges, they had overreached themselves, besought the government to relax the terms to which they were pledged. The senate would listen to no accommodation. Cato, partly from the natural se-

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 17, 18.

verity and strictness of his character, partly from his class prejudices, opposed them with the utmost vehemence, and prevailed upon the assembly to reject their appeal, after degrading them by long suspense.¹ The deepest jealousy and hostility revived between the two orders², and this dissension, as it broke up the policy of Cicero and Pompeius, was in a great measure the turning point of the events of the period.

Thus frustrated in his darling project of amalgamating the upper classes in a durable league, Cicero from this time began to incline more to the senatorial than to the equestrian order. He had tasted the sweets of admission into the highest ranks of the community, and his self-love forbade him to renounce its fascinations and descend again to the level from which he had sprung, and where alone he could act with dignity and independence. He complained that the knights had deserted the senate, though his vanity would not allow him to say that they had cooled in their devotion to himself. He was proud of their having assembled around him to defend his person during the crisis of the Catilinarian conspiracy³; yet when they arrayed themselves on the Capitoline hill to protect the deliberations which preceded the condemnation of the criminals, they were no less resolutely asserting the integrity of the commonwealth and the privileges of its several classes.⁴ But he soon learnt that the ser-

Cicero inclines to the senate rather than the knights.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 18.

² Cic. *ad Att.* i. 19.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 19.: "Vidi nostros publicanos facile a senatu disjungi, quanquam a me ipso non divellerentur."

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 1.: "Nunc vero quum equitatus ille noster quem ego in clivo Capitolino collocâram senatum deseruerit. . . . equites curiæ bellum, non mihi."

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vices he had performed could give him no effective control over a party which despised their benefactor, and were determined to depreciate his merits. The conviction of the miserable inefficiency of many of the principal nobles was forced upon him; nor could he be insensible of the danger their cause incurred, when they professed to put themselves under the guidance of a leader such as Cato, whose ways and views were so alien from their own, and whose disposition was so untractable.¹ As to Cato himself, we may imagine the perplexity with which he must have regarded the several sections of the party among whom he occupied so conspicuous a place. He had to choose his counsellors and instruments either among the elder men, who were indolent and immovable in action, insensible to public morality, even to the contempt of outward decency; or among the younger, who were violent on the other hand, and reckless, their hot patrician blood inflamed no less by luxury than pride. The early years of the former class had been mostly passed in camps. The urgent dangers of the republic had allowed them little leisure even at home to cultivate the refinements of social life. At a later period, crowned with success, and with all the enjoyments of wealth suddenly placed at their feet², they plunged, from mere ignorance, into a tasteless imitation of the sensual civilization of the East. The pictures of

¹ Cic. *l. c.*: "Sed tamen ille (Cato) optimo animo utens, et summa fide, nocet interdum reipublicæ. Dicit enim tanquam in Platonis Πολιτεία, non tanquam in Romuli fæce, sententiam."

² Comp. Plut. *Lucull.* 40.: Νεόπλουτα δ' ἦν τοῦ Λουκούλλου τὰ δεῖπνα τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν. . . . ζηλωτὸν ἀνελευθέρους ποιοῦντος ἑαυτόν.

vice which the writers of the age have left us are principally taken from the highest aristocracy; and the habits of a Piso and a Gabinius leave no doubt of the barbarian coarseness of the class to which they belonged.

The introduction of Grecian models of art and literature, which had so honourably distinguished the age of Lælius and Scipio, produced in fact a very imperfect effect upon the progress of the national mind. For half a century it seemed to be making a genuine impression upon a people far from deficient in natural sensibility, or incapable of appreciating the excellence of its originals. During that happier period it seemed not idle to expect that Rome might become a rival to her mistress and instructress, even in her own arts. But this fair prospect was overcast by the circumstances that supervened. It might have been hoped that, as among other nations, so in Rome, the time had arrived when arms should give place to the pursuits of peace, and the fruits of youthful education have room and leisure to mature in riper years. But the destiny of the race of conquerors prevailed. Each succeeding generation became more immersed in war than its predecessor; the turbid stream of military habits never ran itself clear; the camp continued to pour its sanguine flood into the silver current of humanity and letters. Even those individuals who were most celebrated for their love of polite literature had little of that genuine devotion to it which courts retirement and rejoices in simplicity. The purity even of Cicero's taste may be called in question, though he was far

Character
of the nobi-
lity. De-
graded and
sensual
form taken
by Roman
civilization.

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removed from the voluptuous refinements which enervate the mind and vitiate morality. But Lucullus and the accomplished orator Hortensius, second only to Cicero among his contemporaries, a scholar and a wit, no less than a pleader and debater, did more to degrade than to exalt the tastes they affected to patronize. The display which Lucullus made of his libraries and galleries of art, throwing them open to public admiration, however much in advance of the real wants of the age¹, and calculated to create envy rather than gratitude, might yet be represented as a more magnanimous use of his wealth than the vulgar profusion by which others of his order courted the favour of the multitude. But those who knew him more intimately discovered how little real interest he took in these honourable resources of dignified leisure. In his later years he withdrew himself almost entirely from public life, and seemed to devote all his languid energies to the invention of new refinements upon the luxury of the table.² His example countenanced and corrupted those about him. One after another the nobles sank into a lethargy almost incomprehensible. The writers of a later period have associated the proudest names of Rome with the preposterous novelties by which they amused their idleness. A Gabinus, a Cælius, a Crassus, were immortalized by the elegance of their dancing.³ A Lucullus, a Hortensius,

¹ In fact, it was the Greeks in Rome, and not the natives, who took advantage of this munificence. Plut. *Lucull.* 42.

² Vell. ii. 33.; comp. Plut. *Cat.* 19., *Lucull.* 40.; Plin. *H. N.* xxviii. 14.

³ Macrobi. *Sat.* ii. 10. The affectation of Hortensius in dress and manner is noted by A. Gellius, i. 6.

a Philippus, estimated one another, not by their eloquence, their courage, or their virtue, but by the perfection of their fish-ponds and the singularity of the breeds they nourished. They seemed to touch the sky with their finger, says their mortified advocate, if they had stocked their preserves with bearded mullets, and had taught them to recognize their master's voices, and come to be fed from their hands.¹

If the austere virtue of Cato was roused to indignation at these degenerate patricians, the tendencies, on the other hand, of the younger men of the party were not less repugnant to his sense of justice and reverence for law. If Lucullus and Hortensius were frivolous and narrow-minded, they had at least the merit of moderation and humanity. The remembrance of the horrors of the civil wars, no less than the refinement they had derived from

Ferocity of
the rising
generation
among the
nobility.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 1.: "Nostri autem principes digito se cœlum putant attingere, si nulli barbati in piscinis sunt, qui ad manus accedant; alia autem negligunt." Comp. Varro, *de R. R.* iii. 17., who gives some curious descriptions of the fish-ponds of Lucullus and Hortensius. The former cut through a mountain to introduce salt water into his preserve, for which feat Pompeius gave him the nickname of Xerxes Togatus. (Vell. ii. 34.) Pliny, *H. N.* ix. 80. and foll. celebrates the inventions of Hirrius, Philippus, Murena, and others, and mentions anecdotes of their extravagance: "Invasit deinde singulorum piscium amor." The ponds of Hortensius were at Bauli, "in qua murœnam adeo dilexit ut exanimatam flesse creditur." Compare Martial, x. 30.:

"Natat ad magistrum delicata murœna;
Nomenculator mugilem citat notum,
Et adesse jussi prodeunt senes nulli."

It seems that this folly lasted a hundred and fifty years. Hortensius was said to moisten his planes with wine (Macrob. *Saturn.* ii. 9.), and was the first Roman who brought peacocks to table. (Plin. *H. N.* x. 23.)

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their Greek education, made them shrink from the sight of human blood. But the rising generation had no such reminiscences to stifle their natural ferocity; and the increasing barbarity of the public spectacles, perhaps, it may be added, of the recognized usages of warfare, steeled their hearts against the compunctions of their fathers. They had not learnt from experience the inevitable requital of blood for blood, and breathed nothing but vengeance and destruction against every one who ventured to cross their path. They would govern the commonwealth by impeachments and assassinations; they would bring back the days of Sullan ascendancy; and certainly nothing but a perpetual dictatorship could spring out of their anarchical policy. These were that Bloody-minded Youth, of whom Cicero speaks with such aversion and fear, who hired bands of ruffians to attend them in the forum, nor travelled beyond the gates of the city without an armed retinue.¹ Such demonstrations of course begot rival ones on the other side; quarrels and collisions naturally occurred, the elections were constantly suspended by acts of violence, the assemblies of the people were interrupted by the clang of arms, the sacred privileges of the tribunes were violated, and the most august personages of the state driven from their posts by fear for their lives. Cæsar and Cicero,

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 7., written in the year 695: "Megabocchus (Curio) et hæc sanguinaria juvenus inimicissima est." In another place he calls them "grex Catilinæ." The mildest terms which he can apply to them, when speaking of the temporary favour which they showed himself, are "libidinosa et delicata juvenus." (*Att.* i. 19.)

Cato and Pompeius, all suffered alike and in turn from the unbridled ferocity of such men as Clodius and Milo, Metellus and Curio.

The nobles, when they struck their great blow against the associates of Catilina, had intended that the effect of their boldness should rebound upon their more distant enemies. One of these, as we have seen, was Pompeius, whose hands were tied at the moment by the exigencies of the wars in which he was engaged, and the extent of whose power might be veiled by the remoteness of the stage on which it was exercised. The other was the popular, or, as it may more conveniently be denominated, the Marian party, the remnant of the faction which had opened the gates of Rome to the Italian nations; which had already once ruled the commonwealth, and still aspired to recover its ascendancy through the newly-created influence of its foreign adherents. Though its chief men had been, with the exception of Marius himself, inferior to few of the nobility in rank and origin, the political principle on which it took its stand was that of renouncing the exclusive privileges of Roman birth, and combining in one phalanx of common interests the aristocracy of Italy and the provinces. The democratic character which it assumed was partly a screen to facilitate the attainment of these ulterior objects, which in themselves were far from popular with the mob of Rome. It was not as a protection to the poorer citizens that the Marians advocated the revival of the tribunitian power, though the interests of that class furnished a convenient pretext. The tri-

Position and views of the popular or Marian party in opposition to the oligarchy.

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bunate invested its holders with the privilege of personal inviolability, and was anciently regarded as the shield of the people against the violence of the nobles. But at a later period it had usurped great aggressive powers also, and claimed at least an equal share with the consulate in the initiation of legislative measures. This was the claim which Sulla had annulled, and which the Marians were determined to revive; could they succeed in this, the tribunate would become in their hands an irresistible instrument of encroachment and usurpation. Another of their favourite objects, the elevation of the equestrian order, had a similar tendency: but the knights constituted an exclusive nobility among themselves, and were tainted with the same illiberality towards their inferiors which they experienced in their own persons from the higher aristocracy. Nor was it easy to counteract the influence of Cicero, and the great men who combined with him to constitute this class an ally and bulwark of the nobility; for it was attached by interest, as well as by origin, to the traditional policy of the conquering republic, and was not less jealous of the interference of foreigners with its privileges than the members of the senate itself.

The oligarchy retain their command of the armies of the state.

In the meanwhile, the government did not fail to exercise a jealous control over the command of the armies of the state, and to entrust them solely to those on whom it could rely, at least as against their common enemy the Marians. By exerting all its influence to secure the election of its own partizans to the highest magistracies, it was enabled to consign the legions in the provinces, year by

year, to officers of its own choice. The army, which had long lost its original constitution, and had become a standing force of soldiers enlisted for a long term of years, had ceased to retain the political predilections which its members used to bring fresh to the camp from every annual election. It had exchanged its love for patrician patrons or popular demagogues for pure military devotion to the persons of its leaders, and, officered as it now was, under the ascendancy of the senate, gave such steady support to the existing government, that any attempt at a revolution, except on the precarious chance of a *coup-de-main*, such as that of Catilina, must have been deemed hopeless by any cool and reasonable statesman. The troops of Pompeius, of Lucullus, of Metellus, and the other proconsuls, though quartered in every province of the empire, constituted a garrison to the city, too distant to control the ordinary course of the government, but sufficiently near to overawe any intriguers who had sense enough to forecast the results of a few weeks or months of resistance.¹

Nevertheless, the conviction seemed to be general that the Marians were growing in strength. The

¹ This was the immediate effect of Marius's own reform in the constitution of the army. His object was to popularize the military force of the republic, and wean it from its devotion to the state; and, with that view, he abolished the property qualification, which had been formerly required of every citizen who offered to enlist. Sall. *B. J.* 86.: "Non ex classibus et more majorum, sed uti cujusque libido erat, milites Marius scripsit, capite censos plerosque. Id factum alii inopia bonorum, alii per ambitionem consulis memorabant, quod ab eo genere celebratus auctusque erat, et homini potentiam quærenti egentissimus quisque opportunissimus, cui neque sua curæ, quippe quæ nulla sunt, et omnia cum pretio honesta videntur."

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II

senate felt an unseen power clasping it about with bands from which it could scarcely extricate itself, paralyzing its energies and overshadowing its prospects. However secure it was of the soldiers while still retained under their ensigns, it knew that to disband and disperse them in colonies, though demanded by themselves and on many accounts expedient, must cause an immediate dissolution of the ties by which their allegiance was assured. No class was more ready for tumult and revolt than the veterans of Sulla, settled in apparent ease and contentment throughout Italy; they only wanted leaders of their own choice to plunge into another civil war and scramble for fresh booty. The chiefs of the hostile party were moving all the passions of the vast constituency of the city, to compass their own election to the curule magistracies, as opening the direct road to the provinces and the command of the national armies. Thus it was that a traitor to the aristocracy had obtained the government of part of Spain, and had sworn to bring over his troops to the support of the Catilinarians; a danger which had been only averted from the government by his premature and suspicious death. This instance was enough to show how imminent was the peril of the senate even in the midst of its most apparent security. To defend itself against a surprise in this quarter, it strove by its command of the public tribunals to expose and chastise the reckless bribery of its opponents. But from bribing the electors it was an easy step to corrupt the votes of the judges, and the Marians soon found that they could succeed in the halls

of justice not less readily than in the comitia. When this last bulwark began to be undermined, the nobles felt that the time was at hand when they must unsheath the sword in their own defence, or surrender to the dictation of terms the extent of which they could hardly conjecture.

CHAP. III.

CHARACTER AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF CÆSAR.—HIS EARLY DANGERS AND GOOD FORTUNE.—HE ASSUMES THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MARIAN PARTY: HARASSES THE SENATE WITH REPEATED ATTACKS: BECOMES QUÆSTOR, ÆDILE, AND SUPREME PONTIFF: ESCAPES THE ATTEMPT OF HIS ENEMIES TO INCLUDE HIM IN THE PROSCRIPTION OF CATILINA'S ASSOCIATES: HE ALONE FULFILS THE IDEA OF THE HERO DEMANDED BY THE AGE.

CHAP.
III.

Character
of Cæsar.

THE policy and conduct of the popular party at the great crisis of the commonwealth may be best understood by tracing the career of its illustrious leader, who stood forth far more prominently among his own associates, and gave more distinct expression to their views, than was the case with any one of the chiefs of the opposite faction whose character has already passed under our review. To that grand array of aristocratic gravity, of military renown, of learning and eloquence, of austere and indomitable virtue, were opposed the genius and resources of one man. He bore, indeed, an ancient and honourable name; his talents for war were, perhaps, the highest the world has ever witnessed; his intellectual powers were almost equally distinguished in the closet, the forum, and the field; his virtues, the very opposite to those of Cato, were assuredly not less conspicuous. But he possessed one qualification for success more essential than all these; the perfect simplicity of his own character gave him tact to appreciate the

real circumstances and tendencies of public affairs, to which his contemporaries were signally blind. He watched the tide of events for many anxious years, and threw himself upon it at the moment when its current was most irresistible. Favoured on numerous occasions by the most brilliant good fortune, he never lost the opportunities which were thus placed within his grasp. He neither indulged himself in sloth like Lucullus, nor wavered like Pompeius, nor shifted like Cicero, nor, like Cato, wrapped himself in impracticable pride; but, equally capable of commanding men and of courting them, of yielding to events and of moulding them, he maintained his course firmly and fearlessly, without a single false step, till he attained the topmost summit of human power.

Caius Julius Cæsar, the greatest name in history, was descended from a genuine Roman family of high antiquity.¹ He seems to have been himself the first to claim descent from the hero Iulus, the offspring of Æneas, and through him from the goddess Venus²; a legendary genealogy which the poets adopted with ardour and rendered universally familiar.³ The name of Julius occurs several times in the list of the earlier consuls, but this branch of the house seems to have become

His parentage and connexion with Marius, from whom he inherits the leadership of the popular party. Comprehensiveness of his views.

¹ The Julii were both patrician and plebeian: the branch which bore the surname of Cæsar belonged to the former class.

² In the funeral oration which he pronounced over his aunt Julia, who had been the wife of Marius. (Suet. *Jul.* 6.) At this time he was in full pursuit of the great object of his ambition, and this assertion of his divine descent must be regarded as a stroke of policy, and not as a mere ebullition of youthful vanity.

³ Vell. ii. 41.; App. *B. C.* ii. 68.; Dion. xli. 34.; and the poets *passim*.

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extinct; while that from which Caius Cæsar himself sprang could also boast of more than one consulship, and a large share of other public honours. Besides the father and grandfather of Caius, whose names are honourably recorded, several of his uncles and cousins are mentioned in the annals of the time. They seem, for the most part, to have taken the side of the aristocracy in the civil wars¹, and more than one of them were slain by Fimbria among the enemies of Marius and Cinna.² But Marius himself was married to a Julia, sister to the father of the future dictator; and the nephew inherited from his uncle the championship of the popular party, his connexion with which he further cemented in early youth by espousing the daughter of Cinna.³ Having thus planted himself in decided opposition to the oligarchy, he was not dazzled by the brilliancy of their position, nor deceived in his estimate of their vaunted strength and resources. He knew how rotten was the foundation on which their power really rested, which was no more than the traditional awe of the lower ranks, and the precarious influence of interests ill understood. On the other

¹ L. Julius Cæsar was consul at the commencement of the Social war, and took the command of the Roman armies. In the heat of the struggle he perceived the wisdom of concession, and succeeded in carrying a law for the admission of the Italians to the franchise of the city. But the character of the war was changed by this time, and many of the Italians refused to avail themselves of the boon. (*Cic. pro Balb.* 8.) The son and grandson of this Cæsar were noted partisans of the senate at a later period, though they had little influence in public affairs.

² *Flor.* iii. 21.

³ Cornelia, by whom he had his only daughter Julia. (*Suet. Jul.* 1.)

hand, he was thoroughly conversant with the growing elements of the Marian forces. He knew that their strength, great as it was even at Rome, under the very shadow of the patrician majesty, was supported moreover by many external bulwarks, such as the ambition of the Italians, the restlessness of the veterans, and even the hatred of the provincials to the ruling class, with whose injustice and tyranny they were most familiar.¹ He foresaw that the genuine Roman race would be overwhelmed by the pressure of its alien subjects; but he conceived the magnificent idea, far beyond the ordinary comprehension of his time, of reducing the whole of this mighty mass, in its utmost confusion, to that obedience to the rule of a single chieftain which it scorned to render to an exhausted nation. He felt, from the first, the proud conviction that his was the genius which could fuse all its elements into a new Universal People; and the more he learnt to appreciate his contemporaries, the more was he persuaded that none among them was similarly endowed. He aimed at destroying the moral ties, the principles or prejudices by which the existing system of society was still imperfectly held together. But he did so from no love of destruction or pride of power, but because he felt how obsolete and insecure they had become, and because he trusted in his own resources to create new ideas in harmony with his new institutions.

Cæsar was called upon to assert his character He is per-

¹ "Romanos odere omnes, dominosque gravantur
Quos novere magis." Lucan. vii. 284.

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secuted by
the Sullan
party.

and his political principles at the very outset of his career. Sulla, suspicious of the youthful nephew of his rival, and urged probably to destroy him by his own adherents, but restrained by some lurking feeling of mercy, or sympathy with a kindred genius, required him to divorce his wife Cornelia, and thus loosen his connexion with the Marians.¹ Their party was at the moment in its lowest state of despair. The proscription had lopped off all its leaders, and no one dared to raise his head above the ranks of the multitude, who were protected by their insignificance. There was no one among them to whom Cæsar could appeal for protection; yet, though now only in his eighteenth year², he resolutely refused to comply with the dictator's command. Sulla was staggered by his boldness, and still refrained from striking. Even Pompeius, the rising favourite of the senate, had divorced Antistia at the decree of the tyrant, and Piso Annia, the widow of Cinna. But the dictator, it would seem, was growing weary of power. He was satisfied with the revolution he had effected; he entertained, as he proved by his abdication, a feeling of magnanimous confidence in the stability of his work; and, in a moment of generosity or malice, he spared the life of one from whose genius he anticipated a brilliant career. Nevertheless, he is said to have remarked, that in Cæsar there was

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 1.; Plut. *Cæs.* 1.

² A. U. 672, B. C. 82. Cæsar was born A. U. 654, B. C. 100. Of his most celebrated contemporaries, Crassus was born about B. C. 115.; Pompeius and Cicero, both B. C. 106.; Cato, B. C. 95.

more than one Marius, and to have warned the oligarchs to "beware of that young trifler."¹ They were not prone to disregard their master's predictions, and Cæsar did not escape altogether with impunity. He paid for his constancy by the loss of his place in the priesthood and of his wife's fortune.² He was himself compelled to seek an asylum at a distance from Rome, beyond the immediate observation of his enemies; and until his pardon was assured, he lurked in disguise among the Sabine mountains.³

The friends of Cæsar had represented to the dictator his youth, his careless habits, his insignificance, as reasons why he might be spared with safety. The reply of Sulla showed that he saw further into his character than ordinary observers. He had the acuteness to know how much energy and power of application is frequently concealed in youth under an exterior of thoughtless dissipation. There can be no doubt that the future orator, historian, and statesman must have been actively employed from his earliest years in storing his mind with learning, and laying the foundations of the varied interest in literature which he afterwards developed. He was also deeply meditating

Cæsar undertakes the patronage of the popular cause.

¹ Suet. *L. c.*; Plut. *l. c.*; Macrob. *Sat.* ii. 3.: "Ut puerum male præcinctum caverent." Dion. xliii. 43.: Τὸν κακῶς ζωννύμενον φυλάττεισθε.

² Suet. *Jul.* i.

³ He was discovered and seized by one Cornelius Phagita, from whom he escaped by a bribe. It is recorded by Suetonius, as an instance of the clemency of his character, that he never avenged himself upon his captor in the time of his power. (Suet. *Jul.* 74.; Plut. *Cæs.* 1.) He was pardoned at the intercession of the Vestal virgins, of Mamercus Æmilius, and Aurelius Cotta. (Suet. *Jul.* 1.)

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the part which he should play in political affairs. The great popular party of the last generation lay exhausted and shattered on the ground. He determined to revive and consolidate it, and claimed, with the generous devotion of youth, to be the organ of its passions and the centre of its affections. The boldness of his demeanour in collision with the all-formidable dictator stamped him at once as a man fit to command. He seemed to leap at once into one of the niches of fame and popularity in which the figures of the great men of the day were admired and courted by the multitude. His next step was to make himself conspicuous abroad, to form connexions for himself and his party among the nations and potentates beyond Italy, who were yearning for a nearer access to the privileges or favour of Rome. At this period the generals of the republic in the East were intently occupied in recovering the authority in the provinces which Mithridates had wrested from her in his first contest. Cæsar learnt the first rudiments of warfare at the siege of Mytilene, under Thermus.¹ He profited by the opportunity of a mission to the court of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, to gain the personal as well as the political friendship of that monarch, who eventually bequeathed his possessions to the Roman people.² He also served under Servilius in Cilicia; but as soon as the news of the

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 2.

² The influence which Cæsar obtained over the king of Bithynia, leading, as it apparently did, to this successful result, excited the jealousy of the nobles, and was rewarded by the circulation of infamous but wholly unsupported charges against his private character. (Suet. *Jul.* 2.; comp. 49, 50.)

dictator's death reached the camp, he abandoned the army and returned to play a more conspicuous part in civil affairs.

Upon the abdication of Sulla, no one had dared to move a finger against the institutions he had established, such was the terror the monster still inspired, though disarmed and decrepid. Upon his death, the self-control of the young aspirant was manifested in his holding aloof from the premature reactionary movement of Lepidus.¹ Nor did he entangle himself in any way in the projects of Sertorius. Throughout life he never trusted himself to the schemes and combinations of others. Whatever intrigues he may have favoured with the view of thrusting more hasty and violent men into action, he was careful not to compromise his own ulterior plans by proclaiming himself an open enemy of the government, till he had acquired a position from which he might direct and control every instrument he chose to employ. Accordingly, while the sedition of Lepidus was rapidly working the destruction of its movers, Cæsar was betaking himself to slower and more secret methods of moulding circumstances to his designs. He undertook the impeachment of Dolabella, a distinguished noble, for malversation in his province; and, although the senators succeeded, as judges, in screening the delinquent, his accuser was rewarded by the unbounded applause of the people. The provinces hailed him as the patron of the subject

But abstains from joining the movement of Lepidus. Impeaches some of the principal nobles.

A.U. 677.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 3.: "Et Lepidi quidem societate, quanquam magnis conditionibus invitaretur, abstinuit, quum ingenio ejus diffusus, tum occasione quam minorem opinione offenderat."

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A. U. 678.

against the citizen, and defiance was boldly hurled against the privileges of the aristocracy. A similar result followed a second attack upon Antonius. In this case the accused, though he escaped at the time, was expelled from the senate by the censors six years afterwards. It was evident that "the young trifler's" blows already told.¹

Cæsar
studies rhe-
toric at
Athens. Ef-
fects of the
prevalent
taste for
foreign
study.

Still acting upon his principles of caution and delay, Cæsar retired again from Rome, and occupied himself for some time at Rhodes in attendance upon the instructions of the rhetorician Molo.² Even in this proceeding, however trifling, we may discover a trace of the independence of his character. It had been, from early times, the practice of the Roman nobles to educate their young men for the bar and the forum, by observation of the orators of the day, their own friends and relations. The school was a noble one; its models lived and breathed, and transacted the real business of the state. All their words had a meaning, and might be traced to effective results. But the practice nourished exclusive views of state-policy, and tended to confine the management of affairs in the hands of the favoured class who had private access to the dis-

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 4. Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, consul A. U. 673, had been proconsul of Macedonia. C. Antonius, afterwards consul with Cicero (691), was accused of extortion in Greece. These impeachments are coupled with that of Verres for the enormity and notoriety of the offence in each case:

"Inde Dolabella est atque hinc Antonius, inde
Sacrilegus Verres." Juv. viii. 105.

² Suet. *L. c.*; Plut. *Cæs.* 3. who is wrong in the order of time. (Comp. Drumann, iii. 135.) Cicero had studied under Molo a few years previously. (Plut. *Cic.* 4.; Cic. *Brut.* 91.)

cussions and exercises of the nobility. The sullen patricians of the imperial times looked back with regret to the period when the halls of the Greek rhetoricians had not yet become the resort of political adventurers, and pointed, with bitter triumph, to the sarcasm of Cicero, who had once called them schools of impudence.¹ Yet Cicero himself, the young Italian, to whom, no doubt, the arts and experience of the nobility were far from freely communicated, had forged his own best weapons in the workshop which, when himself ennobled, he thus harshly stigmatized. And Cæsar also may have been compelled to learn the business of the forum, in some degree, from the mouths of the sophists, while he was urged, no less by his own views and inclination, to bring their studies into fashion by his example, and throw wide the portals of political education. Predisposed as he was to imbibe liberal and cosmopolite ideas, his personal observation of the men of Greece and their modes of thinking might have been highly influential in enlarging his views, and shaking to their foundations the prejudices held sacred by his countrymen. The school of Molo, the resort of the ardent and enlightened youth of all nations, may have prepared the way for his senate of Gauls, and Spaniards, and Africans.

¹ See the passage in the *Dial. de Oratoribus*, 35.: "At nunc adolescentuli nostri deducuntur in scenas scholasticorum, qui rhetores vocantur: quos paullo ante Ciceronis tempora exitisse, nec placuisse majoribus nostris, ex eo manifestum est, quod L. Crasso et Domitio censoribus cludere, ut ait Cicero, ludum impudentiæ jussi sunt." The passage of Cicero occurs in the *De Orat.* iii. 24. The words are put into the mouth of L. Crassus, but this speaker is considered generally to represent the sentiments of the writer.

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He is captured by the pirates. His courage and good fortune.

The many imminent risks of his life which Cæsar incurred confirmed him in the steadfast confidence with which he relied on his good fortune, which became one of the secrets of his success. During his retirement in the East, he fell into the hands of the Cilician pirates, who were not unaccustomed to make a parade of their defiance of Rome by murdering the officers of the republic whom they captured. Fortunately, the name of Cæsar was not yet enrolled in the annals of the magistracy; but his birth and the wealth of his family were well known, and the ruffians were satisfied with demanding a ransom. Some romantic embellishments are added to the story by the imagination of the narrators, in accordance with the reckless magnanimity of character with which tradition loved to invest her favourite hero.¹ He disdained, it was said, to purchase his liberty at so mean a price as twenty talents, and offered his captors fifty. At the same time he threatened them with his vengeance, and pledged himself to return with a fleet, arrest the pirates, and crucify them as common robbers.² His vengeance, indeed, did not slumber. After his release, he collected some forces, attacked and overcame his captors. He was content, however, with offering to send them to Junius Silanus, the proconsul of Asia,

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 2.; Polyæn. *Stratagem.* viii. 23. 1.

² Plutarch gives a graphic account of the way in which Cæsar is supposed to have passed his time among the pirates while waiting for his ransom. He spent eight and thirty days among them, not so much like a prisoner as a prince surrounded by his guards, and he joined in their sports and exercises. He read his poems and speeches to them, and scoffed at their bad taste if they did not applaud them.

under whose military authority he was acting, that they might suffer condign punishment at his hands. The proconsul, in reply, ordered him to sell them as slaves, but Cæsar resented, as an insult to himself, the lenity or avarice which could dictate such an act. He boldly disregarded the command, and sentenced his prisoners to the cross, the death of slaves and robbers: but the historians thought it worth recording, as an instance of the clemency always attributed to Cæsar in comparison with his contemporaries, that he allowed them to be put to death by a less painful process, before he inflicted upon their bodies the last indignity of the law.¹

Upon his return to the city, Cæsar prepared to enter upon the career of public office, for which his extreme youth had hitherto disqualified him. He now began to pay his court to the people with systematic assiduity.² His high character, his noble aspect and popular manners, even the lustre of his patrician descent, recommended him to their affections; moreover, he had chosen his side as a patron of the popular cause, and had bearded the oligarchy in their stronghold, the courts of justice.³ But it was not sufficient to enlist their prejudices in his favour. The can-

He enters the arena of public honours; is pushed forward by the zealous efforts of his party.
A. U. 680.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 74.

² The fascination of Cæsar's manners and address is specially noted. Plut. *Cæs.* 3.

³ The people, says Plutarch (*Lucull.* 1.), set the young orators upon noble delinquents, just as well-bred whelps are hounded upon wild beasts: 'Ἐδοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς ἀνευ προφάσεως οὐκ ἀγεννὲς εἶναι τὸ τῆς κατηγορίας ἔργον.

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didate for the suffrages of the people availed himself profusely of the arts of bribery and corruption, and carried out the lax morality of the day with characteristic energy. His private fortune had never been large; his wife's dowry had been seized by Sulla; and he found himself reduced to the greatest straits in supplying the demand of this policy. But he drew boldly upon his own matchless self-confidence. He borrowed of all his friends, and even of his rivals; he pledged his future fortunes; he held out the lure of places and provinces to the wealthier of his own faction; the last reward of their fidelity could be obtained only by placing him, at whatever cost, on the pinnacle of public honours. The pre-eminence of his genius, however, was soon discovered by his own party; as he rose, his adherents must rise with him. Accordingly, he was supported and impelled forwards by the combined efforts of all who had money to stake upon the great game he was playing for their common advancement.

Caesar defies
the law of
Sulla in
exhibiting
the bust of
Marius.

Meanwhile, the policy which Pompeius had deliberately adopted after crushing the faction of Sertorius, that of surrendering the most obnoxious privileges which Sulla had conferred upon the senate, found, of course, a zealous partizan in the youthful patriot. This was the beginning of the intercourse between the two great rival statesmen of the age, and they mutually cultivated an appearance of friendship, although little cordiality could really exist between the cold, correct, and selfish Pompeius and the gay ambitious

intriguer with whom he condescended to act.¹ Nor did the latter affect any concealment of his political designs, as far as they had yet perhaps dawned upon his own mind. His Marianism became more openly avowed every day, and it was only a misplaced contempt for one whom he regarded as a spendthrift and a reveller that could suffer Pompeius to view it with such unconcern. On the death of Julia, the widow of Marius, her nephew pronounced a funeral oration in her honour.² Of course a much larger share of his panegyric was devoted to the hero Marius than to the respectable matron, the ostensible subject of the ceremony. The family honours of the old Arpinate were scanty, but his exploits had raised his name to a level with the most illustrious Romans; and when the orator boasted in the same breath of his descent from the gods, and his connexion with the plebeian champion, the people felt it as a compliment to themselves, and declared that two such illustrious titles to their esteem were fitly associated in the same person. Sulla had attempted, in the wantonness of his power, to obliterate the remembrance of his rival. No monuments were allowed to rise in his honour. The public exhibition of his bust was forbidden. But Cæsar boldly violated the law, and paraded an

A. U. 686.

¹ Pompeius was enjoying his first consulship, with Crassus for his colleague, A. U. 684, B. C. 70.

² A. U. 686, B. C. 68.

³ Plut. *Cæs.* 5. On the death of his wife Cornelia, about the same time, he delivered also a funeral oration over her. It was not the

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passions of the people, by thus placing before their eyes the figure of their favourite at the moment when they least expected or dared to hope it; an example which was afterwards imitated in his own case by Antonius, when forbidden to plead for vengeance by words. In both instances the effect upon the excitable blood of the South was electric; and from that moment, perhaps, the popular party regarded Cæsar as the representative of their lost chieftain, and the heir to their favour and affections.

Serves the
office of
quæstor in
Spain.

Cæsar at this period was serving the office of quæstor, upon the expiration of which he followed the proprætor Antistius Vetus to Spain.¹ In his share in the administration of the province he obtained the praise of industry and vigour.² The sophists, who were wont to parade him as a striking instance of the conversion of a dissolute youth to the noblest virtues and aims, imagined a sudden change to have taken place in his character at this time, and ascribed it to his reflections on beholding a statue of Alexander the Great at Gades, and to a dream of auspicious interpretation.³ But there is really no trace of any such conversion in Cæsar's history. His morals custom to bestow this honour upon *young* married women, and Cæsar obtained credit by this act for peculiar kindness and affection to the memory of his wife. He probably seized the opportunity to proclaim to the world his connexion with the family of Cinna, in whose behalf he supported the bill of Plautius for allowing the adherents of Sertorius to return to Rome. Suet. *Jul.* 5.; Gell. xiii. 3.

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 5.

² Vell. ii. 43.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 7.; Dion. xxxvii. 52.; but they differ as to the time, which Dion puts some years later. Plutarch connects the dream (ἰδοκεῖ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μητρὶ μίγνυσθαι τὴν ἀβήτορον μίξιν) with the passage of the Rubicon.

were from the first as lax as those of the youth of the time generally, and his devotion to sensual pleasures continued through life to be little worthy of one who had so much both within and without him to exalt and purify his character. From the very outset of his career he placed an object of political ambition before his eyes; nor was he at any time more thoroughly in earnest than when he defied the dictation of Sulla in his earliest youth.

After an interval of two years, the young champion of the Marians gained another step in the career of public honours. He was elected to the office of *ædile*¹, a post which afforded peculiar opportunities to a candidate for popular favour, and in which he acquitted himself very much to the satisfaction of the people. Following steadily the bold policy which he had adopted upon mature calculation, he bade high for their applause by the magnificence of his shows and entertainments.² He had prevailed upon his colleague Bibulus, a wealthy noble, to furnish the sums requisite for this profuse expenditure, for his own private resources were exhausted, and his debts amounted to thirteen hundred talents. He might share the credit of generosity with his colleague³, but he knew that

Becomes
ædile; connects himself by marriage with the family of Pompeius; restores the trophies of Marius, and baffles the indignation of the nobles.

¹ A. U. 689, in the consulship of P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Pætus. The election took place of course in the year preceding.

² The gladiatorial shows with which he celebrated the memory of his father were peculiarly splendid. "Omni apparatu arenæ argenteo usus est." Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. 16.

³ Even this was not the case, for the goodwill of the people insisted upon ascribing the whole merit to their favourite. Bibulus consoled himself by making the best bon-mot the occasion allowed: "Nec dissimulavit collega ejus M. Bibulus evenisse sibi quod Polluci; ut

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its more substantial recompense would accrue to himself alone. In the mean time he had been forwarding with all his influence the schemes by which the friends of Pompeius were pandering to their patron's ambition, and widening the breach, already apparent, between him and the senatorial party. He had chosen to connect himself, by a second marriage, with the Pompeian house; and his devotion to the aggrandizement of its chief might be mistaken by its object, and by the world, for family affection.¹ The success of the Manilian bill was owing, probably, far more to the crafty support of Cæsar and Crassus than to the eloquence of Cicero. The exhibition of the bust of Marius in a funeral procession had already irritated the nobles; but now a greater insult was inflicted upon them. Among his other acts of munificence as ædile, Cæsar had decorated the forum, the basilicas, and the Capitol with pictures and statues; he had enlarged them with additional porticoes for the gratification of the people, and these also he had adorned with monuments of taste and luxury.² One morning there suddenly appeared among the new ornaments of the Capitol the statue of Marius surrounded by the trophies of his Cimbric and Jugurthine victories.³ The people were intoxicated with delight; the nobles scowled with undisguised

enim fratribus ædes in foro constituta tantum Castoris vocaretur, ita suam Cæsarisque munificentiam unius Cæsaris dici." Suet. *Jul.* 10.; Dion. xxxvii. 8.

¹ Pompeia, Cæsar's second wife, was the daughter of Q. Pompeius Rufus, consul with Sulla A. U. 666. If there was any connexion by blood between the two great branches of this gens, it must have been a very remote one.

² Suet. *Jul.* 10.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 11.; Plut. *Cæs.* 6.

indignation. The author of the deed did not proclaim himself; but neither party could err in assigning it to the daring ædile. Catulus, once more at the head of his party, determined to bring him to punishment for this direct breach of the law. His bitterness was inflamed, over and above his political enmity to the Marians, by the remembrance of a brother who had been one of the most distinguished victims of their proscription.¹ He accused Cæsar of having by this act thrown off the mask from his ulterior designs; of no longer subverting the republic with mines, but of assailing it with the battering-ram.² Cæsar defended himself before the senate, and succeeded in foiling his accuser; but his triumph was not owing to the favour of his audience, but to the temper of the people, upon which the nobles dared not make an experiment. It would appear, from the historians, that the trophies of Marius retained possession of their conspicuous place in front of the Capitol, an indication of the popular strength, which must have shaken the nerves even of Cato himself.³

Still the resolution of both parties became more firmly rooted; the combat waxed warmer and

The nobles
retaliate.

¹ Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 3.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 6.: Οὐκ ἔτι γὰρ ὑπονόμοις, ἔφη, Καῖσαρ, ἀλλ' ἡδὲ μηχαναῖς αἰρεῖ τὴν πολιτείαν.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 11.: "Tropæa restituit." Vell. ii. 43.: "Restituta monumenta." They make no mention of their having been removed. Propertius (iii. 11. 46.) speaks of them as existing at a later period: "Jura dare et statuas inter et arma Marî," and Val. Max. vi. 9. 14.: "Cujus bina tropæa in urbe spectantur." The antiquaries of modern Rome thought they had discovered a portion of these identical trophies in the monument now placed at the top of the steps which lead to the Campidoglio; but the illusion has been dispelled by the greater acuteness of later critics.

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warmer. The senate hastened at the earliest opportunity to strike another blow. The republic claimed possession of Egypt upon the pretence of a will made in their favour by the king, Ptolemæus Alexander I., during the ascendancy of Sulla; but the government had prudently abstained from enforcing these pretensions.¹ It preferred leaving the fertile plains on which Italy relied for no small portion of her daily sustenance in the hands of a dependent sovereign, to subjecting them to the ambition or cupidity of a citizen. But Cæsar was now anxious to reap the first-fruits of the fame he had acquired, and relieve himself from some part of the load of his immense pecuniary obligations. He solicited the appointment to an extraordinary mission, for the purpose of constituting the country a province of the empire, and arranging its administration. The senate, however, in its jealousy of Pompeius, and of all who appeared to side with him, conceived that Cæsar proposed to strengthen the hands of its general in the East by adding to his enormous powers the control of one of the granaries of the city. Accordingly, it peremptorily rejected the demand, and proceeded, in addition to this insult, for the claim was fair and reasonable, to make another move against its indignant enemy. It made use of one of the tri-

¹ Cicero throws suspicions upon the validity of this claim (*De Leg. Agr.* ii. 16.); but there is no doubt that the republic conceived it had a legitimate title to the country, and it seems most probable that this was the pretext of Cæsar's demand. The account given by Suetonius (*Jul.* 11.), that he proposed to restore a king whom the Egyptians had expelled, is evidently a confusion of dates and circumstances Comp. Drumann, iii. 146.

bunes, named Papius, to introduce a plebiscitum, decreeing the removal of all aliens from Rome.¹ The pretence was, that strangers from the provinces flocked into the city and interfered with the popular elections, where the immense number of the genuine voters rendered it impossible to exercise due caution in taking the suffrages. But this blow was more particularly aimed at the Transpadane Gauls, who were anxious to exchange their Latin franchise for that of Rome. Cæsar, while passing through their country on his return from Spain, had listened affably to their representations, and they had gladly connected themselves with him as their patron and political adviser. This measure, therefore, seemed calculated to gall the popular leader, and reduce the estimation in which the provincials began to hold him.² But the time was coming when such attacks would only draw closer the ties between the subjects of the republic and their chosen defenders; and, at a later period, the persecution of a Transpadane Gaul was one of the crowning insults which drove Cæsar to take up arms against the senate.

It was now Cæsar's turn to strike. The creatures of Sulla, who had perpetrated at his instigation the atrocities of the proscription, had obtained an act of indemnity to relieve them from the legal guilt incurred by the murder of Roman citizens. Sulla had caused a general enactment to

Cæsar strikes again. Proceedings against Sulla's agents in the proscription. Prosecution of Rabirius.

¹ Dion, xxxvii. 9.

² This was called the Lex Papia de peregrinis or de civitate Romana, A. U. 689. Dion, xxxix. 9.; Schol. Bob. in *Orat. pro Arch. Cic. de Off.* iii. 11.

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be passed, defining and assigning punishments for every mode of assassination, but including a special exemption for his own agents in that bloody work.¹ By discharging the office of ædile, Cæsar acquired the right of assisting the prætors in the performance of their judicial functions, and administered the law in the department to which the investigation of charges of murder was referred. While acting in this capacity, he permitted accusations to be made against two of Sulla's ruffians, Luscious and Bellienus, and pronounced sentence of death upon them.² It seems that Catilina was dragged before the same tribunal, on a similar charge, but was allowed to escape conviction.³ These prosecutions gave great satisfaction to the people, whom the violation of an unpopular law had ceased to surprise or disgust. The victims of these convictions were justly odious, and they fell without commiseration. But Cæsar did not stop here. These proceedings were merely intended to prepare the way for another and more terrible demonstration against his opponents.⁴ Thirty-six years before L. Saturninus, a tribune and favourite of the people, had headed a revolt against the government, and seized upon the Capitol.⁵ The consuls, Marius and Va-

¹ This was the *Lex Cornelia de sicariis*. Suet. *Jul.* 11.

² Cato, in his quæstorship, had already prosecuted the agents of Sulla who had received public money in reward for their services to him in the proscription. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 17.

³ Dion xxxvii. 10.

⁴ The case of Rabirius may be conveniently noticed here, as belonging to the same series of attacks upon the persons of the nobility as those just mentioned. But it did not occur till the early part of Cicero's consulship, A. U. 691.

⁵ A. U. 654, the year of Cæsar's birth. •

lerius, summoned the citizens to their aid. The principal men of all parties seem to have obeyed the invitation; and, after besieging the public enemy in his fortress, they at last reduced him by cutting the pipes which supplied it with water. The consuls, it appears, offered him pardon on capitulation¹; but it so happened that, upon his opening the gates and descending from his fastness, a tumult arose, his party was attacked, and himself killed in the confusion. A slave named Scæva came forward, declared himself the man who had struck the blow, and obtained a public reward for the good service he had done the state. For many years no further notice was taken of the circumstance. But it was determined in Cæsar's councils to make this event, so long passed, a pretext for another attack upon the oligarchy; and an aged senator named Rabirius was picked out to suffer the charge, now apparently advanced for the first time, of having been the real author of the deed. The man himself was not unjustly obnoxious, as being one of the worst specimens of the cupidity and tyranny of his class; but the charge against him seems to have been monstrously iniquitous, and was preferred, perhaps, on that very account, that its extravagance might evince in the most glaring

¹ Cicero's argument that the pardon of the consuls was not valid because it had not been formally ratified by the senate is a paltry quibble; but such an act on the part of Marius, who was sometimes a reluctant instrument in their hands, would be regarded with jealousy by that body, Cic. *pro Rabir.* 10. The whole speech is an appeal to the passions much more than to the judgment and equity of his hearers; but the facts of the case were in themselves overwhelmingly strong in favour of the accused.

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manner the determination of the popular leaders to drive the senate to extremity. The trial was held before a tribunal at which Cæsar himself presided, together with his kinsman Lucius, by the extraordinary appointment of the prætor.¹ Cicero defended the criminal; but his eloquence was not likely to be of any avail, and sentence was given against his client. Consternation reigned in the ranks of the nobility. The charge was capital, and an appeal lay in one quarter only, the comitia of the tribes. This resource seemed to offer but a slender chance of success, but it was necessary to resort to it; and it might be faintly hoped that the eloquence of the unrivalled orator would have greater effect upon an excitable multitude than upon cool and prejudiced individuals. But Cicero again failed; and but for the timely interference of a prætor, Metellus Celer, the unfortunate Rabirius could hardly have escaped the confirmation of his sentence. When the frontiers of Rome were but a few miles from her gates, and the advance of the Etruscans behind the barrier of the Vatican and Janiculan hills was frequently sudden and unperceived, watch was kept upon an eminence beyond the Tiber, to give notice of the approach of an enemy, whenever the people were occupied with the trans-

¹ They were styled *duumviri perduellionis*, judges of murder. L. Cæsar had been consul the preceding year, and was generally connected with the party of the senate, but he seems on this occasion to have been completely under the influence of his kinsman Caius. Dion, xxxvii. 27. The circumstances of this trial, which we gather from a comparison of Cicero's pleadings with Dion's succinct narrative, have given rise to much controversy. The statement in the text is taken from Dion.

action of business in the Campus Martius. The signal of danger was the removal of the great white flag which floated conspicuously on the summit of the Janiculan.¹ The people broke up hastily from their elections or debates, and rushed to man the walls. The old custom remained in force for centuries among a people more than usually retentive of formal observances.² Metellus, acting no doubt in concert with the leaders of the prosecution, struck the flag, and suspended the proceedings. The excited and blood-thirsty populace understood and perhaps laughed at the trick, consenting cheerfully to be baulked of their prey for the sake of a constitutional fiction. The object of the accusation being already gained, the prosecutor Labienus did not press the matter further, and it was allowed to fall into oblivion.

Indefatigable in harassing the aristocracy, the leaders of the popular party had already undertaken to support the agrarian bill proposed in the previous year by one of the tribunes, Servilius Rullus. The object of the tribune was to get a board of commissioners appointed to carry into effect three great popular measures.³ The first of these was the division among the commonalty of all the public land beyond Italy which had been acquired by the republic since the era of the consulship of

The agrarian law of Rullus, another weapon of the Marian party.

¹ Serv. *ad Æn.* viii. 1.: "Alii album et roseum vexillum tradunt, et roseum bellorum, album comitiorum signum fuisse."

² Dion, who gives this account (xxxvii. 28.), says that the practice still continued in his own day: *Καὶ ἔτι τε καὶ νῦν ὅσας ἔνεκα ποιεῖται.*

³ Cic. *de Leg. Agr. contra Rull.*; Plut. *Cic.* 12. The discussion of these measures took place at the commencement of Cicero's consulship, 691. His first speech was spoken on the first of January (*in Pison.* 2.).

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Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, in the year of the city 666. This embraced a great proportion of the conquests of Lucullus and Pompeius in the East ; for all the lands of conquered enemies, which were neither assigned to Roman colonies nor restored to the natives upon their submission, became public domain, and were granted in occupation on easy terms to favoured citizens, but with no right of property. In Italy, also, the event of the Marsic war had thrown much of the landed property of the vanquished party into the possession of the state ; and this had either been given to the Sullan veterans as colonists, or let to them as tenants. This portion of the public domains, which had been acquired since the period assigned by the tribune, he excepted from his law, and did not venture to touch.¹ However popular such interference might have been, it would doubtless have been dangerous. Cicero declares that it would have involved the kindred of the mover of the bill himself in the common ruin of those who had benefited by the dictator's liberality. But it would have been, no doubt, a great boon to the clamorous poverty of the urban populace to have received a share of the public land in the East, whatever its amount may have been, which we have no means of estimating.

In the second place, the commissioners were to institute an inquiry into the pecuniary transactions of the successful generals of the republic, who had returned from their Eastern victories laden with

¹ This war was terminated in the year of Sulla's and Pompeius's consulship: Rullus drew his line immediately previous to that epoch.

the spoils of war and the presents showered upon them by subjects and allies. It was proposed that the whole of the sums which they had thus personally acquired, beyond what they had expended upon public works, or handed over to the treasury, should be restored to the commissioners appointed to make the investigation. Pompeius himself, such was the gratitude and delicacy of the republic, was to be exempted from this restitution; but the account of others was to be made retrospective; even inherited property, it seems, was to be swept into the net; and it was from Faustus Sulla, the son of the dictator, that the amplest return was anticipated.

A third provision of the law was, that a tax should be imposed upon all public lands excepted from the sale. The monies thence accruing might be used by the commissioners in making such purchases of land for division as they should judge desirable. But the point upon which Cicero, who resolutely opposed the measure throughout, lays the greatest stress, as the most arbitrary and dangerous of its enactments, was that by which certain domains in Campania were to be divided among the commonalty, and colonies to be drafted to Capua and neighbouring places. He declares his grave apprehensions lest Capua should thus become the seat of a great plebeian community in antagonism to Rome; he enlarges upon the dangers which were apprehended from that city in the time of Hannibal; expatiates upon the pride and vicious character attributed to its inhabitants in all ages, and denounces the scheme as one which must infallibly

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create a great rival power in the centre of Italy. It may be recollected that in the course of the Social war the allies had threatened to destroy Rome and transfer the common seat of government to Corfinium.¹ Such perils might occur again; and though Cicero himself may have entertained no serious apprehension from the foundation of the new colony, we can understand how plausible his argument was, as addressed to the jealous pride of the Roman comitia. The orator's speeches against the agrarian law of Rullus were amongst the most specious triumphs of his art. In three successive harangues, he first convinced the senate of the impolicy of the proposal, then persuaded the people that it would be of no advantage to their interests, and, finally, defended himself with vehemence against the insinuation of the tribune that his opposition to it had been grounded on personal views.

Critical position of Cicero.

The fact was, with regard to Cicero and his vigorous hostility to this measure, that its introduction placed him in a critical position, from which it required consummate dexterity to extricate him with any appearance of honour. He had just reached the summit of his ambition, first by the advocacy of certain popular claims, under the wing of Pompeius, and again by persuading the nobles that he had been an aristocrat throughout at heart, that his liberal tendencies had been misunderstood, and that he was, in fact, entirely

¹ Vell. ii. 16. : "Caput imperii sui Corfinium elegerant quod appellarunt Italicum." Comp. Lucan, ii. 136. :

"Tum, cum pæne caput mundi rerumque potestas
Mutavit translata locum, Romanaque Sannis
Ultra Caudinas speravit vulnera furcas."

devoted to their interests. The bill of Rullus was a test of his real policy, which he could not evade. It was one of those decisive measures which try the mettle of the adherents of party; no man could support it and profess himself an oligarch; no man could oppose it and retain the affections of the people. It was an ingenious device of the Marians to compel Cicero to break with the people, whom he had thus far cajoled and, as they deemed, betrayed to the senate. Cicero, indeed, was most reluctant to pronounce openly in favour of the aristocratic party, though it was to their cause that he doubtless proposed from henceforth to devote himself. The effort he made to the last to convince both parties that he was really advocating their interests could deceive neither, and the noisy declamations he vented about the imaginary dangers of his new Carthage were only meant to cover his ignominious retreat from a position which was no longer tenable.

C. Calpurnius Piso was a nobleman of high reputation, and a devoted partizan of the senate. He had been consul in the year of the city 687. He had subsequently obtained the province of Gaul beyond the Alps, and had suppressed the mutinous spirit of the natives with unscrupulous severity. The Allobroges preferred against him a charge of malversation, and his judicial murder of a Transpadane Gaul gave Cæsar, as the patron of that people, an opportunity of coming forward and conducting their prosecution.¹ Cicero was

Cæsar prosecutes Calpurnius
Piso: competes with Catulus for the dignity of supreme pontiff, and is victorious.
A. U. 691,
B. C. 63.

¹ Sallust, *B. C.* 49.: "Piso oppugnatur in iudicio pecuniarum repetundarum, propter cuiusdam Transpadani supplicium injustum."

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intimately connected with this Piso, whom he had extolled to Atticus as the pacificator of the Allobroges¹, and with whom, while absent in Gaul, he had concerted measures for his own elevation to the consulship.² He now undertook his defence, and the judges found no difficulty in acquitting him.³ This result was a matter of little concern to the popular party, who were satisfied with seeing the breach between the chiefs of the rival factions daily widened, and their personal animosities rendered irreconcilable. Piso vowed revenge, and soon afterwards made a desperate effort to obtain it, in concert with Catulus, who was at the same time stung by a new disappointment. We have already seen what indignation this nobleman, the veteran champion of the Sullan constitution, manifested when the upstart leader of the Marians exhibited the spoils of their revered hero in the Capitol. He had, moreover, failed in getting this audacity punished; the trophies remained to perpetuate the recollection of the insult. We may imagine the mortification with which the idol of the nobles, the honoured prince or leader of the senate, would daily regard them. How bitterly he must have felt it when, upon offering himself as a candidate for the office of Pontifex Maximus, the most dignified elevation to which a citizen could aspire, he found the same Cæsar, still young in years, still a novice in political affairs, still unknown

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 13.

² Cic. *ad Att.* i. 1.

³ Cic. *pro Flacco*, 39. : "Consul ego nuper defendi C. Pisonem, qui quia consul fortis constansque fuerat, incolumis est reipublicæ conservatus."

by any civil or military exploits, starting in audacious competition with him.¹ For the nobles professed to regard Cæsar merely as a reckless spendthrift, and to consider his well-known pecuniary embarrassments his only claim to notoriety. Catulus offered, perhaps in derision, to buy off his opposition by ministering to his necessities, that the field might thus be left open to the rivalry of himself and Servilius, a worthy candidate, who had just returned in triumph from the East with the title of Isauricus. But Cæsar knew his own position, and had calculated his resources. He refused the offers of Catulus with scorn, declared that he would persevere in the contest, and that, as for his debts, he was prepared to borrow more to win it.² The enactments of Sulla had withdrawn from the people the appointment to the sacerdotal college, and had constituted that body self-elective. What mode the dictator assigned for the appointment of the supreme pontiff does not clearly appear, but it was probably confided to the comitia of the centuries by the same law of Labienus which had restored the election of the priests generally to the people. It was apparently only a few months or weeks since this great triumph had been achieved by the popular party³, and Cæsar might reasonably count upon the good offices of the electors. Nor did he conceal from

¹ Sallust, *B. C.* 49. : "Catulus ex petitione pontificatus odio incensus, quod extrema ætate, maximis honoribus usus, ab adolescentulo Cæsare victus discesserat."

² Plut. *Cæs.* 7. : 'Ο δὲ καὶ πλείω προσδανεισάμενος ἔφη διαγωνεῖσθαι.

³ Dion, xxxvii. 37. ; comp. Fischer, *Röm. Zeittäfel*, 228.

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himself that he staked all his fortunes upon the die. When the moment arrived, and he was about to present himself in public, his mother attended him in tears to the door of his house, and he embraced her with the words, "This day you will behold your son either supreme pontiff or an exile."¹ The election terminated in his elevation to the much-coveted honour. The old traditions of the state were violated in favour of one so young and inexperienced; and the senate was taught that its civil influence was gone for ever; it must now gird itself for the battle, and place its trust in its purse and its sword.

The nobles attempt to implicate Cæsar in Catilina's conspiracy.

The deadly animosity which had been fostered between the leaders of the rival factions by so many contests might be sufficient to account for the charge, so often made against Cæsar, of having been concerned in the conspiracy of Catilina, even if we had not the direct assurance of contemporaries that such was its real origin. Smarting under their late vexations, Piso and Catulus combined with their united influence to urge Cicero to include their hateful enemy in the arrests which he was meditating.² They even attempted bribery, but without effect. The consul was either too honest, or, at least, too cautious. He could not venture to punish Cæsar capitally, and to have included him in the list of the accused would have

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 13.

² Sallust, *B. C.* 49. : "Sed iisdem temporibus Q. Catulus et C. Piso neque precibus neque gratia neque pretio Ciceronem impellere poterunt, uti per Allobroges aut per alium indicem C. Cæsar falso nominaretur."

saved all. But the triumphant career upon which the young Marian was now entering, successful in every encounter with the nobles, where the public exposure of their enormities was in itself success, growing also as he was in strength as well as in popularity, affords a strong argument in favour of his innocence. The only temptation he could have had to join in an act of violence lay in his pecuniary embarrassments. But in this respect a person in Cæsar's position had resources which common minds little appreciated. He was regarded by his friends as the rising sun, destined to be the fountain at some future day of all honours and emoluments. In that age of universal recklessness no mode of gambling was more general than that of staking mens' fortunes on the success of political adventurers. Whatever enterprize Cæsar announced, money always flowed in to effect it.

The line of argument which he adopted in the senate, when the punishment of the criminals came to be debated, was not dictated by any personal interest in their behalf. He declared that they were justly liable to the severest of all possible penalties, but to the free and high-minded banishment, he contended, and imprisonment would be worse than death. These, accordingly, were the punishments which he advocated, and he enforced his arguments by the consideration that these, at least, were strictly legal; for the people alone, he maintained, had power to decree death on a charge of treason. Such tampering with the letter of the law on the part of the nobility had been the great

Cæsar advocates a lenient sentence on the conspirators: he is threatened with personal violence.

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cause of offence which had embittered the rivalry of political factions. The murders of the Gracchi and of Saturninus had roused the people to the most direful vengeance. The proscriptions of Sulla were no more than a similar stretch of prerogative on a more extensive scale. The execution of Lentulus and his associates would reopen the sluices of bloodshed; reaction would follow upon reaction; each party would alternately decimate the other.¹ This was the popular argument of the day. The commonalty were depressed, and they naturally made their strongest appeals to the principles of mercy; but that Cæsar really felt the force of his own reasonings may be believed from the example of clemency which he conspicuously set when he was himself in the ascendant. But the nobility, as has been already said, were in a position of strength, in which an act of bold severity, if followed by prudence and moderation, might have cowed their enemies on either side, and re-established the constitution. Unfortunately they perpetrated the violence recklessly, and neglected to anticipate and avert its effects. Their cry for blood was not the politic severity of Cicero, but the thirst of wild beasts.

¹ Cæsar's arguments, though ultimately unsuccessful, had considerable influence: "Metum injectit asperiora suadentibus, identidem ostentans quanta eos in posterum a plebe Romana maneret invidia." Suet. *Jul.* 14. Tiberius Nero had preceded Cæsar in declaring similar sentiments. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 5.; Sall. *B. C.* 50. How deeply the violence of Sulla had sunk into the minds of the Roman people may be estimated from a remarkable passage of Dionys. *A. R.* v. 77. It was not the cruelty, but the irregularity of his proceedings that made so lasting an impression. His dictatorship was a mere tyranny. He acted as no Roman had ever acted before, and treated Romans as Romans had never before been treated.

Even the precincts of the senate house were profaned by their barbarous passions. Cæsar, on leaving the Temple of Concord, in which this celebrated deliberation had been held, was attacked by a mob of knights, partizans of the oligarchy, the friends especially of Piso and Catulus, from whose drawn swords he was with difficulty preserved by the influence of Cicero and the zeal of his own associates.¹ His position as an enemy of the aristocracy was now more distinct than ever. The contest between them had assumed the form of personal hostility, in that last and most frightful shape in which it was familiar to the Romans. Rage, hatred, and defiance expelled all milder counsels; and while every one was hastening to array himself on one side or the other, the middle party, the object of the fostering care of the best and wisest statesmen, dwindled away into impotence and insignificance.

The ranks of both parties in the state were filled with men of practical ability, whose lives had been passed in the free and active spheres of the camp and the forum; but, with the exception of Cæsar himself, it would be difficult to point out a single individual of original genius, or one who could discern the signs of the times, and conceive comprehensive measures in harmony with them. The temper of the Roman people at this crisis of their history required the guidance of a mind of more vigorous grasp than was possessed by a Cicero or a Pompeius, whose talents as public men were limited to a capacity for ad-

Extrava-
gant ideas
popularly
afloat.
Want of an
original and
powerful
mind to
guide them.

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 8.

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ministration, in which respect we shall have occasion more than once to signalize their ability, but who could neither understand nor grapple with the great evil of the Sullan revolution, which had checked the natural progress of reform demanded by the extension of the Roman franchise, and restored the landmarks of a constitution which was no longer the legitimate exponent of the national character. The people had already undergone a marked change in their ideas and motives of action, while they were still clinging, with the pertinacity for which they were remarkable, to forms from which the living spirit had departed. The extent and rapid succession of their conquests, bringing with them an overwhelming accession of public and private wealth, had filled men's minds with the wildest anticipations. The extravagance of each succeeding year eclipsed the profuseness of its predecessor. M. Lepidus, the consul in the year of Sulla's death, erected the most magnificent dwelling that had been seen up to his day in Rome; within thirty-five years it was outshone by not fewer than an hundred mansions.¹ The same was the case with the extension of the territorial possessions of the nobility, their accumulation of plate, jewels, and every other article of luxury, and not less the multiplication of their slaves and dependents. The immoderate interest which ready money commanded shows that the opening of new channels to enterprize outstripped even the rapid multiplication of wealth. Mines of gold lay, as it were, at the feet of any man who

¹ Plin. *H. N.* xxxvi. 24.

could procure means to purchase the soil above them. The price was trifling compared with the gains to be acquired; but whether the speculator succeeded or was ruined, the usurer reared a stately fortune in ease and security. All eyes were turned from the barrenness of the past and fixed upon a future of boundless promise. Men laughed at the narrow notions of their parents and even of their own earlier years. It is only once or twice in the course of ages, as on the discovery of a new continent, or the overthrow of a vast spiritual dominion, that the human imagination springs, as it were, to the full proportion of its gigantic stature. But even a generation which has witnessed, like our own, an extraordinary development of industrial resources and mechanical appliances, and has remarked within its own sphere of progress how such circumstances give the rein to the imagination, what contempt for the past, what complacent admiration of the present, and what daring anticipations they engender regarding the future, may enter into the feelings of the Romans at this period of social agitation, and realize the ideas of an age of popular delirium.

When the mind of a nation is thus excited and intoxicated by its fervid aspirations, it seeks relief from its own want of definite aims in hailing the appearance of a leader of clearer views and more decisive action. It wants a hero to applaud and to follow, and is ready to seize upon the first that presents himself as an object for its admiration, and to carry him forward on his career in triumph. Marius, Sulla, and Pompeius, each in their turn

Cæsar the only man who could fulfil the demands of the crisis.

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claimed this eager homage of the multitude; but the two former had passed away with their generation, and the last lived to disappoint the hopes of his admirers, for whom he was not capable of extending the circuit of the political horizon. For a moment the multitude was dazzled by the eloquence and activity of Cicero, but neither had he the intellectual gifts which are fitted to lead a people onward. The Romans hailed him as the saviour and father of his country, as another Romulus or Camillus¹; but this was in a fit of transient enthusiasm for the past, when their minds were recurring for a moment to their early founders and preservers. It was still to the future that their eyes were constantly directed; and it was not till the genius of Cæsar burst upon them, with all the rapidity and decision of its movements, that they could recognize in any of the aspirants to power the true captain and lawgiver and prophet of the age.

¹ Cic. *in Pis.* 3.; Plut. *Cic.* 22.; Appian. *B. C.* ii. 7.; Plin. *H. N.* vii. 30.; Juvenal, viii. 244.

CHAP. IV.

DEFEAT AND DEATH OF CATILINA.—THE OLIGARCHY DERIVES GREAT CONFIDENCE FROM THIS SUCCESS, AND DEFILES POMPEIUS.—POPULARITY OF CICERO.—CÆSAR'S PROGRESS IN THE ATTAINMENT OF HONOURS AND POWER.—RETURN OF POMPEIUS FROM ASIA: HE RESENTS THE ATTITUDE OF THE SENATE TOWARDS HIM.—THE SENATE TURNS THE LICENTIOUSNESS OF CLODIUS TO A POLITICAL OBJECT.—POMPEIUS ALLIES HIMSELF WITH CÆSAR AND CRASSUS.—THE TRIUMVIRATE.—CÆSAR'S CONSULSHIP, AND CONTINUED HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HIM AND THE SENATE.—HE OBTAINS THE PROVINCE OF GAUL.—CLODIUS ELECTED TRIBUNE: HIS POPULARITY, AND MACHINATIONS AGAINST CICERO.—ABANDONMENT OF CICERO BY THE CONSULS, AND COLDNESS OF THE TRIUMVIRS.—HE IS ASSAILED BY CLODIUS, AND RETIRES INTO EXILE.

CATILINA had replied to the denunciations of Cicero with a few words of furious menace; but, on leaving Rome, he addressed letters to some of the principal men of the city, in which he declared his intention of betaking himself to Massilia as a place of voluntary exile.¹ But to Catulus, who either was, or whom at least he wished to be considered, a more intimate friend he opened himself without disguise. He declared that he was urged to extremity by the violence of personal enemies; that he could no longer endure to see the elevation of unworthy Romans to places of trust and honour, from which he was himself excluded by unjust suspicions; that, in short, he was now resolved to

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Catilina
puts himself
at the head
of the in-
surgents in
Etruria.
A. U. 691,
B. C. 63.

¹ Sall. *B. C.* 33, 34.

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effect a revolution in the state, for such was the obvious meaning of his threat to undertake the defence of the poor and the oppressed in Italy and the city.¹ On reaching Arretium in Etruria he assumed the insignia of military command, and repaired to the camp of his adherent Mallius, who had already gone forward to raise the standard of revolt, and was actively appealing to the hopes and necessities of the rustic population. The senate forthwith issued a decree by which Catilina and his lieutenant were declared enemies of the state, and ordered the consul Antonius to levy troops for their destruction. At the same time it deemed it prudent to offer pardon to all, except the two leaders, who should abandon the guilty enterprise; but not a single man, it was said, was found to desert his chiefs. On the other hand, while some supplies of men and money were forwarded from his coadjutors in Rome, Catilina received considerable additions to his forces from among that desperate class which rejoiced in the prospect of an impending revolution, and now rushed to share the peril and the spoil without any previous concert with the conspirators.²

His defeat
and death.

The rebel force now consisted of two legions of the ordinary complement, but not above one fourth of the number were fully equipped, the rest having

¹ Sall. *B. C.* 35.

² Among these traitors to the state was a youth, A. Fulvius, the son of a senator, who, being arrested on his way and brought back, was put to death by his father's order. (*Sall. B. C.* 39.; Dion, xxxvii. 36.; Val. Max. v. 8. 5.) This imitation of the discipline of the ancient republic excited neither applause nor indignation among the languid voluptuaries of the senate. Merimée, ii. 183.

armed themselves with any weapons which they could seize or fashion for the occasion. While awaiting the result of his friends' machinations in Rome, Catilina kept to the mountains, out of the reach of the consul's forces. Antonius himself showed great tardiness and indecision; his conduct was open to the suspicion of sympathy, if not of concert, with the enemy he was sent to subdue. But, fortunately for the republic, his lieutenants were men of vigour and activity. The prætor, Metellus Celer, had checked by the rapidity of his movements the spirit of disaffection which was beginning to manifest itself in either Gaul. He was at the head of three legions, with which he occupied Picenum and Umbria, and watched the northern flanks of the Apennines. Hasty and ill-concerted risings in Bruttium and Apulia had also been speedily quelled; yet, if Catilina could have burst from the toils by which he was surrounded, he might have taken advantage of the winter season to rouse rebellion throughout Italy, and have collected resources for another year's campaign.¹ The news of the detection and defeat of the conspiracy reached him in the neighbourhood of Fæsulæ. His first impulse was to make for Gaul, with which view he traversed the territory of Pistoria, and was about to cross the Apennines, when he found himself confronted by Metellus with firm resolution and superior numbers. Something might still be hoped from the favour or timidity of Antonius, and he turned again to throw himself upon the consular army. Antonius shut himself

¹ Cic. *pro Sest.* 5.

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up under pretence of illness, and allowed the command to devolve upon Petreius, a veteran of unflinching fidelity. Catilina's undisciplined bands had no chance against their opponents as soon as they met in the field; yet they fought to the last with the ferocity of wild beasts, unless, indeed, their devotion to their leader deserves a nobler title. Three thousand of their number were slain in the combat, and each man fell on the spot on which he had been marshalled for the battle. The body of Catilina himself was found far in advance of the line, among the corpses of the enemy, and the expression of his dying countenance still corresponded to the passions which had animated him in life.¹

Differences
between the
leaders of
the senate.

While the generals of the republic were still hunting the common enemy in the Apennines, and the machinations of his associates had not yet been exposed, the leaders of the senate were allowing themselves to quarrel among one another, as if they had no one to fear either within or without the city. The election of consuls for the ensuing year had fallen upon D. Junius Silanus and L. Licinius Murena. Sulpicius, who, as well as Catilina himself, was one of the disappointed candidates, resented the decision of the comitia, and brought forward a charge of bribery against Murena. He was a distinguished member of the aristocratic

¹ Sallust, *B.C.* 61.; Florus, iv. 1.; Dion, xxxvii. 39, 40. Catilina made his escape from Rome Nov. 9, A.U. 691, of the unreformed calendar, equivalent to Jan. 13, B.C. 62. The execution of the conspirators took place Dec. 5 = Feb. 7, and he was slain in the beginning of the year 692 = the middle of March, B.C. 62. Fischer, *Zeit-tafeln*, p. 221.

party, and obtained the assistance of Cato in promoting his suit. We may believe that even the stern moralist would not have lent himself to this proceeding at such a moment, had not the guilt of the accused been gross and notorious. It is not likely, however, that his rival came into court with clean hands. At all events, in the existing crisis of affairs, it was most important that the executive should not be paralysed by depriving Silanus of his appointed colleague, and withdrawing his attention from the care of the public interests to the harassing duties incident to a fresh election. This Cicero saw, and immediately stepped forward to defend Murena, to whose military reputation he trusted for giving an imposing attitude to the defiance which the senate was on the point of hurling at its enemies.¹ The exertions of the orator were successful, and his speech is more than usually interesting, from the tone of banter in which he indulges towards men in whom the senatorial party reposed the highest confidence; from the disparagement he throws, on the one hand, upon the legal science for which Sulpicius was justly celebrated, and upon the Stoic philosophy, on the other, of which Cato was the advocate and the pattern. In a subsequent work, of more pretensions to sober argument, he alludes to this speech, and acknowledges that he had purposely adapted his rhetoric to the taste of a vulgar

¹ The speech *pro Murena* was delivered after Catilina's retreat, but before the execution of his associates (c. 37.); Murena's military services are extolled (cap. 5. 9. 16.).

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audience.¹ But we must regard this curious effusion of levity as a sign that the orator was already puffed up with the success of his policy, and did not scruple to gratify his vanity by depreciating the merits of the chief men of his own party. Cato, who, with all his outward austerity, was a man of singular good-humour, smiled at his opponent, and quietly remarked to those about him how witty a consul the republic enjoyed.²

Cæsar
prætor.
The nobles
indicate
their suspi-
cions of
Pompeius.

In the midst of their contentions for the highest office, the nobles had allowed Cæsar to obtain one of the second places in the scale of power, the prætorship, which he held in conjunction with M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the candidate of the opposite party. The most prominent among the tribunes were M. Cato and Metellus Nepos, a brother of Celer, the prætor of the preceding year. Nepos was an adherent of Pompeius, and was sent by him from Asia to canvass for the tribuneship, that on his own return he might secure the services of an ally in that important office. Cato, it was said, had resisted the solicitations of his friends to allow himself to be nominated for another seat on the tribunitian bench, declaring that the post was too invidious for one who was resolved not to swerve in the conduct of affairs from the strictest rules of probity and justice. But while

¹ Cic. *de Fin.* iv. 27. ; comp. Quintil. xi. 1.

² Plut. *Cat. Min.* 21. Niebuhr excuses Cicero's levity, and represents it as the innocent expression of natural cheerfulness and playful spirits on the happy termination of an arduous enterprize. (*Lect. on Rom. Hist.* ii. 29.) But the affair of Catilina had not yet reached its crisis; and though the consul might be confident that he possessed the means of crushing the enemy, his mind must have been engrossed with anxiety regarding him.

on his journey into Lucania, to escape from the turmoil of the approaching elections, he met Nepos, who had just landed at Brundisium. He knew or divined the object of this sudden arrival, and ordered his horses' heads to be turned towards Rome, resolved to defeat the election of a creature of Pompeius, or at least to place himself in a situation in which he might neutralize his baneful influence.¹ He sought and obtained the tribuneship, in which he was, at the same time, associated with the enemy whom he had set himself to watch, whose evil schemes he was prepared to counteract by the free exercise of his official veto.² Such were the suspicions which the leaders of the aristocracy already entertained of their once favourite champion.

This early preparation for a year of violence and intrigue was amply justified by the events which followed. On the first of January, when the consuls entered upon their duties, it was customary for all the chief men, the magistrates and dignitaries of the state, to proceed to the Capitol, and there offer them their solemn greetings.³ Cæsar, however, instead of assisting in this act of official courtesy, took advantage of the absence of his colleagues and rivals to address the people in the forum, and to propose that Catulus should be deprived by their vote of the honours due to him as

Cæsar proposes to deprive Catulus of the honour of restoring the Capitol, but is defeated.
A. U. 692,
B. C. 62.

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 20.

² Cic. *pro Mur.* 3.

³ We find this custom alluded to a hundred and fifty years later by Pliny (*Ep.* ix. 37.): "Vides quam non delicata me causa obire primum consulatus tui diem non sinat: quam tamen hic, ut præsens, votis, gaudio, gratulatione celebrabo."

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the restorer of the temple of Jupiter, which was now on the point of completion.¹ That august edifice, the glory of the City and the Empire, had suffered severely in the conflagration which took place during the conflict of Sulla and Marius.² The charge of restoring it in a manner worthy of the extended greatness of the republic had been assigned to Catulus, as prince of the senate and the most illustrious of all her citizens.³ He had accepted the commission with pride, and bestowed infinite care on its execution, nor had he shrunk from incurring vast personal expense, that his name might deserve to be inscribed on its front by his grateful countrymen. Cæsar brought forward a charge of peculation against him, and demanded the production of his accounts; while at the same time he insisted that he should not be permitted to put the finishing hand to the work, but that the burden and the glory should be transferred to Pompeius. This attack was, perhaps, not seriously meant to succeed. It answered the purpose of enraging and alarming the nobles, of thwarting a personal enemy, above all, of menacing the aristocracy with the vengeance of the chieftain they distrusted. It was also an overture of more cordial alliance between the two rivals. But the

¹ See Cic. *in Verr.* ii. 4. 31.

² Not by accident, but designedly. Some charged Sulla, others Carbo, with having applied the torch. Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 72. says, "fraude privata."

³ Sulla originally undertook it, but died before the work had proceeded far. This disappointment, it was said, was the only exception to the universal good fortune from which he obtained his surname of Felix. "Hoc solum felicitati ejus negatum." Tac. *l. c.*; comp. Plin. *H. N.* vii. 43.

nobles, on hearing what was going forward, rushed from the presence of the consuls into the forum, with all their friends and adherents, and succeeded in averting the threatened blow. The name of Lutatius Catulus was duly inscribed upon the noblest monument of the national pride, and bore witness to the glory of the most blameless hero of the aristocracy until the temple was again destroyed by fire in the civil wars of Vitellius and Vespasian.¹

The main object of the extraordinary powers which Pompeius enjoyed had been recently attained by the death of the terrible Mithridates in the preceding year. The power of the Eastern tyrant had been gradually broken by the perseverance of a succession of Roman generals, and he had been finally expelled from all the territories which he had inherited or acquired on the southern shore of the Euxine. The ascendancy which Pompeius had gained over his army, and probably the zealous assistance of the civil administrators throughout the East, whose extortions he had not chosen, like Lucullus, to check, gave him far more complete command of his resources than his predecessors ever possessed. Accordingly, he obtained

Pompeius desists from the pursuit of Mithridates, who forms a new combination against Rome,

¹ Tac. *l. c.*; Suet. *Vit.* 15. Dion (xliii. 4.) says that the senate decreed (A.U. 708) that the name of Catulus should be erased, and that of Cæsar substituted. In modern times, indeed, an inscription has been found within the tabularium bearing the name of Catulus: "Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N. Catulus substructionem et tabularium de s. s. faciendum cœravit." This, however, refers only to a small and inferior part of his work. The tabularium, the depository of the public archives, was built against the face of the Capitoline hill, upon a huge substruction of masonry between the two summits of that eminence.

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an easy conquest over Tigranes, king of Armenia, and received his submission with favour upon payment of an adequate tribute.¹ He drove the king of Pontus beyond the Caucasus: but to pursue him further was a service of no little danger, for such a charm did the mighty monarch carry with him, even in exile and disgrace, that wherever he came the nations rose to welcome and obey him. Mithridates retreated round the north-eastern coasts of the Euxine, and established his court at Panticapeum, at the mouth of the Cimmerian Bosphorus.² Pompeius relinquished the pursuit, and turned southwards in search of wealthier lands to plunder and feebler sovereigns to intimidate; while the enemy whom he had been specially commissioned to destroy was maturing a new combination against the power of Rome, more gigantic and formidable than any which his bold imagination had before conceived. As, at an earlier period, his far-seeing sagacity had induced him to enter into negotiations with Sertorius in Spain, so he now communicated with the restless warriors of Gaul, and proposed to traverse Dacia and Pannonia with a Scythian horde at his back, and join his impatient allies at the threshold of Italy.³ Even at the farthest extremity to which his power ever reached, this extraordinary man could leave a durable name in the traditions of the native population. A ledge on the summit of a rock pro-

¹ Vell. ii. 37.² Appian. *B. Mithrid.* 107.³ Dion, xxxvii. 11.; Flor. iii. 5.; Appian. *B. M.* 109.: 'Ες Κελτοὺς ἐκ πολλοῦ φίλους ἐπὶ τῷδε γεγονότας ἐπενόει διελθὼν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐμβαλεῖν.

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jecting into the sea, in the neighbourhood of Odessa, is popularly known at this day as the "throne of Mithridates."¹ But the ordinary result of Oriental polygamy hastened the old man's end. He had excited against himself hostility in the bosom of his own family. Three sons and three daughters he had put to death to secure his throne, but another of his children named Pharnaces, whom he had destined for his successor, eager to defeat the wild enterprize which his father meditated, and gain the favour of the Romans, revolted against him. Deserted by his troops and people, Mithridates prepared to embrace a voluntary death. His system, it was affirmed, had been fortified against poison by the habitual use of antidotes; he was compelled to require the services of a Gaulish attendant, and fell upon the sword reluctantly presented to him.²

but puts an end to his life on the revolt of his son Pharnaces, A. U. 691.

The treason of Pharnaces was rewarded with the kingdom of the Bosphorus, and he was received by Pompeius into the friendship and alliance of the republic. Meanwhile, the mere presence of the Roman general with his army had sufficed to annex many rich provinces to the empire. When Pompeius desisted from the pursuit of the king of Pontus, he repaired to the court of Antiochus, surnamed Asiaticus, in Syria, and ordered him to descend from the throne of the Seleucidæ and surrender his country to the Roman people. This sovereign, the last of a dynasty which had wielded the sceptre of Syria for two centuries and a half,

Successes of Pompeius in Syria and Palestine.

¹ Michelet, *Hist. Rom.* iii. c. 4.

² Dion; Appian.; Liv. *Epit.* cii.

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and had furnished a succession of seventeen kings¹, had entered upon his hereditary rule on the expulsion of Tigranes by the Roman arms. But the country was totally unable to defend itself against the Parthians and Armenians; it was too rich or too critically situated to be intrusted to a dependent monarch, and Pompeius reduced it without hesitation to the form of a province. Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria submitted to the same yoke without an audible murmur, and became incorporated in the proconsular government of Syria. At Damascus the conqueror received the appeal of Hyrcanus, who had been deprived of the high-priesthood of Judea by his younger brother Aristobulus. He listened to the usurper's defence of his conduct in assuming the title of king; but he condescended to weigh the arguments of the Jewish statesmen and the usages of the nation, and finally undertook to restore Hyrcanus to power, and re-establish the ancient theocracy. The Jews, however, would not submit to foreign dictation. Aristobulus was their favourite. They wished, as of old, to have a king to reign over them. They defended their freedom of choice, and the object whom they had chosen, with all the valour and obstinacy of their race. For three months the temple-citadel held out against the skill and patience of the Romans: but the fanaticism of the

¹ Appian (*B. Mithr.* 70.) calculates the period at 270 years, and adds fourteen for the duration of the rule of Tigranes. He is manifestly in error. Seleucus began his reign B.C. 312, with which year his era commences (*Clinton, Fast. Hell.* in ann.); and from thence to B.C. 64 (A.U. 690) are 248 years complete. Various computations may be compared in the *Art de Vérifier les Dates*, ii. 337. ed. 8vo.

people, which was kindled by the excitement of patriotism, proved their ruin; for, as on former occasions, their presumptuous confidence in divine favour induced them to omit the requisite means of defence, and their fastness was surprized during a season of unguarded ceremonial.¹ The victor replaced Hyrcanus in the high-priesthood and abolished the royal title. He made the country dependent upon Rome; but, though he violated the Holy of Holies by his profane presence, he appears to have acted with more than usual moderation in sparing the sacred furniture and treasures of the temple.² If the death of Mithridates had been longer delayed, it was the intention of Pompeius to have made a campaign against the Nabathæans; and it was now his idle ambition to penetrate to the Eastern Ocean, as he had carried the arms of the republic in Spain to the shores of the Atlantic.³ But that important event demanded his return to Asia Minor. He there completed the arrangements of his foreign policy, and gave his last directions for the settlement of the provincial administration. The basis upon which the edifice of social order had been established by Lucullus remained unshaken after his successor had left Asia.⁴

¹ Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* xiv. 4. 3.; Strabo, xvi. 2.: *νηστείας ἡμέρα*.

² Dion (xxxvii. 16.) says the contrary: *πάντα τὰ χρήματα διηρπάσθη*: but the other is the statement in which the rest of our authorities concur. See Drumann, iv. 467. The spoliation of the temple of Jerusalem was reserved for Crassus.

³ This may, perhaps, be regarded as a rhetorical flight of Plutarch's, who amplifies it still further (*Pomp.* 38.).

⁴ Cic. *Acad.* ii. 1.; comp. Plut. *Pomp.* 39.

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The nobles
make pre-
parations
against the
designs im-
puted to
Pompeius.

The zeal with which the nobles had rushed to the defence of Catulus could not fail to mortify the jealous disposition of Pompeius, and their statesmen might regard the death of Mithridates with alarm rather than satisfaction, for nothing now remained to delay the conqueror's return to take accounts of their proceedings in his absence. It was in vain that Cato sneered at the feeble resistance of the Asiatics, and asserted that the successes of their conqueror were merely victories over women.¹ The power and ability of so great a captain were not to be charmed away by empty taunts. It was a better policy to fortify the position of the senate by courting the services of its most distinguished military members. Lucullus had lately received the long-delayed honour of a triumph: the technical objection that he had not actually finished the war in the East was overruled, and his real merits were not unduly rewarded by an unusual stretch of the senate's prerogative.² This year, Q. Metellus, another scion of the same illustrious family which furnished a tribune at the late elections and a prætor at the preceding, was flattered with a similar honour.³ He received, at the same time, the surname of Creticus, in token of his final reduction of the savage mountaineers of an island which it had taken three years to subdue. But the importance of his victory was to be estimated, not so much by the resources or valour of its population, as by

¹ Cic. *pro Mur.* 14.

² Cicero seems to claim the merit of having extorted this act of justice and good policy (*Acad.* ii. 1.): "Nos consules introduximus pæne in urbem currum clarissimi viri."

³ Vell. ii. 34

A. U. 691.

the convenience of its harbours and fastnesses for protecting the commerce of the Mediterranean, and imposing a bridle upon piracy in the surrounding seas.

No sooner had Metellus Nepos arrived in Rome than he put himself in communication with Cæsar, and the two agitators acted in concert in their schemes for harassing the party to which both were equally hostile. Nepos began his career as tribune by denouncing the execution of Catilina's associates.¹ He declaimed against it, on the one hand, as a crime against the people; on the other, as offensive to Pompeius, the saviour of the state and the champion of the constitution. Thus early were the nobles made to feel the handle they had given their protector, if he should choose to overthrow their power by force, and pretend that he was avenging an illegal murder. Under Cato's undaunted leadership, however, they mustered all their courage. Cicero himself presented a bold front to his accusers; and the people for once were not forgetful of the preservation of their homes and hearths by his patriotic vigour. On the first day of the new year, when the consul was about to lay down his office and to make the customary oration to the people, the tribune offered to impose silence upon him, declaring that it was unfit that the murderer of Roman citizens should address an assembly of free men. Amidst the uproar which this proceeding excited, Cicero was only able to exclaim, with a solemn adjuration, that he had saved the state, and the universal

Popularity
of Cicero.
A. U. 692,
B. C. 62.

¹ Dion. xxxvii. 42.; Plut. *Cic.* 23.

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shout of applause overwhelmed every sound of contention.¹ But it might be a matter of ominous significance to him that this innocent or necessary act of self-defence was resented by Celer, the brother of Nepos. The late prætor, though now enjoying the proconsulship of Gaul by Cicero's surrender of his own prior claim, and though professing himself both his personal and political friend, was unreasonable enough to address to him a letter of bitter remonstrance, to which his correspondent replied with becoming spirit.

Violence of
the tribune
Nepos;
triumph of
the nobles.

The attack was repulsed. But Catilina had not yet been defeated; and the tribune now moved a rogation to the people for recalling Pompeius with his troops, and giving him full powers for the destruction of the common enemy. The senate shrunk from offering any such invitation; it would rather have thrown some obstacle in the way of his return, and rejoiced in the dilatoriness of his present proceedings. It exerted all its influence to thwart the odious proposal. It was now that the part Cæsar was playing became manifest. He appeared as the counsellor and confidant of the demagogue, whose violence was rapidly tending to make any reconciliation between the oligarchy and their former leader impossible. The tribune had occupied the forum with a crowd of his own

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* v. 1, 2. Plutarch (*Cic. l. c.*) attributes the favour with which Cicero was received to the good offices of Cato, who was the first to address him as the "Father of his country." Plutarch is not correct, perhaps, in saying that he was the first who received this honourable distinction; at all events, he was the last while the voice of the Roman people continued really free: "Roma patrem patriæ Ciceronem libera dixit." Juv. viii.

adherents. He presented, moreover, a startling array of military force, whether to protect his own inviolable person, or to overawe his opponents. It was with difficulty that Cato, who would not be withheld from appearing by the advice and entreaties of his friends, could make his way to the conspicuous position where the functionaries of the state presided over the popular assembly. Cæsar and Nepos were sitting side by side. Cato advanced and took his seat directly between them, to interrupt their private communications. Nepos directed the proper officer to read aloud the proposed resolution: Cato snatched the paper from his hand, and tore it in the face of the multitude. This boldness had already raised a cry in Cato's favour, when his colleague, furious at being thus thwarted, began to recite its tenor from memory. Thermus, another of the tribunes and an adherent of Cato, stopped Nepos's mouth with his hand. This was a violent way of interposing the tribunitian veto, the means of control which each of those officers legally possessed over every one of his colleagues; but it hit the humour of the excited multitude, and was crowned with tumultuous acclamation. A scene of riot and disorder followed, which prevented the adoption of any measure under the sanction of legal forms; and although it was necessary for the friends of Cato to hurry him from the strife, and to secure his safety in the temple of Castor and Pollux, the object of Nepos was defeated, and a great triumph obtained for the insulted senate.¹

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 26—30.

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The nobles
venture to
insult
Cæsar, and
are com-
pelled to
make repa-
ration.

But the aristocratic party was fated always to push its victories too far. The senate, elated by the unaccustomed sounds of popular applause, ventured to suspend by main force both Nepos and Cæsar from the functions to which they had been duly elected by the people.¹ The tribune fled to the camp of his patron, proclaiming that the sanctity of his office had been profaned by violence. Cæsar, with greater resolution, threw himself upon the protection of his allies and adherents, and continued to administer his prætorial functions in defiance of every hostile menace. He refused to quit his tribunal till compelled by a military force, whereupon he dismissed the lictors who attended upon him, divested himself of his official insignia, and retired with dignity to his private dwelling. The populace now assembled to avenge the insult offered to their favourite. A riot ensued, which compelled the consuls to retrace their steps, not without the most obsequious expressions of respect and deference to him.² But how hollow these compliments were, how insincere the appearance of reconciliation, is amply demonstrated by a fresh attempt which was made at the same moment to implicate him in the late conspiracy, the inquiry into which was still in progress. The ostensible promoters of the charge were L. Vettius and Q. Curius, both men of notorious character, who had

¹ A few days before this the populace had assembled outside the place where the senate was sitting, on a report that Cæsar was being roughly handled within, and so alarmed the consuls that they sent Cato in all haste to appease the tumult by the promise of a regular largess of corn. *Plut. Cæs.* 8.

² *Suet. Jul.* 16.

already sold themselves to the senate, and denounced the plot in which they had in fact been deeply engaged.¹ Vettius declared that he could produce letters from Cæsar to Catilina; Curius only professed to have ascertained his guilt from the mouth of their common leader. It is hardly to be supposed that these wretches would have ventured to assail the champion of the people, and a man of such well-known courage and resources, unless they had received direct encouragement from some of the chiefs of the senate. Cæsar, with his usual decision, went straightway to Cicero, and engaged him to remove any suspicion of his criminality. The late consul declared publicly that it was by Cæsar himself that the first intimation of the danger had been made to him. It does not appear whether this had really been the fact; but the testimony of Cicero could not be discredited. Not only was Cæsar acquitted, but the reward assigned to Curius as the supposed discoverer of the plot, was taken from him, and handed over to the object of his calumny. Vettius was sacrificed to the wrath of the people, and thrown into prison; nor did Novius the quæstor, who had ventured to allow his superior magistrate to be cited before his tribunal, escape a similar chastisement.²

Another incident occurred during Cæsar's prætorship, which is mentioned by Suetonius as an instance of his zeal in defending the clients who intrusted their interests to his care.³ It is so

Cæsar protects Masintha in defiance of the senate.

¹ Dion. xxxvii. 41.; Sallust, *B. C.* 17.

² Suet. *Jul.* 17.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 71 The occurrence is not mentioned by any other writer.

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briefly related that we are at a loss fully to understand it; but it seems at least to give further indications of the confidence he now felt in his position, and the spirit of defiance which animated all his transactions with the government. He was appealed to by a Numidian chieftain named Masintha, to defend him against a claim for tribute on the part of Hiempsal, the tributary sovereign of the country. Hiempsal sent his son Juba to Rome, to take the proper measures for having the cause decided by the tribunals of the republic; for the kingdom of Numidia had recently been constituted a Roman dependancy by Pompeius, and the senate assumed the right of determining the political relations of the king and his vassals. It seems that, when the republic declared itself in favour of the royal claim, Cæsar did not abstain from a personal insult to Juba, whose beard he pulled in derision. But the majesty of Rome he still more gravely insulted; for when it was decided that Masintha should be delivered to Juba for the punishment of his contumacy, Cæsar snatched him from the hands of the officers, and carried him to his own house, the pontifical mansion in the Via Sacra, where he kept him, not surely in concealment, as Suetonius says, but in open defiance of the senate, until his departure for Spain some months afterwards, when he assigned him a place in his suite.

Early life
and character of
Clodius.

At length fortune seemed to throw in the way of the nobles an opportunity for creating disunion among the popular leaders. We have hitherto contemplated Cæsar as the sole representative of

his party; and so great was the pre-eminence of his talents and the ascendancy of his character, that he maintained that position without a rival throughout his career. But the giddy multitude had also its favourites, and among them was P. Clodius, a young man of very dissolute habits, but not without some popular talents¹, upon whom it lavished no small portion of its admiration. Connected with several of the principal men of the state, Clodius enjoyed every advantage in the outset of his public life. He was admitted to the confidence of Lucullus in Asia, whom he betrayed by exciting a mutiny in the ranks, the first occasion on which he essayed the arts of a demagogue.² Marcius Rex, when commanding in Cilicia, had placed a portion of the fleet under his control, with which he fell into the hands of the pirates.³ Released by the intervention of Pompeius, he betook himself to Antioch, thrust himself into the affairs of the Syrians, and narrowly escaped death for the disturbances which he excited. Having thus succeeded in embroiling every affair in which he had taken part, he returned to Rome, and there appeared in the character of a patriot. He accused Catilina of malversation, and again experienced an ignominious failure.⁴ But though he became involved in the common suspicion of a guilty acquaintance with the designs of the conspirators, he was in fact a supporter of Cicero in the process

¹ Vell. ii. 45.: "P. Clodius, homo nobilis, disertus, audax."

² Plut. *Luc.* 34.

³ Dion. xxxv. 15.

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 1.

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of their detection.¹ Meanwhile, he was no less intent upon making love to the women, than upon quarrelling with the men, and it seemed as if his triumphs were destined to be confined to the weaker sex. The odious charge that he lived in incest with his sisters can only be regarded as a current tale of scandal, the truth of which it would be preposterous to assume.² But he was a favoured admirer of Pompeia, the wife of Cæsar; and it was in the prosecution of this licentious intrigue that he perpetrated an act, the discovery of which raised him to a disgraceful notoriety, and was well nigh creating a fatal dissension between the popular leader and an important section of his party.

He profanes
the mys-
teries of the
Bona Dea.
A.U. 692,
B.C. 62.

The Bona Dea, an old Italian divinity, whom the antiquaries of superstition sought to identify with various Greek and Latin goddesses, enjoyed the honour of a peculiar festival, at which none but women were allowed to attend. The presence of any of the male sex was deemed a pollution, and expected to bring a curse upon the nation. The intruder, it was once devoutly believed, would be visited with the loss of his sight; but no instance had yet been known of the wrath of the goddess being tempted to this extremity. The ceremony was held in the month of December³, in the mansion of one of the consuls or prætors, and the

¹ Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 3.; Plut. *Cic.* 29.

² Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 20., *ad Div.* i. 9.: "Qui non pluris fecerat Bonam Deam quam tres sorores." The three sisters were married respectively to Marcius Rex, L. Lucullus, and Metellus Celer. The last was the Clodia whose gallantries and political intrigues are so frequently stigmatized by Cicero. Drumann, ii. 374. foll.

³ Drumann, ii. 204. *note.*

mistress of the house had the honour of presiding. The matrons of Rome were assembled at night under the roof of Pompeia, in the official dwelling of the chief pontiff, which lay at the foot of the Palatine hill, nearly opposite to the spot where two half-buried columns now mark the entrance to the temple of Romulus and Remus. The beardless gallant introduced himself into the house in the garb of a female musician; he had corrupted one of Pompeia's maids, and sent her to acquaint her mistress with his arrival. The appointment had probably been concerted. But meanwhile he incautiously allowed himself to be seen by another female attendant. Being addressed by her, his person or his voice immediately betrayed him.¹ The alarm was given, and the utmost consternation prevailed. Aurelia, the mother of Cæsar, a Roman matron of the ancient stamp², who professed to keep strict watch over the virtue of her daughter-in-law, speedily threw a veil over the mysteries of the goddess, and rushed through the house, a torch in her hand, to discover the intruder. He was surrounded and recognized, but allowed to escape.³ The matrons who had assembled to assist at the ceremony dispersed to their homes, and none of them failed to inform her husband that night of the interruption of the rites and the pollution of the city. The next day the story was bruited far

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 12.; Plut. *Cic.* 28.; Dion, xxxvii. 45.

² Comp. the author of the *Dial. de Corrupt. Elog.* c. 28.: "Sic Corneliæ Gracchorum, sic Aureliæ Cæsaris, sic Atiæ Augusti matrem præfuisse educationibus ac produxisse principes liberos accepimus."

³ "Aurelia pro testimonio dixit suo jussu eum esse dimissum." Schol. Bob. in *Orat. in Clod. et Curion.* 5. 3.

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IV.

The nobles attempt to turn this transaction to a political account, but are baffled by Cæsar.

and wide, and the cry of indignation and fear resounded over the seven hills.

Such a moment of national panic presented a golden opportunity to the politic advisers of the aristocracy, and it was with no religious feeling, for Cicero himself scoffs at the goddess who failed to strike the impious intruder blind¹, that they consulted the pontiffs and the Vestal virgins, from whom they received the most formal assurances that a crime had been committed which demanded signal expiation. Cæsar, as the chief of the pontifical college, could not abstain from coinciding in this solemn declaration. Accordingly, he felt it incumbent upon himself to divorce his wife; yet he could not be induced to fasten his suspicions publicly upon Clodius, nor to come forward as his accuser. This was the point at which his enemies were aiming. A man of his influence might have insured the conviction of the criminal; at all events, it was obvious that, by invoking punishment upon Clodius, he would have incensed many of their common friends, and during a long and bitter struggle a thousand incidents might occur to widen the breach in their party. But though disappointed in this hope, the nobles would not let go their hold of their victim. According to the ordinary mode of procedure in cases which were confined to questions of fact, the judges were selected by lot for the decision of each particular cause from the list of one hundred and five, previously drawn by the same method from the three orders of senators, knights, and ærarian tribunes. But, whether the

¹ Cic. *pro Dom.* 40.

charge against Clodius was one for which there was no exact precedent, or whether its importance might be held to justify a departure from the usual course, the senate wished the judges to be assigned by the direct appointment of the prætor. This also was a method not unknown to the constitution; and though the advantage it offered to the senate seems obvious, we do not hear that it was regarded by their opponents as unjust or invidious. Accordingly, the new consuls, Piso and Messala, were enjoined to move a rogation to the people to sanction this mode of procedure. Messala went to work in good faith; but his colleague was easily won over by the enemy, and allowed every obstacle to be thrown in the way of the enactment which he himself proposed. Cato pushed the matter forward with his usual promptitude; Cicero joined in the general outcry, always hoping to be floated to the top in every current of popular opinion; but he dared not commit himself to active measures. Pompeius was expected daily with his army at the gates of Rome; all parties were intriguing with him, but no one yet knew what his judgment in the matter might be; it was the part of prudent men not to put themselves too prominently forward at so critical a moment.

It was in January of the year 693 that the conqueror of the East reached the shores of Italy. No sooner did he touch the land than he falsified the apprehensions of the city by disbanding his host of veterans, with the promise of ample rewards for their services, which he felt secure of obtaining

Pompeius reaches Italy, disbands his army, and enters the city as a private man.

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from the senate and people.¹ Rome received the news with surprise, gratification, and, it must be added, contempt. But there was no difficulty at least in affecting gratitude, and the great captain was escorted into the city with the liveliest demonstrations of respect and joy. His entry into Rome was the celebration, it was said, of a triumph, not over the kings of Asia, but over himself, the heir of Sulla, the child of the proscriptions.² When the pageant was over, the proconsul required time to cast his eyes around him, and obtain an insight into the position of affairs. Meanwhile, his conduct was in every respect studiously moderate. Every word he uttered was noted and treasured up by innumerable ears, every movement was watched and criticized; all parties hung in suspense, and awaited in silence the declaration of his sentiments. But amongst all parties he found no friend; perhaps he sought none: his coldness and vanity were equally repulsive, and he was too fearful of committing himself by premature disclosures to court the intimacy of any one. But among the number of those who crowded about him and tendered advice and service, it is probable that Cæsar acquired his usual ascendancy, unsettling his views and shaking his resolutions.

He expresses himself with great reserve on public affairs.

The first harangue which the new-comer made to the senate was so cautiously worded, that no indication whatever of his thoughts could be drawn

¹ The reception of Pompeius, and the whole proceedings in Clodius's trial are related with great liveliness by Cicero in two of his letters to Atticus, i. 14. 16.

² Drumann, iv. 479.; comp. Dion, xxxvii. 50.; Plut. *Pomp.* 43.; Vell. ii. 40.

from it. The coldness of his demeanour before that assembly might raise a fear that he reserved his animation for the forum, and his confidence for the popular demagogues. At the instigation of Piso, Fufius Calenus, one of the tribunes in the interest of Clodius, stepped forward and invited him to address the people in the Flaminian Circus. As soon as he appeared there, Fufius straightway demanded of him whether he approved of the rogation of the consuls, by which the judges in the forthcoming trial were to be assigned by the prætor. Pompeius parried the thrust: his answer, as Cicero triumphantly proclaimed, was that of a true aristocrat; he made a laboured speech, with many unmeaning words, in which he magnified the authority and majesty of the senate, and professed to regard it with the most devoted respect. The consul Messala was encouraged by this apparent overture to ask his opinion, when he next presented himself in the senate, on the affair of Clodius and the proceedings of the government. But the crafty dissembler again shrunk within himself; his reply was courteous but indefinite, and was limited to a general approbation of the behaviour of the nobles. He then turned to Cicero, and expressed a hope that he had said enough on that point. The applause with which even this guarded language was received, induced Crassus to rise and deliver a studied panegyric upon the conduct of the late consul. Cicero, sitting next to the object of universal attention, and watching every turn in his countenance,

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thought that he perceived a gleam of approbation stealing over it. He rose to take advantage of the favourable moment, and enlarged, with his usual copious rhetoric, on the dangers from which the state had been preserved, and his own share in the glory of the deed. He spoke, as he alone could speak, of the dignity of the senatorial order, the good feeling of the knights, the favourable attitude of the Italians, the paralysis of every element of disaffection, the cheapness of provisions, the security of the commonwealth.¹ The senate responded, to the speaker's entire satisfaction; it was the crowning day of Cicero's vanity; yet one triumph was wanting to it, Pompeius would not be drawn into any further indication of his views.

Proceedings
against Clodius: these
end in
failure: dis-
appoint-
ment of
the nobles.
Clodius
meditates
vengeance.

When the day came for moving the rogation, the friends of Clodius, the remnant, as Cicero invidiously asserts, of the Catilinarian crew, with the younger Curio, a reckless demagogue and spendthrift, at their head, attempted to resist the influence of the nobles by various irregular manœuvres: but the opposite party displayed more than usual vigour; Cato, Hortensius, and Favonius, Cato's shadow², spoke with energy in the cause of justice, and the assembly at last separated without coming to a decision. Once more the senate met, and resolved in favour of the rogation by a majority of four hundred to fifteen, notwithstanding the personal entreaties of the accused.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 14.: "Quid multa? totum hunc locum, quem ego varie meis orationibus soleo pingere, de flamma, de ferro,—nosti illas ληκύθοις,—valde pertexui." Compare as specimens of these ληκύθοι, the *Orat. in Pis.* 2., *pro Mur.* 39.

² Drumann, ii. 209.

Clodius's addresses met with no other success than that of raising a laugh against Cicero, whom the aristocracy were never displeased to see made ridiculous. The mover of the rogation, fortified by the prestige of this overwhelming majority, would now have beaten down all opposition; but Hortensius, by an unlucky scruple, counselled concession at the last moment, and waived the essential point in question, the assignment of the judges by the prætor. He thought the guilt so manifest that the culprit's escape was impossible: a sword of lead, he said, would suffice to slay him: the concession would be graceful in appearance, while it could have no evil consequence. But he was deceived. Fifty-six judges were chosen by lot, a mode of selection which no doubt in itself admitted of much false play; but, at all events, there were many among them whose poverty and bad character cast equal suspicion on their honesty. The friends of Clodius strained every nerve to seduce them¹: money was showered upon them, promises were lavished without stint; the noblest and fairest women of Rome were induced to grant them their favours; the corruption of this infamous tribunal became a by-word to succeeding generations.² Yet the testimony which was produced against the accused seemed to make his escape impossible; his own plea, that he was absent at Interamna on the night in question, was

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 16. 5.: "Arcessivit ad se, promisit, intercessit, dedit," &c.

² Senec. *Ep.* 97.: "Atqui dati iudicibus nummi sunt; et quod hac etiam nunc pactione turpius est, stupra insuper matronarum et adolescentulorum nobilium salarii loco exacta sunt."

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refuted by the direct testimony of Cicero¹; the mother of the injured husband asserted her knowledge of his guilt; the slaves of the house confessed it under torture²; one word from Cæsar would have sufficed to settle the matter; but that word nothing could extort from him. "Then why divorce Pompeia?" cried the nobles in their vexation; the reply was adroit and spirited: "The wife of Cæsar must be above suspicion."³ The eloquence of Cicero carried even the multitude with him, and the judges affected to be terrified by the demonstrations of popular disgust. They demanded a military guard for their protection, while Catulus asked, with bitter irony, if they feared to have their pockets picked of their bribes. The cause was at last decided in favour of Clodius by a majority of thirty-one over twenty-five, which was less, perhaps, than might have been expected from the composition of the tribunal. The nobles consoled themselves as they best might, by the evidence its smallness gave to the substantial justice of their cause, and to the bias of public opinion; but they were more sorely disappointed at having failed to create that dissension between Cæsar and his domestic rival which they had fondly anticipated. It was upon Cicero, however, that the force of the blow rebounded. He had made an implacable enemy of one with whom he had hitherto culti-

¹ Cic. *pro Mil.* 17.; Quintil. iv. 2. 88.

² Schol. Bob. in *Orat. in Clod.* vi. 3. Abra, the servant of Pompeia, was put to the question. It would appear from Cicero, *pro Milon.* 22., that the slaves of Clodius were tortured also: "de servis nulla quæstio est in dominum nisi de incestu, ut fuit in Clodium."

³ Suet. *Jul.* 74.; Plut. *Cæs.* 10., *Cic.* 29.

vated terms of amity; and from henceforth Clodius seemed to devote every faculty he possessed to the prosecution of a memorable revenge.

Cæsar could afford to smile at the impotent machinations of his enemies, but he had one more boon to ask of the good genius which had so constantly befriended him. He had succeeded in every step which he had hitherto taken in the city. He had obtained great honours, and wielded at the moment almost unequalled influence. But his rivals were powerful in the field: Lucullus and Crassus, as well as Pompeius, were experienced generals; they had gained the attachment of armies; they could raise troops with a stamp of the foot; and when raised, they could lead them to victory. But Cæsar had neither veterans at his command, nor means to levy recruits. His name was unknown in war, and was no watchword to the aspirants either for plunder or for glory. Accordingly, being satisfied with the peaceable attitude assumed by Pompeius, and assured that the parties in the state were so nicely balanced that no material change could suddenly occur in the situation of the political game, he determined to retire to the Further Spain, the province which had been assigned to him on the expiration of his late office, there put himself at the head of a Roman army, and store his coffers with the spoils accruing whether from war or peace. But such were his private embarrassments that he could not even leave Rome for his destination without one more extraordinary effort. He applied to Crassus for a loan of eight hundred and thirty talents, to

Cæsar assumes the government of a province,

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satisfy his most pressing creditors, and to equip himself for the expedition.¹ Crassus was not unwilling to furnish him with the sum required, as a requital for past, and an incentive to future services; for the jealousy which he had sown between Pompeius and the senate was hailed by Crassus and all the ambitious statesmen of the day as a direct service to themselves.²

and baffles
the project
of his
enemies to
detain him
at Rome.

The delay which these arrangements required was nearly fatal to the proprætor's expedition itself. For in the mean while, the senate was occupied with the affair of Clodius; and a decree was passed, no doubt with special reference to Cæsar, that the prætors should not depart for their provinces until it had been discussed and finally settled. Accordingly, the details of his commission had not been arranged, the sum which the state should contribute to his expences, the number of the troops to be entrusted to him, the names of those who were to constitute his retinue, were not determined, when Cæsar, resolved not to allow his designs to be frustrated, suddenly left Rome in the middle of the year, and betook himself to his province in defiance of every impediment. He had reason to apprehend that a scheme was in contemplation to retain him at home by a political impeachment³; but he knew that when once at the

A U. 693,
B.C. 61.

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 7., *Cæs.* 11. It was on this occasion, according to Appian (*B. C.* ii. 8.), that he said he wanted 250,000 sester tia to be worth nothing.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 11.: 'Ἐπὶ Κράσσον κατέφυγε πλουσιώτατον ὄντα Ῥωμαίων, δεόμενον δὲ τῆς Καίσαρος ἀκμῆς καὶ Ξερμότητος ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Πομπήιον ἀντιπολιτείαν.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 18.: "Incertum, metune iudicii quod privato parabatur, an quo maturius sociis implorantibus subveniret."

head of his legions, his enemies would not dare to recal him, and he trusted to reap such a harvest both of treasure and reputation, as would divert the effects of their malice on his return.

The whole of ancient Iberia was divided at this time into two provinces, the Hither and the Further.¹ The former extended from the Pyrenees along the coast of the Mediterranean to the Sinus Urcitanus, near the south-eastern angle of the peninsula. The line of the sea-shore was studded with numerous Roman settlements; the Celtiberi, occupying the central parts of the country, from whence the great rivers take their rise, had been conquered at an early period, and were rapidly assimilating to the type of the victorious nation²; the brief season of their education under Sertorius had already borne fruit in a spirit of discipline and obedience. But, throughout the northern districts, the limits of the province, as well as of the Roman authority, were less clearly defined. The Cantabri, Vaccaei, Astures, and Callaici, the remnant of the old and unmixed Iberian stock, maintained among

The Roman
provinces
in Spain.

¹ Spain; Hispania, Iberia: the former name was given by the Carthaginians to the south-western extremity of the peninsula, and was probably a Phœnician word. The rough breathing and sibilation are characteristic of their appellations: comp. Hasdrubal, Hiempsal, Thapsus, Ruspina, Hispalis, Hispania, Hesperia (?). The Romans adopted the name from them. On the other hand, the Greek geographers gave the country the name of Iberia, which may have been derived, through the Massilian traders, from the river Iberus. But it is probable that the earliest population of all the north and centre called themselves Iberians. Plin. *H. N.* iii. 3.: "Iberus — amnis, quem propter universam Hispaniam Græci appellavere Iberiam." Comp. Mannert, *Geog.* i. 227.

² They were subdued by the arms and artifice of Cato the Censor, about A. U. 557. Appian, *Hisp.* 41.

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barren mountains their sullen independence. The southern and western portion of the peninsula constituted the further province, which was afterwards subdivided into two, the Anas or Guadiana forming the line of demarcation between them.¹ The coast of the Mediterranean and the valley of the Bætis were the abodes of wealth and luxury, of art and science; but even these favoured districts were liable to the sudden attacks of savage neighbours, and the vigilance of the provincial government was constantly exercised in protecting the central retreats of peaceful civilization.²

Cæsar's
successful
campaign
in Spain.
A.U. 693.

Having thus invested himself, as it were, with the government of his province, the proprætor proceeded, in the same spirit, to raise ten cohorts from his own resources, in addition to the twenty which were stationed in the country. The tribes of Lusitania, beyond the Tagus, had never yet submitted to the Roman yoke, and behind them lay the mountains of Gallicia, which harboured a race to whom even the name of the republic was almost unknown. The provincial governors lived in a state of almost perpetual warfare with the petty chieftains, whose nominal dependence was marked by the imposition of a tribute, seldom paid except when exacted by force of arms. Even the necessity of self-defence might justify the repeated incursions by which they restrained the hungry wanderers on their frontiers. The crime of the officers who represented the majesty of Rome in

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 38.: "A saltu Castulonensi ad Anam."

² Liv. xxxiv. 17.: "Omnium Hispanorum maxime imbelles habentur Turdetani."

these distant possessions, was not so much their encroachment upon the rights and liberties of an implacable enemy, as the hasty and incomplete method of warfare which they adopted. They struck their blows at random, not for the ultimate security of the interests committed to their care, but for the gratification of their personal ambition or avarice, and persevered in no definite plan of conquest. Cæsar seems to have acted with a different sense of his duty as a provincial governor. He was not satisfied with the mere avowal of submission; he required a guarantee that submission should be permanent: he carried war into the fastnesses of the mountains, and drove the enemy from his retreats into the open plains. Nor was he to be diverted from his purpose even there by the booty which the natives craftily threw in his way; he thrust home at the main body of his opponents, pursued them over broad rivers, drove them to the borders of the sea, and into islands on the coasts. He collected vessels from Gades, and with their assistance finally reduced these last strongholds. In this way he effected the complete subjugation of the districts of Lusitania north of the Tagus, including the wild fastnesses of the Herminian mountains and the rapid waters of the Durus. Brigantium in Gallicia, protected on the land side by the difficult character of the surrounding country, he attacked with a naval armament, and erected his victorious standard at the furthest extremity of his province.¹

¹ Brigantium seems to have been either the modern Ferrol or Coruña. Mannert decides for the former, but the remains of an old

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IV.His civil
administra-
tion,

The success of the new candidate for military fame gave a brilliant earnest of his future glories. The brief space which he could devote to civil affairs, must have been employed with at least equal energy. The great complaint of the provincials, throughout the Roman dominions, was the pressure of their debts to the government. The farmers of the public revenues exacted their dues with the utmost severity. But they and the Roman residents generally, with the eye to money-making so characteristic of the nation, were always ready to accommodate the natives with usurious loans, and thus extricate them from immediate difficulties at an enormous eventual sacrifice. The revenues, not of individuals only, but of cities and states, became mortgaged beyond the possibility of redemption. The persons of the debtors and of their families were liable to be seized and sold into slavery. When the affair came to this point, we may imagine how ready a refuge was offered to the victim by the bands of brigands in the mountains. The administration of Cæsar was particularly directed to the abolition of this cause of perennial warfare. He effected an adjustment by which the debts were

Roman tower near the latter place may remind us that Brigantium was celebrated for its lighthouse. (Oros. i. 2.) The two modern towns, however, lie nearly opposite to each other across a bay, and the lighthouse might serve as a beacon to vessels bound for either destination. The Mons Herminius is supposed by both Drumann and Mannert to have lain south of the Tagus, but it would rather appear from Dion's account to have been situated near the Douro. It may probably be identified with the Sierra d'Estrella in the province of Beira. The authorities for the history of this campaign, important only as a prelude to Cæsar's great military achievements, are Plutarch, *Cæs.* 12 ; Dion, xxxvii. 52, 53.

to be liquidated by instalments, and is said to have conciliated, by his wisdom and prudence, the goodwill of either party. The tribute which had been imposed upon the province by Metellus Pius, during the Sertorian war, was remitted by the senate at the proprætor's instance; upon which service he founded a just claim to the gratitude of the Spanish people.¹ At the same time, he did not neglect the main object of his own visit to the country. He amassed a considerable treasure for himself, and took care to satisfy the cupidity of his followers and soldiers in due proportion.² The army saluted him on the field with the title of Imperator.

During the absence of Cæsar, Pompeius continued slowly and irresolutely to press upon the senate the ratification of his acts in the Eastern wars. He had expended large sums of money in the service of the state, he had levied contributions from subjects and allies, he had conferred privileges upon cities and crowns upon political partizans. All this he had done in the exercise of his own discretion, invested as he was with the extraordinary powers of the Manilian law; never-

Pompeius presses the senate to ratify his acts.

¹ Auct. de B. Hisp. 42.

² Suetonius, in a passage where he rakes together all the charges which were made against the subject of his memoir during his lifetime and afterwards (*Jul.* 54.), says that he was accused of accepting presents from individuals, and even soliciting them. This is not improbable, but no one seems to have made any charge against him of fraud or rapine in his civil administration. His enemies, with all their unscrupulous animosity, never threatened to bring his conduct as a provincial governor before a judicial tribunal. Cæsar's proprætorship was an object of panegyric among his countrymen. Comp. Cic. *pro Balb.* 19.; Vell. ii. 43.; Plut. *Cæs.* 12.

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theless, he was anxious that his proceedings should be confirmed by a special decree of the senate, to relieve him from all future responsibility. But that body was well pleased to have an opportunity of humiliating the haughty general. Lucullus, more particularly, grudged the distinctions of his rival and successor in the Eastern command¹, and insinuated that he had been himself the first to break the power of Mithridates, leaving him an easy prey to a fresh adversary with augmented resources. And the tyrant had, after all, escaped from his pursuer, and robbed the pretended conqueror of half his glory by a voluntary death.²

Pompeius's
triumph.
A. U. 693.
Sept. 22, 23.

The senate listened with approbation to these unworthy objections, and gradually recovered its courage in the presence of one who had so lately been the master of its legions. It had concealed its enmity under a flourish of acclamations when Pompeius entered Rome, accompanied, not by his troops, but a crowd of flatterers and courtiers.³ The studied modesty of his bearing roused the presumption of the nobles, in the same proportion as it allayed their jealousy. He would not accept any title to designate the theatre of his conquests, and perpetuate their memory in connexion with his name. He was content with the simple appellation of Magnus, the Great, which had been

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 46.

² Lucan (i. 336.) puts this depreciating language in the mouth of Cæsar :

— “ Lassi Pontica regis
Prælia, barbarico vix consummata veneno.”

³ Vell. ii. 40. : “ Quo magis homines timuerant, eo gratior civilis tanti imperatoris reditus fuit.”

sanctioned by the popular voice at an earlier period, and which, in a single word, more than comprised all local designations.¹ He further declined any mark of public approbation, except the permission to wear a laurel chaplet and the triumphal insignia at the spectacles of the Circus.² Meanwhile, he exhibited the solemnity of his triumph, such an one as Rome had never before seen.³ It was not so remarkable for the munificence of the festivals by which it was attended, or for the public shows in the theatre and Circus, as for the interest and value of the spoils which rendered it illustrious. The treasures of Mithridates, collected from the plunder of Greece, were not restored to the sufferers, but reserved to enrich the friends of the latest victor. Works of painting and statuary were eclipsed by vast hoards of plate, and the novel luxury of gems and pearls and crystal vases. The taste, indeed, for these objects in Rome dated its introduction from this auspicious event⁴; so rapid was the transition the people made from the old Italian barbarism to that stage

¹ Ovid. *Fast.* i. 603.:

“Magne, tuum nomen rerum mensura tuarum est.”

So also Octavianus took the title of Augustus:

“Si petat a victis tot sumat nomina Cæsar
Quot numero gentes maximus orbis habet.”

² Dion, xxxvii. 21.; Vell. l. c. observes: “Id ille non plus quam semel, et hoc sane nimium fuit, usurpare sustinuit.” The glories of the triumph were a giddy elevation which furnished a constant theme to the moralists. Nemesis could hardly endure the provocation of seeing a mortal sitting among his fellow-citizens in the robe in which he had thrice ridden to the temple of Jupiter in the Capitol: “Vela-mina summo Ter conspecta Jovi.” Luc. ix. 177.

³ Comp. Plutarch's elaborate account, *Pomp.* 45.

⁴ Plin. *H. N.* xxxvi. 7.

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He presses
for an agra-
rian law for
the satis-
faction of
his veterans.

in a nation's life when it finds delight in mere brilliancy and rarity and meretricious ornament.¹

This harmless gratification of his vanity, however, did not avail to advance the immediate object of Pompeius's interest. The soldiery which had been disbanded at Brundisium, required the fulfilment of the ample promise of lands which he had held out to them.² Sulla had demanded estates for his veterans; why should not Pompeius extort the same? But the copy had not the boldness of the original; the vision of the dictatorship still eluded his grasp. He attempted to gain his point by management suited to the times; but in this also he failed, from want of adroitness. He had secured, by the ordinary methods of corruption, the election of two consuls for the year 694, on whose political or private sentiments he thought he could rely.³ But the one, L. Afranius, was a mere cypher

A. U. 694,
B. C. 60.

¹ Pompeius is the first Roman who can be confidently charged with the bad taste of allowing himself to be represented by a naked statue. This was the fashion which the Greeks applied to the representation of deities and heroes, and it consorted suitably with features of ideal beauty and majesty. In the Roman emperors the combination of the naked figure, with the ordinary human head trimmed and curled according to the fashion of the day, is generally ludicrous. The emperors, however, who claimed kindred with the divinities, were not altogether inconsistent. But a naked figure of a Roman citizen, before the age of apotheoses, was preposterous and unmeaning. Pompeius was probably misled by personal vanity, for he was one of the handsomest men of his day. (Plut. *Pomp.* 2.; Plin. *H. N.* vii. 10.; Vell. ii. 29.) The famous statue in the Palazzo Spada at Rome, which is supposed to represent him, and to be that beneath which Cæsar was assassinated, can hardly be presumed genuine; but another, also naked, preserved in the Villa Castellazzo near Milan, has a better claim to our confidence. See Winckelmann, *Gesch. der Kunst*, xi. 1.

² Though the legions were disbanded, it must be supposed that at least a part of them re-assembled to accompany the triumph of their general.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 16.: "In comitia omnibus invitis trudit noster

among statesmen, one, says Cicero, who did not know the value of the thing he had bought, and who understood dancing better than politics.¹ The other, Metellus Celer, had received a personal affront from his patron, who had divorced his sister Mucia immediately upon his return to Rome.² It was under these unfavourable auspices that one of the tribunes, named Flavius, was engaged to bring forward a bill on similar principles to that of Rullus, for a division of lands in Italy among the veterans of Pompeius and the poorer classes of the city. These lands were to consist partly of public domains, partly of estates to be bought by the government with the spoils of the late war. Cicero, who had opposed the former agrarian enactment with so much bitterness, speaks with moderation of this. He professes, in his correspondence, to have bestowed some pains on shaping and amending it, and to have studied to reconcile the interests of individuals with those of the state and of Pompeius himself.³ If such was his tone in addressing a private friend, he was probably still more guarded and conciliatory to all parties in the senate. But if the sting was thus taken out of an unpalatable and violent measure, the nobles only relaxed their opposition to fall into indifference and stifle the

Magnus Auli filium." Plutarch notices the audacious openness with which Pompeius bribed the voters. (*Pomp.* 44.)

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 19. ; Dion, xxxvii. 49.

² Dion, *l. c.* ; Plut. *Pomp.* 42. Mucia was the daughter of Mucius Scævola, and half-sister of Celer and Nepos. She was suspected of familiarity with Cæsar.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 19. : "Et sentinam urbis exhauriri et Italiæ solitudinem frequentari posse arbitrabar : " this was the language of the Gracchi.

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project by procrastination. The city was occupied, on the one hand, by a topic of private scandal, the intrigue of a noble named Memmius with the wife of a brother of Lucullus.¹ On the other, it was amused by the manœuvres of Clodius, who, in his anxiety to obtain a seat on the bench of tribunes, was seeking to be adopted into a plebeian family by a vote of the people.² Every one knew that his ultimate object was to obtain the means of injuring Cicero, and the city looked on with more curiosity than solicitude.

But is
obliged to
desist from
his de-
mands.

About the same time news arrived from Gaul of the commotions with which that country was menaced, and of the great preparations which the Helvetii were making for a national emigration, which threatened to respect neither the Roman province nor the territories of the allies. A revolution in Gaul was always a matter of deep alarm at Rome. The senate decreed that the consuls should undertake by lot the defence of the two provinces on either side of the Alps, and that deputies of consular rank should be sent immediately to levy troops and provide for the security of the national possessions. Distinguished men were promptly selected for this important charge; but Cicero and Pompeius were specially reserved, as statesmen whose services at such a crisis could not be dispensed with at home.³ The imminence of this Gallic war cooled down whatever interest the agrarian bill had excited.⁴ Pompeius, fearing

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 18.

² Cic. *l. c.*

³ Such was Cicero's complacent interpretation of this proceeding (*ad Att.* i. 19.).

⁴ Cic. *l. c.* : "Sed hæc tota res interpellata bello refrixerat."

to exasperate the people by pressing his demands at such a moment, desired his friends to desist; but he bitterly regretted the precipitation with which he had disbanded his army and confided himself to the gratitude or fears of his countrymen.¹ It would seem that the people generally were not much less jealous of their national champion than the senate itself. They conceived that his plan for enriching the rabble of the forum by grants of public land, was no better than a cover to his designs upon their liberty.²

It was a great descent for Pompeius to make from giving the word of command to consuls and consulars, to wielding, as his instruments, the most turbulent of the tribunes and popular demagogues.³ To this degradation he was reduced by the hostility of Lucullus and the resentment of Metellus Celer. The consul, for the gratification of his private pique, paid court to Cicero and the senatorial party, and the creature of favour and corruption became all at once, in their eyes, an admirable magistrate, a patriot, and a statesman. The violence of his opposition to Pompeius provoked violent retaliation. The tribune Flavius, presuming on his new patron's support, actually seized the consul's person, and threw him into prison. Metellus was well pleased to parade his

His schemes
for embroil-
ing public
affairs.

¹ Dion, xxxvii. 50.

² The populace insulted him in the theatre. An actor having occasion to say in his part, "Nostra miseria tu es magnus," was required to repeat the words several times. At the words, "virtutem istam veniet tempus cum graviter gemes," the audience burst into loud acclamations. Cic. *l. c.*

³ Compare Plutarch's remarks, *Pomp.* 46.

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injuries before the eyes of the city. He summoned the senators to hold their deliberations in his cell. Flavius erected his tribunal before the prison door to prevent their ingress; they caused the wall to be pulled down, and walked into the presence of their chief. Pompeius was not yet hardened to such scandalous proceedings, and hastened to repress his adherent's zeal.¹ Such moderation, however, would have been a bright spot in the history of these times of selfish violence, had it been accompanied by any attempt to check the degeneracy of the age, and infuse new vigour into the workings of the constitution. But Pompeius had no wish to effect any thing for the good of the state, unless it would surrender itself wholly to his discretion. Then, and not before, he was ready to try the experiment of reform, to bring to bear all the influence he was known to enjoy, all the wisdom and magnanimity he was supposed at least to possess. It would still remain to be seen what talents the successful warrior really had for civil administration. But no party in the state was yet willing to buy so doubtful a good at so uncertain a price. Meanwhile, the idea began to dawn upon his mind, that by the artful application of his resources, his wealth, his power, his private connexions, he might clog the proceedings of all parties, and throw the executive into a state of abeyance. The dread of mob-rule, and of the violence of demagogues, would ultimately prevail,

¹ This story, it must be remarked, rests solely on the authority of Dion (*l. c.*); and if true, it is strange that it should not be alluded to by Cicero.

as nearer and more urgent, over the apprehension of dictatorial despotism; and the author of the confusion would alone be able to disentangle it.

Great as Pompeius undoubtedly was, it was a cardinal defect in his character that he failed to keep his principal aim steadily in view, and allowed minor objects to divert his course and fret away his energies. This may be observed even in his military career, in which his genius was most conspicuous. In the Spanish campaigns his operations were desultory and indecisive, and there seem to be traces of similar feebleness in his contest with Mithridates; his countrymen were dissatisfied, and suspected him of protracting the struggle for political objects. In the city this want of decision became daily more evident. The consequence was that Pompeius failed to acquire any moral ascendancy over his associates. His virtues were sobriety and moderation, and these he possessed in an eminent degree. But when these qualities are not the result of resolute self-control, but arise from a deficiency in animation and the sense of enjoyment, they have little attraction for men of warmer temperaments, and exercise still less command over their imaginations. Accordingly, no man was so constantly deceived in the persons whom he selected for his instruments: they discovered his weaknesses, and shook off the yoke of his condescension. The distance which he affected in his intercourse with those about him, arose partly from natural coldness, but more perhaps from his own distrust of his power over them. They mistook it at first for greatness of soul; but

Weakness
of Pom-
peius.

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His dissimulation detected.

when they approached nearer to the self-proclaimed hero, they found with disgust of what ordinary clay he was formed.

Nor can it be disguised that this coldness and reserve had been known by their usual fruits, in an early career of remorseless cruelty and inveterate dissimulation. The nobles who shuddered at the idea of Pompeius assuming the powers of the dictatorship, well knew the school in which he had been brought up, and the proofs he had given of having imbibed its lessons. He had licked the sword of Sulla; and as with young tigers who have once tasted blood, they could never be assured that his thirst was sated.¹ He was himself another Marius or Sulla, no better, only more disguised.² Under the orders of the dictator he had shed the best blood of Rome, and had been branded with the title of the young hangman.³ He had put to death a Carbo, a Brutus, a Scipio Æmilianus; nor had he ever evinced any symptom of compassion or clemency. His word was not to be trusted, he was capable of disowning his own commands, neither friend nor enemy could rely on his actions corresponding with the sentiments he expressed.⁴ Rome might have yielded to a chieftain

¹ Luc. i. 327.:

“Utque feræ tigres nunquam posuere furorem,
Quas nemore Hyrcano, matrum dum lustra sequuntur,
Altus cæsorū pavit cruor armentorum;
Sic et Syllanum solito tibi lambere ferrum
Durat, Magne, sitis.”

² Tac. *Hist.* ii. 38.: “Occultior, non melior.”

³ Val. Max. vi. 2. 8.: “Adolescentulus carnifex.”

⁴ Cic. *ad Div.* viii. 1. 3.: “Solet aliud sentire, aliud loqui.” Comp. *ad Att.* i. 13. 4., ii. 20. 2. ii. 22. 1., iv. 9., iv. 15. 7.; Drumann, iv. 545.

who demanded her submission with the drawn sword, but it was too much to expect that she should put herself voluntarily in the power of one who affected to ask it as a favour to have the lives and liberties of her children placed in his hands.¹

From the moment of his return to the city, Pompeius was casting his eyes around him to find creatures who might further his occult ends, without either compromising himself or asserting too much independence of his direction. In these intrigues he was singularly unfortunate. When he divorced his wife Mucia, he had perhaps already in view the formation of an advantageous alliance. He proposed, it was said, to connect himself with the family of Cato, with whose character and position he must, if so, have been strangely unacquainted. The overture was rejected with disdain.² In Cicero, indeed, he found a willing flatterer, and with him he carried on a long course of dissimulation and cajolery, which was transparent to every one except its object.³ "In vain," he said to him, "should I have earned the glories of a triumph, hadst not thou preserved the city for me to triumph in."⁴ Indeed, he paid his court to his dupe so assiduously,

He makes
overtures of
alliance to
Cæsar.

¹ The later Romans drew this distinction between their submission to the usurpers of the civil wars, and to the legalized despotism of the emperors. Luc. iv. fin.:

"Jus licet in jugulos nostros *sibi fecerit ense*
Sylla potens, Mariusque ferox, et Cinna cruentus,
Cæsareæque domus series, cui tanta potestas
Concessa est."

² Plut. *Pomp.* 44.

³ It is evident that Cicero was warned against Pompeius by his friend Atticus. Cic. *ad Att.* i. 17. 10., ii. 1. 6.

⁴ Cic. *de Off.* i. 22.

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and showed himself so frequently in his company, that the young nobles gave him jestingly the name of Cnæus Cicero. But he seems to have early satisfied himself that he could make little use of the orator's services. Again, he was disappointed in the behaviour of both the consuls; the one was imbecile, the other unexpectedly hostile; his interests were not advanced by either. Clodius was too giddy and too self-willed to be trusted as an ally; the services of Flavius it was beneath the dignity of the great Pompeius to appear to require. Crassus was aiming like himself at the exasperation of the public dissensions, with the blind presumption that his wealth and the number of his clients would give him the advantage over all competitors in a period of popular discord. But with Crassus he was at deadly feud, for neither were of a temper to forget an ancient jealousy, and Pompeius least of all men knew how to make an overture of reconciliation. It was in these circumstances that he was disposed to invite Cæsar to his counsels, in whom he had already discovered, as he thought, all the alacrity to serve him that he could desire. Cæsar, he conceived, had no consideration to lose in the eyes of the nobility, of whose opinion he stood himself so much in awe; while his temper and necessities seemed equally to encourage him to defy the consequences of the most daring aggressions. We may suppose further, that in the view of a man so decorous and correct as Pompeius, the character of the profligate Marian appeared so bad, that he might expect to be able at any time to shake off and disown the connexion with im-

punity. The return of Cæsar from his province was opportune for the views of both parties, and they lost no time in coming to the show of a mutual understanding.¹

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Rome had no rewards for the honourable and beneficial discharge of civil duties in the provinces; but the military successes of the proprætor in Spain entitled him to claim the distinction of a triumph. Cæsar addressed letters to the senate, detailing his exploits and soliciting their reward. But the consulship was an object of more solid advantage; and as the year of Afranius and Celer advanced, the time drew near when it might be sued for and won. One obstacle intervened. The jealousy of the law forbade the Imperator to enter the city before the day of his triumph, while the vanity of the people demanded the appearance in the forum, on three stated occasions, of every candidate for their suffrages. It was true that the senate had frequently obtained for its favourites a dispensation from this latter regulation. Marius had been raised to the consulship, Lucullus to the ædileship, each in their absence.² A few years later Cato was the foremost to propose a similar indulgence to Pompeius, while he held the proconsulate of Spain, and was scrupulously refraining from entering the city.³ But on the present occasion the nobles were rejoiced to throw an impediment in the way of the man they hated; they conceded

Cæsar sues
for the consulship, and
relinquishes
the honour
of a triumph.

¹ It is at this period that the name of Cæsar first occurs in the letters of Cicero, and is introduced to us with the ominous words:

"Cæsar cujus nunc venti valde sunt secundi" (*ad Att. ii. 1.*).

² Plut. *Mar.* 14., *Luc.* 1.; Cic. *Acad.* ii. 1.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 54.

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the triumph on purpose that they might exclude him from the consulship.¹ When his friends were urgent to obtain a decree in his favour, the rigid patriot resorted to an artifice, and wore out the day with an interminable harangue.² Undoubtedly the nobles expected that Cæsar would have foregone the uncertain contest for the consulship; but on the contrary he relinquished the triumph, and hastily leaving his province before the arrival of his successor, appeared in Rome in due season to solicit the votes of the citizens. It was a compliment to the majesty of the people to exhibit this preference of their honours before those of the senate; but in Cæsar's eyes the value of the one outweighed a hundred times the empty glory of the other. He formed a coalition with a wealthy candidate, L. Lucceius³; the nobles put forth all their strength on behalf of Bibulus, and contributed an immense sum to bribe the centuries. Even Cato joined in this audacious cabal, and thus by his example set the seal to the universal acknowledgment, that law was impotent and revolution inevitable.⁴

The cabal
of Pom-
peius,
Cæsar, and
Crassus:
the first
triumvirate.
A.U. 694.

Meanwhile, Crassus, set aside equally by the leaders of the various sections of the nobility, the idle, the profligate, and the impracticable, felt himself ill at ease, even in his conspicuous position. Cautious, industrious, and studious of appearances, he was himself equally removed from all these extremes; and, without any open rupture, his influence with his party seemed to slip from under

¹ Dion, xliv. 41.² Suet. *Jul.* 18.; Dion, xxxvii. 54.³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 17. 11.⁴ Suet. *Jul.* 19.

him. The return to Rome of Cæsar, the main-spring of every thing original and active, breathed new life into him as well as into Pompeius, and was calculated to form a new era in the fortunes of both. The Marian candidate for the consulship was already prepared to establish an intimate connexion with each, and at the same time to reconcile them to one another. Crassus soon began to listen with satisfaction to the overtures of so skilful a negotiator. A little adroit flattery served to smooth over the wounds his vanity had received; and he was easily induced to withdraw his countenance from friends who knew not how to appreciate his importance, and bestow it upon those who had the prudence to solicit it. Thus did the three competitors for supreme power combine to form a league among themselves for their mutual advancement. The covenant was that no proceedings should be allowed to take place in the commonwealth without the consent of each of the three contracting parties.¹ United they constituted a power beyond all the resources of the commonwealth to cope with. However much or little they might deign to consult the forms of the constitution, their influence was really omnipotent, their voice decisive. The cabal only wanted open avowal to be recognized as the usurpation of absolute power, and the distribution of this power in more than one hand alone distinguished it from a monarchical despotism. Such was the triumvirate of Pompeius, Cæsar, and Crassus, which bore its legitimate fruit in the empire of Octavius.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 19.

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Reflections
upon the
character of
this league.

The curtain now draws up for the commencement of another act in the great drama, and discloses to us a new development of the history of the Roman people. The blood of the Roman and the Italian has mingled in one common current; the counter-revolution has obliterated all traces of the Sullan reform; the contest has ended in raising individual statesmen to a position in which they can array their own private ambition against the general weal. Each great chieftain finds himself at the head of a faction whose interests centre in him alone, who are ready to fight under his banner and for his personal aggrandizement, and have ceased to invoke the watchwords of party or the principles of class. The triumvirs are now leagued together to undermine the old form of government; by-and-by they will fly asunder, and challenge each other to mortal duel. Each will try to strengthen himself by an appeal to old names and prejudices, and the shadows of a popular and a patrician party will again face each other on the field of Pharsalia; but the real contest will be between a Cæsar and a Pompeius, no longer between the commons and the nobility. For the one party has no common object of sufficient interest to bind it firmly together; the other, though every privilege and every traditional feeling is in peril, has no reliance on its leaders, by whom it has been so often betrayed, and has become a mere gathering of desperate men, crowded together by an instinct of resistance, but animated by no vital principle of permanence or progress.

It was precisely at this period, the crisis of the fortunes of the oligarchy, that the best and wisest of its champions became lost to it. Catulus died in the same year¹ which witnessed Cæsar's return to Rome and the establishment of the triumvirate. The confusion into which the affairs of his party from henceforth fell confirms the truth of the mournful panegyrics which Cicero pronounces upon him. "He was a man whom neither the tempests of danger nor the breezes of glory could ever divert from his course, either through hope or fear."² "Since the death of Catulus," he writes in a letter of this period, "I maintain the true policy of my order, without a protector and without a companion."³

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Death of
Catulus.

The effects of this triple union soon became apparent. The election of Cæsar to the consulship was carried by acclamation; the nobles could only succeed in thrusting in Bibulus as his colleague. This was the second time that these reluctant yoke-fellows had been joined together in public office, and there was little prospect of their bearing their honourable burdens with decent unanimity. In the heat of the rumour of a Gallic tumult, the senate had already assigned the two Gauls to the consuls of the year; but the aspect of things became less warlike, and Metellus feared that he should have no opportunity for acquiring a tri-

Cæsar obtains the consulship for the year 695.

¹ In the middle of the consulship of Metellus Celer. Cic. *pro Cal.* 24.

² Cic. *pro Sest.* 47.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 20. Asinius Pollio commenced his history of the civil wars with the consulship of Afranius and Metellus: "Motum ex Metello consule civicum." Hor. *Od.* ii. 1.

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umph.¹ It now hastened to allot their future provinces to the consuls newly designated, and made a feeble attempt to guard against Cæsar's increasing power by decreeing to them the supervision of the roads and forests; a paltry charge, not worthy even of Bibulus.² Cæsar was justly incensed at this manœuvre, but he had no doubt of being able to counteract it when the time should arrive; meanwhile, he had a game to play, and he commenced it with his usual decision.

His proceedings in office: he humbles the nobles, and gratifies Pompeius.

The influence of Cæsar and his allies far outweighed that of his colleague, not only in the forum, but even within the precincts of the senate. Finding himself outvoted and thwarted on every occasion, Bibulus at last refused to convene the senators, and shut himself up in his own house, where his friends assembled and discussed their plans and prospects at least without interruption. As the absence of one consul prevented the other from convoking the senate, it was hoped that this secession would cripple the power which Cæsar was threatening to use against his opponents; but he, nothing daunted, convened the popular assemblies whenever he had occasion, and proposed and carried whatever measures he chose. In this way he passed an agrarian law, similar to that of

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 20.

² Suet. *Jul.* 19.: "Provinciae minimi negotii." It is possible, however, that this charge was not quite so trivial. Cælius writes to Cicero, in the year 704, that Curio was about to propose a law in the interest of Cæsar, "viariam, non dissimilem agrariæ Rulli," and combines it with a *lex alimentaria*. (Cic. *ad Div.* viii. 6.) Any measure which threw the public burdens on the privileged classes would be agreeable to Cæsar.

Flavius, by which he satisfied the veterans of Pompeius, and settled a colony of twenty thousand citizens at Capua. The colonists were selected from the heads of families who had as many as three children; a principle which was afterwards frequently resorted to as a means of encouraging the multiplication of the Roman people. The party who met at the house of Bibulus counselled a sudden attack upon Cæsar's supporters in the comitia, and the consul of the nobles rushed sword in hand into the midst of the assembly, challenging his colleague to an appeal to arms. But his friends were outnumbered, and forced to exert all their efforts to save their champion and bear him off into a place of security. Cato distinguished himself in this unseemly riot by pushing through the crowd to the rostrum, protected by the inviolability of his office; but the harangue which he commenced enjoyed no such privilege, and was soon drowned in the uproar which it excited. Cæsar was less scrupulous than even the city populace, and ordered his lictors to seize the tribune and drag him from the place.¹ Lucullus, old and feeble, was grievously ill-treated, and only saved his life by throwing himself at his enemy's feet.² When the bill had thus been passed by the people, the victorious consul required the senators to ratify it by an oath of obedience. By threatening to obtain an enactment to make refusal capital, he succeeded in forcing it down the throats of Cato and his staunchest adherents.³ Pompeius's

¹ App. *B. C.* ii. 12.² Suet. *Jul.* 20.³ App. *B. C.* ii. 12.

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satisfaction was completed by a decree of the senate sanctioning the acts of his government in the provinces. He hugged himself with delight at the success of his intrigues, and regarded the establishment of the triumvirate as the crowning stroke of his policy.¹

Mysterious
confession
of a conspi-
racy against
the lives of
Cæsar and
Pompeius.

Much of the violence and apparent bitterness of the statesmen of the day which we have witnessed hitherto, may be attributed to the excitability of the Italian character, prone to the most exaggerated expression of its feelings. After all, the politicians of Rome continued to live together in private with much harmony and good temper: their public feuds were often forgotten in the relaxation of social intercourse. Their conduct was rather that of rival gamesters than of deadly enemies. But at this crisis an event occurred which served to sow dark suspicions between honourable opponents, and reminded men once more of the use of the dagger, to which the national mind was never long a stranger. L. Vettius, whose name has already received dishonourable mention, either attempted, or confessed that he had been suborned to attempt, the lives of Cæsar and Pompeius.² He was arrested with the poniard upon him, which he was to employ in the deed of assassination, and which he declared had been furnished him by the consul Bibulus. His disclosures tended to impli-

¹ Dion. xxxviii. 5.

² This story is given in detail by Cicero (*ad Att.* ii. 24.). Compare Suet. *Jul.* 20.; Plut. *Luc.* 42., and Cic. *in Vat.* 11.; also the Schol. Bobiana *pro Sest.* p. 308., in *Vatin.* 320. These writers agree in insinuating that the plot was a fabrication of Cæsar's. Appian (*B. C.* ii. 12.) suggests an unsatisfactory reason. Dion. xxxviii. 9.

cate the most conspicuous members of the senatorial party, Cato and Cicero, and more especially the younger Curio. The nobles defended themselves by insinuating that the pretended plot was a fabrication of Cæsar himself. Vettius, they asserted, had promised to break down Curio's influence by fastening upon him a charge which should cover him with odium and disgrace. With this view he had insinuated himself into the young man's confidence, and gradually prepared him for the announcement of his intended blow. Curio escaped the snare, and revealed the plot to his father; the father to Pompeius. Such was the story as told by the nobles. To this there was nothing to be opposed but Vettius's word, and that doubtless was totally without value. The criminal was thrown into prison, and was found some days afterwards dead in his bed. His death was attributed to suicide, but the rumour prevailed that he had been despatched for the convenience of others.¹ Of whom? of those who were really at the bottom of the scheme, whether a genuine or a feigned one. Of Cæsar then? Assuredly not; for Brutus, whom the culprit had named, was the son of Cæsar's favourite, Servilia. More probably, of Curio and the violent section of young aristocrats, who declaimed against the tyranny of the triumvirs while they lauded the memory of tyrannicides, and who were certainly capable of any excesses.²

¹ Cicero (*l. c.*) attributes his death directly to Vatinius, in the interest of Cæsar.

² Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 7.: "Megabocchus (Curio) et hæc sanguinaria juvenis . . . grex Catilinæ . . . (comp. *ad Att.* ii. 8.). The spirit of Catilina was not extinguished. When C. Antonius, under whose auspices

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Cæsar obtains the proconsulship of the two Gauls and Illyricum for five years.

They alone must be content to bear the suspicion of any act of unusual enormity ascribed generally to a party which reckoned among its leaders such honourable men as Lucullus, Cato, and Cicero.

Bibulus did not venture forth again in public during the remainder of his term of office. Cæsar continued to administer the affairs of the commonwealth without the aid or opposition of his colleague.¹ The release of the knights from the rigour of the terms on which they farmed the revenues of Asia was another of his measures²; a wise one in itself, and at the same time conducive to his own interests; for that body, already alienated from the senate by the repulse they had before suffered, and apparently cooling in their gratitude towards Cicero, their unsuccessful patron, were delighted to transfer their allegiance to the popular champion. The increased influence which the consul acquired by these proceedings he took care to confirm and extend by the greatest display of munificence in his shows and entertainments.³ The alarm with respect to Gaul had in some measure subsided during this year; but the people, on the motion of Vatinius, conferred upon their favourite

the arms of the conspirators had been defeated, was convicted of malversation and banished in the year 695, the tomb of his victim was crowned with flowers by unknown hands. *Cic. pro Flacc.* 38.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 20.: "Ut nonnulli urbanorum quum quid per jocum testandi gratia signarent, non Cæsare et Bibulo, sed Julio et Cæsare consulibus, actum scriberent . . . utque vulgo ferrentur hi versus:

"Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, sed Cæsare factum est:

Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini."—Comp. *Dion.* xxxviii. 8.

² Suet. *l. c.*; Appian. *B. C.* ii. 13.; *Dion. l. c.*

³ One of Cæsar's popular acts, of more than ordinary sagacity, was his providing for the publication of the proceedings of the senate. Suet. *Jul.* 20.; Duruy, *Hist. des Romains*, ii. 399.

the charge of the Cisalpine province, together with that of Illyricum, for the space of five years; an extraordinary stretch of their prerogative, but one for which the Manilian and Gabinian laws afforded ample precedents. Both Crassus and Pompeius blindly supported the interests of their colleague, and extorted for him from the senate the addition of the Transalpine province, the seat of expected war.¹ But his enemies were well pleased perhaps to rid themselves of his detested presence upon any terms; while it was now the main object of his ambition to obtain the conduct of extensive and protracted military operations, to create an army of devoted adherents, and enrich a numerous retinue of the best families in Rome. At the same time Pompeius offered his hand to Julia, his rival's daughter², and this alliance was regarded as a pledge that both were thoroughly in earnest in their combination to oppress the republic. In vain did Cato warn the senate that it had raised up a king over itself, and introduced him, guards and all, into the citadel of the commonwealth. Even Cæsar himself seems for once to have been intoxicated with success, and to have vaunted in unmeasured language of the triumph he had

¹ The one province was probably at this time a necessary complement to the other. Cæsar constantly levied in the Cisalpine Gaul the troops which he required for his campaigns in the remoter province. *Dion.* xxxviii. 8.

² *Vell.* ii. 44.; *Dion. lib.* xxxviii. 9.; *Suet. Jul.* 21. Cæsar gave his daughter to Pompeius, though she was betrothed at the time to another. He at the same time married Calpurnia, the daughter of L. Calpurnius Piso.

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Clodius
elected tri-
bune: his
popular
measures.
A. U. 696,
B. C. 58.

achieved over his enemies, and the vengeance he would wreak upon them.¹

The affairs, however, of the city were at this moment assuming a character of more intense interest than ever. After vacating the consulship at the commencement of the year 696, and taking the command of his legions, Cæsar still continued to linger outside the walls to watch events. The new consuls were L. Calpurnius Piso and A. Gabinius, both adherents of the triumvirs, and the latter especially devoted to the interests of Pompeius. They seem both to have been equally notorious as men of depraved characters and dangerous dispositions, though the former paraded an almost cynical affectation of republican virtue.² Cæsar had exerted himself to effect the adoption of Clodius into a plebeian house. The forms of the law were satisfied or evaded³, and, to the utter dismay of the nobility, the shameless demagogue was elected to the office of tribune. While his immediate object was well known to be the persecution of Cicero, his personal enemy, he was generally understood to be a creature of Pompeius, and feared as a ready instrument for the furtherance of his treacherous schemes. The consuls were necessitous and greedy; and the young tribune

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 33., *Pomp.* 48.; Suet. *Jul.* 22.

² Cf. Cic. *Or. post Red.* 4., *pro Dom.* 9., *pro Sest.* 7., *de Prov. Cons.* 3., *in Pison.* 4. But it must be borne in mind that our knowledge of them, especially of Piso, is derived principally from their enemy, and that he at an earlier time had spoken more favourably of them (*ad Qu. Fr.* i. 2.).

³ Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 12.; Vell. ii. 45.; Suet. *Jul.* 20.; Dion, xxxviii. 12. Cicero advanced various technical objections to the legality of this adoption (*pro Dom.* 13. 29.).

made no scruple to assure them, on the strength of the favour in which he was held by the people, of the reversion of two of the most lucrative provinces at the expiration of their year.¹ With such a combination of influential men to back him, Clodius did not delay for a moment in pushing forward a series of measures, calculated both to increase his popularity and to curtail some of the most vital powers of the oligarchy. He began with proposing a gratuitous distribution of corn to the needy citizens.² He introduced a bill to limit the power of the censors in expelling unworthy members from the senatorial body.³ He also effected the restoration of the collegia, guilds of trades, which had been suppressed only a few years before by a decree of the senate. These guilds dated their origin from the time of Numa⁴, and were undoubtedly in the first instance an institution worthy the wisdom of the reputed lawgiver of the monarchy. They were calculated, at the era of their foundation, and long after, to raise the estimation of the kinds of labour which they fostered and protected; a matter of importance

¹ *Cic. de Prov. Cons.* 2.: "Syria et Macedonia quas, vobis invitis et oppressis, pestiferi illi consules pro eversæ reipublicæ præmiis occupaverunt."

² *Lex Clodia frumentaria.* *Ascon. in Pison.* p. 9.

³ *Lex Clodia de censoria notione.* *Ascon. in Pison. l. c.*: "Quartam (legem tulit Clodius) ne quem censores in legendo senatu præterirent neve qua ignominia afficerent, nisi qui apud eos accusatus et utriusque censoris sententia damnatus esset." *Dion. xxxviii.* 13.; comp. *Cic. pro Sest.* 25. This law was again abolished by Scipio in his consulship, A. U. 702.

⁴ *Plut. Num.* 31. Many of these guilds are specified by Plutarch, *Num.* 27., and Pliny, *H. N.* xxxiv. 1., xxxv. 46.; comp. *Dionys. A. R.* iv. 43. See various inscriptions in the collections.

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in a city of soldiers and landowners, among whom trade and shopkeeping were generally held in contempt.¹ At a much later period these guilds gave consistency and weight to the class next below that of the knights and publicans, one which, without the enjoyment of public office or dignity, had nevertheless a stake in the commonwealth and an interest in its well-being. Their direct tendency to consolidate the power of the middle ranks of society made them extremely obnoxious to the aristocratic party, which had only recently effected their suppression.² At the same time, it must be allowed that, in a period of faction and licence, and the occasional ascendancy of mere mob-government, they were liable to be perverted to the worst purposes, and to become hotbeds of seditious intrigue. In the existing condition of the city, familiarity with secret bonds of union, secret signs and devices, and peculiar social distinctions, all tended to foster that spirit of lawless combination which was menacing the ruin of the commonwealth. On the other hand, the persons, the property, and the repute of the trading classes had no further need for special protection; the growth of luxury and refinement rendered their services indispensable, and ensured them respect. Accordingly, Cicero opposed their restoration; and we shall find hereafter how cautiously the wisest emperors watched and restrained them. But Clodius undoubtedly was looking to the further use to

¹ Cic. *de Off.* i. 42.

² "L. Cæcilio, Q. Marcio consulibus, collegia sublata sunt quæ adversus rempublicam videbantur esse." Ascon. in *Pison.* § 8., A. U. 686.

which an unscrupulous demagogue might mould them, and succeeded in carrying his measure triumphantly.¹

Repeal of
the Lex
Ælia Fufia.

A still more important step was the repeal of the Ælian and Fufian laws, which had become practically one of the most efficient weapons of the oligarchy in the deadly struggles in which it was engaged.² These statutes directed that whenever the comitia were convened the consuls should consult the auspices and signs of the heavens, according to the prescribed forms ; and if they declared them to be unfavourable, the assembly was to be at once dissolved, and its acts rendered invalid. This became a constitutional check in the hands of the consuls to the power of the tribunes³, who, among their other prerogatives, possessed that of summoning the assemblies of the people. Thus, when Bibulus had refused to attend the comitia, he had performed these ceremonies, as he asserted, in his own house, and had discovered the proceedings of the people to be informal. The act by which Clodius had

¹ Lex Clodia de collegiis. Ascon. in *Pison. l. c.* : "Post novem annos quam sublata erant, P. Clodius trib. pl. lege lata restituit collegia." Comp. Dion. xxxviii. 13.

² Lex Clodia de auspiciis. Cic. *pro Sest.* 15. ; Ascon. *l. c.* ; Dion. *l. c.* We do not know what were the actual provisions of the new law, but we can hardly suppose that they went the whole length of repealing the consular prerogative in a matter so closely connected with the popular superstitions. A few years after this we find the consuls still obnouncing, and thus vitiating the proceedings of the comitia, as heretofore. It may be urged, however, that, after the defeat of Clodius, the laws passed in his tribunate would be little regarded by the opposite party. Yet Cicero speaks of the Lex Ælia Fufia as entirely abolished (*in Vatin.* 8, 9.).

³ The tribunes had also the power of taking the auspices, and were accustomed to thwart the proceedings of their colleagues by these means. Cic. in *Vatin.* 8.

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obtained his adoption into the plebs had been vitiated in a similar manner; and, at a later period, Cicero argued on this ground that his enemy's election to the tribunate had been null and void from the first, and all his subsequent acts illegal. To overthrow this bulwark of the constitution was naturally a great object with Clodius himself and his party, however manifest it might be that the power of the people had outgrown the danger to which it was in earlier times exposed from it. But having cleared his way by all these preliminary movements, the tribune next proceeded to make his meditated attack upon the destroyer of Catilina's associates.

Danger of
Cicero's
position.

We have already seen how rapidly Cicero fell in general estimation and influence after the eventful period of his consulship. As he felt himself sinking, he strove to buoy himself up by constantly dinning into the ears of senate and people the glories of his consulship, and pouring around his own actions the same flood of rhetorical hyperbole, which might be excusable, if not always graceful, in his pleadings for others.¹ The virulence of the great contending factions had thrown both equally beyond the reach of his moderate counsels, and the superior lustre of the triumvirs had cast his services and abilities entirely into the shade. The three allies had no occasion to encumber themselves with a fourth colleague for the sake of talents with which they could dispense; and it is but justice to the great orator to say that he was too sincere a patriot to

¹ Plut. *Cic.* 24. : Οὔτε γὰρ βουλήν, οὔτε δῆμον, οὔτε δικαστήριον ἦν συνελθεῖν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ Κατιλίαν ἔδει θρυλλοῦμενον ἀκοῦσαι καὶ λέντλον. The reader will be pleased with the good-humoured apology which the biographer makes for his hero.

sell himself to such a cause. But at the same time, the suspicion which haunted him, that he was in constant danger of being seduced by their intrigues, was altogether unfounded. Difficult as it is to read the real designs and objects of the crafty confederates under the disguises which they all knew how to assume, it seems to have been their deliberate aim to inflict a wound upon the aristocracy through the sides of their vaunted consul.¹ Pompeius at least contemplated, as we may conjecture, that the sympathy of his order and of his personal friends might raise a tumult in Cicero's defence, and looked steadily for the moment when an armed interference would be necessary to restore peace to the republic, and elevate one of the cabal to an avowed and legalized supremacy.

Cæsar indeed, with his natural kindness and friendly feeling², would have spared Cicero the humiliation of a public disgrace. He offered him a place in the list of commissioners for dividing the Campanian lands³; a post of honour, inasmuch as it was coveted for lucre's sake by the greatest personages, and still more one of influence, in which he might have surrounded himself with a

Cæsar makes friendly overtures, which he rejects.

¹ Vell. ii. 45.: "Non caruerunt suspicione oppressi Ciceronis Cæsar et Pompeius." Cicero allows (*pro Sest.* 7.) that Pompeius had given him an assurance that he would require a solemn promise from Clodius not to molest him; but it is evident that he had no faith in the triumvir's sincerity.

² Dion. xxxviii. 11. ἐπεικεστέραν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως εἰλήχει φύσιν, καὶ οὐ πᾶν ῥαδίως ἔθυμοῦτο Συμφῶ μὲν δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἔχαριζετο, κ. τ. λ.

³ Vell. l. c.: "Hoc sibi contraxisse videbatur Cicero quod inter xx viros dividendo agro Campano esse noluisset." Comp. Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 2.; Quintil. xii. 1. 16. It appears from a letter to Atticus (ii. 5.), that the orator was expecting the offer of a mission to Egypt, of which he speaks with much affected coyness. It does not appear whether the offer was ever made, but probably not.

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multitude of friends and expectants. When Cicero refused this offer, Cæsar pressed him to become one of his lieutenants in Gaul, which would at least have removed him from the scene of the machinations in progress against him.¹ But the orator seems to have considered this appointment as beneath his dignity, and would not consent to be withdrawn from the sphere in which he conceived his political importance to lie. He persisted also in his fond hope that the Roman people would not desert him in extremity²; that his enemy's schemes would eventually be frustrated; that Pompeius would step in at the last moment for his protection. It was not till he found every solicitation rejected with increasing marks of distrust, that Cæsar seems to have determined to abandon to his fate the opponent of his policy.³ As he saw the crisis approach, he hovered about the city with such troops as he had collected, and was evidently in a better position than either of his colleagues for striking at the dictatorship, if, in the midst of these impending convulsions, the state should lose its balance.

Cicero appeals to the compassion of the people:

In the mean time Pompeius, who was jealous of any union between Cæsar and Cicero, remarked

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 18.

² Dion. xxxviii. 16.: Τούτοις οὖν τοῖς λογισμοῖς κρατήσιν ἐλπίσας, καὶ γὰρ ἐθάρσει παρὰ λόγον ὥσπερ ἀνεξέταστος ἐδεόλει.

³ The degree of sanction which Cæsar gave to the persecution of Cicero has never been estimated with precision. This is owing to the politic reserve which the orator adopts in speaking of one by whom he was more completely overawed than by any other of his contemporaries. If the answers of Atticus to his letters had been preserved, we should no doubt possess the key to many hints of the value of which we are now unconscious. Abeken, *Cicero in seinen Briefen*, p. 91.

the latter's distrust with satisfaction. From old habits of respect and awe, the orator continued still to look to him as alone possessed of real power to restrain the popular demagogue; and Pompeius did not hesitate to lure him on to the last with false hopes, in order to prevent his throwing himself into the arms of another. From Crassus, a personal enemy¹, Cicero had no assistance to expect, and, notwithstanding every soothing assurance on the part of Pompeius, he could not but behold with increasing terror the development of his enemy's plans. It was by giving way, however, to these apprehensions that he animated the courage of his enemies, and confirmed the coldness and secret treachery of those who professed to protect him. He hastily determined to try the effect of appealing to the compassion of his countrymen, whom he had saved from revolution, or at least of the party whose ascendancy he had preserved. Accordingly, he suddenly appeared in public in black garments, as a suppliant for favour and commiseration²; a theatrical display never adopted except by persons actually under accusation. This stroke of policy was not unsuccessful among the orator's friends, but it had no effect upon the hostile or indifferent. The senate indeed clothed itself in mourning, and vast numbers of the knights and other classes followed the example. Even Publius Crassus, the triumvir's son, a devoted admirer of the statesman and philosopher, assumed the general costume of fear and sorrow: as many as twenty thousand of the citizens embraced the

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 13.

² Plut. *Cic.* 30.

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fashion of the day.¹ But the creatures of Clodius were unabashed: their confidence even rose, as they beheld the effect of the mere distant rumour of their leader's machinations. They made a jest of the mourners, raised tumults in the streets, and assailed both Cicero and his adherents with mud and stones.²

of Pom-
peius and
the consuls.

The friends of the orator, more terrified and perplexed than ever, now made a last effort to secure the protection, or at least ascertain the intentions of the consuls and triumvirs. They deemed it impossible that any men who aspired to hold the reins of government should continue to countenance the violence of a faction which had taken possession of the streets. But Gabinius treated their representations with scorn.³ Piso, to whom Cicero applied in person, as a connexion of his family, though less rude, proved not more tractable.⁴ He affected to treat the suppliant consular with frankness. He explained to him that Gabinius was compelled by his poverty, if not by his inclination, to espouse the popular side, and that since he despaired of obtaining anything from the senate, his hopes of succeeding to a rich province depended upon the favour of the tribunes. It was his own duty, he argued, to advance the interests of his colleague, just as Cicero himself had catered

¹ Cic. *Or. post Red. ad Quir.* 3., *pro Sest.* 11, 12., and elsewhere. Dion. xxxviii. 16. The consuls issued an edict to forbid this sign of sympathy.

² Plut. *Cic. l. c.*; Dion, *l. c.*; Cic. *pro Mil.* 14.

³ Cic. *pro Sest.* 11.

⁴ Dion (*l. c.*) thinks that he was not personally hostile to Cicero, and gave him the advice which he really deemed the most expedient under the circumstances.

for the benefit of Antonius; irony the more cutting, since it was rumoured, falsely we may believe, that, in conceding to Antonius the government of Macedonia, the orator had stipulated for a share of its expected profits. He ended with coldly taking leave of his visitor, recommending him, as the common duty of every citizen, to provide for his own interests and safety.¹ In the mean time the heads of the senatorial party betook themselves, with a numerous attendance of citizens, to the house of Pompeius, on the Alban hill, whither he had retired on purpose to avoid the solicitations which he foresaw, and which he feared perhaps to be unable to parry. The Clodians, indeed, had plied him with secret admonitions to protect himself against the dagger of the friend he was betraying, and then gave out that his retirement was adopted for the sake of personal security.² Pompeius replied to the deputation by referring them to the consuls, the appointed guardians of the public peace and of private rights: if they thought fit to summon him to arm in their defence, he was ready to obey the call.³ To Cicero himself, who even after this repulse ventured to apply to him in person, he answered more explicitly, that he could do nothing against the will of Cæsar; and herein we may believe that he threw off for once his usual

¹ Cic. *in Pis.* 6. This account rests upon Cicero's own representation of the affair, but there seems no reason to doubt its correctness in the main. The historian may disregard the coarse personalities which the orator flings against his enemies, the effeminacy attributed to the perfumed Gabinius, and the crapulousness of his sententious colleague.

² Cic. *pro Sest.* 18., *pro Dom.* 11.

³ Cic. *in Pison.* 31.

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Clodius prevails on the people to pass a resolution affecting Cicero's safety; who retires into voluntary exile.

dissimulation, and confessed the truth, that the whole affair was really hurried irresistibly along by the impulse which Cæsar had given it.

Clodius had fixed deeply the roots of his popularity when he brought forward the bill to which all his previous efforts were intended to pave the way. He proposed that the assembled people should declare, in general terms, that every one who was guilty of the blood of a citizen, without legal sanction, should be put under the ban of the state and interdicted from fire and water. This was, in fact, a sentence of outlawry, by which the person so attainted was denied legal protection, his property was confiscated, to harbour him was rendered penal, and any one was allowed to slay him with impunity. Such a resolution would be, at first sight, no more than a confirmation of laws already existing; but it would bind the people to enforce their dormant austerity, and it would point directly at Cicero, who, by putting Lentulus to death on the authority of a decree of the senate, had violated the popular interpretation of the constitution.¹ The tribune convened the people in the Flaminian Circus, outside the walls, to give Cæsar an opportunity of attending its deliberations, for, being invested with a military command, he could not enter the city. He took part in the discussion, reminding the assembly of the opinions he had expressed in the senate against the capital sentence, and renewed his condemnation of the conduct of the consul and his party both on legal

¹ See Cicero's speeches after his return from exile, and his letters to Atticus. Dion. xxxviii. 17.; Plut. *Cic.* 30, 31.

and political grounds; yet, at the same time, he faintly dissuaded the adoption of the present proposal, on the ground that the time for animadversion was past, and that it was better to bury the whole matter in oblivion. But the people affirmed the resolution, and Clodius was determined not to throw away the arms which it put into his hands. It was thought by many, and by Cicero himself at a later period, that his best course would have been to take no notice of this proceeding, which did not expressly accuse him, and thus defy the enemy to a direct attack.¹ To accept this resolution as affecting himself was to acknowledge his conduct liable to the imputation of irregularity, which the senate and their champion himself indignantly denied. Some advised, and among them was old Lucullus, to draw the sword at once, not in defence of Cicero only, but of the senate, of the constitution of Sulla, of the interests of the best and bravest classes of the nation.² There was no safety, they argued, in parleying any longer with the popular demagogues: every year was adding to their strength; their leaders clung closer together instead of splitting asunder; the opposite party had already fallen into the hands of three chiefs with a common object; if it came under the power of one, its unity of purpose and action would be irresistible. But others persuaded Cicero to bow to the present storm, which they felt

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 15.: "Cæci, cæci, inquam, fuimus, &c. . . . quod, nisi nominatim mecum agi cœptum fuerit, perniciosum fuit."

² Lucullus recommended Cicero to remain in the city and defy the malice of his enemies. (Plut. *Cic.* 31.) He must assuredly have contemplated bringing matters to a crisis by a resort to arms.

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assured could be only transient.¹ The popularity of so miserable a creature as Clodius could not last; better counsels must ultimately prevail in the breast of statesmen so respectable as Pompeius, at least, and Crassus. If he left Rome for the present, the matter might be more easily smoothed over, the sentence modified, and perhaps shortly reversed.² Cicero yielded to this advice, which was probably the wiser of the two, with the general prudence and humanity of his disposition³; but he marred the grace of the concession, in the eyes of posterity, by the unmanly lamentations with which he accompanied it. The last act of the retiring patriot was to take an image of Minerva, which he prized among his household treasures, and place it in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter⁴; thereby signifying that the citizen who had once saved his country by his presence, recommended its preservation during his enforced absence to the goddess of moderation and wisdom.⁵

¹ Hortensius and even Cato were of this opinion. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 35.; Dion. xxxviii. 17.

² The laws allowed a Roman citizen to escape capital punishment by voluntary exile; but in such case they permitted the confiscation of his property, and inflicted upon him civil incapacity to the fullest extent.

³ His views are expressed with eloquence and sense in the speech *Pro Sest.* 19—21.

⁴ Plut. *Cic.* 31.; Dion. *l. c.*; Cic. *de Legg.* ii. 17.

⁵ Middleton, *Life of Cicero*. A better interpretation perhaps would be, that in time of anarchy wisdom must seek refuge under the protection of power.

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EARLY CONQUESTS OF THE GAULS: THEIR FORMIDABLE HOSTILITY TO ROME.—GRADUAL SUCCESS OF THE ROMANS IN THE CONTEST BETWEEN THEM.—REDUCTION OF GALLIA CISALPINA.—ALLIANCE OF ROME WITH MASSILIA.—THE ROMANS ACQUIRE A PROVINCE BEYOND THE ALPS.—GAULISH ETHNOLOGY:—1. THE IBERIANS: 2. THE GAEL: 3. THE BELGÆ—DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CÆSAR AND STRABO: MODERN THEORY OF A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE KYMRY AND GAEL IN GAUL AS WELL AS BRITAIN—PHYSICAL AND MORAL CHARACTERISTICS; CIVILIZATION; RELIGION: 4. THE GERMAN TRIBES IN GAUL.—GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE GAULS, AND AMOUNT OF THEIR POPULATION.

OF all the nations with which Rome had come into collision, two alone could boast of having reduced her to submission: the Etruscans had extorted hostages at her gates; the Gauls had encamped within her walls, and carried off the ransom of her existence.¹ The surrender of the city to Porsena, attested by the most veracious of her historians, had spread an expiring gleam over the annals of the Etruscan nation, already declining from its highest power, and doomed to speedy decay and entire subjugation. The victorious attack of Brennus, in the fourth century of her career, marks the era at which the tide of Gaulish conquest was at its full. About that period the name of the Gauls was more terrible,

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Victorious
career of
the Gauls
in Europe
and Asia.

¹ Tac. *Ann.* xi. 24.: "Capti a Gallis sumus, sed et Tuscis obsides dedimus." Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* xxxiv. 39.) states that the treaty which Porsena concluded with the Romans forbade them the use of iron except for implements of husbandry.

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throughout Europe and Western Asia, than that of any other conquerors. They had occupied almost every part of Spain, and might still be traced in the remotest corners of the Peninsula.¹ The indigenous Iberians had been compelled either to amalgamate with them, or to make their escape through the passes of the Pyrenees. In a series of repeated immigrations, they had succeeded in establishing themselves throughout the North of Italy, overthrowing the languid power of the Etruscans in those regions, and re-peopling their half-deserted cities with colonists of a new race. From the central recesses of the parent country vast swarms were still incessantly issuing. One horde established a Gallic sovereignty on the banks of the Danube. A second penetrated into Illyria, and prepared the way for the successive waves which spread over Pæonia and Macedonia, which broke against the defiles of Thermopylæ, and were at last shivered to atoms in the gorges of Delphi. Another band, still more adventurous, succeeded in crossing the Thracian Bosphorus, and made itself master of the greater part of Asia Minor. The populous coasts of the Ægean Sea, with all the fair cities of Ionia, were overrun by these barbarians in the third century before our era; and, after many vicissitudes of fortune in their wars against the kings of Syria, they still left their name impressed upon a province of Asia, and became, as mercenary troops, the main defence of the thrones of their conquerors.²

¹ The Gallæci or Callaici, in Gallicia, and the Celtici near the mouth of the Guadiana, were of Gaulish descent.

² Justin. xxv. 2. See Amedée Thierry's *Histoire des Gaulois*,

However much the Romans might strive to disguise the full extent of their disgrace, the taking of the city by the Gauls left a deep and permanent impression upon their minds. War with the Gauls was thenceforth regarded with peculiar alarm and horror. It was designated, not by the ordinary term of War, but as a Tumult; an era of dismay and confusion, when the customary regulations of the state must be suspended, and the usual immunities from service overruled.¹ The defeat of the Allia continued to be commemorated in the calendar as an anniversary of evil omen²; and a special hoard of treasure was deposited in the Capitol, never to be touched except for the purpose of repelling a Gallic invasion.³ The strength and stature of the barbarians, so much exceeding those of the Italian races, made it necessary for the Roman generals to improve the equipment of the legionaries. Camillus introduced the helmet of brass or iron, and fortified the shield with a rim of metal, to turn the edge of the heavy but untempered Gaulish sword; he furnished his soldiers also with a long pike, to keep the gigantic enemy at a distance.⁴

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Their capture of the city leaves a deep impression on the minds of the Romans.

partie i. ch. i. iv. x. I shall have frequent occasion to refer to this admirable work, as also to the same writer's *Histoire de la Gaule sous l'Administration Romaine*. The one I shall cite under the title "Gaulois," the other under that of "Gaule."

¹ Plut. *Cam.* 41.: Οὕτω δ' οὖν ὁ φόβος ἦν ἰσχυρὸς, ὥστε ξέσθαι νόμον ἀφεῖσθαι τοὺς ἱερεῖς στρατείας χωρὶς ἂν μὴ Γαλατικὸς ᾖ πόλεμος.

² Luc. vii. 409.: "Et damnata diu Romanis Allia fastis." Comp. Ovid. *A. A.* i. 413., and elsewhere.

³ App. *B. C.* ii. 41.: "Α φασιν ἐπὶ Κελτοῖς πάλαι σὺν ἀρχῇ δημοσίᾳ τεθῆναι. κ. τ. λ.

⁴ Plut. *Cam.* 40.; Polyæn. *Strat.* viii. 7. These pikes (ύσσοι μακροί)

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Continuation of the struggle between the Romans and Gauls.

For a while the Gauls passed annually under the walls of Rome, in quest of booty from Latium or Campania. At last the Romans took courage, and ventured to issue from their retreat and obstruct the march of the depredators. The tactics of the generals of the republic were signalized by caution no less than by bravery, and the result of more than one well-fought campaign was the final deliverance of Central Italy from these periodical ravages. The popular stories by which the events of this conflict were embellished, of the golden collar won by Manlius, and of the raven which aided Valerius in his unequal combat, evince the long-continued interest with which the Romans regarded this desperate struggle.¹

Fresh immigration of Gauls into Italy, A. U. 455.

The next contest which took place between the two nations was decided at a greater distance from the hearths of the republic. In the year of the city 455, a new swarm of barbarians issued from the defiles of the Alps, and threatened to overthrow the earlier establishments of their own countrymen within that barrier. The Cisalpine Gauls diverted them from their unnatural enterprize by pointing to the riches of the South, and opening to them a passage to the frontiers of Etruria. Some of their own hordes also offered to accompany the new comers.² The Etruscans were engaged at the moment in the secret preparation of a mighty armament against Rome. Alarmed and discon-

were probably massive and heavy, and not adapted for throwing. The famous pilum was apparently this same pike shortened to six feet, and used principally as a missile. (*Gaulois*, i. iii.)

¹ Sall. *B. J.* 114. : "Cum Gallis pro salute non pro gloria certare."

² Liv. x. 10. ; Polyb. ii. 19.

certed at the arrival of the strangers demanding lands as the price of peace, they sought to enlist them on their own side by the amplest promises of Roman plunder. Meanwhile, they offered an immediate donative in money. The price was stipulated and paid down, when the Gauls treacherously refused to move without the more substantial present of a fixed territorial settlement. "Give us lands," they exclaimed, "and we will be your allies now and hereafter; if not, we will retrace our steps with the treasures we have already extorted." Deceived and baffled, the Etruscans deliberated, and determined, with becoming spirit, to have no further dealings with such perfidious and dangerous allies. The Gauls kept their word, and recrossed the Apennines; but discord soon arose between the Transalpine and Cisalpine divisions of their army, and the greater part of both were sacrificed in the furious encounters which resulted from their disputes.

Meanwhile, however, the ramifications of a great Italian coalition were extending themselves throughout the Peninsula. The Samnites and Umbrians united with the Etruscans; and, strong as they were in their native confederacy, the allies determined to enlist the Cisalpine Gauls also in the common enterprize. The Romans flew to arms with undaunted spirit. The struggle that ensued was terrific, and seldom had the republic been brought into more signal peril. The imprudence of Fabius and the devotion of Decius were among the events by which this war was signalized. The Gauls, in their turn, complained that they were

Coalitions
of the Gauls
with the
Italians
against
Rome.
Triumph of
the Romans.

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betrayed by the Etruscans, who were induced to desert their allies by a judicious movement of the Roman forces, which carried fire and sword into their defenceless territories. The fatal day of Sentinum ended with the defeat and immense slaughter of the Gauls and Samnites, more especially of the former.¹ When they were once more engaged by the Etruscans to unite the forces of the two nations together, the Samnites were incapacitated from joining the new coalition. In this war the Romans were uniformly successful, and it was terminated by the great battle at the Vadimonian lake, where the Boii and Senones, the flower of the Cisalpine forces, were entirely defeated; and the Romans could boast for the first time of having reduced their most formidable enemy to sue for peace.² The solicitations of the vanquished, however, were not made, or not listened to, till the nation of the Senones had been almost exterminated by Drusus, and their capital, Sena, transferred to the conquerors, who established a Roman colony within its walls. The victorious legions returned to the city with the identical treasure, as they fondly boasted, which had been surrendered by their ancestors as the ransom of the Capitol.³

A. U. 470.
B. C. 284.

The Gauls
join Han-
nibal and
share his
reverses.

These disasters effectually broke the strength of the Cisalpine Gauls, nor did they again venture to threaten the republic with invasion and con-

¹ Liv. x. 26.

² Liv. *Epit.* xii.

³ Suet. *Tib.* 3. : "Drusus . . . traditur . . . pro prætore ex provincia Gallia retulisse aurum Senonibus olim in obsidione Capitoli datum, nec, ut fama est, extortum a Camillo."

quest. The power of Rome gradually extended and consolidated itself in the Peninsula; and, during the interval of the first two Punic wars, her citizens carried their arms beyond the limits of Italy Proper, and effected the subjugation of the Boii and Insubres. The arrival of Hannibal was hailed as an opportunity of deliverance and revenge. But the Gallic tribes did not rise simultaneously, as in former times, in reply to his call for assistance. He obtained succours from the Gauls, indeed, as from other nations of Italy, but not in such overwhelming numbers, nor with such zeal and confidence of success, as he had hoped and anticipated. It was against the genius and moral resources of the individual that Rome had to contend in her wars with Hannibal, rather than against the spirit and energy of his allies. When these resources failed, the Gaulish auxiliaries, despairing of the condition of their own country, now deprived of its last defender, devoted themselves to the interests of their Carthaginian leaders, and followed the remnant of their host into Africa.¹

A. U. 532.
B. C. 222.

Thus cowed in spirit and reduced in power, fortune favoured the Cisalpines with no more such golden opportunities. But they were yet untaught to submit to a foreign master; and while the Romans continued to strengthen their position on the Po by colonies and fortified works, the indignation of the natives frequently broke out in desultory and fruitless resistance. Under the Carthaginian

Cisalpine
Gaul reduced to the form of a province about the end of the sixth century of the city.

¹ The Gauls and Ligurians formed together a third part of the Carthaginian forces at the battle of Zama. App. *Pun.* 40.

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Hamilcar, they attacked and destroyed Placentia¹; but their success was transitory, and repaid by a bloody defeat. Wars followed upon wars; treachery on their own part led to cruel retaliation on that of the enemy. The Boii at last broke up from their harassed and insulted homes, and migrated in a body to the banks of the Danube. The Romans gradually pushed their conquests to the foot of the Alps, and closed the defiles of the mountains against the reinforcements which might have poured in from the Further Gaul. Towards the end of the sixth century of the city, the whole region between the Rubicon and the Alps was reduced to the form of a Roman province, secured by numerous garrisons and watched with unremitting vigilance. The name of Gallia Cisalpina still remained, as a memorial of the people in whom the republic had found her most dangerous and most inveterate enemy; and every year, after the completion of his term of office, one of the consuls went forth with a numerous army to govern the province, which might be intrusted only to personages of the highest authority and greatest experience in the state.

First trans-
actions of
the Romans
beyond the
Alps. Al-
liance with
Massilia.

In the meanwhile, however, the Romans had not neglected to secure their acquisitions within the barrier of the Alps by checking the movements of the Gallic tribes beyond it. Massilia, the modern Marseille, had been founded some centuries before this era by a Grecian colony; but it was by slow and painful steps that this celebrated city extended its influence along the southern coast of

¹ A.U. 554, B.C. 200; Liv. xxxi. 10.

Gaul. Notwithstanding the numerous maritime colonies which it established, it with difficulty maintained its own existence against the tribes of the interior, and the intimate relations which it cultivated with the great Italian republic from an early period were found to be of equal convenience to either party.

The Massilian aristocracy, which enjoyed the exclusive administration of the government¹, was purely mercantile, and possessed little or no territorial wealth. Like the other commercial settlements of the Greeks in ancient times, and many of the Italian republics of the middle ages, Massilia was unable to defend itself by the unassisted strength of its own native population. While other states, in similar circumstances, have depended upon the fidelity of mercenary troops, the Massilians rested their security mainly upon their alliance with Rome. Under the shelter of this great military power, their commerce flourished and expanded on all sides. Syracuse and Carthage were crushed by the universal conquerors: the maritime power of Etruria had dwindled into insignificance under the blighting influence of their oppressive domination. The mercantile activity of Greece, which had migrated from Athens to Rhodes and Corinth, was impaired by internal weakness, and repressed by the harassing activity of the pirates in the eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, Massilia reigned for a considerable period without a rival in the career of commerce. But

Massilla, its
position and
resources.

¹ Strab. iv. 1. ; Aristot. *Pol.* v. 6. ; Cæs. *B. C.* i. 35. ; Cic. *de Rep.* i. 27.

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her trade was mainly supplied by the produce and the wants of the vast continent which lay behind her. She opened regular communications with the interior of Gaul, and from thence with the ocean and the British isles; thus substituting a direct and safer route for the perilous circumnavigation of the Phœnician coasting vessels. The wines and other produce of the South found their way up the Rhone and Saone, then by a short portage to the Seine and Loire, or across the plains of Languedoc, to the Garonne, and so to the coasts of the Atlantic.¹ The interchange of commodities between Gaul and Britain was constant and regular, producing a close moral and intellectual connexion between those distant regions. Meanwhile, the riches which accumulated in the emporium of all this traffic disposed the Massilians to cultivate the arts and enjoy the luxuries of their mother country; and their learned leisure was crowned with a reputation hardly any where exceeded beyond the bounds of Greece itself.² But the jealousy of the maritime tribes of Southern Gaul was not appeased by the blandishments of commerce and social refinement. The Ligurians especially, the rudest and most restless of the number, were engaged in almost constant

¹ Strabo observes (iv. 1.) how conveniently the great rivers of Gaul lie for the purposes of commerce: οὕτως εὐφύως ἴσχει τὰ ρεῖθρα πρὸς ἀλλήλα. The same is eminently the case as regards the construction of railroads. The three great valleys of the Saone, the Loire, and the Seine are separated by a table land of moderate elevation. At one period of the Roman domination the commerce of the whole of Gaul radiated from Autun, in the centre of this district.

² Strabo (*l. c.*) remarks that Massilia became a place of resort for the purpose of liberal education, not only to the Gauls, but even to the Romans themselves.

hostility with the Greek colonists. The position occupied by this people commanded the most practicable of the Alpine passes, where the mountains descend into the Mediterranean. The Romans had no object more at heart than to obtain the possession of this key to Gaul; and the claims upon their assistance which their new ally was constantly making could not fail to afford them a pretext for seizing it.

The first interference of the Romans in the affairs of the Massilians occurred in the year of the city 600. Antipolis (Antibes), and Nicæa (Nice), two offsets from the original Grecian stem, were beleaguered by the Ligurians, in the midst of whose territory they lay, and were on the point of surrendering. The arrogant republic sent ambassadors to require the assailants to desist from an enterprise against the dependencies of an ally. But the mountaineers refused to listen to their representations, or even to allow them to land. In making the attempt, Flaminius, the principal commissioner, was severely injured, and some lives were lost in the encounter. The deputation sailed away to Massilia, where the wounds of Flaminius were assiduously tended, while the news of the violence done to him was conveyed to Rome. The event was stigmatized as a violation of the law of nations, and so specious a pretext for decisive hostilities was embraced with eagerness. The Oxybii and Deceatæ were specially marked out for vengeance as the guilty tribes. An army was assembled at Placentia, under the consul Opimius. Ægitna, the offending town, was taken and sacked, and the

The Romans first interfere with the affairs of Transalpine Gaul in behalf of the Massilians A. U. 600.

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armies of the audacious barbarians defeated after an ineffectual resistance. The consul gave up their territory to the Massilians, and compelled the rest of their kindred tribes to surrender hostages for their good behaviour. The Roman troops occupied the country through the winter; but it does not appear that they established fortresses, or made any permanent settlement there.¹

Formation
of the
Transalpine
province,
about
A. U. 623.

This first campaign of the Romans beyond the Alps had been short and easy, nor did its success contribute to the territorial aggrandizement of the republic. In the epitomes of the national history it was not thought worthy of mention.² It was in the year 629 that a second occasion presented itself for pushing an army into Gaul. The wars of Fulvius Flaccus against the Salyi, and of Calvinus against the Vocontii, undertaken, in the first instance, at the request of the Massilians, ended in the discovery of the alluring baths of Provence at Aquæ Sextiæ (Aix), and the foundation of a Roman town within the lines of the consular encampment. Massilia gained a large accession of territory; but the Romans had set their foot firmly upon the soil of Gaul. From this moment wars succeeded one another with rapidity. The republic had now an interest of its own in the country to preserve and extend. It formed alliances with some of the native states, and made their grievances a pretext for assailing others. Hence the fierce contest with

¹ Polyb. xxxiii. 7, 8.: Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὀξείαν ἔλαβε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν συντέλειαν.

² Florus (iii. 2) says: "Primi trans Alpes arma nostra sensere Salyi."

the Allobroges, with the Arverni and their king Bituitus, between whom and the Ædui, who claimed the friendship of Rome, there existed an ancient enmity.¹ The interference between these rival states gave a great development to the Roman policy, for most of the Gaulish tribes were bound to one or the other of them by ties of fear or interest. Fabius Maximus defeated with immense slaughter the combined forces of the Arverni and Allobroges near the banks of the Isere; his colleague Domitius inveigled Bituitus into his camp, and by a signal act of treachery cast him into chains, and sent him to Rome.² The senate censured the perfidy of the consul, but failed not to profit by it. Bituitus was detained in Italy as a hostage for the submissive behaviour of his people and of his son Congentiatus, whom it was proposed to place on his father's throne, after receiving a Roman education. In the mean time the whole tract of country between the Alps, the Rhone and the maritime possessions of the Massilians, was reduced to the form of a Roman province. The territory of the Salluvii and Allobroges, comprehending the modern Savoy, was absorbed, together with that of many smaller tribes, in this extensive conquest, and the whole district received, by way of eminence, the appellation of the Province. The Arverni were treated with more

¹ A strict alliance was formed between the Romans and the Æduans, and the terms of brothers and kinsmen were frequently interchanged between them. *Cæs. B. G.* i. 43.; *Tac. Ann.* xi. 25.; *Cic. ad Att.* i. 19.

² This Domitius was an ancestor of the Emperor Nero. The authorities for this war are *Liv. Epit.* lxi. lxii.; *Oros.* v. 14.; *Flor.* iii. 4.; *Plin. H. N.* vii. 50. The date *A. U.* 623, *A. C.* 131.

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consideration. Situated beyond the Rhone and the Cevennes¹, they were too remote to be an object of immediate cupidity to the Romans, and their power and influence were so great that it appeared more politic to accept them as allies than to threaten them with subjugation.

Importance
of this
province.

The highest importance was attached to the outpost of the Roman power established beyond the Alps. It was reserved as a consular province, and every year one of the consuls marched into it with an army, to maintain it in subjection and defend it from the intrigues and violence of the neighbouring tribes. But the principal object of the Roman governor was to extend its frontiers. In the years immediately succeeding, Manlius, Aurelius Cotta, and Marcius Rex successively crossed the Rhone, and seized upon several districts between that river, the Cevennes, and the Pyrenees. Some tribes were conquered by arms, while the easy submission of others, such as the Volcæ Tectosages, gained for them the title and privileges of allies. These new acquisitions were

¹ Strabo (iv. 2. fin.) describes the dependencies of the Arverni as extending to Narbo and the frontiers of the Massilian possessions in the South, but the centre of their power lay in the mountainous district of Auvergne. They were received, like the Ædui, into the alliance and friendship of Rome. Tacitus says that the Ædui alone of all the Gaulish nations were honoured by the Romans with the title of brothers. It is probable that Lucan, when he gives the Arverni a claim to this distinction (i. 428.),

“ Arvernique ausi Latio se fingere fratres,
Sanguine ab Iliaco populi,”

confuses them with the Ædui, both nations in his time being equally Romanized. It is remarkable that, in his enumeration of the Gaulish nations, he omits all mention of the latter people.

maintained by the establishment of a colony at Narbo Martius (Narbonne), which served also as a check upon Massilia, and a rival to her in arms and commerce. This city became one of the principal colonies of the republic beyond the limits of Italy. The final subjugation of a portion of the Alpine tribes by Marcius, the completion of the Domitian road along the coast of the Mediterranean, and the precarious occupation of the passes of the Graian and Cottian mountains, afforded means of rapid access from Italy to every part of its trans-alpine possessions.¹

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While the victorious republic was occupied with the organization of its new province, a great but transient revolution threatened to shake its power to its foundations. Distant rumours of vast national migrations among the Gaulish races had already found their way to the ears of the Roman annalists; but, conspicuous as were their results in the constant irruption into Italy of new swarms of barbarians, their features were indistinct, and their causes unknown. The observation of the intelligent people of the South gradually became more keen, their interests more awakened. The movement of the Cimbri and Teutones, at the beginning of the seventh century of the city, which weakened the

Origin of
the Cimbri
and Teu-
tones.

¹ Oros. v. 14.; Liv. *Epit.* lxiii. The campaign of Appius Claudius against the Salassi, A.U. 611, shows that at that early period the possession of the pass of the little St. Bernard was an object of importance. He defeated the hostile tribes; but we cannot suppose that one such victory was sufficient to give the Romans a permanent hold of their country. It is probable that both the Graian and Cottian passes were only used by them occasionally, and at the price of a stipulated payment.

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power of the Gauls, while it served to develop the ambition of the Romans, was more carefully noticed and more accurately detailed. The Cimbric Chersonesus seems to have been adopted as a place of refuge by a remnant of the mighty nation known by the cognate names of Cimmerici, Cimbri, or Kymry, left behind in the course of its westward progress, and cut off from the rear of the advancing host by the rapid influx of the Teutonic races behind it.¹ The Cimbric is generally recognized as one branch of the great Celtic family, and a broad line has always been drawn by ethnologists between this and the Teutonic. The union of the offspring of such inveterate foes in any common enterprize of magnitude has been pronounced impossible, and various conjectures have been hazarded to reconcile the statements of history with the supposed nature of things.² But the progress of knowledge on these subjects has served to smooth the difficulty. As our investigations proceed, we discover, on the one hand, a greater variety of

¹ The Cimbri are designated as Gauls by Sallust, *B. J.* 114.; Flor. iii. 3.; Diod. Sic. v. 32.; Appian. *Illyr.* 4. Plutarch, on the other hand, terms them Germans. (*Mar.* 11.) But little regard can be paid to these assertions on either side. Among recent and more critical authorities I observe that Zeuss (*Deutschen und Nachbarstämme*, p. 144.) maintains their German origin.

² Certain cantons in the mountains about Vicenza and Verona have been supposed from the peculiarity of their language to be peopled by the descendants of the Cimbri who penetrated into Italy. It is said that a Danish prince visited them and recognized the dialect as that of his own country. Their language has indeed been proved to be German by M. Edwards (*Lettre à Am. Thierry*, p. 91.); but an Italian writer, Count Giovanelli, has discovered in Ennodius and Cassiodorus the fact of the establishment of a German colony in that district in the time of Theodoric, from which these people are in all probability derived.

shades of distinction between the several branches of one principal family ; on the other the differences between families themselves appear to be less decisively marked. Thus, among the Celtic populations of Gaul, we shall observe a Gaelic, a Cimbric, and perhaps a Belgic variety, each having some different characteristics, yet all blended together and maintaining a common affinity through various points of contact. To Cæsar's observation the connexion between the Celtic Belgians and the Teutonic Germans seemed more close than that between the different races of the same Celtic family. This view is no doubt essentially erroneous ; but the fact that so accurate an observer should have made the mistake, may suffice to convince us how powerfully the accidents of intercourse and proximity may operate in sundering kindred and amalgamating independent elements. There seems therefore no objection to the supposition that the Celtic tribe, isolated, as has been described, from the rest of its brethren, and closely pressed by the vicinity of a Teutonic population, gradually assimilated itself to its immediate neighbours. The sudden occurrence of a common danger would naturally draw more closely the bonds of social alliance ; the feelings of ancient antipathy would give way before the claims of mutual distress ; and thus the representatives of widely divergent stocks might eventually combine in political union. We shall have occasion hereafter to notice a very similar case, the union of the Celtic Belgians with their German neighbours within the Rhine, when

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Their great migration to the South early in the seventh century of the city.

they associated together to resist the invasion of the Romans.¹

There is reason to believe that the low countries between the Elbe and the Baltic, which were the seats of the Cimbri and the Teutones, were harassed, in the early part of the seventh century, by a series of destructive inundations, followed, by scarcity, famine, and pestilence.² The inhabitants of the neighbouring shores of Friesland and Holland might have combated these enemies with courage and industry, and by their persevering labour have kept their footing in the country. But the Cimbri and their neighbours had no local attachment, and little of local interest to tie them to the soil they occupied. Nations are slow in losing the habit of movement, and the confidence with which their fathers had repeatedly wandered forth in quest of new settlements had not abated in the later generation. The Cimbri and Teutones made a joint resolution to migrate in one mass, and seek new abodes in the South, wherever fortune might permit them to establish themselves.³ The inhabitants of Northern Ger-

¹ It will be seen that the Cimbri and Teutones were afterwards joined by the Helvetii and Ambrones, both of them undoubtedly belonging to the Celtic family.

² Appian (*Illyr.* 4.) says that the country of the Cimbri was afflicted by earthquakes and a pestilence. Strabo (vii. 2.) alludes to a report that their migration was caused by an inundation of the waters of the sea. He is disposed to doubt the truth of this account, but gives no satisfactory reason for disputing it.

³ A remnant were left behind. Strabo mentions that the Cimbri, in the time of Augustus, sent an embassy to apologize for the temerity of their ancestors. The emperor seems to have regarded them as a German people (see *Monum. Ancy.*): "Cimbrique et Chatiides et Semnones et ejusdem tractus alii Germanorum populi." By that time

many were thinly scattered, without fortresses or fixed habitations; they offered no resistance to the progress of the invader, nor inducements to his stay, and the barbarian horde shot across them as an arrow through the yielding air. Indeed the central regions of the continent were for the most part covered with forests and altogether unsettled. Accordingly, from the shores of the Baltic to the Danube, and even to the foot of the Rhætian Alps, was, as it were, but one step to this gigantic emigration. But here the Romans rushed forward to stem the torrent, the nature of which they had been taught by long experience to fear. They seized upon the passes of the mountains, and haughtily commanded the invaders to retire from the territories of a people whom the great republic entitled her friends. The barbarians were appalled by this bold defiance from an enemy whom they had never yet seen, but whose fame was bruited throughout Europe. They hesitated in their career, and offered to apologize for an insult committed in ignorance. The Roman general, Papirius Carbo, acted with base treachery in attacking their camp unexpectedly, while he delayed the return of the deputation they had sent to wait upon him.¹ But neither his perfidy nor

The Romans oppose them and are defeated.
A. U. 641.

they had probably lost every trace of their Celtic descent. Comp. Tac. *Germ.* 37.

¹ Appian, *Gall.* fr. 13.: Οἱ δὲ Τεύτονες . . . προσέπεμπον ἀγνοῆσαι τε τὴν ἐς Ῥωμαίους Νωρικῶν ξενίαν . . . αὐτὸς δὲ . . . ἀδοκῆτως ἀναπανομένοις ἔτι τοῖς Τεύτοσιν ἐμπεισὼν ἔδωκε δίκην ἀπιστίας. It may be conjectured that the apology of the Teutones was a pretence, and that while they promised to abstain from injuring the Noricans, they had no intention of quitting the neighbourhood, where their position necessarily gave umbrage to Rome.

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his arms succeeded in averting the danger. The bloody combat which ensued terminated in the defeat of the Romans with such loss, that they would have been unable at the moment to maintain possession of the passes, if the enemy had had the presence of mind to follow up his victory.¹ But the barbarians were yet undecided as to their future course. They contented themselves with spoiling the undefended countries south of the Danube, until, having gorged themselves with booty during a three years' sojourn, they changed the direction of their march towards Gaul, and entered it with the favour and co-operation of the most powerful of the Helvetic tribes.

They turn
to the West,
enter and
overrun
Gaul.

The vast multitude now spread itself with augmented numbers over the Belgian territory, entering its frontiers between the Rhine and the Jura. In some districts it met with resistance, and was engaged in sanguinary struggles, but generally the inhabitants hastened to propitiate the foe by the offer of hospitality and an appeal to the ties of kindred.² The invaders seem to have shown no disposition to rest from their wanderings in the territories which they might have extorted from the native population; but the city of Aduatucum, in the country of the Eburones, they reserved as a magazine for their stores and booty, and a safe re-

¹ The battle is said to have taken place at Noreia. (Strabo, v. 1.) Noreia is supposed by Groskurd (Strabo, *in loc.*) to be the modern Friesach, in Carinthia, between the Mur and the Drave. Walckenaer (*Geog. des Gaules*, ii. 80.) places it at Noring, near Gmund.

² Strabo says that the Belgæ alone throughout Gaul were able to resist the invaders; but Cæsar (*B. G.* ii. 4.) seems to confine this success to those tribes in Belgium which were of German origin.

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treat for their old men and children, who could no longer endure the fatigues of endless adventure.¹ The combined hordes next turned their faces to the South of Gaul, where they met with no serious impediment to their progress; and it was not till they had exhausted the resources of the regions which lay in their way, that their rapacity was tempted by the rich and flourishing possessions of the Roman power. It was in the Province that they declared their intention of taking up their abode, and they boldly demanded an assignment of lands from the proconsul Silanus. He returned a contemptuous refusal, which he followed up with a vigorous attack upon the audacious intruders. But the strength and spirit of the barbarians of the North again triumphed over the panic-stricken legionaries; and it was chiefly by the skilful use of its natural barriers that the Province was protected from invasion, till a new army could be sent into the field. The arrival, however, of these fresh forces only brought with it new defeats. L. Cassius was routed with one army, and himself slain, in the defence of the frontiers²; the remnant of his legions was compelled to pass under the yoke. Aurelius Scaurus was taken prisoner in another quarter, with the total loss of a second. The Cimbri began to deliberate whether they

They defeat the proconsul, Silanus:

Cassius and Scaurus:

¹ Aduatucum, according to D'Anville, is the modern Falais. It may be recognized perhaps, from the particular description which Cæsar (*B. G.* ii. 29.) gives of the locality. Its inhabitants in his time were the descendants of the Cimbric garrison.

² Liv. *Epit.* lxx.: "In finibus Allobrogum." Oros. v. 15. says, "Tigurinos usque ad Oceanum persecutus," which I can only suppose is a strange mistake for the Lacus Lemanus. Thierry, *Gaulois*, II. iii.: "A' la vue des remparts de Genève."

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Cæpio and
Manlius :

should not at once cross the Alps and carry their arms into Italy; but, startled by the resolute defiance of their captive, they preferred to secure their position in the Province, and reduce the towns in the interior, a task of difficulty and fatigue to an unskilled and undisciplined multitude. Rome put forth her resources, and assembled another powerful army to cover the cities of the Mediterranean. But her generals, Cæpio and Manlius, did not act in concert; the jealous pretensions of the one ruined both himself and his colleague. The two camps were forced one after the other on the same day; the rout was more complete, and the slaughter more overwhelming than had befallen the republic since the fields of Cannæ and the Allia. On the one hand, the Province lay defenceless at the feet of the invaders, with all its wealthy colonies and commercial establishments; on the other, the Alps were unguarded, and a bold advance might carry destruction and desolation into the heart of Italy. Rome trembled at the name of the Cimbri, which recalled to her all the horrors of Gallic invasion.¹ Never did Fortune play a more wanton trick for her favourite children than when she averted both

¹ The figure of the Cimbrian warrior which Marius painted in derision on a shield, and set up in a conspicuous part of the forum (if Mariano be not a corruption for Manliano, see *Cic. de Orat.* ii. 66.), was an imitation of a similar mockery of a much earlier date, commemorating probably (comp. *Liv.* vii. 10.) the victory of Manlius over the gigantic Gaul. The scutum Cimbricum was the sign of a banker's office in the consulship of L. Æmilius Paullus, A.U. 586, according to a curious inscription given by Reinesius, p. 342. (Thierry, *Gaulois*, Introduction.) The terms Cimbri and Galli were used by the Romans of that day as synonymous; the precise distinction between them will be shown presently.

these impending dangers, and directed the more enterprising of the barbarian hordes towards the frontiers of Spain, while she engaged the remainder in the enjoyment of ease and luxury on the spot where they had won their triumphs. The main body of the invaders was occupied in an inglorious incursion beyond the Pyrenees for the space of two years. Meanwhile, the Romans recovered from their consternation, and, acting in the spirit which the crisis demanded, broke through every rule to appoint Marius to the command, and to give him the authority of the consulship for three years successively. The new general reached the province before the return of the enemy, and the great military works which he effected for the security and convenience of his future operations already marked the energy and foresight of his character, before the opposing forces took the field. The barbarians had now resolved upon the invasion of Italy, and divided their armament, with the view of crossing the mountains simultaneously from the West and the North, and meeting at an appointed rendezvous on the banks of the Po. The Cimbri and Helvetii took the longer circuit; the Teutones and Ambrones were to cut their way through Marius's legions, and penetrate the Cottian or the maritime Alps.¹

The events of the short campaign which followed, as preserved in the picturesque narrative of Plutarch, are more than usually striking. The admiration in which the name of the Roman general was so long held by his countrymen caused them

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But invade
Spain in-
stead of
penetrating
into Italy.

Marius
takes the
command.
His great
victory at
Aquæ
Sextiæ:
A. U. 652,
B. C. 102.

¹ Plut. *Mar.* 15.

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to treasure up every quaint rudeness which fell from the rough soldier's lips during the awful moments of suspense which preceded the final catastrophe. But we must confine our hasty glance to the great encounter which took place in the neighbourhood of Aquæ Sextiæ. After the unprecedented series of six successive defeats which the Romans had sustained in conflict with their formidable enemy, they here gained a victory which balanced all their former losses. The barbarians were totally exterminated, the survivors of that bloody day falling one by one under the vengeance of the provincials in their vain endeavours to escape northwards. It would be useless to repeat the enumerations of the slain given with great variations by the different historians. It is evident that the whole horde was annihilated; and the dead, lying unburied upon the field, gave to it the frightful appellation of the Putrid Plain, which seems still to be retained in the name of Pourrières, a village which marks the spot.¹ The proprietors in the neighbourhood fenced their vineyards with the bones of the giants of the north; but the greater portion of the ghastly mass sank gradually into the soil, and the fields over which the Roman and the Teuton fought and struggled on that terrible day became celebrated for their rank fertility.²

¹ Plut. *Mar.* 15—24.; Thierry, *Gaulois*, n. iii.

² The French antiquaries have taken great interest in tracing the existing monuments and traditions of these events. (See *Mém. Soc. Antiq. Franç.* ix. 48., xvi. 1.) The localities, it seems, may be distinctly pointed out in the valley of the Arc, about ten miles east of Aix. The ancient names of several hills and villages are still pre-

The enterprize of the Cimbric horde, though more successful in the outset, was crowned with disaster no less overwhelming. The barbarians descended into Italy by the pass of the Brenner, and drove before them the troops commanded by Catulus, the aristocratic colleague of Marius. They crossed the Adige and reached the banks of the Po, where they expected to meet their companions, whose absence surprised but did not seriously disquiet them. Unfavourable rumours began to be

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And at
Vercellæ.
Destruction
of the in-
vading
hordes.

served in their modern appellations. The Mont Ste. Victoire, on the side of which the army of Marius was arrayed, evidently derives its name from the battle. The people of the neighbourhood have kept festival there from time immemorial, and the addition of the term Saint, together with the Christian exterior given to the solemnities, may be ascribed to the pious policy of the mediæval church. "Les habitans de Pertuis," says M. Castellan, "petite ville au de là de la Durance, à trois lieues d'Aix, paraissent en avoir mieux conservé la tradition que tous les autres peuples du voisinage. Ils s'y rendent au bruit des tambours, et des fifres. Des prieurs nommés annuellement, choisis pour diriger la marche et maintenir le bon ordre, se chargent aussi de la subsistance des pelerins, parmi lesquels se trouvent des personnes des deux sexes et même des enfans. Arrivés sur le sommet, après une journée de marche par des chemins peu praticables, ils campent en plein air; et dès que la nuit commence, ils mettent le feu à un grand monceau de broussailles, sautant tout autour en signe d'allégresse. Répété à Pertuis, aussitôt que la flamme y est aperçue, ils font entendre réciproquement au lointain, à cris redoublés, ces paroles dignes de remarque, 'Victoire, victoire!'" Compare this account with Plutarch's narrative, *Mar.* 22.: μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ὁ Μάριος τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ὕπλων καὶ λαφύρων τὰ μὲν ἐκπρεπῆ καὶ ὀλόκληρα . . . ἐπέλεξε· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐπὶ πυρᾷ μεγάλης κατασωρεύσας τὸ πλῆθος ἔθυσε θυσίαν μεγαλοπρεπῆ· καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ περιεστῶτος ἐν ὅπλοις ἐστειφανομένου, περιζωσάμενος αὐτὸς, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἐστίν, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν περιπόρφυρον καὶ λαβὼν δῆδα καιομένην, καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χειρῶν ἀνασχὼν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν, ἔμελλεν ὑψήσειν τῇ πυρᾷ . . . μεγάλης οὖν χαρᾷ τοῖς ἐπινικίοις προσγενομένης ὁ στρατὸς ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνοπλίῳ τιμὴν κρότῳ καὶ πατάγῳ συνηλάζαν. Thierry (Gaulois, *l. c.*) adds another interesting illustration of the same tradition; "Le matelot Provençal, près d'entrer dans la rade de Marseille, montrant au voyageur le sommet lointain de la montagne, lui dit aujourd'hui, comme disaient ses ancêtres d'Arélaté ou de Fosse: 'Voilà le Temple de la Victoire!'"

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heard around them; but the Cimbri were too confident in the invincibility of the tribes by whose side they had so often conquered to apprehend the possibility of their destruction. They persisted for some months in awaiting their promised arrival, and consumed the period of inaction in the sensual indulgences to which the charms of climate and abundance invited them. At last Marius appeared before them at the head of his victorious legions. The Romans announced their triumph and the annihilation of the Teutons, with bitter sarcasms; nor were the Cimbri backward in preparing for a final struggle. The great battle of the Campus Raudius, near Vercellæ, whither the barbarians seem to have advanced by a lateral movement in quest of their expected allies, gave another complete victory to the arms of Rome. The slaughter of the invading army was not less entire than that of the other division; and the republic preserved a lasting monument of the peril from which it had been rescued in the titles and rewards which it showered upon the head of its illustrious champion.

Oppression
of the Pro-
vince.

When the cloud of danger had passed away, the Romans might have remembered with gratitude the fidelity with which the natives of the Province had resisted the temptation to join the invaders. With the single exception of the Volcæ Tectosages¹,

¹ Dion, *Fr.* 97.: Στασίασα πρὸς τὰς τῶν Κυμῶν ἐλπίδας. The temerity of the Volcæ cost them their independence, for they were allies and not subjects of the republic, though the Romans had invented a pretext for introducing a garrison into their city Tolosa. Having risen and overpowered this military force, they were marked

whose apparent connexion with the Belgians may have caused them to sympathize with the Cimbri, the Gallic tribes of the south gave no encouragement to the invaders. But their constancy was attributed to timidity, and the exactions of the oppressor were restrained neither by fear nor remorse. The soldiers of Marius demanded lands; the Roman citizens throughout the country were clamorous for compensation for their losses. It was decreed that the districts of the Province which the invaders had occupied should not be restored to their original proprietors, but divided among the claimants of the ruling nation. When the Gauls ventured to complain, it was coldly replied that having lost their lands to the Cimbri, the Romans had acquired, by reconquest, a right to their possession.¹ Such was the notion of the relations of ruler and subject which found favour among the governors of a state which boasted its principles of jurisprudence no less than its military prowess. The natives sullenly submitted; but it was evident that this ill-treatment had rendered them now, whatever they may have been before, enemies to Rome and secret conspirators against

out for vengeance by Servilius Cæpio, who was aware of the great riches which the city contained. He took advantage of the absence of the Cimbri in Spain, attacked Tolosa, and gave it up to plunder. But the treasure which had formed a part of the spoil of Delphi was fated to bring a curse upon its possessors, and the end of Cæpio was not more prosperous than that of the people whom he reduced to servitude. Strab. iv. 1.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* i. 29.: 'Ο μὲν Ἀπουλῆϊος νόμον εἰσέφερε διαδάσασθαι γῆν, ὅσην ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων καλουμένην Γαλατίαν Κιμῆροί, γένος Κελτῶν, κατελήφεσαν' καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ Μάριος ἔναγχος ἐξέλασας τὴν γῆν ὡς οὐκέτι Γαλατῶν ἐς Ῥωμαίους περιεσπάκει.

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V.

Disaffection
of the pro-
vincials :
they side
with the
Marians and
Sertorius.

her. Nor was this all, for poverty and disappointment compelled them to look to arms and violence, as the only means of obtaining bare subsistence. Henceforth there was no hope for them but in the chances of tumult and confusion. This soon appeared ; for the event of the Social war, which drove the proscribed adherents of Marius in great numbers into this region, the cradle of his glory, and the adopted home of many of his veterans, found the Gauls well disposed to listen to the invitations of their shattered party, and avenge its cause upon the Roman government. It was from Gaul that Sertorius derived a great part of his resources : the Province threw itself into the arms of his lieutenants, and accepted the decrees of his senate, composed of the fugitives of the Marian faction.¹ When Pompeius was sent by the nobles to crush the rebellion in Spain, he was compelled to make good his footing in the Gaulish province before he could venture to cross the Pyrenees. The Marians indeed made but a feeble resistance. The vengeance of the Roman general and of Fonteius, who was charged with the restoration of the senatorial authority, fell upon the unfortunate natives with more weight than ever.² From many of their cities, such as Tolosa, Ruscino, and Bitterræ, they were immediately expelled, and colonies of the conquering people planted in their room. The success which finally crowned the arms of the republic in Spain fastened the yoke of servitude still more firmly upon their necks.

¹ Oros. v. 23. compared with Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 20.

² Thierry, *Gaulois*, II. iv.

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 Tyranny of
 Fonteius :
 he is im-
 peached,
 and de-
 fended by
 Cicero.

Fonteius continued to exercise the functions of governor, and organized throughout the country a system of tyranny, which may be sufficiently appreciated even from the pleadings of Cicero in its defence. The orator makes no attempt to refute the charges of avarice and extortion brought against his client otherwise than by contemptuously rejecting the credibility of any testimony of a Gaul against a Roman. Cicero's speech is indeed a more instructive exposition of the horrors of provincial suffering than any detail of particular charges could be. The contumelious indifference which it breathes to the rights of a foreign subject implies much more than a consciousness of the guilt of the accused. It shows how frightfully the mind even of a philosopher could be warped by national prejudice and the pride of dominion; it further indicates what was the temper of the senatorial body presiding on the bench, before whom such an overt denial of justice could be paraded. Pompeius, who had professed to purify the tribunals and to pacify just complaints, withheld his countenance from an accusation against a creature of his own. The whole force of the aristocratic party arrayed itself in vindication of its privileges. The judges absolved the culprit, and the suppliants relapsed into apparent submission, still brooding over the wrongs of their country and meditating revenge. Not only was Fonteius acquitted, but his system of oppression seems to have continued unrelaxed.¹ The

¹ Another governor of the province, Calpurnius Piso, was accused of similar tyranny, again defended by Cicero, and again acquitted by

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provincials were overwhelmed with debts contracted to discharge the burdens imposed upon them by the state, the pressure of which had been aggravated by successive years of famine. Nor was the surrender of lands and goods sufficient to satisfy the law and the creditor as long as the obligation was not wholly redeemed. The person of the debtor might be sold, together with his wife and family, into the most cruel slavery. He might be driven to labour in chains on the public works, or to wait as a menial on the commands of a Roman colonist. Such was the system pursued by the remorseless policy of the republic, and such the result upon which even the reformer and philanthropist could look with complacency.

The Allobroges send deputies to Rome to solicit justice: they are tampered with by Catilina.

Nevertheless, the Gauls still continued to hope for justice at the hands of the Roman people. The Allobroges, plunged into desperate poverty by the pressure of their debts, which threatened the confiscation of their entire territory, sent an embassy to Rome to plead their cause and sue for mercy. It was during the secret progress of Catilina's machinations that the foreign deputies were deploring the frustration of their hopes by delay and neglect. While in this mood they were craftily addressed by Umbrenus, a creature of the conspirators, and at the same time a person well known to the Gauls, among whom he had lived and trafficked. He condoled with them on their misfortunes, sympathized with their sense of ill-treat-

the judges. (Cic. *pro Flacc.* 39.) Among the atrocities which, on another occasion, Cicero imputed to P. Clodius were his extortions in Gaul as quæstor. Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 20.

ment, confirmed them in their apprehension that no reparation was to be obtained from the justice or clemency of the ruling powers, and, finally, when he had moved their indignation and despair to the proper pitch, revealed to them the existence of a plot for the overthrow of the government. Nothing could be so opportune, he said, to its success as an outbreak in the Transalpine province, which was in fact already partially disturbed. Nothing could be so agreeable to the conspirators, or so strongly command their favour and grateful recollection. The Allobroges had it in their power to avenge themselves at one blow upon the party from whose tyranny they suffered, and to secure from the victors every reward and advantage they could desire.¹

At first the delegates lent a willing ear to a proposition so alluring and unexpected. But a moment's reflection suggested to them a safer means of obtaining their end. They took counsel with Fabius Sanga, the patron and advocate of their nation, disclosed to him the whole occurrence, and by his advice offered to betray every circumstance to the consul Cicero. The fortune of the republic thus prevailed at the crisis of her utmost peril; such evidence was placed in the hands of the government as sufficed to put it on its guard against the impending danger. The Allobroges were directed to enter warmly into the plot, to attend the meetings at which it was discussed, to obtain written and sealed assurances from the chief

They reveal the conspiracy to Cicero.

¹ Sall. *B. C.* 40.; Cic. *in Catil.* iii. 6.

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conspirators, in which the invitation to insurrection and promise of reward should be distinctly conveyed. When their hands were full of these fatal documents they were seized, according to agreement, by the agents of the consul, and the treason stood revealed to the world.

Ingratitude
of the
senate. The
Allobroges
revolt, and
are subdued.

We may suppose that the consul and senate were not slow to promise their favour and protection to the foreigners in return for a service the importance of which they recognized in the most public way.¹ But it is extremely doubtful whether the Allobroges derived any benefit from the fidelity of their representatives. Harassed and disappointed they allowed the conspirators to rouse them at last to actual rebellion.² The insurgents invaded the frontiers of the Province, and attempted to excite a general movement among the population. A moment earlier this would have caused great alarm and been pregnant with serious danger; but the senate had recovered its confidence with the fall of Lentulus and his colleagues, and a vigorous campaign, under the conduct of Pomptinus, sufficed to reduce the Gauls once more to their former subjection.³

A. U. 693.
B. C. 61.

Reflections
on the
contest be-
tween the
Romans
and Gauls.

We have thus traced step by step the slow and indignant retreat of Gallic independence from the Apennines and the Tiber to the Garonne and Cevennes. Civilization has triumphed over barbarism: the one gave union to the Romans, and a

¹ Cic. *in Catil.* iv. 3.: "Hesterno die præmia legatis Allobrogum dedistis amplissima."

² Sall. *B. C.* 42.

³ Dion. xxxvii. 47, 48.; Cic. *De Prov. Cons.* 13.; Liv. *Epit.* ciii.

distinct object as well as method to their policy ; while the other, notwithstanding the external cultivation of their principal tribes, still kept the Gauls asunder by petty jealousies and divisions. Though identified for the most part one with another in the great features of language and character, there existed among them certain shades of difference, both in origin and sentiments, and this disadvantage was aggravated by their want of foresight and mutual self-control. The conquest of Gaul is one of the most complete and distinct episodes in Roman history ; but its interest and value as a portion of human annals must be lost to those who fail to discriminate between the various elements of which the vanquished race consisted. When Cæsar distinguished so carefully between the different populations of Gaul, it was not merely in the spirit of the antiquarian that he placed his information on record. He wrote as the practical warrior and statesman, who had thoroughly scanned their means of resistance, and estimated with sagacity the moral and material resources from which he had the fairest province of his empire to form.

The original authorities from whom we learn the main facts regarding the ethnology and character of the Gauls are, as is well known, principally two, Cæsar himself and Strabo. The first lived for nine years in the heart of the country, and spoke of the state of things which he himself witnessed, with all the advantages of acute observation and consummate literary ability ; the second, better acquainted in his own person with the East than the West, depended partly upon the

Sources of
our know-
ledge re-
garding
Gaulish
ethnology.

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accumulated knowledge of a century later, and partly on the accounts of Posidonius¹, who had travelled in Gaul in the time of Marius. A careful criticism may make use of the one of these authorities to explain or correct the other; and their respective statements, where apparently conflicting, may possibly be reconciled by the consideration of the different circumstances under which they wrote. The outline here presented of the antiquities of Gaulish history is the result of a comparison of both, together with such additional illustrations as modern research and reflection have enabled us to supply.²

Quadruple
division of
ancient
Gaul.

The population of that large portion of the European continent which was known to the ancients by the name of Gallia was distributed in four principal divisions, varying more or less in origin, in language, and institutions.

1. The
Iberians.

1. The whole of the South, from the Garonne to the Pyrenees, and along the coast of the Mediterranean, was occupied principally by a race altogether distinct from their Gallic neighbours. Under the name of Iberi, they have generally been considered as the remnant of a family of nations which occupied much of the southern part of Europe before the arrival of the great Celtic race in the West. The Vascones and

¹ Posidonius is frequently referred to by Strabo, particularly in books iii. iv. and xi. He visited Massilia and the Narbonensis, was born A.U. 619, and died A.U. 703. (Ukert, *Geogr. der G. und R.* i. 174.)

² I have been principally guided by Thierry's elaborate history: see particularly the Introduction, which has been much enlarged in the third edition, Paris, 1845.

other tribes of the Spanish peninsula are proved to have been closely connected with the Iberi, and these must be considered ethnologically distinct from the other inhabitants of the southern parts of Gaul. The Iberians, it is supposed, were originally thrust forth from Gaul into Spain, and back again by a retrograde movement, when the Celtic race first penetrated through the Pyrenees. Of the older race such as neither submitted to the new comers nor mingled with them¹ were compelled, for the most part, to make their escape through the western and eastern outlets of the mountains, whence they spread themselves to the Garonne on the one side, to the Cevennes, the Rhone, and the Alps on the other. They became known in the West and the East respectively by the names of Aquitani and Ligures. In the former region they remained stationary; on the other side they continued to push forward, driving the Sicani before them, and finally established themselves along the coast of the Mediterranean, from the Pyrenees to the river Macra.² We have seen how the whole of this coast fell gradually into the hands of the Greeks of Massilia and the Roman invaders. The Aquitani continued to occupy the triangle between the Pyrenees, the Garonne, and the Bay of Biscay, within which they formed a confederacy, holding little intercourse with the Gaulish tribes beyond the river, speaking a language³ and main-

¹ The Celtiberi, a people widely spread in the Spanish peninsula, were said to be a mixed race of conquerors and conquered. (Diodor. Sic. v. 33.; comp. Lucan, iv. 9.)

² Thucyd. vi. 2.; Avien. *Or. Marit.* 132., &c.

³ Strab. iv. 1. init. (comp. 2. init.): Τοὺς Ἀκουιτανούς τελῶς ἐξηλλαγ-

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V.

taining institutions peculiar to themselves, but jealously watched and domineered over by the colonies of the republic at Narbo, Biterræ, and Tolosa.

2. The Galatæ, Galli, or Gael.

2. The Gauls, properly so called, the Galatæ of the Greeks, the Galli of the Romans, and the Gael of modern history, formed the van of the great Celtic migration¹ which had poured into the West at various intervals during many hundred years. Their origin, as well as the causes and events of their early movements, is lost in the night of ages. Having overrun the south of Gaul and penetrated into Spain, they lost a part of the territory thus acquired, and the re-occupation of Aquitania by the Iberian fugitives placed a barrier between the Celts in Spain and their brethren whom they had left behind them in the North. In the time of the Romans the Galli were found established in the centre and east of the country denominated Gaul, forming for the most part a great confederation, at the head of which stood the Arverni.² It was the

μένους, οὐ τῇ γλώττῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἐμφερεῖς Ἰβηρσι μᾶλλον ἢ Γαλαταῖς. (Compare Zeuss, *die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 163.)

¹ The term Celtæ, Celts, which is now generally adopted as the generic appellation of one of the principal families of the human race, was confined by the ancients to the Gauls, and seems to have had originally a still more limited signification, as the designation of certain tribes in the neighbourhood of Marseilles. Strab. iv. 1. fin.: Ἀπὸ τούτων δ' οἶμαι καὶ τοὺς σύμπαντας Γαλατὰς Κελτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων προσαγορευθῆναι.

² The power of the Arverni might be estimated, says Strabo (iv. 2.), by the many contests they maintained with Rome, and the numbers they brought into the field: Διέτειναν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν μέχρι Ναρθῶνος, καὶ τῶν ὄρων τῆς Μασσαλιώτιδος· ἐκράτουν δὲ καὶ τῶν μέχρι Πυρήνης ἰθινῶν, καὶ μέχρι Ὠκεάνου καὶ Πήγῳ; after which he gives an instance of the barbaric splendour of their king Bittus or Bituitus.

policy of the Romans to raise the Ædui into competition with this dominant tribe, and with this view they distinguished them, as we have seen, with especial marks of favour. The Arverni, whose name is retained in the modern appellation of Auvergne, occupied a large district in the middle and south of Gaul, and were surrounded by tributary or dependent clans. The Ædui lay more to the north and east, and the centre of their possessions is marked by the position of their capital Bibracte, the modern Autun, situated in the highlands which separate the waters of the Loire, the Seine, and the Saone.¹ The one nation was better placed for defence, the other for commerce; and with the spread of riches and civilization, the ancient influence of the Arverni seemed on the point of giving way to the more active ambition of their rivals. Other Gallic tribes stretched beyond the Saone: the Sequani², who afterwards made an attempt to usurp this much-coveted pre-eminence; the Helvetii and other mountain races, whose scanty pastures extended to the sources of the Rhine; the Allobroges, who dwelt upon the Isere and Rhone³, and who were the first of their race to meet and the first to succumb before the irresistible prowess of the Roman legions. Ac-

¹ Strabo places them between the Arar (Saone) and the Dubis, by which he evidently means the Liger (Loire). He makes the same mistake in this name twice. See Groskurd's *Strabo*, iv. 3. § 2.

² The valley of the Doubs formed the centre of the Sequanese territory, which reached to the Jura and the Rhine, Strab. iv. 3.

³ The settlements of the Allobroges occupied the space between these two rivers, and extended also a little beyond the latter into the modern province of Franche Comté.

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according to the classification both of Cæsar and Strabo, the Turones, Pictones, and Santones must be comprised under the same general denomination. It is probable, however, that the relationship in these three cases was not so close, as these tribes do not appear to have formed a part of the political confederation of the Galli.

3. The
Belgæ: dis-
crepancy
between
Cæsar and
Strabo.

3. It will be seen that the limits thus assigned to that portion of the ancient Celtic population of Gaul which is appropriately designated by the term Galli, embrace at least the whole centre and east of the country. Beyond the Seine and Marne, the north-east was occupied by a race whom Cæsar characterizes as not less different from the Galli in language, manners, and institutions¹, than were the Iberi, whom modern ethnologists represent as belonging to a distinct family. To this race he gives the name of Belgæ, and informs us that in their own estimation they were principally descended from a German stock, the offspring of some early migration across the Rhine. According to Cæsar's view, the Gallic race extended much further than the limits above assigned to it, and included the people of the North-West, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Seine; whereas Strabo, following probably the information of Posidonius, gives the whole of Gaul north of the Loire to the Belgæ. At the same time, the geographer by no means concurred in Cæsar's view of the origin of this third race, which he believed to be Gaulish and not German, though differing widely

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 1.; comp. Strab. iv. 3. init.

from the Galli, or Gauls of the central region. According to his account we should regard them as a variety of Celts, distinct both from the Iberi on the one side, and the Teutons on the other. In order to explain these conflicting statements, we must observe that Cæsar's account is not strictly consistent with itself, for certain among the Belgic tribes he contrasts with the rest as being German by origin, and forming separate leagues among themselves for mutual defence in the midst of jealous and probably alien neighbours.¹ The great mass, therefore, even of the Belgæ were still Celts; but, as the immigration of Teutons was an event of gradual progress, it is reasonable to suppose that in the time of Posidonius the population beyond the Seine was as yet little tainted with the admixture of the foreign element. At that period the middle race between the Loire and the Seine may have been more akin to the Belgæ, as Strabo, viewing them with the eyes of the earlier writer, represents, than with the Galli, south of the Loire, to whom Cæsar, on the contrary, assimilates them. We may conclude that, with whatever mixture of German blood, still, even in the time of Cæsar the main element of the whole population of the North was Celtic, differing from the Gallic subdivision of the family, and requiring to be designated by a distinctive appellation. This fact of the division of the Gauls into two races is one of great importance in the history of the Celtic family, though its announcement

Theory of
the division
of the
Gauls into

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 4, 5. The Belgæ themselves only affirmed that most of them (*plerosque*) were of German origin, and Tacitus remarked among them a certain "*affectatio Germanicæ originis*."

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V.

two races,
the Gael
and the
Kymry.

seems to have been left to very modern times.¹ It may be traced, however obscurely, in several ways, which can only be cursorily indicated here. Thus, for instance, the existence, in the neighbouring island of Britain, of two Celtic races, the Gael and the Kymry, with different types of language and feature, is well known. In Gaul there remain at the present day vestiges of only one of these languages, the Kymric, which is still spoken in some portion of Brittany, a district included, as we have seen, in the Belgica of Strabo. The common theory, that the population of this country is the offspring of certain immigrations from the opposite coast, is wholly untenable.² The supposition that three such scanty infusions of Kymric blood as genuine history records, should have sufficed to change the language and physical character of the whole people of the Peninsula is inconsistent with the doctrine of the permanence of type in the majority of every mixed population, which modern experience so strongly attests. The Kymry, then, as distin-

¹ I believe that Thierry was the first to discuss it scientifically. The introduction to the third edition of the *Hist. des Gaulois* notices the favour with which the theory has been received. Niebuhr gave a hint of the same view in his lectures on Roman history, delivered before Thierry's work, but published since. (*Lect. on Rom. Hist.* ii. l. 44.) On the other hand, Arnold criticizes and hesitates to adopt it. (*Hist. of Rome*, i. c. 24.)

² Three such are particularly mentioned: the first, A.D. 285, when Constantius Chlorus assigned lands to some fugitives in the territory of the Curiosolitæ; the second, a century later, when Conan Meriadec followed the usurper Maximus from Britain, and obtained a sovereignty in Armorica after his defeat; and the third, some years after, when the same Conan invited a few settlers to confirm his power in the Peninsula. (Daru, *Hist. de Bretagne*, i. 53.) The stories of subsequent immigrations of the Kymry in the fifth century are regarded by Niebuhr as certainly fabulous.

guished from the Gael, were the first known inhabitants of this part of Gaul, and probably of Belgica generally.

Evidence
of this di-
vision from
physiolo-
gical dis-
tinctions.

Some further evidence of this division of races may be discovered, it is said, in the different types of feature which are still strongly characteristic of the population of the north and south respectively. This, undoubtedly, is a subject which requires much closer investigation than it has yet received before it can be regarded as furnishing substantive and independent evidence of the fact in question. Yet it is too interesting and important to be altogether omitted. A curious observer¹ has distinguished, among a great mass of what may be called neutral characters, two opposite types of form and feature prevalent in different parts of Gaul respectively. In the one, the shape of the head is long and oval, the forehead high and narrow, the nose curved downwards and pointed, the chin small. This type of head is generally accompanied with a tall and spare figure, and prevails throughout the northern parts of Gaul, the Belgica of Strabo. The other is distinguished by a flat head, a forehead low and broad, the face round or approaching to square, the chin prominent, the nose small and straight or turning upwards; the corresponding stature is short and the figure thick. This is the type which prevails in the centre and east of France. The one type occurs throughout the seats of the Kymry, the other in those of the Gael. It will be readily admitted that, among

¹ M. Edwards, *Lettre à Amed. Thierry*.

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V.

the Celtic populations of our own islands, the latter of these types is strongly characteristic of the Highland Gael and also of the Irish. The former answers precisely to the characters most generally prevalent among the Welsh, though among them there is undoubtedly a large intermixture of the other type also.

Evidence
from moral
and poli-
tical cha-
racteristics.

But if there exist even at the present day certain physical characteristics which seem to attest the early diversity of the great races by which Gaul was occupied, we may discover still further evidence of the same fact both in their political combinations and their social institutions. The campaigns of Cæsar bring us successively into acquaintance with distinct confederacies existing in different parts of the country, with little intercourse or communion between one another. The first is that of the Arverni, Ædui, Sequani, and other central and eastern tribes; beyond them the Belgica of Cæsar forms a separate cluster of nations, closely connected among themselves, but maintaining no political relations with their southern neighbours. The tribes of Normandy and Maine hang, as it were, loosely upon the skirts of the Belgians Proper, and, though less intimately united with them, are easily induced to join in a common cause. The Armoricans, strictly attached to one another, are allied moreover with all the tribes on the northern coast, and seem to be no less closely linked with the fortunes of the Turones, Andi, and others on the lower Loire. In short, there exists a certain homogeneity throughout the whole Belgica of Strabo. Even to the south of the Loire it may be suspected

that the Santones and Pictones belong to the same race with the communities to the north. The request of the Helvetians to the Sequani, to be permitted to fix themselves in the territory occupied by these tribes¹, seems to show that no strict bonds of blood or sentiment existed between the nations of the eastern and those of the western centre of Gaul.

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The progress which civilization had made in the northern and more southern parts of Gaul respectively, seems also to indicate the distinct and later development of the Kymric element of the population. At the time when the northern invaders were disputing the soil of Italy with the republic, they showed in one respect a striking inferiority to opponents with whom they were so equally matched in the field. It marked the national aptitude of the Romans to imbibe the lessons of civilization, that from the first they regarded the city with the ideas of freedom, sympathy, and unity attaching to it, as the source or nucleus of political society. Hence arose the deep-set principles from which were unfolded their conceptions of civil government, of personal independence, of social rights and their correlative duties. But the feeling of citizenship, the moving principle of Greek and Roman life, had little power of spontaneous development among any races of Celtic origin. The natural ties which held society together among the Gauls were rather personal than civil. The Gaul devoted himself to the service of his chieftain, whether as a serf, a client, or a friend; the chieftains dwelt apart, and

Additional
presump-
tions in its
favour:
different
character
of Gaulish
civilization
in the
Gaelic and
Kymric
communi-
ties respec-
tively.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 9, 10.

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V.

issued forth to war or council attended by a retinue of dependents, of whom they exacted a sort of feudal service in return for their maintenance.¹ A state of society of this kind gives room for the display of emulation and personal attachment, but it tends to isolate the elements of a nation rather than to concentrate them. The strength of the whole body was broken up by the petty factions and feuds which existed among its members; and while the courage of the Gauls was unsurpassed, and their onset formidable from its impetuosity, they wanted those moral ties between man and man by which alone disasters can be borne and retrieved. Such was the general character of the Gaulish people; but in process of time their manners and principles of action had admitted of partial modification. When the Romans saw themselves at last arrayed front to front against the great powers of central Gaul, they found its political institutions in all the uncertainty and tremulousness of a period of transition. The increase of arts and commerce had collected masses of the population in cities; Bibracte, Noviodunum, Genabus, Vienna, and Tolosa, were marts of commerce and strongholds of popular independence. The germs of municipal liberty had taken root in the bosom of the Gaelic states, and the influence of the chieftains of clans was gradually bowing before it. These states were, for the most part, governed by a chieftain exercising a nominal sovereignty, but elected and controlled

¹ Compare the account of Orgetorix in Cæsar (*B. G.* i. 4.): "Omnes suam familiam, ad hominum millia decem, undique coëgit et omnes clientes obæratosque suos."

by a popular assembly. The nobility struggled by artifice and intrigue to maintain a remnant of their authority, while the bolder and more ambitious of their class cherished schemes of aggrandizement and usurpation. Political power among the Gaelic tribes had fallen, for the most part, into the hands of the commonalty, but public virtue had withered almost before it blossomed; for the communities whose institutions were the most liberal, and condition the most advanced, were precisely those which submitted most readily to the Roman domination. But the northern or Kymric tribes were still subject to the primitive rule of their kings and nobles; among them the class of the commonalty had as yet received no development. They possessed no great cities, no public marts of industry and commerce. The places which we find dignified by the names of towns, or oppida, were for the most part merely entrenched fastnesses on lofty eminences or in woody coverts, whither a whole tribe might retreat in case of attack with all its movables and cattle¹; but in the intervals of

¹ On this point there is much diversity of opinion. A writer in the *Mém. Soc. Antiq. de France* argues,—1. That the term *civitas*, when applied to the Gaulish barbarians by Cæsar, never means a city, but always a state: 2. That the designation of *urbs* is used only two or three times; of Avaricum, *B. G.* vi. 9., vii. 15.; of Gergovia, vii. 36.; of Alesia, vii. 68.: 3. That *oppidum* (Strab. *φρούριον*) is always a place of refuge and defence merely. He urges that Cæsar's description of the oppida implies that they were almost empty spaces; large armies manœuvred in them, as at Avaricum 40,000 Gauls assembled "in foro et locis patentioribus," vii. 28. In the oppidum of Vesontio Cæsar's officers dwelt in tents, i. 39. Critognatus speaks of it as a great calamity, that on the invasion of the Cimbri the Gauls were compelled to resort to their oppida, vii. 77. When Gaul was conquered, one of the means taken to break the people to servitude was to compel them to inhabit their oppida by seizing their lands: "com-

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peace the people dwelt in hamlets or detached habitations, in the situations most convenient for fishing, hunting, or husbandry.¹ That the oppida were not intended for permanent residence appears clearly in the case of the Armoricans, at least, from their position on the rockiest and most remote peninsulas.

Different
character
of Druidism
among the
Kymry and
the Gael.

The religious ideas prevalent among the Gauls may furnish us with another clue to the distinction between their several races. The theological system known to us by the name of Druidism, from the appellation of its priests, was claimed by the Kymry of Britain as their own invention.² Without attaching any credit to this assertion in its literal meaning, it may nevertheless be taken to represent the fact that Druidism was preserved in its purest and most systematic form in our own island; and the express statement of Cæsar is sufficient to prove that the highest instruction in its mysteries flowed from thence, and that its votaries were

pulsos in oppida multatis agris," vii. 54. He asserts that in the ancient Celtic languages, the Low-Breton for instance, there is no word for a city in our sense. The assemblies of the people were held not in cities, but in the open air, at the common frontiers of several nations, vi. 13. So religious ceremonies were performed in forests and on mountains, &c. The argument is probably pushed too far, but Walckenaer (*Geogr. des Gaules*) is, I think, too sweeping in his rejection of it.

¹ The Gauls built their scattered dwellings principally in the woods and on the banks of streams; "æstus vitandi causa." They were made of the branches of trees and clay (Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 30.), and thatched with straw (Vitruv. i. 1.); only a ground floor, as appears from the absence of any word in the old Celtic to signify stage or story. Accordingly, there exist no remains of domestic buildings of the Celts in Gaul.

² Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 13.: "Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur: et nunc, qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illic discendi causa proficiscuntur."

wont to flock thither to imbibe its most spiritual lore. The great religious assembly of the whole of Gaul was held in the territory of the Carnutes, north of the Loire.¹ It was in the northern and western parts of the country that the Druids seem to have exercised the greatest influence in political affairs; it was there that they continued to animate successive revolts against Rome, till they and their religion became marked out as objects of inveterate persecution. In those regions also the most important and most numerous remains of Druidical worship still exist, and support the inference that it was among the Kymry in Gaul as well as in Britain that the oldest and purest form of Druidism flourished. The character of the system was essentially Oriental, and forms another link in the chain which connects the Kymry of the West with the Cimmerii of the Euxine shores², and through them with the primitive hives of Asia. It corresponded in many important particulars with the simple and comparatively spiritual character of the Persian theosophy; it taught the purity of the Godhead as a metaphysical abstraction, and the eternity of the soul's existence by transmigration³; it had its

¹ The spot is said to have been at Dreux. (Mæbe in Cæs. *l. c.*) Cæsar states that the Gauls considered it the centre of their country, which might be nearly true of the Kymric confederacies.

² Diodor. Sic. v. 32.

³ There seems no reason to suppose that the Druidical dogma maintained, like that of Pythagoras, the transmigration of the human soul into the bodies of animals. See Diodor. v. 28. It is not quite certain even that Cæsar represents the soul as passing from one human body into another (vi. 14.): Lucan (i. 460.) and Mela (iii. 2) only assert a belief in its immortality, implying the existence of a future

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mysteries and initiatory rites, by which the mind of the votary was withdrawn from the contemplation of the manifold energies of the Godhead to that of his essential unity; it abounded in symbols, inculcated retirement and meditation, and upheld the character of its priesthood as mediators between earth and heaven: again, it made use of natural phenomena as means to elevate the mind to a comprehension of a first cause, glided from thence into the frivolous delusions of astrology, and finally degenerated into all the impieties and horrors of belief in magic.¹ Hence its addiction to human sacrifices², the last resort of superstitious terror endeavouring to extort the secrets of futurity from a reluctant power, and to control the course of destiny. But by the side of this Oriental theism there existed another system, much less distinctive in its character, an elemental worship of the grossest kind, in which the objects of nature were identified with the memory of deceased heroes, and the sun and stars, the thunder and the whirlwind, were worshipped as the visible representatives of superior beings. The Roman sceptic was surprised to find the barbarians adoring, as he said, the same divinities whom his own critical acuteness had rejected. Jupiter and Apollo, and the rest of the host of Olympus, were recognized in the

state. See an essay by Chiniac de la Bastide, in *Leber, Coll. de Pièces relatives à l'Histoire de France*, p. iii.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 14.; Plin. *H. N.* xxx. 4.: "Britannia hodieque eam (magiam) attonitè celebrat, tantis cærimoniis, ut dedisse Persis videri possit." Compare Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 71.; Ammian. xv. 9.; Mel. iii. 2.

² Diodor. Sic. v. 31.; Strab. iv. 4.; Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 16.

consistory of the Gallic deities ; Mercurius seemed to hold the highest place among them, under the name of Teutates, and was venerated as the patron of all their civilization ; the sun, or Apollo, was worshipped by the name of Belenus ; Taranis represented the thunderer Jupiter ; and Hesus was their Mars, the god of battles.¹ We may assign the worship of Belenus and Teutates to the traditions imported into Gaul by the Phœnicians.² The Greek colonists of the coast may also have had their share in moulding the Western polytheism to the shape of the Eastern ; but it must still remain a question how far this form of heathenism was independent of Druidism³, and how far, on the other hand, it was a degeneration from that more spiritual system in accordance with the sensual tendencies of the period and the people. But if the councils and institutions of the Gaelic nations were more independent of Druidical influence, it must have exerted a vigorous ascendancy over the lower classes, and taken deep root in the remoter and less frequented districts. In the north-western angle of Gaul, comprised between the lower Loire and the Seine, the region in which the Kymry seem to have been most unmixed, there exist at the present day about ninety remains of Celtic monuments,

Existing
monuments
of Druidism
in Gaul.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 17. ; Luc. i. 445.

² The Phœnician origin of the worship of Teutates (Theuth) is confirmed by that of a Mercurius in Spain. (*Liv.* xxvi. 44.) Billingsgate is a record of the worship of Belenus in Britain ; Tottenham, Tattingstone, &c., of Teutates.

³ This hypothesis is maintained by Thierry, who considers Druidism to have been only adopted by the Gael at a later period. (*Gaulois*, II. i.)

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all probably of religious significance. They abound equally on the rocky coasts of Brittany, and the wooded hills of Normandy, in the meadows of Anjou, and the plains of the Orleanois.¹ In central and eastern Gaul similar remains are confined to the highlands about the sources of the Seine, the Loire, the Allier, and the Vienne. Within those narrow limits about fifty such may be enumerated. But in the lowlands of the Gaelic territory they either never existed or have been altogether obliterated. Throughout the Province not more than one or two vestiges of the kind can be traced. Here perhaps they were most ruthlessly exterminated by the arm of Roman persecution. Their number is also very small in the north-eastern or Belgic provinces of France; and there too they were trodden into the soil by the heel of the Roman legionary quartered for centuries in the neighbourhood of the German frontier, or were worn away by the attrition of succeeding waves of invaders, the Sueve, the Frank, and the Burgundian. In Aquitania the presence of the Celt is attested by only one or two monuments of his religion, and the antiquity of these may possibly remount to the earliest period of Gaulish history. But in the district between the Gironde and the lower Loire they are hardly less numerous than in Brittany and Maine, and are there scattered indiscriminately over hill, plain, and valley, in token of the general diffusion and security of the worship which they subserved.

¹ These enumerations are made from Hocquart's *Carte Archéologique de la France*. These various monuments are almost universally cromlechs, dolmens, or rocking-stones.

The Belgians a Celtic people, with an intermixture of Teutonic tribes.

4. The Rhine, which formed the geographical boundary between Gaul and Germany, was never a barrier capable of restraining the migratory propensities of the northern races, or preventing the repeated transit of invaders from the right to the left bank. Accordingly, the Kymric population, which had spread over the northern region of Gaul, was constantly harassed by the Teutonic hordes, which pressed hungrily on its rear. The Germans, who had introduced themselves within the limits of Gaul, were already, in the time of Cæsar, intermixed in a great degree with the earlier possessors, besides retaining, in some localities, their own names and characteristics. Such were the Eburones, Treviri, and Nervii, the Segni, Cæresi, and Pæmani, who all dwelt apart from the Kymry, with distinct habits and institutions. But it is to the whole of this population, thus fused and intermingled, that Cæsar applies the name of Belgæ; a name, however, which can be shown not to be properly generic, but to be appropriated in strictness, like that of Celt originally, to certain particular tribes.¹ We have already noticed some traces of subdivision among the great Kymric race, and the boundary between the pure and the mixed Kymry may be placed on the line of the Seine and Marne. We may readily believe that this mixed people had lost much of the genuine manners, language, and religion of its Celtic ancestors; and this may account for the paucity of its sacerdotal monuments, as well as for the difference which Cæsar so strongly marks between its language and that of the Gael.

¹ Thierry, *Gaulois*, Introd. lvii.

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But he is undoubtedly mistaken in his assertion that the Belgians were for the most part of German origin, their essential identity with the Celts being sufficiently established by the declarations of Posidonius and Strabo, together with the strong presumptions that have been adduced from physiological and other evidence.

Their character and mode of life.

This people, however, as it was the last to emerge from the rudeness of its primeval forests, and was unable to shake off from its bosom the unmixed barbarism of a still younger race clinging so closely about it, so it was much behind the rest of the Gaulish population in all the elements of civilized existence. Throughout the extensive region which it occupied, we hear of no place deserving the name of a city, except perhaps Samarobriua, the modern Amiens, the bridge over the Somme. The Morini and Menapii fed entirely on fish and the eggs of wild fowl; they dwelt in the recesses of their woods and morasses, with no more sense of cleanliness and comfort than the Teutonic Eburones and Nervii. The Belgians were noted for the use of the scythed chariot¹, one of the rudest and earliest implements of war. They rejoiced in passing their whole lives with arms in their hands. The German tribes haughtily

¹ Lucan, i. 426.:

“Et docilis rector rostrati Belga covini.”

Thierry attributes the scythed chariot to the Treviri, but I question whether the Germans ever used it. Mela iii. 6. says: “Bigis et curribus, covinos vocant, Gallicè armati.” Covinus appears to be a Celtic word, common both to the Kymric and Gaelic variety. Cæsar, however, makes no mention of scythed chariots among the Gauls or Britons. (Cluver. *Germ. Ant.* i. 335.)

excluded from their territory the purveyors of all foreign articles, whether of use or luxury. Accustomed to constant warfare with a more savage and ferocious race than themselves, the Belgians acquired a renown for bravery beyond all the other inhabitants of Gaul.¹ They affected to despise their brethren in the South, kept aloof from their confederacies, and were even inclined to disown their kinship.

The limits of the Belgian conquest are broadly defined by the two great rivers which have been mentioned; but it is probable that some of these tribes penetrated far into the South. The Volcæ, who occupied a district between the Rhone and the Pyrenees, in two divisions distinguished by the names of Arecomici and Tectosages, are connected with the Belgians by the co-ordinate appellation of Bolgæ, and even Belgæ.² The fate of Britain was similar to that of Gaul. There also the conquering Kymry found the Belgians at their back before they had well time to turn themselves round in the habitations of the vanquished Gael. There, too, the new comers brought along with them a portion of Teutonic blood; and the south-eastern angle of the island, the limit of their progress, came to be inhabited by a mixed people, who seemed to superficial observers to have little in common with the race upon whom they had intruded themselves.

Some of their tribes penetrated into the south of Gaul.

But, notwithstanding the familiar intercourse thus established between the Celtic and Teutonic

Hostility between the Gauls and Germans.

¹ *Cæs. B. G. i. 1.*; *Ammian. xv. 11.*

² *Thierry, Gaulois, Introd. p. li—lv.*

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tribes who shared the north-east of Gaul, the enmity between the two races continued unabated, the Germans hovering on the banks of the Rhine with numbers and courage daily augmenting, the Gauls crouching in abject terror before an enemy whom they dared not encounter, or even inviting him within their frontiers to fight their battles for them. The time had long passed since the Gauls had been an emigrating and a conquering people.¹ Their incursions into the German territories had once been no less numerous and successful than those by which they had possessed themselves of one half of Italy and devastated nearly the whole. But step by step they had been hurled back in both quarters by nations fiercer or better disciplined than themselves. The progress of moral and physical culture among them had taken a direction which paralysed their means of defence both against the Germans and the Romans. It enervated their bodies and subdued their daring courage, as compared with the wild barbarians of the North, while it had no tendency to impart that community of sentiment and identity of purpose, which hold the scales of victory so evenly between civilized powers.

General
character of
the Gauls.

The ancient writers abound in descriptions of the character of a nation which performed so conspicuous a part in the early history of Europe. In stature the Gauls are uniformly represented as exceeding the people of Greece and Italy. Undoubtedly the disproportion between the Italians and the

¹ Tac. *Germ.* 28.: "Validiores olim Gallorum res fuisse summus auctorum divus Julius tradit, eoque credibile est etiam Gallos in Germaniam transgressos." Comp. Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 24.

Kymry was strongly marked ; and the Senones, from whom the Romans derived their most formidable conceptions of the Gaulish warriors, as well as the Cispadanes generally, were of the Kymric race. The lightness of complexion ascribed to the nation was also characteristic of the northern rather than of the southern population. It may be conjectured that a change of habits and perhaps of climate has embrowned a skin which paled under the shadow of primeval forests¹: yet even now the darkest-haired Gael has not the olive tint of the Italian and Greek. The temper of the Gauls in general was lively, frivolous, and irascible, inconstant even to perfidy, violent in language and gesture²; their courage was daring and impetuous, but not capable of enduring resistance and reverses.³ At the same time they were noted for simplicity and good-humour, and rushed gaily into danger without artifice or malice. But their great defect was the want of patience and true earnestness, and of the moral firmness which controls a prejudice and refrains from a gratification for the sake of an ulterior result. Their want of self-control and self-

¹ Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, i. 529.

² The spirit of bravado for which the Gauls were remarkable (*ἀπειληταὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπατικοὶ καὶ τετραγῶδημένοι ὑπάρχονσι*. Diod. Sic. v. 31.) is aptly illustrated by the reply of their chieftains to the vain-glorious question of Alexander the Great. After exhibiting before them a great display of his magnificence and power, he ended by demanding of them, What was the thing in the world they were most afraid of? "We fear nothing," they replied, "except it be lest the sky fall." Strab. vii. 3.; compare Posid. ap. Athen. iv. 40.; Ælian. xii. 23.

³ Tac. *Agric.* 11., comparing the Gauls and Britons, says of both: "In deposcendis periculis eadem audacia, et, ubi advenere, in detrecandis eadem formido."

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respect was manifested in the brutal sensuality to which they were addicted. It may be guessed that the worst of their vices disgraced those principally who came in contact with the sickly refinement of the Greek settlers: but even the over-civilized nations of the South affected to be shocked at their enormity. The Gauls exhibited docility in learning and considerable aptitude for practical avocations. They carried on commerce in various articles of manufacture; and, though their coinage was rude in execution, we know that the art of working metals was in extensive use among them. They were acute in intellect, and curious in speculation, though they never produced a spontaneous literature. But their intercourse with Rome gave a new stimulus to their genius; and under the empire the cities of Gaul were hardly second to any as seats of learning and schools of rhetoric.

Population
of Gaul.

The spirit of careless exaggeration, which was wont to regard the desert region of the North as the teeming parent of innumerable nations, has vanished before the calculations of experience and reason; and it will be readily allowed that at least one half of Gaul was occupied in the time of Cæsar by unsettled and scanty tribes, who abandoned a vast proportion of their territory to the barrenness of nature, while in the remnant which they professed to cultivate they barely scratched the soil. If the numbers of their fighting men are represented as enormous, we must remember that war was the only occupation of the people of the North, and that at least a fourth of each

nation was ready at any moment to start up in arms.¹ In the South the manners of the people approached much nearer to those of civilized life, and the richness of the soil was developed by a due application of labour. A calculation of the entire population has been made for the period of the fourth century of our era upon grounds which apparently deserve confidence, and the result gives a total amount of ten millions and a half.² At that period the country had been for some time exposed to the ravages of barbarian invasion, and the growth of the population had doubtless been checked by a long term of misgovernment. Nevertheless, it would be preposterous to suppose that the semi-barbarous Gauls of Cæsar's age approached at all nearly to that number. Cæsar himself boasted, as we learn from Plutarch³, that he had combated three millions of men; and in this round number we may conjecture, from the ideas of the time, that he meant to comprehend the whole male population⁴ of the hostile states. If, on the one

¹ When the whole mass of the Helvetic tribes migrated to the amount of 368,000 souls, 92,000 men were capable of bearing arms. Cæs. *B. C.* i. 29. Cæsar assures us that he saw the precise data from which this enumeration was made. In the Pannonian revolt the total number of the insurgent tribes is stated generally at 800,000, that of the warriors at 200,000. Vell. ii. 110.

² Dureau de la Malle, *Econ. Pol. des Romains*, i. 301.; Duruy, *Hist. des Romains*, ii. 409.

³ Plut. *Cæs.* 15., who, however, evidently interprets the statement literally.

⁴ The Roman census noticed only the males capable of bearing arms, or about one fourth of the population; but in Cæsar's time the enumeration of the plebs urbana who received largesses comprised all above ten years, and was perhaps understood popularly to embrace the whole of the male sex, to whom it was actually extended by Augustus at a later period. (See Dion. li. 21.; Suet. *Oct.* 41.)

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hand, the tribes of Germans and Britons whom Cæsar met in the field are to be deducted from this calculation, we have to add the inhabitants of the Province, on the other, in order to obtain the number of the whole Gaulish people, which we may fairly conclude to have reached about six millions at the date of his invasion.

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THE SUEVI ENTER GAUL, AND ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SEQUANI.—THE ALLIANCE OF THE REPUBLIC SOLICITED BY BOTH THE GAULS AND GERMANS.—MOVEMENT AMONG THE HELVETHI: THEY THREATEN TO ENTER THE ROMAN PROVINCE: CÆSAR LEAVES ROME, AND ASSUMES HIS COMMAND IN GAUL: REPELS THE INVASION OF THE HELVETHI: FOLLOWS THEM INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE ÆDUI: DEFEATS AND COMPELS THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY.—CÆSAR ADVANCES AGAINST THE SUEVI: NEGOTIATES WITH THEIR KING ARIOVISTUS: OBTAINS A COMPLETE VICTORY, AND EXPELS THE GERMANS FROM GAUL.—CÆSAR'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, A.U. 696. B.C. 58.

AT the period at which we have now arrived in the contest between the Gauls and Romans a third power comes into action, one of which we have already caught indistinct glimpses, but which, from this time forward, is destined to be seldom long removed from our observation. The independence of Northern and Central Gaul is now threatened, not only by the crafty ambition of the South, but more directly by impetuous assaults from the opposite quarter also. The banks of the Rhine were tinged with a deeper shade of barbarism than the countries that lay further to the west. On the left, several offshoots, as we have seen, from the Teutonic family were already settled. It was only within a late period that these immigrations had taken place, and the stream of German invasion still continued to pour in at intervals. The Suevi, a very formidable clan, were now hovering

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The Ger-
mans on the
Rhine: the
Suevi.

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on the right bank, impatiently awaiting an opportunity of following in the steps of their predecessors. These savage warriors were unacquainted even with the rudiments of civilized life.¹ Their polity was simply the military supremacy of the strongest and bravest. They neither built towns nor cultivated land, but dwelt in temporary encampments, sleeping under the branches of trees or in the open air, using their forests and mountains as places of security, and wherever they were unconfined by the pressure of their neighbours, moving periodically from spot to spot in restless migration. But their enterprizes were undertaken rather for plunder than with a view to a permanent change of abode, and they were not in the habit of going forth to war with their wives and children, betraying in that, as in other respects, a want of definite purpose which marks the lowest scale in human progress.

Menacing
attitude of
the Suevi,
A. U. 693.

In the year of Rome 693 the forces of Ariovistus, the king of the Suevic nation, were standing on the German side of the middle Rhine, ready to obey the first invitation to cross it.² They

¹ Some figures on the column of Trajan (see Fabretti, *Columna Trajana*, p. 16.) represent the mode of wearing the hair adopted by this people and their kindred tribes, as described by Tacitus (*Germ.* 38.): "Insigne gentis obliquare crinem nodoque substringere . . . apud Suevos horrentem capillum retro sequuntur." The front hair is gathered back in a large knot or ball on the top of the forehead.

² The date of the irruption of the Suevi is not fixed by the authorities. A passage in Ariovistus's reply to Cæsar, *B. G.* i. 44.: "Neque bello Allobrogum proximo Æduos Romanis auxilium tulisse," has been supposed to refer to the campaign against the Helvetii on the frontier of the Allobroges, A. U. 696. But, in the first place, the Allobroges took no part in that war; and, again, the Ædui in their pros-

formed a compact body of warriors, fifteen thousand strong, unencumbered with baggage or followers, accustomed to a life of unceasing activity, and despising every appliance of luxury or comfort. In the disturbed state of the interior of Gaul at that moment, such a summons could not long be wanting. The Ædui had taken advantage of their commanding position to oppress the neighbouring states. Their rivals, the Arverni, had been considerably weakened by their contests with the Romans, and their influence, founded upon fear rather than favour, had dwindled away as rapidly as their power. The latter had been suffering also from intestine divisions, one of their nobility, named Celtillus, having attempted to usurp supreme authority among them.¹ On the other hand, the Ædui had been received into strict alliance with the Romans upon terms of professed equality. They were proud to be acknowledged as the friends and brothers of the illustrious conquerors; but the levity of the Gaulish character was marked by their perversely holding aloof from them, when their aid might have been expected against the revolt of the Allobroges.² They wished perhaps to parade their independence before the eyes of the Gauls around them, who doubtless observed with jealousy the favour in which they were held

Ascendancy
of the Ædui
in Central
Gaul.

trate condition could not have given any assistance. The war, therefore, with the Allobroges must have been that of the year 692, and must have taken place before the Ædui were menaced by the Suevi and their allies. Accordingly, the date of the arrival of the Germans cannot be placed earlier than 693, nor the reception of Divitiacus at Rome before the end of that year.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 4.

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 44. See above.

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The Sequani complain of their tyranny.

by the Romans. But the republic was deeply offended, and soon found an occasion for showing its resentment. The Sequani complained bitterly of the tyranny of the Ædui, who had imposed heavy tolls on the navigation of the Saone, the common highway for the commerce of both nations with the Province and the coasts of the Mediterranean.¹ When these exactions became no longer tolerable, the injured people determined to shake them off by an appeal to arms. The Arverni also were easily induced to unite in a confederacy against their ancient rivals; but to rise against the Ædui was to brave at the same time the displeasure of the Romans, to give a pretext at least to the southern invader for interfering with the affairs of Central Gaul. It was to secure themselves from danger in this quarter that the allies determined to give the Suevi an interest in their defence. The resources of the German tribe were undefined and unknown, but their proximity was imminent, the terror of their name was great, and their neighbours made the fatal mistake of fancying that they could counterbalance the hostility of Rome.

They invite the Suevi to their assistance, throw off the yoke of the Ædui, and assume the leadership of the Gaelic tribes.

Accordingly, Ariovistus and his warriors were invited within the Gaulish territory, and they readily set their feet upon the soil of the Sequani. The Romans at the moment were so much occupied with domestic perils that they could pay no attention to this important movement. Possibly the Ædui, conscious of their own recent treachery, were ashamed to invoke their assistance; perhaps the republic was well pleased to leave them for

¹ Strab. iv. 3.

once to fight their own battle upon unequal terms. The contest quickly terminated in their complete discomfiture, and the conditions which they were compelled to accept were highly disadvantageous and disgraceful.¹ They surrendered the children of their nobility to the Sequani as hostages, and swore never to wage war for their recovery, never to solicit the succour of the Romans, or to withhold such respect and submissive behaviour towards their triumphant enemy as are due from the client to his patron. The Sequani affected to seize the honourable pre-eminence from which the Ædui had thus fallen, and claimed the leadership of the tribes in that part of Gaul.

Among the Ædui, the chief magistrate, or vergobret, had no power to resist the national will, of which he was no more than the interpreter and organ.² But Divitiacus, who occupied that station, felt acutely the dishonour of his countrymen, and refused to submit in his own person to the terms in which the multitude acquiesced. He escaped with difficulty beyond the frontiers, and took refuge in Rome, where he hoped to obtain the succour of the republic for the recovery of the honour and influence of his nation. Gaul could have sent no man more fit by his intellectual cultivation to

Divitiacus
the Æduan
solicits the
assistance
of the
Romans.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 31.: "Cum his Æduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum armis contendisse, magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse."

² Cæsar terms this magistrate vergobretus, which Celtic scholars derive from the words *ver-go-breith* ("homme de jugement," O'Brien, Thierry). He was elected by a council of priests and nobles, and had the power of life and death. But his office was only annual (*B. G.* i. 16.), and a second of the same family could not hold it during the lifetime of a previous occupant. (*B. G.* vii. 33.)'

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command for her the respect and sympathy of a civilized people. Divitiacus belonged to the Druidical caste, and was well versed in all the lore it boasted. As an expounder of the mysteries which already attracted the curiosity of the Roman sages, his society was peculiarly agreeable to Cicero, who has enshrined in his immortal pages the memory of their friendly intercourse.¹ The recommendation of so illustrious a patron secured for the wanderer of the North more than ordinary respect. When he appeared in the senate to plead the cause of his countrymen, the allies and brothers of the republic, he was requested to take his seat among the assembled nobles. But this honour he modestly declined, and delivered his address leaning on his shield.² Cæsar, who took an interest in every object of human science, no less than in the affairs of state to which he had been regularly trained, engaged in an intimacy with the Gaulish chieftain, which forms one of the most pleasing features in his life and character for its tenderness, disinterestedness, and fidelity. It was in all probability from conversation with Divitiacus, who became his constant companion in his Gallic campaigns, that he derived a great part of the acquaintance he manifests with the history and in-

¹ Cic. *de Divin.* i. 41.

² The story is recorded by Eumenius, a native of Autun, and we may conjecture that it was preserved traditionally among the Ædui (*Gratiar. Act. Constant.* 3.): "Princeps Æduus in senatum venit, rem docuit, cum quidem oblato consessu minus sibi vindicasset quam dabatur, scuto innixus peroravit." Livy (xxxviii. 21.) describes the Gaulish shield as a long, narrow, and flat plank: "Scuta longa, cæterum ad amplitudinem corporum parum lata, et ea ipsa plana, male tegebant Gallos."

stitutions of his adversaries. But, in the meanwhile, the simplicity of the Æduan's character was not proof against the seductions of Roman refinement. He evidently became a convert to the views and sentiments of the conquering nation; in his admiration for the arts and sciences which flourished in the metropolis of the South, he gradually forgot the ruder virtues of his own countrymen; and he familiarized himself with the fatal idea that a foreign dominion might exalt and ennoble the people whom it enslaved.

But, however well pleased individuals might be to display their magnanimity and urbanity before the eyes of an admiring stranger, the government had too many anxious cares pressing upon it to decide at once the tenor of its Gallic policy. The Allobroges had just been subjugated, but their resistance had cost blood and treasure; moreover, the Ædui had done nothing for their allies towards hastening the termination of the struggle. Meanwhile, the course of affairs in the city was evidently leading to the entire subjection of the republic to the will of an odious triumvirate, and whichever of the three chiefs should claim the conduct of a new war would acquire thereby a fearful pre-eminence. As far, therefore, as the senate was concerned, the solicitations of Divitiacus fell upon unwilling ears. Moreover, Ariovistus, on his part, had not been idle. He also solicited an alliance with the Roman people; and his representations, backed as they were by so powerful a force quartered almost on the frontier of their possessions, were not without effect. Anxious to avoid

Ariovistus,
king of the
Suevi, ne-
gotiates
with Rome.

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The republic determines to take the side of the Ædui.

The Sequani are oppressed by their German allies.

war at any price, the senate temporized, and encouraged the German to make his appearance in person.¹ While Divitiacus was still at Rome, the government bestowed upon his rival the titles of friend and ally, and presented him with magnificent tokens of its regard.² If the senate could have had its own way, it would have continued to balance the two parties one against the other, and tried by these means to prevent aggression on either side. But it was with the people, after all, that the determination of the matter really lay; and when they insisted, shortly afterwards, upon the appointment of Cæsar to his Gallic command, with such extensive and permanent powers, it was a distinct declaration of the national will in favour of a decisive and warlike policy beyond the Alps. This declaration, however, was not made till the progress of events called more imperatively for Roman interference, and Cæsar's position was such as enabled him to take the conduct of it.

Meanwhile, the Suevi became enamoured of the charms of their new habitation, its climate, fertility, and cultivation. Not less than one-third of the territory of the Sequani had been surrendered to them, and as it was too extensive for their own occupation, they introduced fresh hordes of their countrymen into it, till their force amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand warriors.³ The Sequani, insulted and harassed, fled from their

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 19.: Καίτοι τὸν βασιλέα πρότερον αὐτῶν Ἀριόβυστον ἐν Ῥώμῃ σύμμαχον πεποιτημένος.

² *Cæs. B. G.* i. 43.: "Rex appellatus a senatu et amicus, munera amplissima missa."

³ *Cæs. B. G.* i. 31.

villages and betook themselves to their places of defence, while the Ædui, suffering probably still greater oppression, rose in arms against the savage intruders. But Ariovistus was not to be easily dislodged. According to the practice of his countrymen he fortified himself in a morass on the upper Saone, and commanded the country from his inaccessible fastness. Secure in his position, he repeated and increased his demands, requiring another third part of the territory of his hosts, in order to settle there a new colony of Harudes from beyond the Rhine. He interposed to prevent any restoration of hostages between the rival nations, whose mutual animosity he strove by all means to foster for his own purposes, while, as far as his power extended, his rapacity and cruelty raged unchecked.

The growing resistance of the neighbouring nations was suddenly paralysed by one of those periodical migrations which were wont to spread confusion throughout the whole land. The Helvetii, who inhabited a great part of modern Switzerland, had grown impatient of the narrow limits in which they were crowded together, and harassed at the same time by the encroachments of the advancing German tide.¹ The Alps and Jura

Restlessness of the Helvetii : they resolve to make a general emigration into Gaul.

¹ The account which was commonly given of this people and their migration is that they were a pastoral tribe, abounding in wealth, and of a peaceful disposition; it was the example of the Cimbri and Teutones, with whom they came in contact, that corrupted their natural simplicity, and suggested visions of conquest and rapine. Strab. vii. 2., following Posidonius. But Cæsar says they were the bravest of the Gauls, from their constant warfare with the Germans on their frontier. Cæs. *B. G.* i. 1.

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formed barriers to their diffusion on the south and west, and the population thus confined outgrew the scanty means of support afforded by its mountain valleys. One swarm had indeed separated from the main body not many years before, uniting itself with the Cimbri and Teutones, and penetrating into Gaul by the northern outlet of their territory. But the German tribes, whose increasing numbers had closed against them the old Gaulish route to the east of Europe, had now settled themselves on the left bank of the Rhine also; and the Helvetii, who felt some contempt perhaps for their Gallic neighbours, were the less disposed to assail an enemy so formidable as the Suevi, and at the same time so poor. The western outlet, therefore, where the Rhone rushes out of the lake of Geneva and threads a narrow defile on its way into France, was the point to which their eyes were directed. Divided into a number of small cantons, they owned the supremacy of no single chieftain; but one, by name Orgetorix, possessed at this time the principal influence among them, and was ambitious of placing himself at their head. His suggestion that the entire nation should transplant itself to a foreign soil was received with universal approbation. He proposed that it should march in one mass into the heart of Gaul, promised it an easy victory over the most martial and powerful of its opponents, and dominion over the whole Gaulish people. He hoped to rise himself to undisputed sovereignty over his own countrymen, and through them to rule over the whole breadth of the land from the Alps to the ocean.¹

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 2.; Dion. xxxviii. 31.; Plut. *Cæs.* 18.

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Orgetorix,
his intrigues
and sudden
death.

This enterprize, extravagant as it may appear, was no more than what the Cimbri might in all probability have accomplished, had they kept it steadily in view, and at a later period it was not the mere dream of a visionary. Orgetorix did not look merely to the employment of arms, however much he relied upon the fancied superiority of his countrymen in war. He was well acquainted with the state of Central Gaul, and the political jealousies of individuals and classes which constituted its weakness. He intrigued with ambitious chieftains among the Ædui and Sequani for aid and encouragement. Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, who had succeeded him in the office of vergobret¹, and was anxious to extend the authority and duration of his office, was won over by the crafty Helvetian by promises of assistance and the bribe of his daughter in marriage. Casticus, the son of Catamantaledes, late king of the Sequani, had failed in obtaining the succession upon his father's death, and was burning with indignation at the affront. Similar views of aggrandizement were opened to him also, and his co-operation promptly secured. But in the meanwhile the Helvetii began to suspect the personal views which their champion was harbouring under the semblance of zeal for the public good. He was summoned to attend before the popular as-

¹ It has been mentioned already, on the authority of Cæsar (*B. C.* vii. 33.), that it was illegal for a second personage of the same family to hold this or any other political office during the lifetime of the prior occupant. If this statement is correct, it would seem that Dumnorix, who was a popular favourite, had already succeeded in getting the law relaxed in his behalf.

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sembly, and challenged to defend himself against the charge of aspiring to the tyranny. According to the custom of the barbarians, who seem never to have contemplated the possible innocence of an accused party, he was to plead his cause in chains, and, if unsuccessful, the penalty was death by fire. Orgetorix accepted the conditions, and the day was appointed: in the interval, however, he collected all his friends and dependants to the number of ten thousand, and effected his escape. The nation flew to arms to recover the person of the fugitive; but his sudden death arrested their indignation. Disappointment and despair, it was rumoured, had driven the guilty intriguer to put an end to his existence.

Prepara-
tions of the
Helvetii.

The loss, however, of their principal adviser caused no change in the counsels of the Helvetians. They sought no alliance with discontented chieftains in the neighbouring states, but, confident in their unassisted strength, determined calmly to abandon their homes, and trust to their own fortune and valour to find themselves, with their women and children, a more desirable residence elsewhere. They devoted the next two years to making the necessary preparations, and to collecting a sufficient store of provisions. The third was destined for the enterprize itself. Meanwhile, they extended their design by embracing in their league the Rauraci, the Tulingi¹, and the

¹ Augusta Rauracorum is the modern Bâle. The position of the Tulingi is quite uncertain, as they are not mentioned elsewhere. See Thierry, *Gaulois*, II. v.; Le Déist, *César*, ind. in voc.; *César*, ed. Lemaire. Stuhlingen is on the German side of the Rhine near

Latobrigi. The next point to be decided regarded the precise course which they should take. Two routes might conduct them westward into Gaul: the one following the defile of the Rhone along the north bank of that river, and thus penetrating into the country of the Sequani; the other lying to the south, and crossing the territory of the Allobroges in the direction of the Province.¹ The former of these roads was one of the utmost difficulty from the nature of the country. For many miles the mountains descend almost perpendicularly into the torrent below. Modern engineers have succeeded in making a road along the brow of these cliffs; but the ease with which the traveller now winds round their projecting precipices, and above the most tremendous abysses, serves to enhance his conception of the perils which must have attended a march among them before these obstacles were overcome. The emigrants soon decided that this route was impracticable in the face of an enemy. The other alternative offered a passage the difficulties of which might not be insurmountable. The Rhone might be crossed either by the bridge, which already existed at Geneva², the frontier town of the Allobroges, in possession at this period of a Roman garrison, or, if this was

Schaffhausen. Walckenaer places the Latobrigi at Breggen, near the sources of the Danube (ii. 272.). Tacitus, it will be remembered, extends the territory of the Helvetii to the Hercynian forest (*Germ.* 28.).

¹ Caesar, *B. G.* i. 6.

² *Cæs. l. c.* It is said that the name of this place does not occur again for a period of four hundred years; but inscriptions have been found there which sufficiently prove that it was a place of importance under the Romans. Walckenaer, *Geogr. des Gaules*, i. 263.

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closed against them, the stream presented fords which might be used by bold men accustomed to stem the torrents of the mountains.¹ The Helvetians determined to force their way through the country of the Allobroges, and to trust either to arms or persuasion to obtain a passage through the Province and across the Rhone into the centre of Gaul. They indulged a hope that the people of the country would be eager, from their known hostility to the Romans, to afford every facility to a transient invader. But the favourable moment had passed; the decisive victory of Pomptinus had cowed the spirits of the Allobroges, and their territory, in the language of the republic, was already pacified.²

Cæsar
lingers in
the imme-
diate neigh-
bourhood
of Rome,
A. U. 696.

We have seen that Cæsar, on the expiration of his consulship, obtained the government of the two Gauls, together with Illyricum; and that the people were so strongly impressed with the military importance of these provinces in the impending crisis, as to confer the command upon him for a term of five years. The enterprizes already meditated by their barbarian foes were not yet quite ripe for execution. The proconsul was content to watch them from a distance during the first months of the year. The development of his own political schemes still required his proximity to Rome; he was engaged in abetting the revolutionary proceedings of the popular tribune, and overawing the deliberations of the nobles by fixing his camp

¹ Cæs. *l. c.*: "Nonnullis locis vado transitur."

² Cic. *de Prov. Cons.* 13.; Cæs. *l. c.*: "Allobroges qui nuper pacati erant."

before the gates of the city, at the same time that he communicated with his lieutenants beyond the Alps, and kept a vigilant eye upon the movements of the Helvetic tribes. The course of three months saw the success of all his schemes. Domitius and Memmius, in the interest of the nobles, compelled him to defend the acts of his consulship before the hostile tribunal of the senate, from which, however, he extorted an entire ratification of them.¹ The triumph of Clodius over the nobility was also completely effected in this short interval. Cicero, who had refused to accept the proconsul's protection, was on the point of flying from the vengeance of his enemy.² The power of the triumvirate was established upon an unassailable basis, while Cæsar had secured by the marriage of his daughter an ascendancy over the spirit of his rival Pompeius.

At this moment the news arrived at the camp of the proconsul that the cloud which had so long been gathering on the frontiers was at last fully charged and about to burst. The Roman province, it was added, was the quarter upon which the first fury of the tempest was destined to break. The Helvetii, having completed their preparations, appointed the twenty-eighth day of March for the meeting of

Cæsar
hastily
leaves Italy,
and reaches
his army on
the Rhone.

¹ Schol. Bob. in *Orat. pro Sest.* p. 297.: "Ipsius Cæsaris orationes contra hos exstant quibus et sua acta defendit et illos insectatur." Comp. Suet. *Jul.* 23. 73.

² Cæsar and Cicero must have left Rome almost on the same day. Cicero had reached Lucania April 8 (*Ep. ad Att.* iii. 2.). This date coincides with April 27 of the reformed calendar. Plutarch (*Cæs.* 14.) says, Καῖσαρ οὐ πρότερον ἐξῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν ἢ καταστασιάσαι Κικέρωνα μετὰ Κλωδίου, καὶ συνεβελεῖν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας. Comp. Abeken, *Cic. in seinen Briefen*, p. 111.; Fischer, *Röm. Zeittüfeln*, p. 239.

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their collective forces at the western outlet of the lake Lemanus.¹ The whole population of the assembled tribes amounted to three hundred and sixty-eight thousand souls, including the women and children; the number that bore arms was ninety-two thousand.² They cut themselves off from the means of retreat by giving ruthlessly to the flames every city and every village of their land; twelve of the one class and four hundred of the other were thus sacrificed, and with them all their superfluous stores, their furniture, arms, and implements. Cæsar's levies were still incomplete; he left his camp with only a few attendants, and reached the Rhone in eight days, at the point where the legion which defended the Province was awaiting his arrival.³ He immediately broke down the bridge at Geneva⁴, thus placing a strong natural barrier between the colony and the foe; for the stream which rushes from the lake has all the violence of a mountain torrent, with the volume of

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 6. March 28, A. U. 696 = April 16, B. C. 58.

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 29.; Plut. *Cæs.* 18. makes the whole number somewhat less, but states the amount of the fighting-men at one hundred and ninety thousand. But compare what has been said, p. 269.

³ Cæsar's words are, "quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit," which leaves it uncertain whether he marched with his troops, or went alone for greater expedition. Plutarch, who however is to be read with great caution, says that he effected the transit in eight days: Ὀγδοαῖος ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ἦλθεν. The march of a Roman army was ordinarily twenty miles a day (Veget. i. 10.). The distance from Rome to Geneva could not have been less than six hundred miles. Cicero (*pro Quint.* 25.) asserts that the distance to the territory of the Segusiani (Lyons) was seven hundred Roman miles.

⁴ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 6.: "Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet . . . pontem jubet rescindi."

the outlet of a vast reservoir. The Helvetians were startled at the proconsul's sudden appearance, and his energetic determination to forbid their progress. They deemed it necessary to try conciliation. They despatched a deputation to the Roman quarters, with instructions to represent their designs as innocent and peaceable, and to request a passage through the territories of the republic, that they might explore some land of refuge in the farthest extremities of the west. They bound themselves in the most solemn manner to respect the property of the provincials on their march. But it was not consistent with the policy of the Roman government to allow of such manifold disturbance as the contemplated movement would produce. The shock of the proposed migration, by breaking up existing combinations, would dispossess the republic of all the advantages she enjoyed, and compel her to enter upon fresh intrigues and reconstruct her policy. But Cæsar makes no profession of looking so far; he merely says that he distrusted the faith of the Helvetians; and, remembering their defeat of Cassius and the disgrace of a Roman army, which they had passed under the yoke, regarded them as inveterate enemies to whom no favour should be shown, and from whom no moderation could be expected.

The Helvetii had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone, and awaited the return of their envoys from the Roman camp. In order to gain time for the arrival of the reinforcements which he expected, the proconsul appointed them to come to him again to receive his answer on the thirteenth

The Helvetians attempt to cross the river and are repulsed.

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of April.¹ During the interval he set his soldiers to work with the spade and pickaxe, and drew a long line of ditch and rampart from the extremity of the lake along the left bank of the river to the point where it rushes into the gorge of the Jura. The skill and energy of the Roman legionary sufficed to complete this fortification, about fifteen miles in length, in the course of the few days allotted to the task. On the ides of April the Helvetians returned, and renewed their application for leave to pass through the Province. Cæsar was now prepared with his reply. He declared that the history of the republic afforded no precedent for such a concession, and declined to yield to their demand. The Helvetii were not discouraged by this refusal. They made some hasty preparations, and resolved to force the passage of the river. The fords in so impetuous a stream were extremely difficult and dangerous; nevertheless, they made several attempts to cross, both by day and night, sometimes by plunging into the river, sometimes with armaments of boats and rafts. But the rampart running close along the edge of the stream was defended with military skill, every attempt to gain a footing on the left bank was defeated, and the assailants were compelled ulti-

¹ The Helvetii met on the 28th of March, but it is not said that they sent their deputation on that day, nor is it likely that they should have done so without some little delay for consultation. The author of the *Précis des Guerres de César*, which pretends to be written from Napoleon's dictation to his attendant Marchand at St. Helena, calculates the extent of the work performed by Cæsar's legion, and estimates the time requisite at from *ten to fifteen* days (p. 34.).

mately to abandon all hope of making good their exit in this direction.¹

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To skirt the right bank between the river and the mountains became now the more feasible of the two alternatives; but this could only be effected by securing the goodwill of the natives. The Sequani had declared their resolution to defend to the utmost this access to their territory, and had hitherto refused to entertain any proposals of negotiation with the intruders. But Dumnorix had been gained over by Orgetorix to the cause of the Helvetii. The death of his adviser had not damped the ambitious hopes which the Æduan had been led to conceive, and he was willing to offer any assistance towards an enterprise upon which he grounded his views of personal aggrandizement. By his intervention the Sequani were induced to grant the Helvetii the favour they desired, upon receiving pledges for their peaceable behaviour. The migrating hordes again declared that they had no other wish but to obtain a passage through the country of the Sequani and Ædui, that they might finally settle themselves in the western parts of Gaul. They pointed out the country of the Santones as

They adopt the other route on the right bank of the Rhone. Cæsar increases his levies and follows them.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 8. Polyænus has collected in his *Strategematicon* numerous stories respecting Cæsar's manœuvres which are contradicted by the simple narrative of Cæsar himself. On this occasion he pretends that the Roman general allowed a great part of the Helvetians to cross the river, and then attacked and destroyed them while they were reposing from their fatigues. Cæsar could not have failed to mention this if it had been the fact; but it is moreover inconsistent with his account of the defences he threw up. The stories told by Polyænus are generally unworthy of credit. Polyæn. *Strat.* viii. 23.

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that in which they proposed to establish their sovereignty. The Romans, however, considered that the settlement of so restless and warlike a people to the north of the Garonne, on which river some of their own most flourishing districts lay¹, would be a source of great inconvenience and danger. Not much was to be expected from the resistance which the Ædui might be disposed to make, nor had Cæsar yet sufficient strength at hand to follow the wanderers on their track, and give efficient reinforcements to the efforts of his allies. For the moment he was obliged to leave them unmolested, while he hastened in person into Italy to collect and expedite the movement of additional troops. He left T. Labienus, a distinguished officer, whose merits will come frequently under our notice, to defend the rampart he had erected, while he urged forward by his own presence the levy of two fresh legions. Three others he carried off from their station at Aquileia, and as soon as he had thus assembled a force of five legions, he hurried back into Gaul by the route of the Cottian Alps.² He had chosen this line as the most direct for the point he had in

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 10.: "Non longè a Tolosatium finibus, . . . locis patentibus et maxime frumentariis." Dion. xxxviii. 32.

² By the passage of the Mont Genevre to Briançon. The neighbouring route by Susa, the Mont Cenis and the valley of the Arc was first rendered practicable by the native chief Cottius in the time of Augustus. It was from him that all the part of the Alpine chain, in which both these passes lie, derived the name of Cottian. It seems previously to have been known by the name of Julian, and that possibly from Cæsar's passage. The more usual but longer route would be that by the Col de Tiniers and Barcelonnette, discovered by Pompeius. Sall. *Fr. Hist.* iii. 3.; Appian. *B. C.* i. 109.; Walckenaer, *G. des G.* i. 225. 538.

view; but the path he took was perhaps the least frequented of all the Alpine tracks, and his progress was obstructed by the mountain tribes, the Centrones, Garoceli, and Caturiges, who assembled to defend their fastnesses against the intrusion of the stranger. Cæsar cut his way through every obstacle. He reached the Rhone at Vienne, or Lyons, and crossed to the right bank of that river, above its confluence with the Saone. In the interval the Helvetii had threaded the defile of the Jura with all their enormous train of women and children, of horses and carriages. Cæsar hoped perhaps to meet and check them before they reached the Saone; but encumbered as they were, and slowly as they moved, they had already got before him, and his object was now no longer to meet but to pursue them. The Saone, the Arar of the Romans¹, offered no formidable barrier. Its width is moderate and its current gentle, though it is only in contrast to its furious neighbour that it can be represented as stagnant or sluggish; nor is it easy to understand the language of Cæsar, who declares that the eye can hardly distinguish which way it flows. This obstacle had already been overcome by the greater part of the advancing horde, though it had taken them twenty days to effect the transit; and the Ædui, who had not ventured to impede their passage, were now suffering under the insolence of the intruders almost without resistance. They placed, indeed, their whole reliance upon Cæsar and the Roman forces, whose aid they

¹ The modern name is traced in Saucona, the appellation given to it by Ammianus, xv. 11.

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loudly invoked in the name of their ancient alliance.¹ Their champions were advancing with rapid strides. The tribe of the Tigurini², constituting one fourth of the whole confederacy, had not yet crossed the Saone, when Cæsar came up with it, and instantly gave it battle with three legions. This was the same tribe which had destroyed L. Cassius and his army exactly fifty years before.³ Among the Romans who had fallen on that day was the grandfather of Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, and the energy of the Roman general was stimulated by the recollection of both a public and a private calamity. The barbarians were incommoded by the mass of baggage, which had been placed under their care as forming the rearguard of the whole armament. The attack was totally unexpected. They were easily routed, and suffered immense slaughter, only a small remnant escaping into the woods in the vicinity.⁴

He overtakes the Tigurini and defeats them.

The Helvetians make overtures of negotiation.

The fugitives were allowed to make their escape unmolested, while Cæsar proceeded to build a bridge with the greatest expedition, and transferred his army to the right bank of the Saone. The Helvetians were alarmed at the rapidity of

¹ Dion. xxxviii. 32.

² The pagus Tigurinus may be the canton of Zug or of Uri. Turicum, the name of Zurich in the middle ages, is proved to have been its Roman appellation also by an inscription, "sta(tio) Turicen(sis)," found there in 1741. Walckenaer, i. 312.

³ A. U. 646, Appian. *Fr. de Rebus Gall.* iv. 3.: Οἱ Τιγύριοι δ' αὐτῶν χρόνῳ ἔμπροσθεν Πείσωνος καὶ Κασσίου τινὰ στρατὸν ἐλόντες ὑπὸ ζυγὸν ἐξεπέπομφεσαν.

⁴ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 12. If the Tigurini amounted to 23,000 warriors, i. e. one fourth of the whole, they were probably out-numbered by three Roman legions with their Gaulish auxiliaries.

his movements. Not only had he destroyed their rearguard in one battle; he had given another proof of vigour and skill beyond their own in crossing the river in a single day. Accordingly, they sent a deputation to confer with him, and while they offered to submit their destination to his direction, and seek their future residence in any quarter that he should indicate, they attempted to disguise their apprehensions of a collision with his forces by reminding him of their former successes against the republic. The aged Divico, to whom the conduct of the negotiation was confided, had been the leader of their army in the famous battle of which they boasted; and they trusted that the language of defiance and contemptuous warning would fall with greater weight from his lips.¹ But the proconsul was not to be moved by such devices. The more they thought fit to remind him of the calamities of the republic, the more, he said, would they incite him to avenge them. Moreover, it was not an ancient quarrel that he had come to renew; he sought compensation for their present insults to Rome and injuries to her allies. He ended, not with issuing directions regarding their destination, but by requiring them to make satisfaction to the Ædui, and pledge themselves, by the delivery of hostages, to submit to the commands which the Romans should impose upon them. Divico arrogantly replied that his nation was more accustomed to take than to give

¹ *Cæs. B. G. i. 13, 14.*

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The Helvetians march through the country of the Ædui, and are followed by Cæsar. Disaffection of the Ædui to the republic.

hostages, as the Romans had good reason to know; and with this taunt the conference broke up.

The next morning the barbarians pursued their march. Cæsar, who had now brought up his whole forces, hung close upon their rear, and skirmishes took place between the cavalry of the two hosts. A brilliant success obtained by the Helvetii in an affair with the Æduan auxiliaries encouraged them to engage more frequently in these partial hosts, which the Roman general, who could not trust either to the valour or constancy of his allies, was anxious on his part to avoid. In this way the rival armies moved for fifteen days up the course of the Saone¹; the one slowly and deliberately foraging for its supplies, and courting the attacks of the enemy's advanced guard; the other closely observing and following all its movements, but studiously declining a general engagement. The space thus traversed could not have been more than one hundred miles, when the emigrants made a movement to the left, and struck across the country, the Romans still hanging on their rear. This manœuvre reduced Cæsar to great difficulty. As long as he kept to the bank of the Saone, he could draw his supplies from the Roman province behind him.² But the Ædui on their part were extremely negligent in providing

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 15. The time which Cæsar assigns to this march creates some difficulty. The distance from Lyons to Chalons is not above ninety miles, and it was probably from the vicinity of the latter place that the Gauls turned to the west and abandoned the valley. It is evident that the Helvetians made no exertions to escape from their pursuer, and that he did not attempt to arrest their progress.

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 16.

for his wants. While he was occupied in preventing the common enemy from destroying their villages and produce, they made no efforts to bring provisions to his camp. It was still early in June, and the standing corn was not yet ripe; nor if provisions had been ready to his hand, would it have suited his policy to irritate the natives by seizing upon them. Nevertheless, he resolved to persevere in his previous tactics, and not to abandon the track of the enemy, till matters at last came to a crisis, and he was compelled to summon the chiefs of the *Ædui*, and make a formal complaint of their conduct.¹ Liscus, the vergobret, replied in the name of his countrymen. He pointed to *Dumnorix* as the real though concealed cause of all the coldness and tardiness which they had betrayed; but it was not till *Cæsar* withdrew him to a private conference that he ventured to expose the intrigues which were secretly in progress, the private understanding which existed between *Dumnorix*, the *Helvetii*, *Bituriges*, and others, the hopes which he drew from their assurances, the power and influence which he had already acquired in his own country. The presence of the Romans was the sole obstacle to the consummation of his intrigues, and all his endeavours were now devoted to impeding their movements, and cutting off their resources, until they should be compelled to retreat. It even appeared that the disaster which had lately occurred to the *Æduan* cavalry was caused by his treachery. *Divitiacus*

¹ *Cæs. B. G.* i. 17—20.

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accompanied the expedition in the proconsul's retinue. Though conscious that his brother's schemes were directed no less against the liberty than the best policy of their common country, he threw himself at Cæsar's feet, and used every solicitation to save the culprit's life. It may be remarked that though he had been two or three years resident in Rome, he was unable to express himself in the Latin tongue; a circumstance the more surprising considering the admiration with which he regarded the life and manners of the civilized South. Cæsar made use of an interpreter in conversing with him.¹ Dumnorix was spared; but the proconsul gave him to understand the peril into which he had thrown himself, and placed his actions under vigilant observation.

Cæsar engages the Helvetii in a decisive battle, and entirely defeats them.

The Helvetii were now making their way slowly across the hilly country which separates the feeders of the Saone, the Loire, and the Seine. In the centre of this tract lies the city of Autun, originally named Bibracte, the capital of the Ædui. Cæsar still following close upon the heels of the advancing host, found himself at a distance of eighteen miles from this place, apparently to the north of it.² Here, however, it became necessary to cease from pursuit, and make for the city, where the provisions he demanded awaited him. This abandonment of his previous tactics, much as he might regret its necessity at the time, prepared for

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 19.: "Divitiacum ad se vocari jubet, et quotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Procillum, principem Galliæ provinciæ, familiarem suum, cui summam rerum omnium fidem habebat, cum eo colloquitur."

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 23.

him an opportunity of giving battle on ground of his own choice. The Helvetii, regarding it as a flight, exulted in it as a symptom either of weakness or cowardice. Turning round to follow their pursuer, their advanced columns soon fell in with the rear of the Roman legions. Cæsar had time to select his position on the side of a hill¹, along which he ranged his infantry in three lines, allowing the cavalry to descend into the plain, and there sustain the first shock of the assailants. The Helvetians, placing their baggage and waggons in the rear, charged with the whole weight of their mass in compact order. The Roman cavalry soon gave way before them, and retired without confusion upon the lines of infantry. Hereupon the general, dismounting first from his own charger, caused the cavalry to dismount also, and send their horses in the rear, that all might be on an equality. It is evident that he distrusted his auxiliaries, of whom that arm was entirely composed², who served under the command of Dumnorix; and he feared lest any weakness or treachery on their part should discourage his own legionaries. The Gauls advanced in close array, their shields inter-

¹ Cæsar ranged his four veteran legions on the side of the hill, and kept the two legions of raw levies in reserve on the summit (c. 24.). His whole legionary force therefore might amount to 36,000 men, and we may add at least half as many more for auxiliaries. The disparity of numbers between his forces and those of the enemy, reduced by the loss of the Tigurini, was not very great. In point of skill, discipline, and the material of war, there could be no comparison between them. The only danger of the Romans lay in the doubtful fidelity of their allies.

² It appears from c. 42. that there were no Roman horse in the army.

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laced above their heads to repel the expected discharge of stones and arrows. But the massive pilum of the Roman infantry did better service than any such light missiles. Hurlled from a vantage ground it pierced the wooden targets through and through, entangling several together, and depriving their bearers of the free use of their arms. The array of the barbarian phalanx was thus loosened and broken, and as soon as its confusion was perceived, down rushed the Romans upon it with the drawn sword. The Gauls could either make no resistance or were forced to abandon their shields to extricate themselves from one another. After a short combat they fled to another hill at the distance of a mile, hotly pressed and followed up the acclivity. A diversion was here created in their favour by the arrival of the Boii and Tulingi, who were the last to reach the field of action, and were now able to check the advance of the Romans. The conflict continued to rage with unabated fury in the space between the two hills. The Gauls gradually retreated upon their waggons, but always presenting their face to their opponents: throughout the battle, which lasted the whole of the long summer's day and late into the night, not one of them was seen to turn his back. The entrenchment which they had hastily thrown up, and behind which they had so long defended themselves, was at last carried; but a vast body escaped from the field, one hundred and thirty thousand according to Cæsar's computation, and succeeded, by rapid marches northward, in reaching the borders of the Lingones in four days. The

care of the wounded and the necessity of seeking provisions at Bibracte, prevented Cæsar from pursuing them. But his victory had been sufficiently decisive, and the loss of the vanquished was tremendous. He hoped that the letters he despatched to the Lingones, threatening them with the vengeance of the republic if they gave food or any other succour to the fugitives, would effect the destruction of the remainder, or force them to surrender. After a halt of only three days he found himself once more in a condition to follow upon their track.

The Lingones had no sympathy with the unwelcome intruders, and being secure of Cæsar's support, they wanted no further inducement to engage them to refuse the wanderers a passage. Disheartened and famishing the remnant of the crumbling host were soon compelled to surrender, and submit to any terms which the victor should be pleased to impose upon them. His measures were indeed sufficiently lenient, but for this he had a political object. The laws of war as interpreted by the Romans placed an enemy, when captured with arms in his hands, entirely at the disposal of the conqueror. Sometimes the whole nation was sold into slavery, sometimes it was even put indiscriminately to the sword, if vengeance or policy seemed to demand it. But Cæsar, inflexible as was his severity whenever he deemed it fitting, accepted on this occasion the surrender of his helpless enemies as an act of voluntary submission, and contented himself with commanding them to return in a body to their own country.

Terms
granted to
the Helvetii.
They are
compelled
to return
into their
own coun-
try.

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It was important that the space which they had left vacant should be peopled again, as otherwise it would have attracted a colony of Germans, and brought a new and restless neighbour to the very doors of the Province. He laid upon the Allobroges the burden of furnishing the survivors of the horde with the necessary provisions, until they could rebuild their habitations and restore their soil to cultivation. A small body of six thousand men had escaped from this convention, and were trying to cut their way into Germany. They were brought back to the Roman camp by the zeal of the Gaulish tribes through whom they had to pass, and these the proconsul, as he tells us, "treated as enemies;" a phrase of fearful import, which leaves us only uncertain whether they were put to the sword or sold as slaves. The tribe of the Boii were allowed to remain in the interior of Gaul, at the instance of the Ædui themselves, who admired their military prowess, and wished to settle them as allies and defenders in some districts of their own country. The whole number of those who returned to their homes amounted to one hundred and ten thousand souls.¹

The Gauls
eager to pay
their court

The Gauls were penetrated with surprise and admiration at the power of the republic, which, at

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 21—29. Cæsar caused a census to be taken. In the camp of the Helvetians lists were found in which the names of the several confederate tribes and their respective contingents were registered. These documents were written *literis Græcis*, either in the Greek language or more probably in Greek characters. It is not to be supposed that the Helvetians were familiar with the language, since Cæsar (*B. G.* v. 48.) uses it expressly to conceal the purport of his despatches from the Nervians, who, rude as they were themselves, might easily have found an interpreter if such knowledge had been

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VI.to the victorious pro-
consul.

this distance from its home, had struck down an enemy before whom their own concentrated energies had quailed. The ability of the leader and the constancy of his legions through all the fatigues of so long a march, and the pressure of so many difficulties, impressed them with a higher sense of the character of their ancient rivals than national vanity had hitherto allowed them to entertain. They began at last to recognize the Romans as a superior race. Every state hastened to vie with its neighbours in strains of respect and adulation. Deputations from every tribe crowded one upon another, congratulating the proconsul on his success, expressing the thanks of the Gaulish people for a deliverance such as they dared least expect from a stranger, so recently their deadly foe. But for Roman intervention Gaul, they confessed, would have been overrun from the Rhine to the Ocean, its cities destroyed, its political relations subverted, and the yoke of servitude imposed perhaps upon the entire nation.

Their apprehension
of the encroach-
ments of
the Suevi.

But if their most imminent danger had been that of conquest by the Helvetii, the prospect of the advance of the Germans was not in reality less alarming. In the midst of their rejoicings for their late deliverance, the Gaulish chieftains still exhibited tokens of secret apprehension. They communicated their fears to Cæsar, and desired his permission to convene an assembly of dele-

generally diffused among the southern Gauls. Cæsar uses the same phrase in speaking of the Druids: "In publicis privatisque rationibus Græcis utuntur literis" (comp. Tac. *Germ.* 3.), where also it is difficult to determine the true meaning.

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gates from various states to determine upon a plan of united action.¹ The council was accordingly held. The result was that the deputies returned to the Roman camp, and placed themselves entirely at the proconsul's disposal. The whole affair was transacted with the utmost secrecy. The Gaulish chieftains, especially the Æduan, were so cowed by the tyranny of Ariovistus, that they dared not utter their apprehensions above their breath. It was not till they were assured of the discretion as well as the favour of the Roman, that they ventured, with Divitiacus for their spokesman, to develop the state of their relations with the German intruders, the oppression under which they were suffering, their ardent thirst for deliverance, and their resolution to put themselves under the guidance of their puissant ally.

He espouses
the cause
of the Gauls
against the
intruders.

The command which the Helvetii had received to return to their original seats, and maintain their ancient barriers against the Germans, foreshadowed the policy of the Roman general. With whatever hopes of amity the senate might have

¹ *Cæs. B. G.* i. 30.: "Petierant uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indiceret," &c. Some writers imagine from this and one or two similar expressions that the whole of the Gaulish tribes were united in a general confederation, and consulted together occasionally for the common good. But this opinion has no foundation. The author of the commentaries uses the word *totus* in a very loose way. He is here speaking only of the two confederations of which the Ædui and Arverni were respectively at the head, as appears clearly from the following chapter. But these embraced none of the states of Aquitania, Belgium, nor even the western division of Gaul. It was not likely that the people of Armorica or the tribes on the Rhine should have asked permission to attend a general convention from a Roman commander whose name could scarcely have reached them.

amused Ariovistus, he could not but feel assured that the intentions of the proconsul, whom it had sent to manage the affairs of Gaul with absolute power, were decidedly hostile to his views. Cæsar had settled the question between him and the Ædui as to which of the two Rome should keep her word with; it was hardly possible to be true to both, and the governor of the province had perhaps no other alternative but to choose between them. Nor was the attitude adopted by the German chieftain calculated to disarm the jealousy of the republic. He declared formally that he had entered Gaul as a conqueror, equally with the Romans, and he claimed to share the country with the invaders from the South: "You have your province," he said, "and I will have mine."¹ The Romans could endure no such partnership. Their influence in Gaul beyond the Rhone rested mainly upon the reliance which the natives might be induced to place on their will and power to protect them. They well knew how the prevalence of such an opinion would assist in breaking up the national spirit of independence, and they already foresaw the rapid absorption of new victims into the mass of their conquests. Cæsar, in fact, embodied the sentiments and policy of his countrymen, and in determining to espouse the cause of the Gauls against the Germans, it is not necessary to suppose that he wantonly courted a rupture with Ariovistus from motives of personal ambition.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 44.; or in the words of Florus, iii. 10.: "Quid est Cæsar? si vult, veniat: quid ad illum quid agat nostra Germania? num ego me interpono Romanis?"

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VI.

Ariovistus
refuses the
proconsul's
terms of ac-
commoda-
tion.

Indeed, the demands which the proconsul made upon the German chieftain bore a semblance of moderation, and were such as a potentate of less pride and wilfulness might have secured his safety by accepting.¹ He was required to transport no more of his countrymen across the Rhine, to restore their hostages to the Ædui and Sequani, and to enter into relations of amity with the states which he had hitherto trodden under his feet. Upon these conditions the proconsul declared himself willing to maintain the good understanding that had thus far subsisted between the rival powers. He would urge no pretensions to diminish the authority which Ariovistus had acquired in Gaul. But the barbarian, flushed with success, would listen to no proposals which did not recognize his sudden and precarious occupation of Gallic territory as an equal title to independent sovereignty with the slowly-consolidated dominion of the Romans. He courted war as between two equal and rival powers; the alliance which the Romans had formed with the Gaulish states he treated with scorn, and disputed their right to step forward as the defenders of the Ædui. While these discussions were in progress, certain of that nation came to Cæsar with further complaints of the violation of their territory by the German warriors: at the same moment the Treviri also besought his assistance to prevent an incursion of the Suevi, one hundred of whose cantons had already assembled all their forces on the bank of the Rhine, for the purpose of a general migra-

¹ Cæs. B. G. i. 34—36.

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Cæsar
commences
hostilities.

Panic in
the Roman
army.

tion. It was of the utmost importance to strike a blow before this multitude could effect a junction with Ariovistus. Cæsar immediately placed himself at the head of his legions, and marched towards the encampment of the German chieftain, prepared to bring the conference to a close in person, or to enforce his demands by arms. When he had reached Vesontio (Besançon), in the country of the Sequani, where it was necessary to halt a few days to provision the troops, symptoms of insubordination began to manifest themselves in the Roman camp.¹ The proconsul was attended, according to the custom of the times, by a number of young men of family, who came to make under his eye their first essay of arms. The privations and terrors of a Gallic campaign were more harassing than such as they might have submitted to in the soft climate of Asia, among the luxuries and amusements of the ancient world. The name of the Gauls indeed had been gradually stripped of its ancient terrors; but the republic had not come in collision with the Germanic races since the invasion of the Teutones, and the hard-won victory of Marius had not sufficed to obliterate the remembrance of her last great panic. Accordingly, when the Sequani were interrogated about the Germans, and described them as the most terrible of men, of tremendous stature, of hideous form, of savage cruelty, warriors who had not slept under a roof for fourteen years², the shattered nerves of

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 39—41.; comp. Plut. *Cæs.* 19.; Dion. xxxviii. 35.

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 36.

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the dissolute patricians gave way. From these effeminate volunteers the panic spread to the veterans, and pervaded the camp. Many sought leave of absence and fled from the danger; others whom a sense of honour retained at their standards, were yet unable to conceal their fears, and did even more harm by remaining.¹ It required all Cæsar's address and patience to make head against the growing spirit of dismay. When all his private persuasions seemed to fail, and the eloquence of his public harangues was exhausted upon the soldiery, he threw himself at last, with the tact of a more experienced general, upon their feelings of pride and emulation. No commander, he said, had ever been ruined, unless by the desertion of his fortune or his own injustice. He declared his reliance upon the fortune which had already so conspicuously attached itself to him, at the same time he was no less animated by the consciousness of his rectitude. Such was his confidence, that he was resolved to go through with the affair he had undertaken, though with no more than a single legion. The tenth legion he knew he could trust, and with the services of all the rest, if they chose to desert him, he could afford to dispense. This speech deserves to be remarked as the first occasion on which Cæsar expressed that unbounded reliance upon his fortune, which became with him so fixed a principle. He had already succeeded so often, against such odds,

¹ Florus, iii. 10., copying Cæsar, c. 39.: "Itaque tantus gentis novæ terror in castris, ut testamenta passim etiam in principijs scriberentur."

and at such imminent risks, that, sober-minded as he was, and at the maturest season of life, the conviction was forced upon him, that his career was watched by a special providence, and destined to lead to some conspicuous end. The tenth legion was that to which the defence of the Province had been committed at the commencement of Cæsar's proconsulate. It was the same, perhaps, which had made Pomptinus victorious over the Allobroges, and it had more recently maintained the line of the Rhone against the threatened invasion of the Helvetians.¹ The favoured division received the compliment with acclamations, while the rest of the army, stung with remorse, determined to wipe off the stain they had incurred, and declared their readiness to dare the worst.

Having thus arrested the contagion of terror among his soldiery, their leader lost no time in bringing them into the enemy's presence. Nevertheless, it was his object to conduct the quarrel, if possible, to a peaceable issue, and accordingly he proposed a conference to the German chieftain. They met on a hill rising from the centre of a plain, where they could be observed by either army, and the openness of the ground offered no lurking-place for an ambuscade.² Each was attended by a squadron of cavalry of equal numbers. Cæsar had no Roman cavalry, nor could he well confide in his Gaulish auxiliaries: yet he was resolved not to reject the arrangement proposed by his adversary, nor betray any appearance of dis-

Cæsar has a conference with Ariovistus.

¹ Guischart, *Mém. Milit.* iii. 15.

² Cæs. *B. G.* i. 43—45.

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trust or dread. He caused a party of Gauls to dismount, and placed the infantry of his favourite legion upon their horses. Thus escorted he met Ariovistus at the appointed spot, and recommenced a discussion upon the points which had already been debated between them. The disputants failed, as before, to come to any satisfactory conclusion. Cæsar persisted in his previous demands with the firmness of a Roman emperor, representing the fixed resolution of the government of which he was merely the agent. Ariovistus had nothing but his own will, his own views and policy to appeal to: though moderate and even respectful in manner, he had no less confidence and constancy than his rival. Each party urged his own right to make conquests over the Gauls. The German, indeed, admitted the equal claims of both, while the Roman contended that the priority of his own country's relations with Gaul gave it the right of excluding all competitors from the ground. The conference, it is related, was interrupted by the impatience of the German horse, who suddenly assailed the Romans with stones and arrows. Cæsar immediately withdrew, and prepared for more serious hostilities. A further attempt at negotiation failed through the inconstancy of the German chief, who invited the Roman general to a second conference, but treated as spies the envoys whom he sent in his stead, and threw them into chains.¹

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 46, 47. Cæsar seems anxious to represent the perfidy of the barbarian in the strongest colours, and does not fail to inform us that his envoys, C. Valerius Procillus and M. Mettius, were selected by him as having been guests of Ariovistus.

CHAP.
VI.Decisive
battle be-
tween the
Romans and
Germans.

The spot at which these occurrences took place lay in the centre between the two armies, which were twenty-four miles apart. Cæsar abstained from advancing, and formed a large entrenched camp to contain the whole of his forces, in expectation of an immediate attack from the Suevi, who manœuvred around him, and established their lines, at a distance of two miles, between him and Ventsio, from which place he drew his supplies. Finding the enemy disposed to defer the contest, it now became the wish of the Roman general to force him to a battle. He led his troops in front of the German position, and drew them up in battle array, but to no purpose. This operation he repeated several days in succession; still the Germans, generally so impetuous and so confident of victory, would neither attack him in his trenches nor meet him in the open field. It appeared from the account of some captives that this reserve was not the effect of the superior discipline introduced by Ariovistus, but arose from a motive of superstition. On such occasions, they reported, whether to fight or to refrain was determined by the decision of the women, whom the Germans were accustomed to regard with peculiar deference.¹ The women had consulted together, according to the prescribed forms of divination, and declared that their countrymen could not conquer if they engaged

¹ The superstitious veneration paid to women by the Germans is noticed by Tacitus (*Germ.* 8.): "Inesse sanctum quid et providum fœminis putant, nec aut consilia earum aspernantur, aut responsa negant." See also *Hist.* iv. 61. Strabo makes the same remark of the Cimbri (vii. 2.). Dion (xxxviii. 48.) follows Cæsar.

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before the new moon.¹ Having ascertained the cause of the enemy's inactivity, Cæsar took advantage of it to make a movement by which he out-flanked them, and then entrenched a second camp in the rear of their position, thereby re-establishing his communications. He was now in a situation to compel them to fight, and at last, after one or two indecisive skirmishes, was gratified by seeing the whole German host issue from its camp into the plain, and there spread itself in barbarian array, tribe by tribe, the women and children in the rear, intermingled with the vast assemblage of waggons, with which it seemed anxious to cut off the possibility of flight. It formed in a huge phalanx, the men raising their shields, after the manner of the Helvetii, like an enormous coat of mail, over their heads. The Romans discharged their piles, and rushed headlong upon the unwieldy mass, each man marking his own object and making directly for it. Unable to break the compact lines of the enemy, they leapt upon them, and, tearing up the serried shields, pierced their half-stifled bearers from above; a desperate mode of attack, to which little resistance could be offered, but exposing to inevitable death the assailant who should fall into the midst. The right wing of the Germans was at last broken and scattered in flight; but the left resisted, and, swaying slowly this way and that, overpowered the forces confronted with it. The third line or reserve of the Romans was then brought into the field, and at last the Germans were thoroughly routed on every

¹ Tac. *Germ.* 11.

side. The fugitives burst through the barrier of waggons in their rear, and fled precipitately towards the Rhine. The distance was only five miles¹, and the pursuit was not slackened to the very brink of the river. Ariovistus succeeded in crossing by means of a boat: not many of his followers were equally fortunate. Some swam across, but a far greater number was slain by the indefatigable fury of the victors. The fate of the women was perhaps not less bloody. Two wives of the German king perished²; of their daughters one was slain, another captured. The Roman general was well pleased to recover Procillus, the bearer of the late flag of truce, whose guards were overtaken while dragging him along in their flight. Three times, he related, had lots been drawn in his presence, to decide whether he should be burnt at once in sacrifice, or reserved for a future occa-

¹ The manuscripts of Cæsar read *quinque*, which agrees with the old Greek translation, τεσσαράκοντα στάδια. But Plutarch makes the distance four hundred stadia, or fifty miles. The context gives little assistance towards determining between these accounts. We only know that Cæsar marched seven days after leaving Besançon, and made a circuit of fifty miles. The distance of Besançon from the Rhine, in a direct line, is about eighty miles. Adopting the reading of our text, the field of battle would probably lie between Bâsle and Muhlhausen.

² "Utræque perierant," Cæs., whom Orosius recklessly contradicts, saying: "duæ captæ sunt." It would not be worth while to mention this discrepancy, but to point out, once for all, the extreme carelessness of many of the later writers in going over Cæsar's ground, although they must have had his commentaries in their hands. The only work which could have come into competition with his, for the author's means of personal knowledge, was the history of his own times by Asinius Pollio, but we are not informed whether that writer entered into the details of the Gaulish campaigns. About plurality of wives among the Germans, comp. Tac. *Germ.* 18.

CHAP.
VIGaul delivered from
the Suevi.

sion; each time he had owed his life to the chance of sortilege.¹

The Suevi who, as before mentioned, had arrived on the banks of the Rhine, and were preparing to cross into Gaul, and partake in the flourishing fortunes of their countrymen, were struck with consternation at the apparition of the flying king and his routed horde. They had no further appetite for aggression, and would gladly have returned in safety to their homes. But the Ubii², whose hostility they had provoked on their march, turned upon them, and made great slaughter in their ranks. The soil of Gaul was thus delivered from the German invaders, and its security in that quarter seemed at least for a time to be sufficiently assured.³ The proconsul led his troops into winter quarters among the Sequani, where he left Labienus in command. Having accomplished both his immediate objects in two campaigns and a single season, he retired for the winter into the Hither Gaul, and convened the annual assembly of that province.⁴

Composi-
tion of
Cæsar's
legions.

When Cæsar entered the Transalpine province he found, as we have seen, no more than a single legion observing the frontiers. The colonies of the republic were defended by a provincial militia,

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 53.

² The Ubii, better known in later times as a Cisrhenane people, dwelt at this period beyond the Rhine, to the south of the Sigambri, probably on the Mayn and Lahn, surrounded by the Suevi. Comp. Zeuss, *die Deutschen*, &c., p. 87.

³ It seems that Ariovistus died shortly afterwards. Comp. *B. G.* v. 29.: "Magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem."

⁴ Cæs. *B. G.* i. 54.

forming not separate legions, but a number of cohorts attached to the regular Roman force.¹ The rapidity of communication by means of the great roads, by which it was the policy of the Romans to bind together every important position, may have enabled them to dispense with keeping stationary garrisons in all the principal towns. The full complement of the legion amounted to six thousand infantry. For its complete equipment it required also a body of three hundred horse: but the cavalry which Cæsar employed throughout his Gallic campaigns was almost entirely Gaulish.² This compact body was attended into the field by auxiliary forces composed of the allies or subjects of the republic, not levied from the neighbouring states only, but drawn also from more distant possessions. Cæsar brought into the field javelinmen from Numidia, bowmen from Crete, and slingers from the Balearic isles.³ Besides the legion already stationed in the province, the state furnished the proconsul with three more; and these he summoned from Aquileia to join in the pursuit of the Helvetii. But, not satisfied with the number prescribed him by the decrees of

¹ It appears from the inscription of a coin (*Thes. Goltz.* p. 237.) that the colony of Arausio (Orange) was founded by the thirty-third cohort of the second legion. See Harduin. *ad Plin. H. N.* iii. 4.

² Spanish cavalry are mentioned *B. G.* v. 26. It is probable also that Cæsar had some Numidian squadrons (ii. 7.). Guischard, *Mém. Milit.* iii. 37.

³ *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 7. The Numidian light infantry used darts four feet in length. Polyb. i. 74.; Appian. *Hisp.* 25., *Pun.* ii. 71.

“Æquaturusque sagittas

Medorum tremulum cum torsit missile Mazax.” — *Luc.* iv. 680.

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VI.

the senate and people¹, he undertook to raise two others in addition at his own charge², though he afterwards contrived to make the state maintain them. Nor, when the magnitude of his operations required fresh succours, did he restrict himself even to this number. In the second year of the war we shall see him enter the country of the Nervii with eight legions³, and provide himself with at least three more at a later period, to occupy a more extended field of enterprize.⁴

Military
reputation
acquired by
his troops.

These troops, composed partly of veterans, but principally of new conscripts, were soon inured to equal discipline and bravery, and vied with each other in feats of prowess and devotion to their commander. Their great leader was not insensible how much he owed to their faithful services. No general was ever more lavish of his praises than he who recorded his soldiers' achievements in his own imperishable commentaries on the Gallic war. Distinguished as they all were in turn, there was one legion, the tenth, on which, as we have seen, he looked with peculiar confidence, and which he exalted by his encomiums to unrivalled celebrity in military annals. And as with his soldiers, so was it also with his officers. Cæsar betrayed no jealousy of the merits of Labienus, the foremost of that renowned band of warriors. Nor

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 14., *Pomp.* 48., *Cat. Min.* 33.; Dion. xxxviii. 41.

² Suet. *Jul.* 24.

³ *Cæs. B. G.* ii. 23.

⁴ *Cæs. B. G.* vi. 32. These included one which Cæsar borrowed of Pompeius in the year 700, and again restored to him, on his demand, four years afterwards. *Cæs. B. G.* vi. 1., viii. 54.; Appian. *B. C.* ii. 29.; Dion. xl. 65.

had he any occasion to fear the rivalry even of the best of the captains he had formed in his own school; for Labienus, who had acquired immortal laurels in Gaul, as second to the proconsul, failed no less signally when he deserted to the side of Pompeius, and arrayed himself against his former leader. The proconsul carried with him Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, and Publius, the son of the triumvir Crassus: both of them became good officers under his eye. Cotta and Sabinus, Trebonius and Decimus Brutus obtained celebrity under the same auspices. The two former were cut off by the sudden attack of an overwhelming enemy; the two latter survived to conspire against their generous commander, the founder of their fame and fortunes.¹

¹ Guischard (*Mém. Milit.* iii. 46.) gives a complete list of Cæsar's officers, as far as they are known to us: T. Labienus, P. Considius, Q. Pedius, Q. Titurius Sabinus, L. Aurunculeius Cotta, Servius Galba, Decimus Brutus, P. Sulpicius Rufus, Q. Atrius, C. Trebonius, C. Fabius, Q. Cicero, L. Roscius, L. Munatius Plancus, L. Silanus, C. Antistius Regulus, T. Sextius, C. Volcatius Tullus, L. Minucius Basilus, L. Cæsar, M. Antonius, Caninius Rebilus, M. Sempronius Rutilus, Q. Calenus, and P. Vatinius. Most of these personages became distinguished in various ways in the eventful years which followed upon the wars of Gaul.

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CÆSAR'S SECOND CAMPAIGN IN GAUL, A.U. 697.—WAR WITH THE BELGIANS.—REDUCTION OF THE SUESSIONES AND BELLOVACI.—GALLANT RESISTANCE OF THE NERVII.—GENERAL SUBMISSION OF THE BELGIAN TRIBES, AND OF THE NORTH-WESTERN STATES OF GAUL.—UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN OF GALBA IN THE ALPS.—CÆSAR'S THIRD CAMPAIGN, A.U. 698.—REDUCTION OF THE VENETI AND ARMORICAN TRIBES.—P. CRASSUS CONQUERS THE AQUITANIANS.—CÆSAR CHASTISES THE MENAPII AND MORINI.—PACIFICATION OF GAUL.

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Review of
the state of
Gaul.

THE state of affairs in Gaul had undergone considerable change during the few months which Cæsar had occupied in its defence. Two formidable hordes of invaders had been defeated and expelled, and the power of the Germans, which had threatened the country with permanent subjugation, was so effectually broken, that the frontier tribes of Gaul might hope again to see the day when they should push their incursions across the Rhine, instead of being the prey of adventurers from beyond it. But in the place of these two enemies the Gauls had introduced far into the interior of their country a power which, under the name of a friend and ally, already threatened to reduce them not less completely to servitude. When Cæsar crossed the Alps for the winter he quartered his troops, not within the limits of the Roman province, but in the territory of the Sequani. What was the meaning of this innovation? Was there any possibility of

Ariovistus returning after his signal defeat with another horde of Suevi to recover his Gallic possessions? or were the Sequani, weakened as they were now by the oppression of the Germans, exposed so helplessly to the hatred of the Ædui as to require a Roman garrison for their protection? It would appear that the proconsul already anticipated the aggressive movement which was about to take place among the Belgian tribes. The Sequani he knew had fallen for ever from that high estimation among the Gauls, in virtue of which they had been allowed to assume the pre-eminence heretofore occupied by the Arverni. Not only their political weakness, but the remembrance also of their treachery in inviting the Germans across the Rhine, disgusted the petty states which had formerly served them as clients. Of these some now betook themselves to the Ædui with the offer of allegiance; others, not forgetting the tyranny of that nation during its prosperity, and suspicious of a people who piqued themselves on their intimacy with the Romans, looked out for some other patron. The Remi were the most powerful of the Belgian tribes. They envied the position to which the chief states of Southern Gaul had attained as leaders of numerous confederacies, and rejoiced in succeeding to a part at least of the influence lately enjoyed by the Sequani.¹ They also were in turn distrusted by the other Belgic states, which has-

¹ Cæsar (*B. G.* vi. 12.), speaking of this period, says: "Eo tum statu res erat, ut longe principes haberentur Ædui, secundum locum dignitatis Remi obtinerent."

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The Romans establish their influence over the Sequani.

tened to form an alliance among themselves, while the Remi haughtily kept aloof.

In the meanwhile the Romans, on their part, were improving the advantages they had secured. The establishment of their winter quarters among the Sequani gave them paramount influence over that broken and dejected people. They restored the hostages of whose retention the Ædui so bitterly complained; but in return they surrounded their camps and councils with Roman spies and agents, and contrived to get into their own hands the real direction of their affairs. The blandishments of Italian civilization were found efficient in reconciling the proudest of the Gauls to the universal yoke. Divitiacus, the gentle victim of Southern luxury, was a useful instrument in the conquerors' hands; while the restless intrigues of his brother Dumnorix awakened no response in the breasts of a people already dreaming of a new career of supremacy under Roman patronage.

Confederacy of the Belgian tribes against the invaders.

While the Ædui were thus familiarizing themselves with these silken fetters, the Remi also were not unwilling to bend before the influence of Rome, with the hope of consolidating their power. But the other Belgian tribes, unbroken as yet by war and uncorrupted by artifice, united themselves under the lead of the Suessiones, and rose in arms against the intruders.¹ The rumour of their intended outbreak reached Cæsar before it had actu-

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 4. and foll. Under the sway of a chieftain named Divitiacus, the Suessiones had recently become the most flourishing and powerful of the Belgian states, and had extended their sovereignty over a part of Britain.

ally burst forth. He hastened to raise two new legions, and hurried back from Italy to the scene of danger. The Belgians had met together in a general conference; the Suessiones, the Nervii, the Bellovaci, the Atrebates, the Ambiani, the Morini, the Menapii, the Caletes, the Velocasses, the Veromandui, all the nations from the mouth of the Meuse to that of the Seine, together with those of the interior¹: to these were added the tribes of German descent; the Eburones, Condrusi, Cæresi, and Pæmani², all joined in this mighty coalition, and the armies it brought into the field numbered altogether two hundred and ninety thousand men. The Remi alone refused to league themselves in the common cause³, and attempted in vain to sow dissension among the confederates. Accordingly, upon them the whole weight of the Belgian forces was in the first instance directed. They appealed to the proconsul for protection, and offered to place themselves entirely at his disposal. They sent him hostages, and proposed to open their fortresses to his soldiers. Cæsar embraced their offer with alacrity, promised them the protection of the republic, and at the same time took measures to secure their entire dependence for the future. The Roman forces were immediately put

¹ These names are identified with the following modern places and districts respectively, Soissons, Hainault, Beauvais, Artois, Amiens, the coast of the Pas du Calais and West Flanders, East Flanders, Pays de Caux in Normandy, the Vexin, the Vermandois.

² Brabant, Liege, and Limburg.

³ The Remi were a powerful people, and occupied probably a great part of the three departments of Aisne, Marne, and Ardennes. Bibracte (Bièvre) is sometimes mentioned as their capital, and sometimes Durocortorum (Rheims).

in motion to succour the suppliant state. Meanwhile, the Ædui showed their usual want of good faith or of energy; the assistance demanded of them was tardily and reluctantly supplied. Divitiacus, still attending upon Cæsar, and still entranced in admiration of him, hastened to persuade his countrymen to adopt more active measures. The legions advanced to the banks of the Axona (Aisne) which they crossed, and then awaited in an entrenched camp the expected attack of the Gallo-Germans.

Commence-
ment of the
war:

Cæsar's
second cam-
paign.

A. U. 697.

B. C. 57.

Bibrax, or Bibracte, the capital of the Remi, eight miles distant from the Roman encampment, was at this moment assailed by the confederates. Their mode of attack was to clear the ramparts by a constant discharge of stones and arrows, and to advance parties of sappers to their foot under the cover of a storm of missiles, their shields firmly compacted over their heads. Their progress was slow, but its success seemed certain. The defenders were exhausted with wounds and fatigue. At last their leaders found means of communicating with the Roman general. They represented that they were not in a condition to hold out longer; unless prompt assistance arrived the place was lost. Cæsar hastily despatched some cavalry and light troops, which penetrated the loose array of the blockading forces, and were received within the walls. The Belgians, disappointed at the escape of their prey, had not the firmness to recommence their frustrated work: after spending a few days in ravaging the neighbourhood, they broke up from their lines and advanced towards

the Roman position. Cæsar's eagle eye measured from a distance the extent of their encampment by the smoke by day and the fires at night, and estimated its length at not less than eight miles.

The Belgians attack Cæsar's position on the Aisne,

The numbers of the enemy and their reputation for superior prowess made Cæsar pause before he ventured to give them battle. The result of a few cavalry skirmishes reassured him, and he resolved to challenge the Belgians to a general engagement. The confederates, nothing loth, issued from their camp as soon as they saw the Romans before them, and prepared to receive the shock. The proconsul's camp was placed on the summit of a gentle acclivity. In front the ground, as it verged towards the plain, was sufficient in space for the evolutions of the six legions which he brought at once into action. His rear reclined upon the river, and he communicated with the further bank by a bridge, the passage being guarded by an earthwork and a small detachment under Titurius Sabinus. The two fresh legions he kept, according to his general practice, as a reserve within his lines. But as his principal danger lay in the risk of being outflanked by superior numbers, he drew a trench from either side of the hill to a distance of four hundred paces, erecting works at each extremity, which he fortified with great care, and supplied with all his engines of defence. Thus advantageously posted, the Romans were sheltered moreover by a morass in their front, into which they hoped the enemy would impetuously plunge.¹

¹ Cæsar's position is said to have been a little below Pont-à-Vaire, on the Aisne, where a morass still exists in the direction which

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But the Gallo-Germans possessed prudence and caution no less than bravery, and rested on their arms, awaiting the onset of the Romans as invaders and aggressors. The cavalry engaged, and the Romans had the best of the encounter; but when he found that the Belgians could not be induced to charge, Cæsar withdrew his legions within his camp.

but are
defeated
with great
slaughter.

Thus unsuccessful in enticing the Romans from their vantage ground, the Belgians changed their plan. By a lateral movement they reached the banks of the river at a place where the stream was fordable, with the intention of crossing it, and thus throwing themselves upon the enemy's rear. As soon, however, as the detachment at the bridge head observed this demonstration, they apprized the general, and he immediately despatched his horse and light troops to prevent its taking effect. These squadrons, crossing the river by the bridge, reached the ford before the Belgians had made good their passage, and attacked them with their missiles while yet struggling in the middle of the stream. A party which had already gained the opposite side was surrounded and cut to pieces by the cavalry. The attempt, though persisted in with obstinate bravery, completely failed, and the Belgians were forced to betake themselves again to their former quarters. The country which they had ravaged began now to fail in supplies; while at

he indicates. A camp placed here would be distant 14,000 toises from Rheims, 22,000 from Soissons, 16,000 from Laon, and 8,000 from Bièvre, which is supposed to have been Bibracte of the Remi. *Précis des Guerres de Cæsar*, p. 44.; Mannert, ii. 207.

the same time they heard that Divitiacus, having collected the Æduan forces, had entered their confines, and was carrying fire and sword to their own homes. The confederates, ill-assorted and undisciplined, flew each to the defence of his own. The confusion which attended upon this hasty break-up, was reported to Cæsar, and he darted upon the disorganized mass with the rapidity of lightning. The rear-guard, if such it might be called, made a brave resistance; but the Romans were invincible in their numbers and their skill, and the day was spent in merciless carnage rather than conflict.

On the morrow the conqueror pushed his success further.¹ He marched upon Noviodunum, the principal stronghold of the Suessiones. Having failed in taking it by the first sudden assault, he constructed the movable towers which the Romans used in their regular sieges, advancing them filled with combatants to the ramparts, and carrying on from them a war of missiles, under cover of which the walls were either mined or shattered by the battering-ram. These engines were hitherto unknown to the Gauls, and they soon found them to be much more efficient than their own rude operations. They hastened to anticipate the vengeance of the conqueror by timely capitulation. The lives of the garrison and inhabitants were assured to them at the prayer of the Remi; but Cæsar insisted upon the surrender of their arms, together with the persons of the principal citizens and of

Reduction
of the Sues-
siones,

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 12. Noviodunum is said to be Soissons. D'Anville; Mannert. ii. i. 205.

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 and of the
Bellovaci.

the king's two sons. The nation was then received among the subjects of the republic.

Straightway the Bellovaci, into whose territory Cæsar immediately advanced, despairing of effectual resistance, courted the clemency of the invader. At the first rumour of his approach, the population had crowded into Bratuspantium, their principal fortress, with all the valuables they could remove. From hence they sent out a train of old men in the garb and attitude of suppliants. When the pro-consul advanced within sight of the walls, he found them crowned with multitudes of women and children, all stretching forth their hands towards him, and signifying by their gestures the extreme of fear and humiliation. Divitiacus also undertook to plead their cause. He urged the wishes of his own people for their pardon, declaring that they had formerly been faithful allies of the Ædui, and had only abandoned them at the instigation of a few evil-disposed individuals. The authors of the revolt had escaped into Britain, with which country the Bellovaci entertained close relations. The mass of the nation, being relieved from their presence, would, he doubted not, return to its duty, and thereby increase the reputation of the Ædui for influence with Rome and clemency towards their fellow-countrymen. Cæsar was not indisposed to allow his allies the credit of thus saving their ancient clients. He professed to be overcome by the prayers and arguments of Divitiacus; but, in consideration of the size and importance of this state¹, he demanded from it not fewer than six

¹ Cæs. B. G. ii. 4.: "Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et

hundred hostages. When he had received these, and had seized upon all the arms he could collect, he left the country, and entered that of the Ambiani, who made their submission and met with similar treatment.

Thus far the Belgians had done little to justify their reputation for superior valour. The force opposed to them was indeed overwhelming; but they had yielded almost without essaying their strength. But it was not so with the Nervii and their immediate allies, the Aduatuci, the Atrebatas, and Veromandui. The Nervii were peculiarly proud of their German descent, and affected to despise what they termed the effeminacy of their Gaulish neighbours. According to their ideas, the only security for maintaining their national bravery was the preservation of the barbarian character in all its unsophisticated rudeness.¹ Accordingly, they interdicted the introduction of foreign goods, prohibited the use of wine and other delicacies, and prided themselves on the coarseness of their mode of life. They bitterly taunted the Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani with their cowardly submission, declared their resolution to maintain the struggle with their own unassisted resources, and challenged the Roman general to follow them into their fastnesses. Contemptuously rejecting the defences, clumsy as they were, which their Gaulish neighbours adopted, they erected no walled fort-

The Nervii
and some
other tribes
still hold
out.

auctoritate et hominum numero valere." They boasted that they could bring an hundred thousand warriors into the field.

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.* ii. 15.

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resses¹; their dwellings were merely open villages; their places of strength the woods and marshes in which their country abounded. They sheltered their families in the impregnable islands which obstruct the outlets of the Scheldt and Meuse, while the whole flower of the nation and its allies, excepting the Aduatuci, who had not yet arrived, took up their position behind the Sabis (Sambre), in the direction in which the enemy was expected to advance.² The Roman general was not less anxious to meet them, marching as he was at the head of one of the finest armies that had ever taken the field, consisting of eight legions, all full of confidence in his good fortunes and their own valour. He was attended also by many of the Belgian chieftains, who wished to make a display of zeal in his cause, while in reality they were watching the first opportunity of harming him.

¹ Cæsar describes (ii. 17.) the peculiar mode which the Nervians adopted for impeding the progress of cavalry, by forming hedges of thorns, brushwood, and the twisted branches of trees.

² What this direction was it is impossible to ascertain with precision. Cæsar marched from Amiens; but the Nervii had no capital city for him to strike at. He would therefore seek out their army wherever it might be posted. He says that he marched three days through the Nervian territories. If this is to be interpreted strictly, it would lead him between the Scheldt and the Sambre, on the right bank of the one and the left of the other. If the Nervii placed themselves on the right bank of the Sambre, they would have abandoned their country to him entirely, nor would the barrier of the Scheldt have prevented his ravaging at least one half of it. If he directed his line of march through the country of the Veromandui, the Nervii might have defended the access to their territories by placing themselves on the left bank of the Sambre, near Maubeuge; or if he crossed the country of the Atrebatæ, he might propose to force the passage of the Scheldt at Condè or Valenciennes. The critics have generally supposed the second of these courses to be that which he adopted.

Some of them gave secret notice to Bodugnatus, the Nervian chieftain, that the order of the advance was such that the army might be attacked with great advantage. Each legion marched separately, followed by its long train of baggage and military engines. If the head of this winding column were boldly assailed, it might be cut off before effectual assistance could be rendered from the ranks behind. But the Belgians had not fought against the Romans long enough to understand their tactics. As soon as Cæsar learnt that he was approaching the enemy, he altered the disposition of his troops.¹ Six legions now advanced in front, next followed the whole of their collected baggage, under the escort of the two legions of recent levies, who formed the rear guard on the march and the reserve on the day of battle. He selected for the site of his encampment a hill descending with a gentle slope to the river Sabis. As fast as the legions arrived on the ground they were employed in throwing up their earthworks for the night's shelter. The cavalry were despatched to clear the banks of the stream of some bodies of the enemy's horse, that the troops might enjoy their watering-places unmolested. The Belgian skirmishers hereupon retreated up the opposite hill into the wood which crowned it, where their main body had already established itself under shelter and unperceived by the Romans.

While the legionaries were busily employed upon their works, the train of baggage began to gain the summit of the hill. This was the appointed signal

The Nervii
surprise
Cæsar's
position,

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 19.

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for the Nervii to burst from their concealment in the wood. They had long waited for it, and great had been their disappointment as they saw legion after legion take up its ground before its arrival. But they were not discouraged when they found that the whole Roman army stood before them. The suddenness of their appearance, and the rapidity of their charge, gave them a great advantage. Cæsar was taken by surprise; it was impossible to issue at once all the orders requisite for the disposition of so large a force. All his quickness and presence of mind would have been unavailing, had the Romans been less thoroughly practised in the kind of warfare, and less trained to act for themselves in cases of emergency. Each man seemed to know, as if by instinct, what it was his part to do, and where to betake himself. The standard-bearers flew to their ensigns planted in the ground; the men flocked around them; line and battalion formed spontaneously. Though many had not time to seize their helmets, or draw off the leathern coverings from their shields, though some of the standards were yet furled, and the hedges with which the country had been obstructed prevented some divisions from seeing the movements of the others, yet in a few minutes the whole scattered multitude was disposed in all the intricate order of Roman battle-array. Meanwhile, the charge of the Nervii had swept off the squadrons of Gaulish horse, together with the light skirmishers who had crossed the stream, hurling them back upon the right wing of the Romans, in which were the twelfth and

seventh legions. On the left the ninth and tenth met the attack of the Atrebates, and, aided by the superiority of ground, repulsed their wearied and breathless assailants. The Atrebates, thus beaten from the brow of the hill, recrossed the river in confusion, losing many in its waters, the Romans pursuing them, and compelling them to renew the combat on the other side. At the same time the Roman centre, consisting of the eighth and eleventh legions, sustained the charge of the Veromandui, and confined their assailants to the strip of level ground between the acclivity in front and the river, which they had tumultuously crossed, in their rear.

The conflict was thus raging in every quarter with no decided success on either side, when a movement of the Nervii on the right suddenly changed the face of affairs. Their numbers were such as to enable them to keep the Romans in check with a part only of their forces, while another division turned their flank, and rushed furiously up the hill on which the encampment was marked out. On the summit of this acclivity the cavalry, which had been repulsed from the other side of the river, had taken breath and formed again; but the sight of the Nervii revived their former panic, and they fled a second time without a blow. Meanwhile, the sutlers and occupants of the camp, which the reserve had not yet reached, had followed the left wing in the hope of sharing in the plunder of the Atrebates, whose confusion on the first attack had appeared irrecoverable. When they now turned their heads and beheld the Nervii in possession of

and carry
his camp
by storm.

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their works, they cried that all was over, and dispersed in every direction. At the same moment the cavalry which the Treviri had sent to Cæsar's assistance, glad to believe the battle lost, left the field with precipitation, and spread far and wide the welcome news, that the Roman camp was taken, and the army totally routed.

Imminent
danger of
the Roman
army.

Cæsar had been himself engaged on the left wing; one moment yet remained to confirm the flagging resolution of the legions on the right, and a glance revealed to him at the critical instant the imminence of his peril. He threw himself immediately into the post of danger. He found the twelfth legion almost surrounded, and the men huddling together about their ensigns, the centurions and standard-bearers for the most part slain, despair beginning to prevail among the survivors, and fugitives escaping in numbers from the ranks. The Nervii meanwhile were concentrating their forces all around them, and pressing the attack with inexhaustible energy. In this extremity the personal exertions of the general decided the fortune of the day. He knew that the reserve was pressing eagerly forward to his succour; but to maintain his position and prevent premature dispersion it was necessary to gain more room for his men to use their arms, and to execute the manœuvre of turning the two legions back to back. Cæsar, indeed, well knew his duty as a general to abstain from personal exposure in combat; but on such an occasion as this he could throw off all restraint, and fight in the first rank with the mean-

Cæsar
fights in
the ranks.

est of the soldiery. When his men saw him thus measuring himself with the enemy hand to hand, armed with a buckler which he had snatched from a soldier of the hindmost rank¹; when they heard him encouraging their centurions by name, and acquitting himself among them as their equal and fellow, every hand was nerved with new vigour, every order he could utter was obeyed with ardour or anticipated by instinct, and a few minutes sufficed to clear a space in which the two legions could spread their ranks and place themselves in a position for mutual support and defence.²

Thus arrayed the Romans were able to maintain themselves, at least for a time, against the numbers and energy of their assailants. The Nervii made little use of distant missiles: they trusted to their great strength and stature, and were eager to close with an enemy to whom they held themselves personally superior. But the cool intrepidity of the sturdy legionary, together with his thorough command of his cut and thrust sword of unfailing temper, was more than a match, man to man, for the German with his ponderous falchion, which embarrassed the slow and heavy movements of its bearer. The agile Roman, looking over the rim of

The Roman army is rescued by the arrival of the reserve.

¹ Compare the conduct of Marius in the battle with the Teutones. Plut. *Mar.* 20.

² Compare Suet. *Jul.* 62.: "Inclinatam aciem solus sæpe restituit, obsistens fugientibus retinensque singulos, et contortis faucibus convertens in hostem: et quidem adeo plerumque trepidos, ut aquilifero moranti se cuspidē sit comminatus, alius in manu retinentis reliquerit signum." Also Lucan. vii. 576.:

"Promovet ipse acies, impellit terga suorum,
Verbere conversæ cessantes excitat hastæ."

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his shield, held close to his breast, attracted the eye of his gigantic foe, while he pierced his belly from below; and as long as he had room to use his weapons, his activity and skill in fence made him almost invulnerable. At length the reserve made its appearance on the brow of the hill, and, at the same moment, Labienus, on the left wing, having driven the Atrebatas to the summit of the German position, and even occupied their camp, perceived from above the distress of his general, and detached the tenth legion to his assistance. A strong reinforcement of troops, some fresh and the others victorious, now poured exultingly upon the rear and flanks of the Nervii. The fugitives reappeared in the field, and proved by renewed exertions their anxiety to efface the stain of their defection. The wounded and the dying collected their failing energies to raise themselves on their shields and hurl their arms at the enemy. Courage and confidence everywhere revived, and the victory of the Romans became at last assured. Nevertheless, the resolution of the Nervii remained indomitable to the last. They were celebrated as the bravest of the Belgians, themselves the bravest of the Gauls, and never did they better sustain their character than on that fatal day. Their eulogy is preserved in the written testimony of their conqueror; and the Romans long remembered, and never failed to signalize, their formidable valour.¹

The Nervii
are routed,

But this recollection of their ancient prowess

¹ The authorities for the account of this great battle are: — Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 19—27.; Liv. *Epit.* civ.; Plut. *Cæs.* 20.; Flor. iii. 10.; Dion. xxxix. 3.; Oros. vi. 7.

became from that day the principal monument of their name and history, for the defeat they now sustained almost annihilated the nation. Their combatants were cut off almost to a man. The elders and the women, who had been left in secure retreats, came forth of their own accord to solicit the conqueror's clemency, and enumerated the losses of their tribe. "Of six hundred senators," they said, "we have lost all but three; of sixty thousand fighting men five hundred only remain." Cæsar treated the survivors with compassion, allowed them the free use of their territories, and promised to shelter the scanty remnant from the malice of the neighbouring tribes.

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and their
nation al-
most de-
stroyed.

The narrative of Cæsar, which forms so clear and interesting a guide through the whole course of his policy and tactics in Gaul, is in general so concise, and enters so little into technical details, as to foil the military critics who profess to study in it the art of war. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to persuade ourselves that in this celebrated battle, in which he ran such imminent risk of destruction, he was not completely taken by surprise, and had failed to adopt the precautions of a consummate captain. He had sent forward his scouts in the early part of the day; and it was from some deserters perhaps from his advanced parties that the Belgians had ascertained the spot where he proposed to form his encampment for the night.¹ When he arrived on the ground he intended to take up, he still pushed cavalry and light infantry in front to clear the country before him; but these

Observa-
tions of mi-
litary critics
on Cæsar's
conduct.

¹ Cæs. B. C. ii. 17.]

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were so little in advance of him, or performed their service so negligently, as to allow a wood, apparently only a few bowshots from his lines, to conceal the whole force of the enemy assembled immediately behind it. At the same moment he allowed his troops to pile their arms and proceed to the work of raising their entrenchments as if in perfect security. If he could not trust his Gaulish cavalry out of his sight, he should at least have taken the precaution of keeping a large portion of his forces under arms to protect the others while laying out the camp. This from his own account he would appear to have neglected, and to have trusted partly to his belief that the enemy was still at a distance, and partly perhaps to the natural defence of the river, though he admits that the stream was only three feet in depth. The rapidity of the barbarian onset was probably greater than he had anticipated; but it may be conjectured that he exaggerates the confusion in which his own forces were found, and that at least the legions of Labienus, on the left, were not unprepared for the possibility of an attack.¹

Reduction
of the
Aduatuci.

The remainder of the Belgian forces effected their escape during the protracted resistance of the Nervii, and betook themselves to their several homes, each hoping that his own turn of retribution might come the last. The Aduatuci, who had not actually borne a share in the battle, were the first upon whom the Romans threw themselves.² Their forces were in full march to join the combined

¹ Précis des Guerres de César, p. 45.

² Cæs. B. G. ii. 29—32.

armies of their countrymen when they learnt the news of the day's disaster. But they relied on the strength of their chief position, and defied the victors to a trial of arms. Deserting every village and open place, they collected the whole of their population, together with all their movables, in one spot, the flat summit of a rocky eminence, defended on three sides by a natural escarpment, and on the fourth by a double rampart on the brow of a gentle declivity.¹ This tribe were the descendants of the garrison which the Cimbri had left in that part of the country in charge of their hoarded spoils before they set out on their fatal expedition to Italy.² They had increased from a body of six thousand warriors to a population of ten times that number, of whom nineteen thousand were counted as combatants. Despising the quailing and unresisting tribes which lay between, Cæsar made directly for the entrenchment of these bolder enemies. He quietly constructed his engines of assault and his towers, with the use of which most of the Belgians were still unacquainted. The besieged collected on their walls, in the strength of which they were blindly confident, and inquired tauntingly, what was the purpose of these monstrous and cumbersome machines, and how a nation of dwarfs (for the small stature of the Italians was always a matter

¹ D'Anville discovers a spot which corresponds with this description in Falais; others identify it with Namur. Mannert (ii. i. 199.) makes the country of the Eburones extend from the Scheldt to the Meuse, and places their fortress in the neighbourhood of Maestricht; while Walckenaer shows that it is most probably Tongres (*G. des G.* ii. 286.).

² Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 29.

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of derision to the northern barbarians) should move them to the assault? The Romans made no reply, but finished their preparations, and applied their mechanical forces, till the towers were seen to nod above the summit of the Belgian ramparts. The besieged were panic-stricken, and declared that the gods themselves fought on the side of the invaders. They had now no other thought than how to make terms with their invincible enemy. They only entreated that, if required, as they expected, to deliver up their arms, they might be protected against their neighbours, so universal was the feeling of insecurity among the Gallic tribes, their jealousy of each other and sense of mutual injuries. This was, no doubt, the secret of the speedy dissolution of the formidable confederacy which the Belgians had formed at the beginning of the year. Cæsar gave the promise they desired, and demanded their arms. They threw down from their walls immense quantities of weapons and armour, till the heap equalled, it is said, the height of the rampart; but a gleam of hope had entered into their breasts, and they still reserved a considerable store which they concealed in a chosen spot. The Roman army was then admitted within the enclosure, and the place formally surrendered. Having thus obtained apparently his principal object, the proconsul was preparing to quit the country, and extend his incursions into other districts. He withdrew his troops from the fortress, and passed the night in his own camp. The Aduatuci seized their hidden weapons, and made a desperate sally upon the Roman entrenchments, which they expected to find

Their
treachery
severely
punished.

now less carefully guarded. But the vigilance of the general had not been lulled asleep. At the first approach of danger the soldiers were found at their posts, and after a furious encounter, prolonged by the conscious guilt and despair of the barbarians, the Romans were completely victorious. The next day Cæsar re-entered their stronghold without resistance, and vindicated the injured majesty of the republic by selling the whole remnant of the tribe as slaves. The remaining states now poured in offers of submission, which appear to have been accepted on easy terms. We must suppose that Cæsar exacted from them the surrender of their arms, together with sufficient pledges for their fidelity. But he abandoned to them the free possession of their lands and laws. He trusted to the gradual influence of Roman manners, to the counsels of the Roman emissaries whom he introduced among them, and to the weight of the mere name of the republic in directing the conduct of their political affairs, to familiarize them in no great length of time with a state of entire dependence.

General submission of the Belgian tribes.

It was probably not till after the great defeat of the Nervii, in which the whole of Cæsar's forces had been engaged, that he was enabled to detach a single legion, under the command of his young lieutenant P. Crassus, the son of the triumvir, to secure the tranquillity of the tribes inhabiting the coast of the British channel beyond the mouth of the Seine.¹ Among these were the Lexovii, the Unelli², the Curiosolitæ and the Osismii. On the

Cæsar sends P. Crassus to demand submission from the tribes in the north-west.

¹ Cæs. B. G. ii. 34.

² Unelli, mod. Côtentin : Osismii, dep. Finisterre : Curiosolitæ, mod.

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southern shore of Armorica dwelt the Veneti, the most formidable of all the nations which composed the western division of the Kymric population of Gaul. These, together with the Aulerci, Rhedones, Carnutes, Andi, and Turones, occupied the whole space between the lower Seine and the lower Loire, and were apparently closely united among themselves, while at the same time the traditional recollection of a common origin made them look not without feelings of sympathy upon the fate of the Belgians in the east. In the affairs of the south they took no interest, and seem to have had little acquaintance with the character of the foreign power which the Ædui had recently called into Gaul. The small force which Crassus led was sufficient to terrify them, one after another, into submission. The proconsul was satisfied perhaps with deterring them from giving aid to the Belgians, and considered the surrender of a few hostages into his hands as an ample acknowledgment of his superiority. The Carnutes, the Andi, and the Turones, whose countries formed the key of the whole region north of the Loire, were selected to bear the burden of provisioning the Roman army, which was quartered in their territories for the winter. Having thus secured the extensive acquisitions he had made in this successful campaign, Cæsar hastened himself to the Hither Gaul, as in

Cæsar retires to Italy for the winter.

Coursault, dep. Côtes du Nord : Veneti, mod. Vannes, dep. Morbihan. Lexovii is a conjectural reading for Sesuvii, an unknown name. They occupied a part of the coast of Calvados. The Aulerci belonged to Maine and the south of Normandy, the Rhedones to Rennes in Bretagne. Mannert. II. i. 149. &c.; comp. Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 9. 11. 17. 29.; vii. 75.

the autumn preceding.¹ He took up his residence at Lucca, at the extreme frontier of his province, where he put himself in communication with his friends at Rome, and held a brilliant court of clients and dependents. The senate, however hostile and jealously disposed, was dazzled by the brilliancy of his achievements, or unable to stem the torrent of popular acclamation. It decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days in honour of his victories, a duration exceeding that of any previous festival of the kind.

The campaigns which have been narrated in the preceding pages, signalized as they were by a rapid succession of hard-fought battles in the open field, suggest some remarks upon the nature of the warfare in which Cæsar and his veterans reaped their undying laurels. While the counsels of the Gauls were marred by manifold jealousies, and by their independent mode of carrying on the war, even after they had been brought into alliance, the Romans enjoyed the inestimable advantage of a single head to plan, and an army disciplined as a single hand to execute. The senate allowed their general uncontrolled power in the administration of his province, and the resources he could command were at all times sufficient to bring into action as many troops as he could supply or manœuvre. On the other hand, the personal qualities of the Gauls, their courage and bodily strength, were at least equal to those of their opponents; in size and stature they were individually superior, though wanting in that compactness of limb and power of endurance which at this time so eminently

Comparison
between the
Romans and
Gauls in a
military
point of
view.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* ii. 35.

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distinguished the natives of southern Europe.¹ As regarded the climate of the country in which the war was waged, neither side perhaps had any advantage over the other. The Gauls, indeed, fought on their own soil and under their own skies, colder in winter and more humid at all seasons than those south of the Alps. But the habits and discipline of the Roman soldier had hardened him against the exhalations of the marshes and the change or privation of food, no less than against the extremities of heat and cold. Throughout his Gallic campaigns Cæsar makes no allusion to the prevalence of sickness in his camps; and if it be true that his ranks too were recruited from the south of Gaul, yet it is worthy of remark, that the Roman legionary seems rarely to have suffered from those accidental causes of mortality which are more to be dreaded in modern warfare than the sword. Cæsar's troops quartered in the neighbourhood of Brundisium in the autumn of the year 705 suffered from the malaria of the Apulian coast, but these were composed, to a great extent, of recruits from the northern parts of Gaul.² How much of this immunity is to be attributed to his food, his habits, and his clothing, is a question which deserves more attention from the physiologist than

Physical
effects of
climate,
food, and
habits of
discipline.

¹ The composition of Cæsar's legions will be considered more particularly on a future occasion; his soldiers were for the most part Roman citizens of the Gallic provinces on either side of the Alps. These might be either of Roman or of Gaulish extraction. The contempt expressed by the Belgians for their diminutive stature is an additional proof of the great diversity of race among the inhabitants of different parts of Gaul.

² Comp. Plut. *Mar.* 26.

it seems to have obtained. The absence or rarity of ardent spirits is not sufficient to account for it, inasmuch as unusual or superabundant food is hardly less detrimental to the soldier than intoxication, and the barbarian armies which entered Italy frequently melted away through careless and indulgent living. But the natives of the North have been found less capable of enduring the rigour of a severe winter than men born in a more hospitable climate.¹ Reared in the centre of the temperate zone, the Italians shrunk from neither extreme of heat or cold. Vigorous in frame, and elastic in constitution, they bore the standards of the republic through Asia and Africa without sickening; while at this day the French are consumed by thousands in Algeria, and fevers decimate the British regiments in the East and West Indies.²

In the field the Gauls were almost destitute of tactics or artificial resources. But while firearms have furnished ingenuity and discipline with irresistible weapons, the barbarians before their invention were much more nearly matched with regular soldiery than in modern times. The numbers and weight of the Gaulish charge could hardly be resisted by the firmest battalions. It was usual to employ the cavalry to bear the first brunt of the encounter; but even these could

Roman
method of
fighting.

¹ It is a well-known remark that the Italian soldiers in Napoleon's Russian campaign suffered less from the cold than the Germans.

² The compliment which Claudian pays to the grandfather of Honorius might have been applied to themselves by many of the Roman legionaries:

"Ille Caledoniis posuit qui castra pruinis,

Qui medios Libyæ sub casside pertulit æstus."—Claud. viii. 26.

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seldom do more than slightly check and retard their impetuous rush. After exhausting his feeble missiles, the legionary could only fall back upon the hinder ranks for support. He was soon pressed into the closest array by the weight of accumulating masses, and when ordered to draw his sword, could no longer wield it with freedom. With modern infantry the closer their array the deadlier is the fire of their musketry, the steadier the advanced points of their bayonets. In such an emergency the long pike of the phalanx was a formidable protection to the Macedonian infantry; but that weapon was too cumbrous for general service, and never adopted by the active and independent Roman, who put all his trust in his sword. In such cases the general relied upon his light cavalry¹, whose sudden onset and no less rapid retreat confused and distracted the enemy, and constantly broke and shivered the masses with which he came to the charge. The great peril of the Romans in the battle with the Nervii arose from their cavalry being unable to rally after their first repulse, and so to relieve the legions from the increasing pressure of the Belgian infantry. Each Roman soldier required a space of three feet on each side of him for the free movement of his arms. But when room was cleared for a moment, the legion immediately extended its front again and separated its battalions. Then each man was

¹ There was, properly speaking, no distinction between heavy and light cavalry in the Roman armies (Guischard, *Mém. Mil.* iii. 42.), but the equipment of that service would bring it generally under the latter denomination, according to our notions.

able once more to ply his sword, singling out an adversary, getting within his guard¹, and carving his naked body with point or edge of the finest temper.

While the rank and file of the Roman legion were protected by plates of iron on the head, breast, and shoulders, the Gauls were but imperfectly furnished with defensive armour, and even this they frequently rejected with the reckless and ostentatious spirit of their nation.² Accordingly, when they encountered a foe who had firmness to withstand their first shock, they had little chance of coming off victorious from the combat of man with man. The obstinacy with which they fought, and the courage with which they maintained their ground, even when they had no opportunity of returning blow for blow, only served to swell the number of the victims. The great disproportion, indeed, between the numbers

Personal
inferiority
of the Ger-
mans.

Gauls

¹ Compare Polyb. ii. 33.: *Συνδραμόντες εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τοὺς μὲν Κελ-
τοὺς ἀπράκτους ἐποίησαν Ῥωμαῖοι, ἀφελόμενοι τὴν ἐκ διάρσεως αὐτῶν μάχην,
ὃ περ ἰδίον ἐστὶ Γαλατικῆς χρείας, διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς κέντημα τὸ ξίφος ἔχειν.*
Liv. xxii. 46.: "Gallis gladii prælongi et sine mucronibus." Comp.
Plut. *Mar.* 25.: *Μεγαλαῖς ἐχρῶντο καὶ βαρεῖαις μαχαίραις.*

² Thierry asserts that the Gauls long resisted the use of defensive armour as an unworthy innovation. I find no express authority for this statement; but Livy (xxii. 46., xxxviii. 21.) represents the Gauls as fighting naked, and stripping themselves for the combat. In the time of Louis XIV. it was necessary to issue repeated ordinances to prevent the French officers from throwing off their armour in the field. The motive, perhaps, in both cases was partly vaingloriousness and partly laziness. Probably the custom of wearing armour among the Gauls did not extend beyond the nobles. Their helmets, generally the skins of animals' heads, their corslets, chainmail, and the ornaments with which they covered themselves, are described by Diodor. Sic. v. 30.; Varro, *L. L.* iv.; Strabo and others. Compare Cluvier, *Germ. Ant.* i.

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slain in these battles on either side is an ordinary characteristic of ancient warfare. In modern engagements the greater part of the carnage is caused by the artillery, which may frequently be served with nearly equal precision and effect by both parties, until the superiority of one being ascertained, the day is decided by the general advance of its lines. There is no reason, therefore, to doubt that the victories of the Romans over the Gauls were gained in many cases with the trifling loss which the victors themselves acknowledged; at the same time it is evident that the dead of the enemy are generally estimated upon mere conjecture, without any attempt at actual enumeration.

Campaign
of Sergius
Galba in
the Valais.

When Cæsar left the Further Gaul for his Cisalpine province, he directed his lieutenant Sergius Galba to occupy the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, with the twelfth legion and a body of horse. This tract of country extended from the lake Lemanus to the highest chain of the Alps, comprehending the districts of Chablais, in Savoy, and the Valais, or valley of the upper Rhone. The position of the Seduni may still be traced in the name of Sitten, which was perhaps the site of their principal town. Octodurus, the capital of the Veragri, may have occupied the spot where stands the modern town of Martigny, for it was considered an important position for defending the Pennine pass, to secure which seems to have been the principal object of this expedition. We have seen that the ordinary route of the Roman armies into Gaul was that of

the Via Aurelia, by the sea coast, sufficiently direct as long as the connexions of the republic beyond the Alps were limited to the Province and the cities of the Mediterranean, but highly circuitous and inconvenient for operations in the more northern parts of Gaul. Cæsar had on one occasion hazarded the passage of the Cottian Alps, in order to reach Vienna with more expedition; but the experiment had served to prove the insecurity of such a route, and it was now his object to effect an easier and safer line of communication. The pass of the Great St. Bernard, the *Alpis Penina* of the Roman geographers, was already frequented for the purposes of traffic: the merchants, probably, bought off the hostility of the natives by the payment of blackmail. But the wild mountaineers were more jealous of the approach of the Roman armies to their solitary fastnesses, and were disposed to dispute with them every inch of their formidable gorges.

Galba seized upon Octodurus, which was divided into two parts, either by the Rhone or the little river Dranse. One quarter of the town he abandoned to the natives, but occupied the rest with his own forces, and proceeded to fortify it with a ditch and rampart. Thus securely posted, all he needed was provisions, and these he demanded of the natives by way of tribute. The valley in which the town lay was extremely narrow, and closely hemmed in by lofty and barren mountains, so as to produce very scanty supplies. Subsistence for an army could only be procured from a distance, and the people of the country paid little regard to the

He occupies
Octodurus,

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commands of an intruder whom they had scarcely seen. Two cohorts were despatched to forage, when the Gauls, taking courage from the reduced number of the garrison, assembled with all their forces on the neighbouring heights, and harassed it by repeated sallies from their fastnesses. They were the more inflamed against the invaders because many of their children had been exacted as hostages. They saw too that the pretence of opening the road was only a cover to ulterior designs, and that it was intended to retain their city in permanent occupation.

but is
obliged to
abandon it
and with-
draw his
troops from
the country.

The Roman general became seriously alarmed at these hostile demonstrations, for which he was unprepared. He had not yet collected sufficient stores to enable him to stand a siege, nor were his entrenchments completed. He called a council of war, in which many proposed to abandon the place at once, and cut their way, as they best might, through the multitudes augmenting around them. But the opinion prevailed that it was too soon yet to have recourse to such desperate measures; retreat should be reserved for the last extremity; art and discipline were meant to supply the place of efficient numbers and full preparation. This determination, however, only cost the Romans greater loss, for it was soon discovered that their defences were not sufficiently strong to make an effective resistance to the numbers and energy of the assailants, who kept up a constant and murderous discharge of missiles upon the garrison, while they filled the ditch with stones and faggots, and hacked at the palisades and earthworks with

pikes and axes. Many of the Romans had fallen, and the defence was beginning to waver, when Sextius Baculus and C. Volusenus, officers of approved courage, pressed in the strongest terms the necessity of retreating. Galba yielded to their demands, and the suddenness of his sally, together with the valour of his legionaries, as soon as they could grapple with the foe, sufficed to throw the Gauls into confusion and drive them to a distance. But Galba, considering that he had come into the country to take up winter-quarters, and not to fight, much straitened also by the scantiness of his supplies, determined to return at once into the Province, and setting fire to his camp, effected his retreat without opposition through the country of the Nantuates to the frontier of the Allobroges. Such is the excuse which Cæsar himself gave for the evident failure and discomfiture of his lieutenant.¹

Cæsar, indeed, magnifies the check which the barbarians received into a signal defeat², and enumerates it among the triumphs by which his arms had been crowned, and the Gaulish nations reduced to submission. This boasted pacification of Gaul gave him the opportunity of visiting Illyricum, the further extremity of the vast tract entrusted to his care. Whatever might have been his plans in that quarter, he had not leisure to carry them into effect. There was doubtless much room for military exploits among the fastnesses of that country, inhabited by a barbarous and turbu-

Disturbances in the north-west of Gaul.
A. U. 698,
B. C. 56.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 1—6.; Dion. xxxix. 5.; Oros. vi. 8.

² Orosius also declares that the Veragri lost thirty thousand men.

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lent population; but the wars of Gaul were the peace of Illyricum. In the midst of his fancied security there burst forth a wide-spread sedition throughout the lately subjugated tribes of Armorica, while the aspect of affairs in other parts of the country demanded his utmost vigilance and activity. P. Crassus was at the head of a legion quartered in the country of the Andi. Their territory was not capable of supplying him, and he despatched officers into the neighbouring districts to levy the requisite contributions. The Unelli¹, Curiosolitæ, and more especially the Veneti, the most powerful of the north-western tribes, were subjected to these demands. The last-named people were celebrated for their maritime power. They held many tribes of the coast in dependence, and presumed upon their skill and prowess in a mode of warfare in which they had never yet measured themselves with an equal. They seized the persons of Silius and Velarius, the Roman officers, threatening to retain them as guarantees for the hostages they had themselves surrendered to the proconsul. At their instigation, also, other tribes laid hands on Trebius and Tarasidius, two other commissioners from the Roman quarters. Having persuaded their clients and dependents to make common cause with them, they sent to P. Crassus, demanding the restoration of their hostages in exchange for the officers they had thus captured. Crassus himself was not strong enough to avenge this insult, but

The Veneti
seize some
Roman
officers.

¹ This reading is adopted by Mæbe from the Greek version of the commentaries and the editions of Aldus and Stephanus. Oudendorp reads Esubios, from the best MSS. : but no such a name is known.

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Cæsar prepares to attack them with a naval force.

Their maritime power, and extensive alliances.

Cæsar takes precautions to prevent the Belgians and Aquitanians joining the league.

he announced it to his general without delay. The proconsul hastened to the scene of action. He determined to attack the Veneti on their own element; for their fastnesses, defended by creeks and morasses, were hardly accessible from the land. With this view he immediately ordered the construction of a flotilla at the mouth of the Loire. The rowers of the Rhone and the Mediterranean were collected for this service in great numbers. He exhorted his legionaries to embark, and declaimed to them against the perfidy of the enemy, who had violated the law of nations in seizing the persons of his ambassadors, as he chose to designate the captive commissioners. The Veneti, on their part, made active preparations to meet the attack, and invoked the assistance of the whole seaboard from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Rhine. The nations were ready at their call: the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Namnetes¹, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, the Menapii, all joined the great maritime confederacy. And now for the first time the name of the Britanni appears in the records of Roman history, for the Veneti drew both ships and men from the opposite coast of the channel.²

The rapidity with which the flame of sedition spread through so many nations and such an extent of country convinced Cæsar how fallacious was his reliance on the submission which had followed upon his last campaign. It was necessary

¹ Namnetes, mod. Nantes; Ambiliati, mod. Lamballe, Mœbe in Cæs. Diablintes (Auleri), the north-west corner of Maine.

² Cæs. B. G. iii. 9.

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not only to face the enemy in arms, but to redouble his vigilance to check defection in other quarters.¹ He sent Labienus with some squadrons of cavalry into the country of the Treviri, the centre of the Belgian tribes, and the quarter in which the Germans might attempt to cross the Rhine. Crassus he deputed to prevent any junction between the Aquitanians and the insurgents. Titurius Sabinus, with three legions, was commissioned to cut off the communication between the eastern and western limbs of the confederacy, and check the progress of levies among the Lexovii, Unelli, and Curiosolitæ. Lastly, Decimus Brutus was appointed to the command of the great naval armament which was equipped partly from the newly-constructed vessels, and partly from the barks of the Pictones and Santones, the only coast-tribes whom the proconsul had been able to retain in subjection. This fleet received orders to steer for the shores of the Veneti, while Cæsar advanced at the head of a large army by land to the same point.

Mode of
warfare
adopted by
the Veneti.

The Veneti placed great reliance upon the character of their fortified positions. Their coasts were studded with promontories and peninsulas, which the tide daily severed from the main land², and upon these isolated projections their forts were generally erected. To such places it was hardly possible to lay regular siege. The Roman tactics required the advance of towers to the walls;

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 11.

² Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 12. The *heppan*, or stockades, of the New Zealanders are described as places of refuge on rocky points of the coast, and not as ordinary abodes.

and the recurring tides would either render their erection impossible, or speedily sweep their base-ments away. On the other hand, the command of the sea enabled the garrisons to supply themselves at pleasure with recruits and provisions. If, after all, the besiegers with extreme toil pushed moles of masonry across these arms of the sea, and, from mounds raised to the level of the walls, were preparing to pour themselves into the fortress, even then, at the last moment, the gallies of the Veneti might sweep up to the gates, and carry off in an instant the garrison and the booty. The tempestuous state of the weather, which kept the Romans to their anchorage through the greater part of the summer, enabled the Veneti to retain their naval superiority. They doubtless owed much to their possession of the ports and their knowledge of the coast, yet Cæsar seems to admit the inferiority of his own seamen in skill and boldness. The difference in the mode of shipbuilding, and in the naval tactics adopted by the parties respectively, seemed to balance the advantages on either side. The Veneti used vessels with flatter bottoms and higher sides than those of the Romans¹; they seem also to have built them of greater strength, as men who had ample experience of the winds and waves of the Atlantic. On the other hand, their sails were clumsy and made of skins; they scarcely availed themselves of oars, and their movements were much slower than those of their rivals. But when once the two came in

¹ Strabo (iv. 4.) follows Cæsar in his account of this people. See also Dion. xxxix. 40—43.

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collision, the Venetian vessel was so firmly compacted as to withstand the stroke of the Roman's beak, and its deck so high as to place its combatants on a ground of vantage.

The Romans gain a great naval victory.

The Romans succeeded indeed in capturing several fastnesses of the Veneti, but the whole tribe had taken to the water, and roamed freely from strand to strand. It was necessary to bring the campaign to an issue by a decisive trial of naval strength. The barbarians mustered not fewer than two hundred and twenty galleys, with which they sailed forth from the mouth of the Morbihan to meet the armament of Brutus.¹ The Roman admiral employed long poles armed with hooks to cut the sheets and shrouds of the enemy's vessels. Their ponderous sails soon brought the masts by the board, and they thus became unmanageable. Others were grappled and dragged out into the open sea, where they were exposed to the repeated shocks of the Roman rostra, impelled against them with all the force that oars could

¹ If the principal fortified place of the Veneti was the modern Vannes, it must be an exception to the choice they generally made of sites for their entrenchments. The local traditions assign the site of Cæsar's camp, from which he observed the seafight between Brutus and the Veneti (iii. 14), to a spot between the point of Quiberon and the promontory of Rhuys (Daru, *Hist. de Bretagne*, i. 38.), in which case it might be supposed that the city of that people was in the immediate neighbourhood. But an ingenious essay in the *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires*, ii. 325. (an 1820), seems to prove that the city in question lay at the bottom of the gulf of Morbihan. A N.E. wind would have been favourable both to the course of the Roman fleet from the mouth of the Loire and to that of the Veneti sallying from their capacious harbour to meet them. The calm which ensued in the middle of the day is said to be of regular occurrence in the summer after a N.E. wind in the morning. The combat took place probably off the town of Sarzeau.

impart. If still unpierced, they were quickly surrounded by several barks at once, when the lighter-armed and more agile Romans soon succeeded in boarding and capturing them. The Gauls, finding themselves unable to cope with these various modes of attack, took to flight and spread their sails to the wind. But a sudden calm deprived them even of this last resource. The Romans, moving lightly round the unwieldy and defenceless masses, assailed them one by one, and were prevented by nightfall alone from accomplishing their total destruction. The loss of the Veneti was overwhelming. Their whole naval force had been collected together. It bore the mass of their youth, their nobility, and their senate, who had hastily embarked to escape from the Roman army, already so near to their city as to witness the naval combat from the shore. The remnant hastened to make their submission; but they were not in a condition to demand terms, and Cæsar, who never shrank from severity when his interests required it, put the survivors of the senate to the sword, and sold the people into slavery; thus signalizing, according to the recognized usages of his time, his vengeance against an asserted breach of the law of nations.¹

Submission
and cruel
punish-
ment of the
Veneti.

The campaign of Sabinus against the Unelli and their neighbours affords us some insight into the state to which the late wars had reduced the north of Gaul. On the one hand, their dread of Cæsar and their opinion of his skill and fortune were such that the nobles and senate of some tribes would not ven-

The tribes
of Nor-
mandy
again sub-
dued.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 16.: "Quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris jus legatorum conservaretur."

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ture to second the popular cry for war.¹ The people rose upon their chiefs and massacred them. On the other, the country was filled with needy and desperate outlaws, men who had lost their all, or of fierce and untractable characters, ready to join or to urge any daring and sanguinary enterprize. These banditti flocked from various parts of Gaul to the standard of a people who had shown their audacity by the murder of their leaders. Lawlessness attracted lawlessness ; and the camp of the Unelli was filled with a crowd of blood-thirsty savages, confident in their own prowess, and disdainful of restraint and counsel. The cautious tactics of Sabinus, who refused, as an inferior officer, to commit the army entrusted to him to a general engagement without the express sanction of his commander, raised their hopes beyond measure. He calculated, probably, on the disastrous effects which must inevitably follow from the collection of these bands of ruffians in a common cause, and was awaiting the moment when they would rush blindly upon their own ruin. The discontent, however, of his own soldiers was a greater embarrassment to him than the numbers or the ferocity of the enemy, and he was compelled to precipitate matters by sending some trusty adherents into their camp, with instructions to represent his inaction as the result of fear, and to promise them an easy victory over a disheartened and disorganized multitude. The Unelli fell into the snare, and rushed tumultuously forth to assault the well-defended camp of the Romans. Breath-

¹ *Cæs. B. G.* iii. 17.

less and exhausted with their own haste, they made but a feeble attack. The Romans repulsed them with great slaughter, and having thrown them into confusion, hurling the first ranks back upon those that followed, issued calmly from their entrenchments, and cut them down with little resistance. The Gauls thus defeated rushed from the extreme of confidence into that of despair. They yielded without another blow.

In the meanwhile young Crassus, burning for distinction, was leading his troops into the country of the Aquitani¹, not so much, apparently, on account of their preparing to take part in the present movement, as from older causes of enmity between them and the republic. The attempts which the Romans had hitherto made to subjugate that part of Gaul had been unsuccessful. Valerius Præconinus had been slain a few years before, with the loss of an army, and Manilius, the proconsul, had been driven back with dishonour. Crassus drew reinforcements from the cities of the Roman province, Tolosa, Narbo, and Carcaso, ever ready to assist in extending the yoke under which they themselves bent to the neighbouring tribes, of whose liberty they were jealous. The Sotiates², ancient enemies of the republic, were the first on whom he fell. This people had learnt the Roman art of war from the conflicts they had maintained with the legions, and now defended their fortress with mines and countermines, which their practice of working their veins of copper had

Campaign
of P. Crassus
in Aquitania.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 20.

² Sotiates, mod. Atre and Sots. Mannert, iv. i. 137.

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given them skill in constructing. But the steady perseverance of the Romans prevailed, and the Sotiates submitted to purchase their lives and property by the surrender of their arms. Their king, Adcantuannus, refused to be a party to this capitulation. He was surrounded by a handful of faithful followers, who, according to a custom prevalent in that part of Gaul, had devoted themselves by a vow to his personal service. They bore in their country the name of Soldurii¹; they were admitted to live with their chief on terms of intimacy and equality, were feasted at his table, and shared all his amusements and luxuries. In return they pledged themselves to live and die for him, to defend him as a body-guard in battle, and, if he fell, not to survive him. So sacred was this vow held that no one, it was said, was ever known to have broken it. When therefore Adcantuannus declared his determination to die rather than surrender like the rest of his countrymen, this trusty band were ready to rush with him against the enemy, and sell their lives as dearly as possible. But being easily repulsed by the superior number of the Romans, the barbarian chieftain repented of his resolve, and begged his life of the conqueror, which was generously granted him.

He effects
the reduction
of that
part of Gaul.

From this tribe the Roman general advanced against the Vocates and Tarusates², whose resources were increased by the assistance afforded

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 22. This circumstance is referred to by Athenæus (vi. 54.), quoting Nic. Damascenus, who renders the word Soldurii by εὐχωλιμαῖος. Drumann, iii. 269. anmerk.

² Vocates, mod. Bazadois: Tarusates, mod. Marsan. Mannert, iv. i. 133. 138.

them from Spain, and their confidence confirmed by the presence and counsel of many officers who had gained their military experience in the camp of Sertorius. Their tactics therefore were just the reverse of those which their countrymen had hitherto employed. They fortified an encampment after the Roman fashion, and awaited the time when the enemy should attack them at a disadvantage, or retire from want of provisions. Crassus found himself compelled to risk an assault, in which he met with little success. But the Aquitanians had neglected to provide sufficiently for the defence of the gate at the rear of their camp, and this omission the Romans opportunely discovered. A chosen band forced their way through the opening while the attention of the defenders was occupied in another direction, and by this seasonable diversion the position of the besieged was mastered, and their forces routed. The flying multitude were pursued by the Roman cavalry, and of fifty thousand men only a fourth escaped to their homes. This triumphant success was immediately followed by the submission of the greater part of the Aquitanian tribes. A few mountaineers alone still hesitated to yield¹, confiding in their inaccessible fastnesses and the lateness of the season.

The submission of only two nations now remained to complete the pacification of Gaul for the second time.² The Morini, farthest of mankind, as

Cæsar chastises the Morini and Menapii.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 27. : "Paucae ultimæ nationes."

² Cæs. *B. G.* iii. 28.

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Virgil designates them¹, occupied the coast of the northern ocean, from the straits to the mouth of the Scheldt. The Menapii also inhabited a land of woods and marshes on the banks of the lower Meuse. In their distant and little envied recesses these two tribes had not yet experienced the keenness of the Roman sword; but they had heard enough of the ill success of their brethren to shrink from open combat with the invaders, and trust to the natural defences of their country, covered with impenetrable forests. After the defeat of the Veneti, the summer was drawing to a close; but Cæsar, who was determined to inflict chastisement upon every nation, however remote, which had dared to join the Northern confederacy, was not disposed to delay this crowning campaign, from which he did not anticipate much risk or trouble. The people, however, hid themselves in their woods, and the obstacles which their country presented were not to be easily overcome. The further the Romans penetrated, clearing their way before them with the axe, the more dense became the obstacles around them, and the less probability did there appear of reducing the natives to extremity. Accordingly, when the bad season began to set in, it was necessary to recall the soldiers from their fruitless labour, and thus, at the close of Cæsar's third campaign, the only members of the Gaulish race who retained their liberty were the mountain tribes of the Pyrenees and the amphibious wanderers of the Wahal and the Scheldt.

¹ Virg. *Æn.* viii. fin.: "Extremique hominum Morini."

The proconsul, as before, imposed the burden of maintaining his troops for the winter upon the last conquered of his opponents, the Lexovii and Aulerci¹, while he himself, as in the winter preceding, departed for Italy.²

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Leaves his
army in
winter
quarters and
returns to
Italy.

¹ In Normandy and Maine.

² Drumann, iii. 270.

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THE BANISHMENT OF CICERO IS FOLLOWED BY THE CONFISCATION OF HIS PROPERTY.—HIS HOUSE ON THE PALATINE, AND HIS TUSCULAN VILLA.—TRIUMPHANT CAREER OF CLODIUS.—HE REMOVES CATO FROM ROME UNDER PRETENCE OF AN HONOURABLE MISSION TO DEPRIVE THE KING OF CYPRUS.—CHARACTER OF M. BRUTUS, WHO ACCOMPANIES CATO.—CICERO'S UNMANLY COMPLAINTS.—EXERTIONS OF HIS FRIENDS IN HIS BEHALF—HIS WIFE TERENTIA.—ATTICUS : HORTENSIVS.—REACTION IN HIS FAVOUR.—CLODIUS DISGUSTS POMPEIUS.—ELECTION OF CONSULS FAVOURABLE TO CICERO.—HE IS RECALLED, AND IS RECEIVED IN ITALY WITH ACCLAMATIONS. A.U. 696, 697, B.C. 58, 57.

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Pusillanimity of Cicero in retiring from Rome.

WHEN Cæsar broke up his camp in the neighbourhood of Rome, and set forth upon his expedition into Gaul, he left the city in the power of a headstrong and capricious multitude, which obeyed no other leadership than that of the tribune Clodius. The terror which this man had inspired among the nobles had sufficed to drive Cicero into exile. The late consul had not ventured to defend himself either by his eloquence or by the arms which were proffered for his succour. It might indeed have been easy to assail the person of the demagogue, to defy the clamorous imputation of sacrilege, and to crush the mutinous spirit of the mob which served him. But he had himself proclaimed that Cicero must either perish or conquer twice.¹ It was evident from these ominous words that there

¹ Cic. *pro Sest.* 19. : "Cum quidem in concione dixisset, 'Aut mihi semel pereundum, aut bis esse vincendum.'"

was another and greater power behind; that the consuls would step forward to protect or avenge the tribune, and, at the last moment, would be supported by the triumvirs.¹ In the eyes of the multitude, however, Cicero stood self-condemned by his sudden flight before he had been made the object of a distinct accusation. How many difficulties would have stood in the way of a legal attack upon him may be conceived from the fictions and evasions to which his enemy was compelled to resort in order to obtain his condemnation even when absent. On the day that he left the city, Clodius convened the people, and caused his client Sextus to propose a resolution, in which the exiled consular was denounced by name as the author of the death of sundry citizens without form of law. By the same enactment he was interdicted from fire and water, and it was forbidden to receive or harbour him. The formula even declared, in its short-sighted malice, that the utmost vengeance of the law should be executed upon any one who should propose his recall, unless the victims of his tyranny should first return to life.²

In order to carry this resolution even in the popular assembly, jealous as it ordinarily was of the encroachments of the senate, and now excited and exasperated against it by artful intriguers, it was necessary to declare the decree, by which Lentulus and his associates had been condemned, a forgery.³

Difficulties that would have stood in the way of his legal condemnation.

¹ This view is set forth in the strongest colours in the speech for Sestius, 16—20.

² "Clodianorum dux." Ascon. in *Pison*. 8.: "Sextus Clodius familiarissimus P. Clodii et operarum."

³ Cic. *pro Dom.* 19.

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So audacious a proposition no one probably would have ventured to assert in the face of the thunders of Cicero's eloquence. But the legality of the enactment proposed by Sextus was questionable in the eyes of the Roman jurists on various grounds, all of which the orator at a subsequent period triumphantly displayed. In the first place it was a *privilegium*, a law, that is, directed specifically against an individual, which contravened a fundamental principle of Roman jurisprudence. It was in fact nothing less than a proscription, a word still terrible to Roman ears.¹ The terms in which it was conceived were inconsistent with the fact. Sextus Clodius had proposed a resolution to the effect, not that Cicero "shall be interdicted," but that he "has been interdicted already;" a form of language which betrays the object of the proposer to treat the condemnation of his enemy as a fact already accomplished by the previous vote of the people, instead of being, as it still was, at the moment an open question.² So again, when Clodius forbade any man to harbour his victim, he abstained from expressly pronouncing his banishment, which he might fear not to be able to carry in all the naked severity of the term.³ It was only by the blunder of Cicero's friends, who sought to mitigate the sen-

¹ A *privilegium* (*lex privo homini irrogata*) was forbidden by the *leges sacratæ* and by the twelve tables. Abeken, p. 118. "*Quæro enim quid sit aliud proscribere.*" Cic. *pro Dom.* 17.; comp. Gell. x. 20.

² Cic. *pro Dom.* 18.: "*Non tulit ut interdicatur: quid ergo, ut interdictum sit.*" This interpretation of a somewhat obscure passage is maintained by Drumann, ii. 259.

³ Cic. *pro Dom.* 19, 20.: "*Tulisti de me ne reciperer, non ut exirem . . . pœna est qui receperit, ejectio nusquam est.*"

tence by inserting a clause to limit the distance of his banishment to four hundred miles from the city, that the brand of exile was legally fixed upon him.¹ And, once more, the accuser had not ventured to instruct the censors to strike off the criminal's name from the roll of the senate, an indignity which had always formed a part of a legal sentence of outlawry.²

Nor was this all. A majority of the citizens would probably have secretly applauded, even if they durst not openly support any one of their members who should have ventured to declare that the edict, such as it was, was carried, not by the unbiassed voice of the people, but by a faction misled by manifest falsehood or overcome by violence. There were many thousands of the Roman people who could never have consented to so scandalous an outrage upon the hero of the equestrian order. So many symptoms of hesitation and self-distrust on the part of the accuser could not fail, when skilfully handled by a consummate master of debate, to make an impression upon all this portion of the assembly, and encourage them to resist the dictation of a demagogue who betrayed such a want of confidence in his own cause. And, after all, it might be argued that the whole of the tribune's acts were essentially invalid, inasmuch as his adoption into a plebeian house was liable to the charge of informality from the first. Such were

He was not
banished by
any legal
procedure.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 4.; Dion. xxxviii. 17.; Plut. *Cic.* 32. The latter writers do not coincide precisely with Cicero in their statement of the distance prescribed.

² Cic. *pro Dom.* 31

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of Cicero's
houses.

some of the positions upon which the orator and his friends might have maintained their ground. He required, they contended, no law to recal him, for he was banished by no legal procedure.¹

Severe as this law was in its provisions, it was not so formidable as it appears. In the licentious temper of the times, no one cared to pay much respect to an arbitrary act of malice, which a turn in the wheel of fortune might at any moment reverse. Possibly Pompeius or Cæsar controlled its execution from a distance, and let it be understood that the safety of the exile should not be compromised, that his friends should be treated with forbearance, and the crime of entertaining him in his banishment connived at. Cicero was well and kindly received at Brundisium, in Italy, no less than beyond the sea. He was apprehensive of the violence of his enemy's adherents; but he

¹ The nature of the decree of Sextus Clodius is to be gathered principally from the speeches *Pro Domo sua* and *Post Reditum ad Quirites*. It is well known that the four orations attributed to Cicero upon his return from banishment lie under suspicion of spuriousness. Their genuineness was first questioned by Markland in the middle of the last century, assailed still more vehemently by Wolf, and has been tacitly surrendered by Orelli. As usual in such cases, it is far easier to point out internal grounds of suspicion than to establish a plausible theory to account for the existence of the speeches themselves, on the supposition of their being spurious. The objections to them, however, seem far from conclusive, and in any case their value as historical documents is little impeached by them. It is known that Cicero delivered speeches on the occasions to which they refer, and that he was well pleased with them as specimens of his oratorical powers; we may conclude therefore that they were published, and obtained notoriety in Rome. The impugnors of the genuineness of the existing speeches allow that they must have been written, as rhetorical exercises, not later than the latter years of Augustus, being evidently the same as those upon which Asconius commented. It is clear, therefore, that if they are not Cicero's, the writer must have had the originals before him, and kept the facts and details distinctly in view.

had at least personally nothing to fear from the law or the legitimate enforcement of its enactments. The sphere of Clodius's power was, after all, confined to Rome. Omnipotent in the forum, he ascended the Palatine hill, razed the orator's dwelling to the ground, and dedicated a portion of its site to Liberty, who of all human idols seems to have received the greatest homage from successful tyranny. His malicious object in this dedication was to render future restitution impossible. The consuls divided the spoils of the Palatine house and the villa at Tusculum, the favourite retreat of the statesman and philosopher. The tribune seized for his own share the remnant of the site of the former, which he had left unconsecrated with that purpose, and attached it to his own residence, which lay contiguous.¹

The demolition of a traitor's house was one of the modes by which the patriarchs of Roman liberty had striven to obliterate the memory of the most odious of crimes. Such had been the fate of the abodes of Spurius Mælius and of Manlius in early times: at a later period the infliction of this indignity savoured rather of the vindictiveness of faction than the sternness of republican virtue. Cicero the oligarch could point with unseemly exultation to the retribution which the nobles had wreaked upon Vitruvius Vaccus and Fulvius Flaccus, the associates of the Gracchi, at the moment that he was inveighing against the tyranny of the cabal which had in turn triumphed over himself.²

Cicero's
house on
the Pala-
tine hill.

¹ Cic. *pro Dom.* 24. 44., *pro Sest.* 24., *post Red. in Sen.* 7.

² All these cases are mentioned in the *Orat. pro Domo*, 38.

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The house of the orator on the Palatine was the most conspicuous memorial of the deed for which he suffered. After his victory over Catilina, in the pride of his heart he had given up the modest dwelling of his father to his brother Quintus, and had bought of Crassus a more splendid mansion for himself, in the fashionable resort of the highest aristocracy.¹ The fortunate consular regarded this abode with peculiar complacency. Cicero, the preserver of his country, he said, had established his household gods on the hearthstone which had been laid by Drusus the demagogue.² It overlooked the forum and the rostra, which had been the foundation of his glories. It was conspicuous in the eyes of the citizens; the person and the actions of its possessor could never escape their observation and memory. But the fickle multitude might retort that Cicero the tyrant possessed at Tusculum the abode which had been occupied by Sulla the dictator³; and the impulse of the moment was gratified by the dispersion of all the ornaments and trophies which had fostered the pride and ambition of one whom they regarded as their oppressor.

His villa at
Tusculum.

If the summit of the Palatine had been selected to keep the memory of its occupant ever fresh in the minds of his countrymen, his villa at Tusculum

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* v. 6., *pro Dom.* 37.

² There was a famous saying connected with this spot. When Drusus was about to erect his house there, the architect proposed a plan by which the occupant should be screened from the curious eyes of his neighbours. "Rather build it," replied the patriot, "so that every action of my life may be seen by every one." Vell. ii. 14.

³ Plin. *H. N.* xxii. 6.

was his chosen spot for retirement and study. Here, also, though too far removed from Rome to be himself an object of observation, his porticoes opened upon the full view of his beloved city, from which he could never long bear to take off his eyes. From the hill on which this villa stood the spectator surveyed a wide and various prospect, rich at once in natural beauty and historic associations. The plain at his feet was the battle-field of the Roman kings and of the infant commonwealth; it was strown with the marble sepulchres of patricians and consulars; across it stretched the long straight lines of the military ways which transported the ensigns of conquest to Parthia and Arabia. On the right, over meadow and woodland, lucid with rivulets, he beheld the white turrets of Tibur, Æsulæ, Præneste, strung like a row of pearls on the bosom of the Sabine mountains; on the left, the glistening waves of Alba sunk in their green crater, the towering cone of the Latian Jupiter, the oaks of Aricia and the pines of Laurentum, and the sea bearing sails of every nation to the strand of Ostia. Before him lay far outspread the mighty City, mistress of the world, gleaming in the sun with its panoply of roofs, and flashing brightness into the blue vault above it.¹ The

¹ The effect must have been far more striking in the time of Cicero than at present, from the greater size of the city, and its extension to the south of the Capitoline. When the houses came to be crusted with marble and the roofs of the temples to be gilded, the brightness it threw into the air must have been exceedingly splendid. Rutilius, in the fifth century, gives us a glimpse of it (*Itin.* i. 193.):

“Nec locus ille mihi cognoscitur indice fumo
Qui dominas arces et caput orbis habet . . .

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ancient city presented few towers, spires, or domes, such as now arrest the eye from a distant eminence; but the hills within its walls were more distinctly marked, and the statues of its gods exalted on pillars, or soaring above the peaks of its innumerable temples, seemed an army of immortals arrayed in defence of their eternal abodes.¹ From the bank of Lake Regillus to the gates of Tusculum the acclivity was studded with the pleasure-houses of the noblest families of Rome. The pages of Cicero commemorate the villas of Balbus, of Brutus, of Julius Cæsar; of Catulus, Metellus, Crassus, and Pompeius; of Gabinius, Lucullus, Lentulus, and Varro.² Accordingly, the retreat of the literary statesman gazed upon the

Sed cœli plaga candidior, tractusque serenus
Signat septenis culmina clara jugis.
Illic perpetui Soles, atque ipse videtur
Quem sibi Roma facit purior esse dies."

¹ Silius's Vision of Hannibal in his camp on the Alban Mount, a conception worthy of an abler hand, may very possibly have been suggested by the view of Rome from this locality. *Sil. Punic.* xii. 707.:

"En age, namque oculis amota nube parumper
Cernere cuncta dabo, surgit qua celsus ad auras,
Adspice, montis apex, vocitata Palatia Regi
Parrhasio plenâ tenet et resonante pharetrâ,
Intenditque arcum et pugnas meditatur Apollo.
At qua vicinis tendit se collibus altæ
Molis Aventinus, viden' ut Latonia virgo
Accensas quatiat Plegthontis gurgite tædas,
Exsertos avidè pugnæ nudata lacertos.
Parte aliâ cerne ut sævis Gradivus in armis
Implêrit dictum proprio de nomine campum.
Hinc Janus movet arma manu, movet inde Quirinus,
Quisque suo de colle Deus . . ."

² Orelli, *Onomast. Tullianum*; comp. Strab. v. 3. § 12.

centre of his dearest interests, and was surrounded by the haunts of his friends and rivals. It was here that, at a later period, when his fortunes were re-established, he composed some of the most abstract of his philosophical speculations¹; but even these too partook of the air of the city and the tone of practical life; the interlocutors of his dialogues were the same men whom he had just left behind at Rome, or whom he might encounter among the shady walks around him²; the subject of their conversations never wandered so far from their daily concerns as not to admit of constant application to the times and illustration from them.

Clodius had taken his measures well. He relied with confidence on the support of the consuls, who, eager to reap the fruits of their office in the spoil of the wealthiest provinces, cared for no odium and foresaw no danger in maintaining the influence of the man who had promised to stand their friend with the people. The adherents of the orator, whose most generous supporters had thronged to the Capitol from the provincial towns of Italy, left the city in disgust when their favourite shrank from the contest, so that the forum was easily filled or overawed by the tribune's armed rabble. On the same day that the decree was fulminated against Cicero, Clodius brought forward another proposition for bestowing the province of Syria

Triumphant career
of Clodius.

¹ The Tusculan villa is the spot in which Cicero laid the scene of his dialogue *de Divinatione* and the *Tusculanæ Disputationes*, and it was there, we may presume, that he composed them.

² Cicero even complains that his villa lay a little out of the road: "Devium τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι et habet alia δύσχροστα" (*ad Att.* vii. 5.).

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He assigns
provinces
to Piso and
Gabinus.

upon Gabinus, and Macedonia, to which Achæa was annexed, upon Piso. This measure was in direct contravention of the *Lex Sempronia* of Caius Gracchus¹, which obliged the senate to assign their future provinces to the new consuls before their election, and merely allowed the candidates a choice between them. But the popular assembly had already claimed the right of appointment; it had gained a signal victory over the senate when it insisted upon giving Gaul and Illyricum to Cæsar; and the rival body having once succumbed to its dictation, had not now the courage to assert its privileges. This triumph over the law encouraged the demagogue to indulge in still further licence. The authority of Piso was extended over several cities within the limits of his province, to which the senate had guaranteed their freedom and exemption from the Roman administration. Gabinus received, on his part, full powers to make war upon any of the foreign potentates whose frontiers bordered upon Syria, upon the Arabians, the Persians and the Babylonians. Egypt alone was not included in the list of states against which he was at liberty to lead the legions of the republic. But Egypt, it will appear, was precisely the point of attack which offered the greatest temptation to the ambition or cupidity of a proconsul in the East; and it was not to be expected that one who had profited so much by successful violence, should hesitate to grasp at the only fruit which was forbidden him.

Intrigue to

There was yet another enemy both of Clodius

¹ Cic. *pro Dom.* 9.

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and the triumvirs, the inflexible and high-spirited Cato, whom it was essential to their objects to remove from the scene of their intrigues. The means which they adopted for this purpose were craftily contrived to undermine his influence by throwing suspicions upon his integrity. Ptolemæus, king of Cyprus, was the younger brother of Ptolemæus Auletes, who occupied the throne of Egypt. The elder had been acknowledged as the ally of the Roman people; the younger had obtained the complimentary designation of their friend.¹ No evil designs were imputed to him, no reasons even of political expediency could be alleged, beyond the ready pretence that he abetted the depredations of the pirates², to give a colour to the demand which was suddenly made upon him to descend from his throne. But it was well known that he had accumulated large treasures, and the Roman government, under the guidance of two unscrupulous consuls, proposed to deprive him of his kingdom and confiscate his possessions to the service of the state. A Roman officer of conspicuous mark and dignity was to be sent to demand the surrender; the edict had gone forth, and no other discretion was left to the instrument of the republic than to manage the affair with violence or mildness,

remove
Cato from
Rome.

Proposed
mission to
deprive
Ptolemæus
king of
Cyprus of
his king-
dom.

¹ Cic. *pro Sest.* 26.; Schol. Bob. p. 301. Orell.

² Schol. Bob. *l. c.*: "Quod diceretur ab eo piratas adjuvari." Clodius had a personal enmity against Ptolemæus; for having once been captured by the pirates, he had applied to him to obtain a sum of money for his ransom. The king, it seems, sent him two talents for the purpose, and Clodius held himself affronted by the moderate value thus set upon him. It appears, however, that the pirates themselves did not consider it adequate. App. *B. C.* ii. 23.; Dion. xxxviii. 30.

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according to the bent of his own disposition. Of all the principal men in Rome at the time, it might be thought that Cato would be the one to whom the execution of an act of such glaring injustice would be least palatable. It is probable that it was partly on this very account that he was selected to enforce it. It was rightly calculated in the councils of the dominant cabal that his principles of strict obedience to the will of the state would not allow him to decline the commission: but it was hoped that the acceptance of so ignoble an office under the direction of the enemies of his party would tend to lower his estimation among them. It was surmised that the handling of such a mass of treasure might have some effect in corrupting even his sturdy morality; at least, that it would furnish a pretext for blackening his character. The tribune accordingly brought forward a rogation to this effect, which he fortified by producing Cæsar's written approval. Pompeius was well pleased for his own part, that the odium which, from the extraordinary commissions with which he had been charged, pressed sometimes with no ordinary weight upon himself, should be lightened by sharing it with a principal leader of that very party which had most vehemently opposed his own schemes of aggrandizement. He considered it a master-stroke of policy thus to stop the clamours of his fiercest enemy, and readily joined the tribune in urging the adoption of the rogation and the appointment of Cato as the commissioner.

This commission is thrust upon Cato.

Cato's apologists indeed averred that Clodius sent to him in the first instance, and used the softest

and most flattering persuasions to induce him to accept the service. Many, he said, of the most distinguished personages of the state were already soliciting it; but it was for Cato he wished to reserve it, as the most honest and incorruptible of all, and therefore the fittest to discharge so delicate a trust. But Cato immediately perceived that the offer was meant, not as a favour, but as an insult and a snare, and rejected it indignantly. The tone of Clodius instantly changed from coaxing to menace, and, presenting himself before the assembly, he obtained a decree for the appointment of the refractory patriot. He assigned him, they said, neither ship, nor attendants, nor military force; he purposely gave the enterprize every chance of failure.¹ He further caused another service of no less injustice to be annexed to the first, the restoration to their city of certain persons whom the free state of Byzantium had expelled for sedition and breach of the public peace.² This political pluralism was always peculiarly hateful to the cupidity of the Roman nobles, though they disguised their selfish feelings under the pretence of jealousy for the purity of the constitution.

The appointment, however, had its charms even for Cato. It conferred great distinction upon a public man, who had served as yet no higher offices than those of quæstor and tribune, and who

He executes
it with mo-
deration
and strict
integrity.

¹ This account is given by Plutarch (*Cat. Min.* 34.). Cato attained the object of his mission without the employment of force; but it is not likely that he was really left without the means. Cicero says: "Si quis jus suum defenderet Catonem bello gerendo præfecisti (*pro Dom.* 8).

² Cic. *pro Dom.* 20.

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was now elevated to the rank of prætor for the purpose of executing this double commission with suitable splendour.¹ It would seem, moreover, from the advice which Cato had given to Cicero, that he thought it hopeless at the time to withstand the combination of tyrants, and was not unwilling himself to embrace a specious retirement, until brighter prospects should open upon his party. Having accepted the commission, he seems to have discharged it with as much forbearance as its nature admitted.² He did not even enter into the presence of the unfortunate king; perhaps he was ashamed to transact so foul a business in person. Remaining himself at Rhodes, he sent Canidius, a private friend, to deliver the decree of the Roman people, and hold out to the injured monarch the promise of a lucrative and honourable compensation in the priesthood of the Paphian Venus. Ptolemæus made no attempt at resistance; but his spirit was too proud to descend to a private station, or receive a favour from the hands of treacherous enemies. Fortunately for Cato, as Plutarch remarks³, he preferred to submit to a voluntary death. His vacant throne was immediately overturned, his subjects placed under the rule of a Roman governor, and the fatal treasures which he had amassed poured with the strictest fidelity into the coffers of the state.⁴ It would be

¹ Vell. ii. 45.: "P. Clodius sub honorificentissimo ministerii titulo Catonem a republica relegavit."

² Plut. *Cat. Min.* 35.

³ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 36.: 'Ο δὲ ἐν Κύπρῳ Πτολεμαῖος εὐτυχία τινὶ τοῦ Κάτωνος ἑαυτὸν φαρμάκοις ἀπέκτεινε.

⁴ Cato's probity was always ostentatious; comp. Vell. ii. 45. and

well for the character of the most celebrated model of republican virtue if the narrative of this event could stop here; but it must be remarked that Cato, having thus performed what he might consider no more than his duty as a citizen, so far from protesting afterwards against the injustice of the decree, seems rather to have prided himself upon his mission, as redounding to his honour no less than to his advancement. As Clodius had probably foreseen, he became the defender of the acts of his patron's tribunate. He not only repudiated the excuses which Cicero afterwards suggested for his submission, but openly withstood the attempts of the orator, after his return from banishment, to fasten a stigma upon the administration of his baffled persecutor.¹ Nor was his zeal in defence of the author of his appointment weakened even by the insult which Clodius cast upon him, by questioning the correctness of the accounts he rendered to the people, and hinting that he had abused his trust. This must have been the more offensive to Cato, as the minute and even morose strictness with which he had made his inventories and effected his sales had already disgusted and irritated his personal followers. That there was something pedantic in his dealings, and matter for

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 39. As he sailed up the Tiber with his treasures, the consuls and principal people came out in a procession to meet him; but he would not pause even to greet them till he had deposited his charge in the treasury. He returned from his mission A. U. 698, ὑπάτευε δὲ Φίλιππος. Plut. *l. c.* Appian makes an unaccountable mistake in saying that he did not actually proceed to discharge his commission till the consulship of Pompeius, A. U. 702. App. *B. C.* ii. 23.

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 40.

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not unreasonable ridicule, may be inferred from Cæsar having made them one of his principal topics of raillery in the satire upon his opponent, which he published long afterwards under the title of *Anticato*.¹

The King
of Egypt
applies for
the inter-
vention of
the republic.

While the king of Cyprus was suffering under the lawless domination of a foreign government, his brother Auletes² was experiencing the penalty of his own tyranny in the rebellion of his indignant subjects. Expelled from the palace of his ancestors in Alexandria, he bethought himself of the necessities of the rival statesmen of Rome, and determined to offer to their cupidity the temptation of interference with the affairs of his country. On his way to Italy he sought an interview with Cato. The coarse and haughty Roman treated the royal petitioner with contemptuous indelicacy, while the supple Egyptian submitted to the indignity without a murmur.³ Nevertheless, the advice of the cynical republican, who was anxious to avert another extraordinary commission, with all the cabals and fatal dissensions to which it would give rise, was sound and friendly; but the banished monarch, with all his professions of obsequiousness, had not the sense to follow it. Cato pointed out to him

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 36. Compare the anecdote in Plin. *H. N.* xxxiv. 19.: "Non ære captus nec arte, unam solummodo Zenonis statuum Cypria in expeditione non vendidit Cato, sed quia philosophi erat; ut obiter hoc quoque noscatur tam inane exemplum."

² This Ptolemæus acquired his surname from his shameless appearance in public as a flute-player. Strab. xvii. 1.: Οὐκ ὠκνεῖ συντελεῖν ἀγῶνας ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις.

³ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 35.: 'Ο δὲ Κάτων ἐτύγχανε μὲν ὦν τότε περὶ κοιλίας κἀθαρσιν . . . ὡς δ' ἦλθεν, οὐτ' ἀπαντήσας, οὔτε ὑπεξαναστάς. . . κ. τ. λ. But such coarseness of manners has been paralleled in comparatively recent times. See Wraxall's *Historical Memoirs*, i. p. 252.

the insults to which he would be exposed in waiting upon the plots and counterplots of the Roman forum, the bribes that would be exacted from him on every side, the adjournment of his hopes, the exhaustion of his resources, finally, perhaps, a success more perilous to him than failure. He recommended him to return to Egypt and make the best terms he could with his rebellious subjects; and the monarch, who disregarded the advice, was said to have afterwards expressed his admiration of its prophetic wisdom.

Cato was accompanied on his mission by his nephew, M. Brutus, a young man of noble birth, of high and ambitious aspirations, but whose public career had hitherto been confined to serving as lieutenant to Cæsar in his government of Spain. The important part which he was destined to act in the closing scenes of the Roman republic, and the peculiar celebrity attached to his name, make us the more anxious to investigate the minuter actions of his life, and acquire a complete view of his character. He was the son of a father of the same name, who had been a prominent supporter of the Marian party, and finally lost his life by rashly joining in the enterprize of Lepidus.¹ His mother Servilia was half-sister to M. Cato², and

Cato accom-
panied on
his mission
by his
nephew,
M. Junius
Brutus.

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 4. Niebuhr (*Lectures on Roman History*, l. 48.) denies that this M. Junius Brutus was father of the tyrannicide. But compare Orelli, *Onomast. Tullian. in voc.*

² Servilia was married first to M. Junius Brutus, secondly to D. Junius Silanus. She was senior by many years to M. Cato. "Servilia apud Catonem maternam obtinebat auctoritatem." Ascon. in *Scaur.* p. 19. The Servilii claimed descent from Servilius Ahala, the slayer of Sp. Mælius, as the Junii from Brutus, the founder of the republic, so that the blood of the two most celebrated assertors of liberty met in the person of the future tyrannicide.

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appears to have been a woman of strong character and more than usual attainments. So far she was worthy of her distinguished relative; but the voice of the public circulated the most scandalous rumours against her, as the favourite mistress of Cæsar, the instrument of her own daughter's dishonour, the venal recipient of the spoils of conquest.¹ The shocking suspicion, however, that Brutus became the murderer of the man to whom he owed his existence is a mere invention of the Roman anecdotists.² He was born A. U. 669, only fifteen years later than Cæsar himself. But Cæsar's intimacy with Servilia was no doubt a principal cause of the marked favour and indulgence with which he distinguished her son.

His character.

The elder Brutus being cut off prematurely, when his son was only eight years of age, the care of his education fortunately passed from the hands of an intriguing mother into those of his uncle Cato; and the youth became early initiated in the maxims of the Stoic philosophy, and learned to regard his preceptor, whose daughter Portia he married, as the purest model of practical and theoretical virtue. But, together with many honourable and noble sentiments, he imbibed also from him that morose strictness in the exaction as well as the discharge of legal obligations, which, while it is often mistaken for a guarantee of probity, is not incompatible with considerable laxity of principle. Accordingly, we find that while, on the one hand, he made no use of the powers of a Roman

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 50., and Macrobian. *Sat.* ii. 2.² Plut. *Brut.* 5.

officer in a province to extort by fraud or violence the objects of his cupidity, he was, on the other, not the less unscrupulous in demanding exorbitant interest for loans advanced to the natives, and insisting upon its payment with rigid pertinacity. His infamous transactions with the magistrates of Salamis in Cyprus, as also with Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, are detailed in Cicero's correspondence with Atticus. It was some years after his residence in the island, that he commissioned a person of the name of Scaptius to collect his debts with their accumulated interest. He allowed his agent to insist upon the most questionable interpretations of the law, and to enforce a rate of interest beyond what Cicero considered either legal or equitable. Scaptius, in his zeal for his employer, obtained the services of a troop of horse, with which he shut up the Salaminian senators in their house of assembly till five of them died of starvation, being really unable to liquidate the sum required.¹ The bitter reflections which Cicero makes upon the conduct of Brutus mark the strong contrast between the tried and practical friend of virtue and the pedantic aspirant to philosophic renown.

But neither, indeed, were the weaknesses of Cicero's character to be controlled by the sage lessons he had imbibed. He lingered in his progress through Italy to the coast of the Adriatic, as if still indulging a hope that the passions of his partizans, whom he had left the city rather than excite to arms, might rise upon his departure in

Cicero's
unmanly
complaints
in exile.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* v. 21., vi. 1.

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uncontrollable fervour only to be appeased by his immediate recal. But the senate cowered under the blow ; the populace of Rome was devoted to the audacity and good-fortune of Clodius ; the states and cities of Italy, with many of which the fugitive had ingratiated himself during his long forensic career, dared not even raise their voices in behalf of the leader of a broken and dispirited party. When at last he summoned resolution to cross the sea to Epirus, it was with a burst of anger and despair, which reveals not less of pique and disappointment than of genuine sorrow. The character of this illustrious exile is fully and curiously developed to us in the very complete collection we possess of his letters at this period. They exhibit the writhings of a mind which wreaks upon friends the torments of self-dissatisfaction. The writer begins early to think he has made a false step, and to throw the blame upon those who advised, or at least did not actively dissuade him from it.¹ “ Unprecedented,” he exclaims to Atticus, “ as my calamity is, nevertheless I am not so much affected by that as by a sense of the error I have committed ; for now, indeed, you perceive by whose wickedness I have been betrayed.” In these words he seems to point more particularly to Hortensius, whom he might fancy to be jealous of him as a rival in eloquence ; but in other places he involves his friends generally in one common accusation : “ Those to whom I believed my safety was dearest have treated me as the most cruel of enemies ; when they saw me despond only a little,

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 8. and foll., *ad Qu. Fr.* i. 3. and foll.

they played upon my fears, and urged me to my ruin." He does not spare Atticus himself, even while heaping upon him the strongest assurances of confidence. At length he works himself to such a pitch of irritation as to discuss the question of suicide, and so arrays his arguments as to leave his friends under some apprehension lest his troubles should be brought to a violent consummation.¹ It is not to be wondered that they expressed their doubts among themselves of the soundness of the sufferer's intellect.² But, without imputing to him any intentional deception, it must be allowed that Cicero had indulged as a pleader and declaimer in the vice of exaggeration, to such a degree as to have little power of looking calmly upon things which excited his feelings, at least of expressing himself upon them with clearness and moderation. He does himself much injustice, probably, in the over-charged picture he has drawn of his own imbecility. He might think to move the commiseration of his contemporaries by magnifying his own infirmities, but he has well nigh lost by it the respect of posterity. Some portion at least of the complaints he lavishes upon his own wrongs might well have been spared for a more frequent and prominent expression of concern at the degradation of his party and country.

Meanwhile, the friends of the unfortunate exile, far from resenting his unjust suspicions, were stirring anxiously in his behalf. Cato, indeed, as

Exertions of
his friends
in his be-
half. Cha-
racter of
Atticus.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 9., *ad Qu. Fr.* i. 3.

² Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 13.: "Scribis te audire me etiam mentis errore ex dolore affici."

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we have seen, was absent upon a distant mission, and Lucullus had relapsed, after a short interval of activity, into the easy indolence to which he had long surrendered himself. But Quintus, the orator's brother, had returned from Asia, where he had been charged with the government of the province, and was conferring with Atticus, Hortensius, and the tribune Ninnius at Rome. The political history of the times makes little mention of T. Pomponius Atticus, however familiar his name is to scholars, from the confidential intercourse with which Cicero honoured him. Yet he was a man of good descent, of ample fortune, and of literary attainments¹; one who mixed freely in the society of the statesmen of the day, and was the friend of some of the most active among them. A follower, by natural disposition as well as from reflection, of the philosophy of Epicurus, he made it his deliberate study to carry its principles thoroughly into practice. In the most stirring and turbulent age of the republic, he abstained from all political action²: though closely connected with the oligarchy, he belonged properly to no party; nor would he undertake the discharge of any functions, civil or political. He refused even the safe and easy dignities which the governors of the provinces could bestow upon the friends who followed in their retinue; nor would he make use of his abilities and attainments in the career of

¹ He wrote an epitome of Roman history, a history of Cicero's consulship in Greek, and drew up genealogical tables of the principal Roman families. Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 23., ii. 1.; Nepos, *Att.* 8.

² Nepos, *Att.* 6.

an advocate, to which every Roman gentleman was in a manner born. He never preferred an accusation against any one himself, although an impeachment was the most ordinary road to notoriety; nor would he lend the weight of his interest to the public spirit or malice of a friend. He never entered into a lawsuit. Having friends of all parties, it was impossible but that the chances of fortune must often reduce some of them to a position in which to treat them kindly might have been dangerous, or at least troublesome. Atticus relieved Cicero, and afterwards Brutus, in the time of their distress, with ample assistance in money¹; but he succeeded in divesting his sympathy of any political colour, and escaped the animadversion of their enemies. This indeed was in later life, when his character for neutrality was well established; and it deserves to be remarked, that the factions of Rome were always extremely tolerant of neutral parties. At an earlier period, however, the fact of his connexion by blood with P. Sulpicius subjected him to the jealousy of Cinna's followers, and compelled him to leave Rome and seek an asylum at Athens.² There he continued to reside for many years, and it was from his known partiality for that place and its people that he derived the surname by which he is familiarly known. The leisure which Atticus obtained by this renunciation of all public occupation he devoted principally to literature and matters of taste. But he had also a keen eye to the acquisition of wealth, though far from illiberal in his use of it. He inherited an

¹ Nepos, *Att.* 4. 8.

² Nepos, *Att.* 2.

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ample fortune, and employed all the opportunities of his time to lay it out to the best advantage. He possessed large families of slaves, whom he educated to enhance their value; he lent money on the most approved securities, especially to the corporations which farmed the revenues; and we read of his purchasing a troop of gladiators in order to let them out to magistrates for public games.¹ The friend of Sulla, of Cicero, of Brutus, and of Agrippa, Atticus lived through several generations of Roman statesmen. At the age of seventy-seven he was attacked by an incurable disease, and then, true to his principles, he submitted to voluntary death by abstinence, rather than encounter the only ill for which his philosophy could furnish no remedy. He died in the year of the city 722.

Character of
Hortensius.

We have already acquired some knowledge of Q. Hortensius, in reviewing the character of the more refined and luxurious class of the Roman nobility.² Born eight years before Cicero, and entering the arena of the forum at the age of nineteen, his florid rhetoric and graceful delivery had already established his fame before the period of Sulla's ascendancy. At the first introduction of his future rival into public life he was in complete possession of the ear of the judges. Attached as he was to the cause of the oligarchy, he continued from that time to exercise his talents chiefly

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 4.; Nepos, *Att.* 13.

² An extremely elegant and lively account of Hortensius is given by Dunlop in his *Hist. of Rom. Literature*, ii. 222. foll. The redundant and florid character of his eloquence is criticized at length by Cicero (*Brutus*, 94, 95.).

in defence of the nobles of his party who were accused of provincial malversation. He pleaded before favourable tribunals; and it was this circumstance that contributed more perhaps than his eloquence to his repeated successes. The prosecution of Verres, in which he was retained by the defendant against the rising genius of Cicero, first shook the supremacy of this champion of the bar. But Hortensius felt no remorse at reflecting that the immense wealth which his abilities procured for him was for the most part derived from the plunder of the provinces. Though unstained by glaring vices, his career was equally unmarked by any elevation of view or the development of any generous sentiments. Accomplished as he was, he made no progress in the affections of the simpler mind of Cicero. After passing through the usual succession of public offices, he obtained the consulship in the year 684. His ambition was thenceforth satisfied, and he made no effort to retain the high position he had acquired. The example of his indolence and luxury made him rather a burden than a support to the sinking cause which he still nominally maintained, and he gradually lost the esteem both of Cato¹ and of Cicero. The latter lived indeed to retract the insinuations he had thrown out against him for want of fidelity to himself²; but if he failed to the last in exhibiting any cordiality towards him, we may feel

¹ Aristocrat though he was, Hortensius was held in little favour by the later admirers of Cato. Perhaps it was natural to contrast two such dissimilar characters. Comp. Lucan, ii. 329.:

“Quondam virgo toris melioris juncta mariti.”

² Cic. *pro Sest.* 16—19.

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Political
nullity of
the Roman
women, and
their con-
sequent
security in
times of
revolution.

that he had better grounds for his coldness than the mere remnant of professional jealousy.

The first duty of the exile's real friends undoubtedly was to provide for the security of his wife and family, whom, in his uncertainty regarding his own movements, he had left behind at Rome. This was a sufficient reason for Atticus to neglect his friend's entreaties to meet him at Brundisium or in Epirus, where an interview could have been of no service to his true interests. Not indeed that there was much actual danger to a woman abandoned by her legitimate protector, even in the midst of his political enemies. The Roman women in the olden times had been educated on a system which disabled them from taking any part in politics. Their sphere was merely domestic, and their minds remained undeveloped for any moral or intellectual purpose. With the increase of civilization the manners of antiquity relaxed; the Roman matrons, the Cornelias, the Portias, and Aurelias, became not unfrequently the counsellors of their husbands and the instructors of their children; but it was only the looser sort, the Fulvias and Clodias, who mixed in the political intrigues of their gallants. The idea still remained rooted in the Roman mind that the wife was the dependent, almost the slave, of the pater familias, and could occupy no place in the arena of public life. Hence it was that, amidst the revolutions and proscriptions of the civil wars, the females of a family were never subjected to the persecutions in which their husbands and brothers were involved. The mother of Sertorius remained unmolested in

Rome throughout the wars which the republic waged against her son. After the death of Caius Gracchus, Cornelia retired no further than to Misenum, and lived there in the enjoyment of a large fortune and the society of the most distinguished men¹, while the son of Fulvius, a youth of only fifteen years, was involved in the fate of his father.² Nevertheless, the situation of Terentia, the wife of Cicero, was one which demanded the solicitude of his friends. The confiscation of her husband's fortune reduced her at once to poverty. She was a woman of high spirit, and acted with fortitude and decision. We have a letter of Cicero's, in which he entreats her not to dispose of a small estate, which was her own property, by which means she was preparing to provide for the immediate necessities of the family. He represents the injury that she will thus inflict upon their son, and counsels her to trust to the benevolence of Atticus and the pious attention of Piso, their son-in-law.³ In a short time ample provision was made for the wants of the family; and Terentia combined with her husband's friends in watching the tides of public opinion, and working in private for his restoration.

High spirit
of Cicero's
wife, Terentia.

The vices and insolence of Clodius were be-

¹ It may be remarked, as an exception to this contemptuous generosity, that Licinia, the wife of C. Gracchus, was deprived of her dowry. Merimée, i. 81. *note*.

² Plut. *C. Gracch.* 17. 19.; Vell. ii. 7.

³ Cic. *ad Div.* xiv. 1, 2.: "Quod ad me scribis te vicum vendituram, quid, obsecro te, me miserum, quid futurum est? . . . per fortunas miseras vide ne puerum perditum perdamus . . . obsecro te, mea vita, quod ad sumtum attinet, sine alios, qui possunt, si modo volunt, sustinere."

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ginning already to contribute to the advancement of Cicero's cause ; by the one the affections of the people were in some degree alienated from his enemy, by the other even Pompeius felt himself at last aggrieved. The exile had meanwhile retired to Thessalonica. Southern Greece, to which he would more willingly have betaken himself, was infested by several of Catilina's adherents, who had taken up their abode there, and among whom he deemed it unsafe to venture his person.¹ But when the year was about to expire, and Piso, the late consul, was preparing to visit Macedonia, his allotted province, the fugitive entertained no less apprehension from the proximity of so bitter an enemy. The country began already to fill with the troops and officers of the new proconsul², by whom any violence done to the banished man might be regarded with favour. Cicero felt it necessary to expedite his departure, and he determined, by approaching nearer to Italy, to give an evidence of his own courage, and animate the exertions of his friends. Accordingly, he took up his residence at Dyrrhachium, although it was within the prescribed limits of four hundred miles from Rome, and lay on the high road to Macedonia. He had numerous partizans in Epirus.³ The magistrates and people were favourably disposed towards him and jealous of their liberty.⁴

¹ Cic. *pro Planc.* 41.² Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 22.³ Cic. *ad Div.* xiv. 1.: "Dyrrhachium veni quod et libera civitas est, et in me officiosa et proxima Italiae." Comp. *Ep.* 3.: "civitas hæc semper a me defensa est."⁴ Pliny (*H. N.* iii. 23.) calls Dyrrhachium a Roman colony, but the

He was confident both of their will and power to protect him; so much had an individual to fear from illegal violence, in the lawless condition both of Rome and the provinces; so much might he hope, even in opposition to the law, from personal and private favour; such, in short, was the weakness of the central executive power under the system of municipal government which formed the basis of the Roman polity.

The elections for the ensuing year proved favourable to the prospect of a reversal of the decrees against Cicero. This was principally owing to the change in Pompeius's disposition towards Clodius. When the victorious general returned from the East, he brought with him a son of Tigranes, king of Armenia, whom he kept in the custody of Flavius, one of the prætors, as a hostage for the good faith of his father. The tribune had obtained possession of this youth's person by fraud, and refused to deliver him up on the prætor's demand. Soon afterwards he accepted a bribe from the Armenian monarch, and sent him home. Flavius hastened out of the city with a body of armed men to intercept the young man's escape; but he was met at the fourth milestone by the tribune accompanied also by a number of his partizans.¹ A combat ensued, in

Pompeius
turns
against
Clodius,
A. U. 697.

great importance of the place as an emporium of commerce had given it probably the means of claiming a more independent position. Under its ancient name of Epidamnus it had been famous for its hospitality to strangers, from whence it may have derived its appellation (sc. ἐπιδημεῖν). See Perizon. *ad Ælian. V. H.* xiii. 16. There was a popular story that the Romans changed the name to Dyrrhachium (sc. δὲς and ῥηχία), "Ominis causa, quasi in damnum ituri." Mel. ii. 2.

¹ Dion. xxxviii. 30.

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the tribune.

which Clodius was successful, killing several of his opponents, and among them one Papirius, a knight, a publicanus, and a friend of Pompeius.¹ Thus outraged and insulted, the great man withdrew his countenance from his upstart creature, and determined to thwart him in every way. It was reported indeed that Clodius had contrived a plot to assassinate the triumvir. All the circumstances requisite to substantiate the report were vouched for: one of the tribune's slaves was seized at Pompeius's door; he had a dagger upon him; he confessed that he had been placed there by his master to commit the murder.² This suspicion, coupled with the violence of the mob which surrounded the tribune's person, induced Pompeius to retire from public view and confine himself to his own house. Even there he was assailed by the populace, and in the riot which ensued the consul Piso openly took part with Clodius. Pompeius succeeded in detaching the other consul Gabinius from him, and by exerting all his influence, joined probably to that of Cæsar, who was also induced to withdraw his countenance from the demagogue³, he obtained the election to the consulship of Lentulus Spinther, a decided friend to Cicero, and of Metellus Nepos,

Election of
consuls
friendly to
Cicero.¹ Cic. *pro Mil.* 14.; Ascon. *in loc.*² Cic. *pro Sest.* 32.; Plut. *Pomp.* 49.³ Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 15., written in the middle of August: "Varronis sermo facit expectationem Cæsaris." Soon afterwards Sestius, a private friend of Cicero, whom he defended subsequently in the energetic speech from which so much of our knowledge of these events is drawn, made a journey into Gaul on purpose to confer with the proconsul, and obtain his approval of the exile's recall, though coupled apparently with some conditions or expressions unpalatable to him (*pro Sest.* 32.).

an adherent of his own, whose personal enmity to the exile he could check and modify. The new tribunes also were now for the most part favourable to the cause of Cicero and of the senate.

The consuls commenced their career by moving the question of the orator's recall. They were baffled in the first instance by the veto of Serranus, one of the tribunes.¹ A second attempt ended in a furious and bloody tumult excited by Clodius, and carried through by the armed clients and paid adherents by whom he was constantly attended. Rome was given up for a season to mere violence. Clodius, blind with rage, set fire with his own hands to the temple of the Nymphs, and consumed the registers of the censorship; he attacked the houses of the principal nobles, and filled the forum with the corpses of the slain. Such a scene had not been witnessed within the walls since the contest of Cinna and Octavius.² At last Annius Milo, on the part of the senate, collected a body of gladiators under arms, and paraded the streets to prevent the assemblage of his opponent's followers; nor did the gravest of the nobility scruple to acknowledge his assistance, and applaud his spirit in undertaking their defence at his own private charge.³

Progress of
riot and
disorder.
Clodius and
Milo.

The senate had now made up its mind to proceed to any extremity. It issued a decree, inviting the Italian citizens to come to the defence of the com-

Cicero is
recalled
from exile,
and returns
to Rome.

¹ Cic. *pro Sest.* 34.

² Cic. *pro Sest.* 35—38.

³ Cic. *de Off.* ii. 17.: "Honori summo nuper nostro Miloni fuit qui gladiatoribus emptis reipublicæ causa omnes P. Clodii conatus furoresque compressit."

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monwealth, and overawe the urban population.¹ Rome was straightway filled with the adherents of Cicero and his party; while every city, it was said, throughout the Peninsula, hastened to testify by some public act or monument its regard for the saviour of his country, the patron of so many states and towns of Italy. Nevertheless, the forms of the constitution gave such obstructive power to resolute and unscrupulous men, that Clodius still contrived to suspend for several months the carrying of a law for his restoration. The refractory tribunes, through whose vetos he acted, for he had ceased to belong to the college himself, saw themselves gradually deserted by all their principal supporters, and were at last bought off or wearied out by the inflexible determination of the senate. It was not, however, till August that the law was finally passed², and early in September the exile reappeared in the city, after an absence of sixteen months. He had advanced almost in a triumphal procession through the length of the Appian way: Italy, it was said, had borne him on her shoulders, and carried him into Rome. He was received on the Capitol with such acclamations as had rarely fallen to the lot of the greatest conquerors³; happy above his patron Pompeius in the fortune which, by unmerited reverses, had already revealed the vanity of the applause which greeted him.

¹ Cic. *post Red. in Sen.* 9., *pro Sest.* 60.: "Ut literis consularibus ex senatus consulto cuncta ex Italia omnes qui rem publ. salvam esse vellent convocarentur."

² Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 1., *prid. non. Sext.* i. e. Aug. 4. The Roman people never voted with such unanimity as on this occasion. Plut. *Cic.* 33.: καὶ λέγεται μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἐκ τοσαύτης ὁμοφροσύνης ἐπιψηφίσασθαι τὸν δῆμον.

³ Cic. *post Red. in Sen.* 15., *pro Sest.* 63., *in Pison.* 22.

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POMPEIUS OBTAINS AN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION FOR SUPPLYING THE CITY.—APPLICATION OF THE KING OF EGYPT TO BE RESTORED TO HIS THRONE.—INTRIGUES OF THE NOBLES IN RELATION TO IT.—VIOLENCE OF CLODIUS.—THE TRIUMVIRS CONFER TOGETHER AT LUCCA.—POMPEIUS AND CRASSUS ELECTED CONSULS IN SPITE OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE NOBLES.—SPAIN AND SYRIA DECREED TO THEM, AND CÆSAR'S COMMAND PROLONGED FOR A SECOND TERM OF FIVE YEARS.—POMPEIUS' THEATRE AND SHOWS.—HE REMAINS IN ITALY, AND GOVERNS HIS PROVINCE BY LEGATES.—CICERO RECONCILED WITH CRASSUS.—GABINIUS RESTORES THE KING OF EGYPT.—HE IS IMPEACHED, ATTACKED BY CICERO, BUT ACQUITTED: AGAIN ACCUSED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, DEFENDED BY CICERO, BUT CONDEMNED AND BANISHED.—CICERO COURTS THE TRIUMVIRS.—CORRUPT PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANDIDATES FOR THE CONSULSHIP.—PARALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION.—DEATH OF JULIA, AND REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THAT EVENT (A. U. 697—700, B. C. 58—54).

THE wealth and influence of the aristocracy might have succumbed in a contest with the representative of the mob of Rome, but it had armed itself with weapons from his own workshop, and turned the arts of the demagogue against himself. The nobles had adroitly availed themselves of the occurrence of a scarcity, perhaps they had contrived it, to inflame the passions of the multitude against the champion they had deemed omnipotent. On the very day upon which the law was passed in favour of Cicero's recal, a sudden fall was remarked in the price of corn. The partizans of the banished man hailed

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Appointment of Pompeius to an extraordinary commission for provisioning the city. Sept. A. U. 697.

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this circumstance as a manifest token of the Divine approbation.¹ True it was that the markets rose again almost immediately; but Cicero had the tact to draw advantage in another way from this reverse also.² Being now reinstated in his position, and, to a certain extent, in the influence he had formerly enjoyed in the counsels of the nobility, he seized this opportunity for advancing his interests, by proposing the appointment of Pompeius to an extraordinary commission for provisioning the city. This was a recurrence to the principle of the Gabinian and Manilian laws, both of which the leading champions of the senate had resisted and denounced. But the republic had now become familiarized with these monopolies of power, which so lately had shaken it with alarm. It conceded, for the third time, indefinite and arbitrary authority to an individual, whose influence in the state was already greater than that of any of his competitors, perhaps even than that of the state itself. It gave him licence to demand supplies from any part of its dominions, at prices to be fixed at his own discretion³; and to enable him to carry out his measures, it invested him with the command of

¹ Cic. *pro Dom.* 5, 6.

² Dion. xxxix. 9.; App. *B. C.* ii. 18.; Plut. *Pomp.* 49. The Clodian party took this opportunity of throwing the blame of this rise upon Cicero, whose friends had filled the city with strangers to effect his recal. Cicero was thus driven to promote Pompeius's interests in his own defence. Clodius thereupon attacked Pompeius as the real author of the famine. Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 3. We may believe with Drumann, that it was the latter who caused an artificial scarcity, with the view of extorting an extraordinary employment.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 1.: "Legem consules conscripserunt quo Pompeio per quinquennium omnis potestas rei frumentariæ toto orbe daretur."

troops and every other resource he might deem necessary. He received the sole appointment to fifteen commissionerships, posts of lucre and dignity coveted by the principal men of Rome. Cicero himself accepted one, though he does not appear to have taken any part in the administration of the affair.¹ The populace, looking to this measure for its immediate relief, was clamorous in its favour, and the senate made no decided opposition.² The appointment was decreed for a term of five years; and its secret opponents were contented with discountenancing certain extravagant provisions which Messius, a flatterer of Pompeius, proposed to annex to it. The triumvir found himself compelled to disclaim any wish for the dictatorial power in the provinces, which his creature's rogation would have conferred upon him³, and the bill passed the popular assembly in a less obnoxious form than might have been apprehended from the strength of his party and the reckless impatience of the multitude.

Hostile attitude of the senate towards Clodius.

The senate was determined to follow up with energy its victory over the public enemy. That august body had listened to the speeches of Cicero on his return with commiseration, the people with shame and contrition. All possible reparation was to be made to the injured patriot. The site of his

¹ Quintus Cicero was employed by Pompeius in the execution of the office (*Cic. pro Scaur.* 2. 39.). Drumann supposes that Marcus resigned his commissionership in favour of his brother. (*Gesch. Roms.* iv. 511.).

² *Cic. ad Att.* iv. 1.: "Senatus frequens et omnes consulares nihil Pompeio postulanti negarunt."

³ *Cic. l. c.*

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house on the Palatine was restored to him, cleared of the new buildings which Clodius had begun to erect upon it, and released from the consequences of the act of consecration, which was now disregarded as informal.¹ Sums of money were also voted to him in compensation for his pecuniary losses.² The next object was to institute proceedings against the demagogue for the violence and illegality of his conduct. The validity of his original election to the tribuneship he had so abused might be brought into question, for high authorities pronounced the mode of his adoption into a plebeian house illegitimate. To establish this point would be to cut up the very roots of his power, by the summary reversal of all his official acts. But it would be difficult to carry so sweeping a censure in the teeth of the various methods of obstruction which a crafty opponent could employ in his defence. While Cicero urged on the prosecution, and Cato, lately returned from Cyprus, stood forward to repel it, the movements of the body of the senate were languid and distracted, and the apprehensions excited by the mob which filled the streets and menaced the assembly deterred it from pressing

¹ Cicero, in his speech *Pro Domo apud Pontifices*, states the reasons why the act of consecration should be pronounced invalid. The college of priests would go no further than to declare that if the circumstances were such as he represented, the act would be vitiated; but the senate was satisfied with this qualified sentence, and proceeded to vote accordingly.

² The compensation for the Palatine house was fixed at HS. vicies, something less than 18,000*l.* of our money, valuing the sestertium at 8*l.* 17*s.* 1*d.* (Smith's *Rom. Antiq.*), that of the Tusculan quingentis millibus, or nearly 4,500*l.*, of the Formian at half that sum: "Certe valde illiberaliter." Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 2.

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the matter to a decision.¹ It was soon found, indeed, that the pursuit of a common enemy was not a matter of interest sufficiently intense to subdue the private jealousies of a triumphant faction. The king of Egypt, Ptolemæus Auletes, of whose suit to the Roman people mention has been already made, had now arrived in the city, and was besieging the doors of the principal nobility with applications to befriend him. A new and most important commission was in view; to whomsoever it fell, it would confer upon him an increase of personal dignity, as the Romans phrased it; it would extend his influence among the lower orders, which still looked upon the honours and titles of illustrious families as claims to their support and suffrages. Moreover, in the discharge of such offices, there was much store of treasure to be acquired, outfit and salary, presents and bribes to be hoarded in the coffers of the family, or distributed among friends or opponents. Such a commission would require a military force for its execution, and thus confer power, and influence, and the means of providing for dependents. For a moment all other affairs of party were abandoned, and political leaders rushed together into the arena to compete for this brilliant preferment. In the first instance, the consuls of the year were authorized, by their exalted position, to propose that the commission should devolve upon one of themselves, upon him who should obtain by lot the province of Cilicia, which lay so opportunely for an expedition to Egypt. Cilicia fell to Lentulus, Spain to Metellus. Len-

It is diverted from its purpose by the application of the King of Egypt for restoration to his kingdom.

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 1.

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The Sibylline oracle prohibits an armed interference.

tulus was preparing to set out for his province, when one of the tribunes, C. Cato, produced an alleged oracle from the Sibylline verses, to the effect that the king must not be restored "with a multitude;" a phrase which seemed to prohibit the employment of an armed force. The power of levying an army was one of the principal advantages which the commission held forth; but the influence of Rome in Egypt was so great that the object, it might be presumed, could be easily effected by the representations even of an unarmed ambassador. The oracle was doubtless a forgery for political objects: but the people were swayed blindly by superstitious terrors, and no one ventured to trifle with their prejudices. Cicero, even in a familiar letter, speaks of the Divine interference with bated breath. In the senate it was generally deemed an opportune fiction; and, in the discussions which took place regarding it, no one seems to have thought proper to question its genuineness.¹ The prediction appears indeed to have sunk deeply into the minds of the nation; the fate of Pompeius, when he was afterwards murdered on the shore of Egypt, was attributed to his neglect of its warning, in venturing merely to land upon the beach and seek an asylum for his broken army.²

Great heats occasioned by the com-

Lentulus did not wait till the question regarding the commission was settled, but departed for his

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* i. 1., in a letter to Lentulus.

² Lucan. viii. 824.:

"Haud equidem immerito Cumanæ carmine vatis
Cautum, ne Nili Pelusia tangeret ora
Hesperius miles, ripasque æstate tumentes."

province as soon as he had descended from the consul's chair. It was there that he awaited the result of these deliberations. In accordance with the provisions of the bill which had already received the requisite sanctions, Cicero would have consented to his retaining the commission, but would have withheld from him the much-coveted military force. Others considered the whole matter as open to fresh discussion. Crassus proposed the appointment of three legates. Bibulus required that the three should be personages of inferior dignity. Volcatius and Afranius, friends of Pompeius, and others who were won over by the intrigues of the royal petitioner¹, would have conferred the office on the great commander alone. Servilius, one of the gravest and noblest of the senate, declared the commission altogether inexpedient.² Thus split into various sections, the senate exposed itself again to the attacks of its bitterest enemy. Clodius succeeded in obtaining the ædileship, while his friends, affecting to support the proposal of Crassus as adverse to Pompeius, used every endeavour to widen the breach between the two triumvirs.³ The latter, regardless

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petition of
the nobles
for this
commission.
A. U. 698.
B. C. 56.

¹ Cic. *ad Div. l. c.*: "Regis causa si qui sunt qui velint, qui pauci sunt, omnes rem ad Pompeium deferunt." The Egyptian king employed intrigue and corruption, and even violence to effect his object. He caused the ambassadors whom the Alexandrians sent to confront him at Rome to be waylaid and murdered on their route. Dion. xxxix. 13.; Strab. xvii. 1.

² Cic. *l. c.*

³ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr. ii. 3.*: "Who is it that starves the people?" exclaimed Clodius. "Pompeius!" shouted his followers. "Who wants to go to Alexandria?" "Pompeius!" they shouted again. "Whom do you wish to send?" "Crassus!"

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of their common interest, could no longer dissemble their mutual jealousy. Pompeius openly accused his colleague of designs against his life, while Crassus thwarted with vigilant activity every scheme for his rival's aggrandizement. Obscure as were the sources of the power which Crassus wielded, every day proved how deeply it was seated, and how great was the weight of the moneyed class by which he was principally supported. The result of a series of petty intrigues gradually narrowed the contest to one between Pompeius and Lentulus, but the increasing violence of the popular demagogues made a decision impossible.

Violence
of Clodius
and Milo.

The city became once more a prey to internal tumults. The nobles began to collect their retainers from the country to protect their champion Milo.¹ The Clodians, unable to repel force by force, appealed in their turn to the tribunals, and impeached him without success. The tribune C. Cato, however, persisted in harassing the senate with factious motions before the popular assembly. The statue of Jupiter on the summit of the Alban Hill was struck by lightning², a portent which excited a general panic, and raised a cry for rescinding the appointment of Lentulus.³ A bill was even proposed to recal him from his province⁴; but the

¹ Cic. *l. c.*: "Operas autem suas Clodius confirmat. Manus ad Quirinalia paratur: in eo multo sumus superiores ipsius copiis. Sed magna manus ex Piceno et Gallico exspectatur ut etiam Catonis rogationibus de Milone et Lentulo resistamus."

² Dion. xxxix. 15. This was in January, or early in February, A. U. 698.

³ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 3.

⁴ Cic. *l. c.*; *ad Div.* i. 5.; "C. Cato legem promulgavit de imperio Lentulo abrogando."

consuls interfered by taking the auspices on the days of meeting, and thus vitiated the proceedings.¹ The wheels of the constitution were locked.

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Clodius had secured himself for the present from the danger of judicial impeachment by obtaining his election to the ædileship. The influence which he still continued to wield at this crisis, bankrupt as he was in character, and destitute of the ordinary resources of great party leaders, must be referred to the secret support he received from personages of more importance than himself. Pompeius indeed had cast him off in a fit of spleen; yet the ends for which the triumvir was working were such as could only be realized through the confusion to which the demagogue's proceedings were tending. The senate had shown more resolution than he expected; the state was not yet ripe for falling quietly under his domination. He now bitterly regretted having divested himself of his military command; the charge of provisioning the city had been denuded of that which constituted its greatest charm, the authority to levy troops. The senate had outwitted him by a specious gift, which added much to his unpopularity, and little to his strength. The subsequent prospect of a command in Egypt had been frustrated. There was only one way left to recover the position which he had relinquished, and that lay through the consulship. The elections were the door, but the senate kept the key. The consuls for the year which had

Pompeius
is anxious
to obtain the
consulship.

The consuls

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* ii. 6.: "Consul . . . dies comitiales exemit omnes. C. Cato concionatus est, comitia haberi non siturum, si sibi cum populo agendi dies essent exempti."

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vigorously
oppose his
views.

just commenced were men of more than common resolution; such at least was Lentulus Marcellinus, and his superior force of character carried Marcius Philippus, his colleague, along with him.¹ These were not the men to surrender the advantage which their party had gained by the reversal of Clodius's infamous law; on the contrary, they were already putting forward, as a candidate for the next consulship, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a brother-in-law of M. Cato, and inspired by his connexion, if not by his own nature, with a deep hatred of the triumvirs. Domitius openly declared that his first act in office should be to propose Cæsar's recal from his province, and he was actuated no doubt by a similar spirit of hostility towards his allies. The danger indeed touched Cæsar much more nearly than either of his associates; for to him the deprivation of his command would be something much more serious than the temporary frustration of his ambitious projects. It would be no less than a summons to appear before his enemies at Rome, unarmed and defenceless. Banishment or even death awaited him, in all probability, the moment that he should descend from power. Indeed, Cæsar's position was exceedingly critical. The reversal of the sentence on Cicero came too soon for his policy. He had assented to it with reluctance. It had been extorted from him by the impatience of Pompeius; for he had doubtless looked to the continuance of Clodius's ascendancy until he could obtain certain

Critical position of Cæsar under a threat of recal from his province.

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 6. : "Consul est egregius Lentulus, non impediēte collega."

further concessions from the terrified senate. He had hoped by means of this instrument on the tribunitian bench to have driven the nobles to consent to an extension of his term of command, with ampler powers and more abundant resources. All this was absolutely necessary for the full development of his design to raise himself to a position in which he might defy his enemies; and in this view he continued, we must imagine, to support Clodius even after Pompeius had withdrawn his countenance from him.

The proconsul of Gaul was never more actively engaged than during the intervals between the campaigns by which his attention was for the time engrossed. After the apparent submission of the Transalpine nations in the autumn of 697, he had betaken himself to the Hither province, where he had two objects in view; the first, and the more ostensible, was to convene the provincial assembly, through which he regulated the internal affairs of his central government, and more particularly provided for the maintenance and recruiting of his forces; the second was to confer with the friends whom he had left in the city, who flocked to him at Lucca¹, bringing in their train political agents of every shade of party, spies, enemies, and admirers. Consulars and officials of every grade thronged the narrow streets of a provincial watering-place. A hundred and twenty

Cæsar arrives at Lucca, and is waited upon by great numbers of senators and knights.

¹ Lucca, according to the ancient orthography, Luca, was on the frontier of Liguria, which was comprehended in the province of Gallia Cisalpina. It was first included in Etruria by Augustus. Mannert, *G. der G. und R.* ix. i. 391.; Suet. *Jul.* 24.: "In urbem provinciæ suæ Lucam."

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lictors might be counted at the proconsul's door, while two hundred personages of senatorial rank, nearly one half of the order, paid their court at his levees.¹

Effects of
his bribery
and caresses.

The genius of the popular champion was never unequal to the opportunities which fortune presented to him, and seemed now to shine the more brilliantly from the pinnacle of glory which he had attained. If he practised every artifice to acquire or retain the affections of all classes, it was to ensure an abundant return of gratitude, and acquiescence in the demands he meditated. While he dazzled them with the lustre of his splendid achievements, and tempered with kindness and affability the haughtiness of military command, he secured an indemnity for the boldness with which he had multiplied his legions beyond the limits fixed by the government, and fortified his position against the malevolence of a future consul. In lavishing upon his flatterers the spoils of his successful wars², he was preparing to dip his hands in the public treasury, for the payment of the armies³ he had led to victory. These manœuvres were crowned with a large measure of success. Senators and knights returned to Rome, their ears tingling with his compliments, their hands overflowing with his benefactions. The spendthrift extolled his generosity; the prudent

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 21.; App. *B. C.* ii. 17. In the winter of 697-698.

² See the instance of C. Rabirius Postumus, whose necessities Cæsar relieved, in the speech of Cicero, *pro Rab. Post.* 15, 16. The effects of Gallic gold became more evident at a later period.

³ Dion. xxxix. 25.

admired his dexterity; the best and gravest bowed beneath the ascendancy of his character, and clung fondly to the hope that he might still save the republic.

The enmity between Pompeius and Crassus was felt by Cæsar, who had so much use to make of both, to be highly disadvantageous to his interests. He was anxious to effect a reconciliation between them before he left Italy to resume the command of his armies. He obtained interviews with them separately, with Crassus at Ravenna, afterwards with Pompeius at Lucca, where he eventually succeeded in bringing them together.¹ The winter had passed, and he had not yet torn himself from the scene of his intrigues, when at the commencement of the month of April he was assailed by a direct attack on the part of the oligarchs. The onset was led by Cicero himself. The orator, after the first outburst of vanity and exultation, had learnt to take a juster view of his own position. The man who could be so easily overthrown could not reasonably aspire to lead a party. The nobles shrunk from his assumption of their championship. The sneering tone in which he continues to speak of them may lead us to infer that he felt the disparagement which they cast upon him. But he bowed to circumstances. Through the first three months of the year he displayed himself very little on the stage of public affairs²; indeed the confusion was such that there was little room for him to

The trium-
virs meet
at Lucca
and arrange
their policy
in concert.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 24.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 6.: "Quo me libentius a curia et ab omni parte rei publicæ subtraho."

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appear. But suddenly, in the beginning of April, he startled the city by stepping prominently forward, and attacking Cæsar's law for the division of lands in Campania.¹ The government had recently been obliged to place a large sum, forty millions of sesterces, at the disposal of its high commissioner for the provisionment of the city. The treasury was drained, and it was easy to assert that there were no means forthcoming for the purchase of lands, according to the tenor of the late agrarian enactment. Cicero, in an extraordinary access of courage, proposed that the law should be altogether repealed; and the senate, admiring and exulting, received the motion with such acclamations as were oftener heard in a popular assembly than in the deliberations of so august a council.² It was resolved that the matter should stand over for solemn discussion on an appointed day in the following month.³ The interview of the triumvirs was devoted to tracing the line of their policy with reference to this hostile demonstration. In the first place, it was determined that all jealousies between the associates must give way to the defence of their common interests. The election of Domitius must be defeated, and Cæsar urged his colleagues to present themselves as candidates in opposition to him.⁴ If successful, he

¹ The question of a repeal had already been mooted by the tribune Lupus in the December preceding, but Marcellinus had thought it prudent not to discuss it during a temporary absence of Pompeius. Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 1.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 5.: "Clamore prope concionali."

³ Cic. *ad Div.* i. 9.: "Non. April. mihi est Senatus assensus ut de agro Campano frequenti Senatu id. Mai. referretur."

⁴ Suet. *Jul.* 24.: "Sed cum L. Domitius consulatus candidatus palam minaretur, consulem se effecturum quod prætor nequisset,

depended on the covenants between them to secure him in his position, and to enlarge his powers to the extent he might deem requisite for his purposes. If the senate should persist in preventing the people from assembling, he was confident that it must ultimately be tired out, or frightened from its course by the fear of a dictatorship. In the mean time Pompeius should use every endeavour to detach Cicero from the enemy, and assist in procuring the prolongation of Cæsar's command, together with the other indulgences which he required.

The proconsul now hastened across the Alps. Pompeius passed over to Sardinia, where he met his legate Q. Cicero, whom he chose to consider, upon his acceptance of a post under him, as a pledge for his brother's allegiance.¹ No sooner had the orator delivered his speech against Cæsar's agrarian law than he had hastened to pay a visit to Pompeius, who was on the point of leaving Rome for Sardinia, with the hope of eliciting from him some tokens of approbation. But the crafty dissembler was impenetrably reserved²; he did not even mention that he expected to meet Cæsar at Lucca on his way. Cicero probably augured no good from his taciturnity. He had already revolved in his mind the rashness of the move he had made; he had balanced the disastrous consequences of a breach with the triumvirs against

Cicero's equivocal conduct in abandoning the nobles, and attaching himself to the triumvirs.

adempturumque ei exercitus, Crassum Pompeiumque in urbem provinciæ suæ Lucam extractos compulit, ut detrudendi Domitii causa alterum consulatum peterent."

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* i. 9.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 6.

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the slender support which he could expect from the weak and wavering faction to which he had renewed his devotion. He was relieved perhaps from a weight of anxiety when he received letters from his brother expostulating with him on his hostility to Cæsar, arguing the policy and wisdom of concession, and still assuring him that the triumphs, though offended, were not implacable. We discover immediately an entire change in the tone of the orator's correspondence.¹ He abandons resentfully the cause of the oligarchs, against whose faithlessness and frivolity he lashes himself into indignation. They no longer love him, he says, and he must now transfer his regard to others who do. He paints to himself in glowing colours the merits of the great chiefs of the republic, and argues from the maxims of the philosophers of old that the simple citizen should conform his views to those of the best and noblest. He deprecates the charge of inconstancy in tones which seem to admit its justice, and finally resigns himself in despair to the irresistible current of circumstances.

Cicero's
speech *de*
Provinciis
Consularibus: he
defends
Cæsar and
Pompeius,
and re-
venges him-
self upon
Piso and
Gabinus.

Cicero indeed was spared the disgrace of refuting in May the arguments which he had alleged against Cæsar's law in the month preceding. The senate, abandoned by its orator, allowed the matter to drop. But when he next appeared in the arena of public discussion, it was to pronounce a laboured panegyric upon the very man against whom he had so lately led the ranks of the opposition. Be-

¹ Compare Cicero's letters, *ad Att.* iv. 5., *ad Div.* i. 7., and more particularly that to Lentulus *ad Div.* i. 9., in which he reviews his political course at this period.

fore proceeding to the election of consuls, the nobles bethought them of the Sempronian law, according to which the consular provinces were to be assigned before the day of election. Little regard, as we have seen, had been paid to an enactment so opposed to the rapid and fluctuating combinations of the politics of the day; but it might be made an instrument for assailing an enemy, and it was well remembered that Cæsar had received his three provinces in utter defiance of it. It was now proposed, not only to enforce it, but to give it even a retrospective effect.¹ All the speakers, except Servilius, had declared themselves in favour of depriving the proconsul of one or more of the governments he held together, when Cicero stepped forward in his defence, with a speech of peculiar dignity and spirit. He pointed out with just enthusiasm the extent and rapidity of Cæsar's conquests; how he had broken the Helvetians, repulsed the Germans, received submission and hostages from every state of Gaul. He insisted on the policy of allowing him to complete and consolidate the work he had thus successfully begun; a work which should relieve Rome thenceforward from all her anxious dread of Gaulish invasion. By an artful panegyric on Pompeius, the victor of the East, he insinuated the importance of fostering the genius of an ambitious rival. He claimed it

¹ Cic. *Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus*; *ad Div.* i. 9. This speech was probably delivered in May (comp. *ad Div.* i. 7.), when Cicero alludes to the discussion in a letter to Lentulus, though he seems to be withheld by shame from mentioning the part he took in it himself: "Quod eo ad te brevius scribo, quia me status hic reipublicæ non delectat." Abeken, p. 153.

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as a merit that he had prevailed on the senate to increase the number of Cæsar's lieutenants, and to grant him those pecuniary supplies which the war demanded¹; and he contended that those acts must be consistently crowned by repelling with indignation the blow now aimed at the proconsul. The arguments of the orator, backed by the influence of the triumvirs, averted the impending decree. But Cicero had not let slip the opportunity for revenging himself on the consuls who had consented to his banishment. He showed with his usual felicity how strongly the Semonian law condemned the appointment of Piso and Gabinius to Macedonia and Syria, and he even succeeded in effecting their recal.²

The consuls resist the election of their successors till the expiration of their offices.

But with whatever gravity and decorum the senate might continue its discussions, in anticipation of the due election of magistrates, there were forces out of doors beyond its control, which had arrayed themselves in so hostile an attitude, that it could not venture to invoke the decision of the comitia. Pompeius and Crassus were canvassing the tribes; the demagogues of the forum, in secret league with them³, were stirring up the passions of the populace, and urging them to reject the nominee of the oligarchy. When it became manifest that Domitius

¹ Dion. xxxix. 25.

² Acon. in *Pison. arg.* p. 2.: "Revocati . . . ex provinciis Piso et Gabinius." The latter, however, did not relinquish his government till M. Crassus came to supersede him, A.U. 700. Piso was summoned home without delay, and his province handed over to the prætor Q. Ancharius. Cic. in *Pis.* 36.

³ Dion. xxxix. 29.: Κλώδιος δὲ ἐν τούτῳ μεταπηδήσας αὐθις πρὸς τὸν Πομπήϊον, κ. τ. λ.

could not succeed, the senate, under the daring guidance of Marcellinus, determined at least to prevent the election of any other candidate. Day after day the consuls persisted in forbidding the tribes to assemble. There still existed sufficient reverence for the forms of the constitution to ensure respect even to this stretch of prerogative. The election of magistrates was so closely bound up with the observances of the state religion, that no appointment could command the regard even of its own authors which was not sanctioned by the ordinary modes of procedure. Indeed, the obstinacy with which Marcellinus maintained a struggle which could only increase the confusion of affairs earned him the acclamations even of the fickle populace. He replied to their insensate shouts by solemnly warning them that a time was coming when even their voices should be no longer free.¹ He wished, perhaps, to prepare their minds for that final appeal to arms which the nobles had been long revolving in their wild and fluctuating counsels. But the consuls knew that their power was on the point of expiring with the close of the current year, and that it would be impossible ultimately to resist the usurpation with which the commonwealth was threatened. They abstained during the remainder of their term from all the duties of their office. They neither relinquished the mourning in which they had clad themselves, nor attended the popular spectacles, nor feasted in the Capitol on Jove's solemn day, nor celebrated the great Latin festival on the Alban mount, but

¹ Val. Max. vi. 2. 6.

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continued to conduct themselves in every thing as men under constraint, and magistrates deprived of their legitimate power.¹

Pompeius and Crassus obtain their elections to the consulship by violence, A. U. 699, A. C. 55.

As soon as the curule chairs had become vacant, the triumvirs reappeared on the stage. With the assistance of C. Cato and the other tribunes devoted to them, they convened the people, and enacted a shadow of the forms of election. They resorted to violence and bribery with equal recklessness; but it was not till young Crassus arrived from Gaul with a detachment of Cæsar's veterans, to carry his father's election, that the nobles finally gave way. Domitius himself had doggedly interposed as a rival candidate, and only retired from the contest when his attendant had been slain at his side.² The new consuls, Pompeius and Crassus, having obtained their own elections by violating every principle of justice and law, proceeded to employ similar means to secure the other principal offices for creatures on whom they could rely.³ M. Cato, who was a candidate for the prætorship, was mortified by a contemptuous rejection, which the character of Vatinius, the rival to whom the all-powerful consuls postponed him, rendered the more insulting.⁴ Nor indeed did the sworn defenders of

¹ Dion. xxxix. 30.

² Dion. xxxix. 31.; App. *B. C.* ii. 17.

³ Two only of the new tribunes, C. Ateius Capito, and P. Aquilius Gallus, were hostile to them. Dion. xxxix. 32.

⁴ Liv. *Epit.* cv.; Val. Max. vii. 5.: "Comitiorum maximum crimen . . . proxima dementiæ suffragia . . . quem honorem Catoni denegaverant Vatinio dare coacti sunt." This striking perversion of justice was remembered four centuries later: comp. Mamert. *Grat. Act. ad Julian.* c. 19.: "Unde factum est ut majores nostri viderent Vatinios designatos et repulsos Catones."

the public tranquillity carry their point in all cases without bloodshed. But quiet was eventually restored; they were feared for their vigour, if not respected, and Rome settled down for a time in exhaustion and disgust under the tyranny of her new rulers.

When Pompeius looked back upon his own career, from the time of his return from Asia in the enjoyment of unexampled glory, and with the prospect of exerting almost boundless influence, he could not fail to observe that he had fallen from the summit of dignity which he then occupied, and that his rival Cæsar was threatening to outclimb him at no distant day. He might remark how different had been the course they had respectively pursued. The one had awaited in proud inaction the offer of fresh honours and powers; the other had seized and secured them with his own hands. The one had studied to increase the confusion of public affairs, by balancing faction against faction; the other had attached himself, without wavering, to the party with which he was hereditarily connected. The one had hoped that the necessities of the state would at last combine all men in the common policy of elevating him to the dictatorship; the other had applied himself steadily to the task of reducing his opponents to insignificance, and throwing the creation of a supreme ruler into the hands of his own devoted adherents. Pompeius seems to have now determined to alter his previous course, and imitate that of the younger statesman, by some bolder and more hazardous steps, such as he had not shrunk from

Pompeius compares his position with that of Cæsar, and meditates a change of policy.

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himself in earlier times, when his position was still to be won. It was with this view that he grasped at the consulship, and obtained it by means which the nobles could never forgive. He wanted, as we have seen, to secure the reversion of a province, and to place himself again at the head of an army. A short experience of civil affairs had sufficed to teach him that the profession of his early choice, in which he had been invincible, was the most natural to him, as well as the most available for his purposes. As a military chieftain, he might enact again the crowning triumphs of his master Sulla, whom he had imitated in the outset of his career with such fidelity and success. But the toils in which Cæsar had entangled him, by the connexion which he had so dexterously formed with him, confined his movements on every side, and disabled him from the free use of the victory which he had gained.

Law of Trebonius for conferring provinces on Pompeius and Crassus. Jealousy of Cæsar's adherents.

The consuls began their career with an outward show of moderation, affecting to be content with their brilliant position, and to look for no ulterior advantages. But C. Trebonius, one of their allies in the tribunate, came forward in their service, and, no doubt, at their own suggestion, with a proposal that the governments of Spain and Syria should be conferred upon them respectively, at the expiration of their year of office, for a term of five years, together with extensive powers for making war and levying armies.¹ The friends

¹ Liv. *Epit.* cv. ; Dion. xxxix. 33. : Στρατιώταις τὲ ὅσοις ἂν ἐθελήσωσι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων χρωμένοις, καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην πρὸς οὓς ἂν βουλευθῶσι ποιούμενοις.

of Cæsar were immediately roused. It was the great object of their patron to obtain a renewal of the lease of his own proconsulate. His original term was now only in the course of its fourth year, but his plans required several more for their full development. Gaul, once conquered, had risen again in arms; Germany and Britain loomed obscurely in the distance; the mere proximity of freedom furnished a dangerous example to unsettled and discontented subjects. The excuse was plausible; but it was only a pretence; the real objects of the proconsul were not such as could be revealed in the Roman forum. Accordingly, the partizans of Cæsar, zealous for their patron's advancement, and not less so for their own private interests, declared that they would not suffer such an augmentation of the dignity of Pompeius and Crassus, without securing an equivalent for the absent triumvir. The consuls were obliged reluctantly to recede from their own exclusive pretensions, and it was signified to Trebonius, as their wish, that he should propose another law for the prolongation of Cæsar's command also.¹

If the statesmen of Rome were disgusted at the arrogant ambition of consuls who had thrust themselves unbidden into the seats they occupied, they were still more alarmed at the favour demanded from the other quarter. They could not fail to foresee that it would build up from its foundations such a power as had never before overshadowed the commonwealth; for it was manifest that these latter years of Cæsar's government

Law for the
prolonga-
tion of
Cæsar's
command
for five
years op-
posed by the
senatorial
party.

¹ App. *B. C.* ii. 18.; Vell. ii. 46.: "Cæsari lege, quam Pompeius ad populum tulit, prorogatæ in idem spatium temporis provinciæ."

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would consolidate his influence over his soldiers, by weaning them from the habits and prejudices of citizens, and teaching them to centre all their feelings of duty and obedience in their leader alone. No sooner, therefore, were these motions made, than the nobles arrayed themselves for another struggle. It was not, however, Lucullus, and Servilius, and Cicero that now appeared, as formerly, in the van. M. Cato, the prestige of whose gravity had been almost worn away by daily collision with violence and vulgarity, and Favonius, a party brawler, rather than a political champion, were the most active leaders of the oligarchy. Ateius and Aquilius, in their capacity of tribunes, were willing to throw over them the bruised and battered shield of their official dignity. But, under the guidance of such men as these, the cause was in danger of being rendered ridiculous. Favonius, being limited to an harangue of a single hour, consumed the whole of it in remonstrating against the shortness of the time allotted him. Cato, to whom a double space was conceded, launched forth into a general invective against the conduct of his opponents, tracking their violence and treachery through the whole sequence of political events, so that his time also was exhausted before he had arrived at the real point of discussion.¹ Such were the infirmities of the men to whose discretion the indolence or despair of the nobles had now consigned their party.

The law is
carried by
popular

Thus was the whole day consumed before Trebonius and his allies, on the tribunitian bench, had

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 43.; Dion. xxxix, 34.

any opportunity of delivering their opinions; for it was the custom, derived from simpler times, to allow private persons to take the precedence in discussion, that they might not be unduly biassed by the superior authority of those who spoke from official seats. Cato had so far gained an advantage, that, at such a turbulent epoch, when it might truly be said that none could tell what a day might bring forth, to put off a decision even for a few hours was at least to open a new page in the chapter of accidents. Aquilius, fearing now that the exasperation of his opponents might induce them to resort to violence to prevent his appearance in the forum on the morrow, passed the night in one of the curias on the spot. But his ingenuity was of little avail. Trebonius caused the doors of the building to be blocked up, and kept his colleague in durance through the greater part of the ensuing day. At the same time, he obstructed the passages which led to the forum, and excluded with a high hand Ateius, Cato, Favonius, and all the most notable men of their party. Some of them, indeed, contrived to slip unobserved into the assembly, while others forced their way into the inclosure over the heads of the crowd. Cato and Ateius were lifted upon men's shoulders, and from that unsteady elevation the voice of the tribune was heard above the din, proclaiming that the auspices had been taken, that the proceedings were illegal, and the assembly formally dissolved. He was answered by the brandishing of clubs, and showers of stones; swords and daggers were drawn in the affray, and the friends of the senatorial

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party were driven from the arena, not without bloodshed.¹ Such were the tumultuary proceedings by which the triumvirs secured the popular ratification of their schemes.

Disastrous
conse-
quences of
this affray
to Pom-
peius.

In such scenes as these, the consuls themselves did not scruple to take part openly. Not long before, at the election of ædiles, the robe of Pompeius had been sprinkled with the blood of a victim of popular ferocity. This accident was eventually attended by the most fatal consequences.² On his return home, the consul was met at his door by his wife Julia, who had heard of the fray, and was hastening to welcome her husband on his safe arrival. The youthful matron, devotedly attached to her spouse, and far advanced in pregnancy, was so much alarmed at the sight, that she was seized with premature labour. The event gave a shock to her constitution, from which, as will appear, she never afterwards recovered.

Pompeius
seeks to
ingratiate
himself with
the popu-
lace. His
magnificent
theatre.

The populace, who delighted in thwarting the senate and mobbing its champions, had nevertheless no sympathy for the chieftains who had now condescended to become their leaders. It was in vain that Pompeius studied to ingratiate himself with them, as Cæsar had done before him, by the magnificence of his public shows. The splendour, indeed, even of Cæsar's ædileship was eclipsed by the opening of his rival's gorgeous theatre, the first edifice of the kind which was built of stone, and designed for permanence.³ In the circuit of its walls, it

¹ Plut. *l. c.*, *Pomp.* 52., *Crass.* 15.; Dion. xxxix. 35, 36.

² Plut. *Pomp.* 53.

³ Dion. xxxix. 38.: ϕ καὶ νῦν λαμπρυνόμεθα. Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 20.:

could accommodate forty thousand spectators, no small portion of the resident population of Rome; and he adorned it with a profusion of gold, marble, and precious stones, such as the Western world had never before witnessed. That so extravagant an expenditure might not seem to have been lavished entirely upon a work of mere luxury, he attached to it a temple dedicated to Venus the Conqueror, so placed that the seats of the theatre might serve as a flight of stairs to the sacred edifice. The ceremony of consecration was attended with a display of music, with chariot races, and all the games of the palæstra.¹ In the course of five successive days, five hundred lions were sent forth to be hunted and slaughtered in the arena. Eighteen elephants were made to fight with trained bands of gladiators; but the populace was seized with a fit of unusual sensibility, and the cries and agonies of these half-reasoning animals damped even the excitement of such a spectacle with pity and disgust.² Some even professed to

“Quippe erant qui Cn. Pompeium incusatum a senioribus ferrent, quod mansuram theatri sedem posuisset: nam antea subitariis gradibus et scena in tempus structa ludos edi solitos, vel, si vetustiora repetas, stantem populum spectavisse.” The founder was supposed to regard none of his exploits with more complacency than the erection of this magnificent edifice. Luc. i. 133.: “Plausuque sui gaudere theatri,” vii. 10.:

“Nam Pompeiani visus sibi sede theatri
Innumeram effigiem Romanæ cernere plebis;
Attollique suum lætis ad sidera nomen
Vocibus, et plausu cuneos certare sonantes.”

The sentiments of the ancients on this building are collected, and its later history related by Drumann, iv. 521.

¹ Dion. l. c.; Plut. *Pomp.* 52.; Cic. *de Off.* ii. 16.; Plin. *H. N.* xxxvi. 24.

² Cic. *ad Div.* vii. 1.; Plin. *H. N.* viii. 7.: “Tanto dolore, ut

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interpret the miserable wailings of the victims, and affirmed that they appealed to the generosity and justice of the Roman people, having only been induced to leave their native shores on assurances of safety, which their captors had confirmed to them by oath.¹ After all, the great man's detractors averred, the liberality was not Pompeius's own.² The building had been raised by the taste and spirit of Demetrius, one of his freedmen, who had thus devoted to the entertainment of the public the treasures he had accumulated in following his patron's fortunes. He had modestly given to it the name of Pompeius, to screen from the invidious gaze of the citizens the enormous amount of his own private gains.

He remains
in Italy,
and governs
his province
by his le-
gates.

Whatever remnant of gratitude, however, the Romans might feel towards their consul, after the efforts he had made to amuse them, they were dissatisfied both with him and with themselves, when they beheld the legions which he and his colleague had hastened to levy in pursuance of their late decree. The tribunes attempted even to revoke the sanction under which they had been raised, but the speedy preparations of Crassus to set forth on his meditated expedition, and the apparent moderation of Pompeius, who despatched his troops to Spain, that their presence in the neighbourhood of the city might afford no cause for jealousy,

populus flens universus consurgeret, dirasque Pompeio quas ille mox luit imprecaretur."

¹ The credit of this statement must be appropriated to Dion exclusively.

² Dion. l. c.

soon engaged them to relax from their hostility. Pompeius himself determined not to quit the centre of affairs; the functions with which he had been invested as controller of provisions gave him a ready excuse¹; and he proposed, for the first time since the institution of the republic, to govern his province through his lieutenants alone.

During their consulship, Pompeius and Crassus had turned some portion of their attention, though without much energy or decision, to the enactment of sumptuary laws; a proceeding which always flatters the envious feelings of the middle classes, and which met at Rome with the cold approbation of the better-informed even among the highest. But in this policy they were speedily defeated by the selfishness of the nobles, particularly of Hortensius², and they were easily induced to desist from a project, undertaken probably more for the sake of appearances than from any zeal in the cause of antique simplicity. They succeeded, however, in establishing a pecuniary qualification for the office of judex³, instead of the merely arbitrary selection from the privileged orders, the senators, knights, and ærarian tribunes, which had prevailed since the enactment of the Aurelian law.⁴ This reform, also, had a specious appearance, inasmuch

Enactment
of sump-
tuary laws,
and a pec-
uniary
qualification
for the office
of judex.

¹ Dion. xxxix. 39.; Plut. *Pomp.* 53. The good-natured philosopher attributes Pompeius's stay at Rome solely to his affection for his wife.

² Dion. xxxix. 37.

³ Cic. *Philipp.* i. 8.; Ascon. in Cic. *Pison.* 94.: "Pompeius in consulatu secundo . . . promulgavit ut amplissimo ex censu, ex centuriis aliter quam antea lecti iudices, æque tamen ex illis tribus ordinibus res judicaret." Comp. Fischer, *Röm. Zeittäfel*, p. 247.

⁴ A. U. 684, B. C. 70.

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as it tended to confine a post of much responsibility and temptation to the classes which, from their affluent or easy circumstances, might be deemed sufficiently free from the ordinary incitements to cupidity. In reality, however, in the frightful state of the reigning immorality, its consequence was probably no other than to enhance the price of judicial favour. But Crassus was eminently studious of outward decorum, and such, no doubt, was the character which the measure seemed at first sight to bear. On the other hand, it was a direct boon to the moneyed interest; it raised wealth above birth, and virtue, and education; it tended to hasten the consummation of social corruption, when poverty is branded as a crime, and money alone supposed to embrace every object of respect.

Political position of Cicero: his connexion with the triumvirs, and hollow reconciliation with Crassus.

The overwhelming preponderance of the triumvirs in the scales of power reduced Cicero to a state of political inactivity. He studied to secure the friendship, or, in other words, the protection both of Cæsar and Pompeius, while at the same time he shrank from joining systematically in the defence of their policy, the only condition on which they would freely impart it. On the one hand, he writes with great satisfaction of the visit with which Pompeius had honoured his retirement, not unmingled, however, with serious misgivings as to the sincerity of his friendly expressions¹; on the other, he pays his court assiduously to the proconsul in Gaul, through his brother Quintus, who had accepted the post of legatus there, and other officers in the army. He submits his poetical

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 9.

compositions to the judgment of the accomplished captain, and is highly delighted with the compliments which he receives in return.¹ He hints that he is engaged on a poem in celebration of Cæsar's invasion of Britain, which now occupied public attention; he applies to his brother for the facts; the form, he says, shall be supplied by his own genius.² But there can be little doubt that Cicero was really attached both to the one and the other, to Cæsar more especially, who seems never to have made a personal enemy or lost a friend. Cicero made no advances towards Crassus, whose person and character he always regarded with aversion, and he could not put on the guise of affection where his feelings were of a nature directly opposite. The other triumvirs, indeed, constantly strove to effect a better understanding between him and their colleague, and their efforts were strongly seconded by the mutual regard of the orator and the younger Crassus. But the enmity of many years, as Cicero himself confesses, burst forth in a violent altercation between himself and Crassus in the senate, just before the departure of the latter for his province, and this open rupture was with difficulty skinned over at the last moment to meet the public eye.³ The stress which the triumvirs laid upon the mere appearance of a reconciliation may have flattered

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 16.² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 15.³ Cic. *ad Div.* i. 9.: "Crassus, ut quasi testata populo Rom. esset nostra gratia, pœne a meis laribus est in provinciam profectus." The reconciliation was attested by a supper, at which the parties met in the gardens of Crassipes, who had lately married the orator's daughter Tullia: "Quum mihi condixisset, cœnavit apud me in mei generi Crassipedis hortis."

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resources.

Cicero's self-importance; but the advice of his friend Atticus was probably the wisest that could be offered, in urging him, at this crisis, to abandon political life. From the termination of the affair of Catilina, his part was, in fact, concluded. His triumphant return from banishment formed an appropriate drop-scene to the noble drama of which he had been the hero. But, in the midst of all his cares, the disappointment of his ambition, the ingratitude of one set of friends, and the insincerity of another, embittered as they were by his constant apprehensions for the welfare of his country, he still filled every vacant moment with the recreations of literature and philosophy.¹ His doors stood always open to any friend who would contribute a speculation or a criticism to his overflowing stores of thought. His mind, irritable, perplexed, and desponding in public matters, recovered, in these healthier engagements, its calmness, its dignity, and its strength. In philosophy, he kept his aim before him with a steadiness which it had been well for his fame if he could have imparted to his political career; or rather, the same disposition to balance and temporize, which wrecked his fortunes as a statesman, fitted him to hear all parties and weigh all theoretical opinions, and, if not to discover speculative truth, to limit on all sides the encroachments of error.²

¹ It was in the course of this year that Cicero wrote, or at least completed his dialogue *de Oratore*, the most elaborate and interesting perhaps of his works. Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 13. 16., *ad Div.* i. 9.

² A story was told of Cicero (Plut. *Cic.* 5.), that in his youth he consulted the oracle at Delphi how he might acquire fame, and that he received in answer the prudent advice, to make the bent of his

Meanwhile, the statesmen of Rome, unable to adjust their rival pretensions to restore the king of Egypt to his throne, had allowed the affair to fall into abeyance. We have seen that Lentulus Spinther had gone to his province of Cilicia, in the expectation of receiving full powers from the government to carry that measure into execution, according to the tenor of the bill which he had himself proposed. When the complete ratification of his commission was withheld, and the subject reopened for competition and intrigue, Cicero undertook to watch over the interests of his friend the late consul, and continued to amuse him with hopes of eventually bringing the matter to a favourable issue. But in the meanwhile the affair, which had lingered so long at Rome and had become at last forgotten in the hurry of more momentous agitations, was settled at once by a daring and unscrupulous hand. Gabinius had succeeded, on the expiration of his consulship at the end of the year 696, to the proconsular government of Syria. We meet with no trace of any special enactment by which that office was assured to him for any longer period than the ordinary term of one year; nevertheless, he occupied the government through the space of two years complete, and did not quit it, even after his formal recal upon Cicero's motion, till towards the end of 699, when Crassus was preparing to supersede him.¹ The aggressive and tyrannical cha-

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Trans-
actions of
Gabinius in
his govern-
ment of
Syria,
A. U. 697,
698.

He resolves
to restore
Ptolemæus
Auletes to
the throne
of Egypt.

own genius, and not the estimation of the world, the guide of his life. This pleasing fiction expresses the judgment of posterity upon his character.

¹ The laws of Sulla, always adapted to enhance the influence of

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racter which distinguished the conduct of the Roman proconsuls, both towards their own subjects and foreigners, was carried out by Gabinus with systematic energy. With regard to Judea he adopted the policy which Pompeius had bequeathed to the governors of the province of Syria, and maintained by a military force the authority of Hyrcanus against the family of his brother Aristobulus. The restlessness of the Arabs on his frontiers might demand his vigilance and activity, and excuse the attacks which he made upon the neighbouring tribes. Some trifling successes which he obtained in these enterprizes acquired for him the title of Imperator from his soldiers.¹ But when he applied to the senate for a supplicatio, in honour apparently of his exploits on one of these expeditions, the nobles showed their dislike to him, and their stifled resentment towards his patron Pompeius, by meeting his demand with a contemptuous refusal.² Such an affront, it was said, had never before been cast upon a proconsul, and it served rather to excite than to check his ambition and audacity. He next proposed to restore Mithridates to the throne of Parthia, from which he had been ejected by his brother Orodes. But at the same time he was

the senate, permitted the proconsul to remain in his province, after the expiration of the year, until he was superseded by a successor (Drumann, ii. 190.). Cicero, in a letter to Lentulus (*ad Dir.* i. 9.), suggests to him that he is not authorized to leave Cilicia before the arrival of a new proconsul with full powers.

¹ It seems that Gabinus suffered some ignominious losses in these campaigns. Cic. *pro Sest.* 33.: "Neque equitatum in Syria et cohortes optimas perdidissemus."

² Cic. *Philipp.* xiv. 9., *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 8.: "Id. Maiis senatus frequens divinus fuit in supplicatione Gabinio deneganda."

besieged by the importunities of Ptolemæus Auletes, who had retired in disgust from the doors of his patrons in Rome, and the offer of a direct bribe induced Gabinius to adopt in preference the cause of the Egyptian.¹

The population of Alexandria, which gave law to Egypt, was headstrong and rebellious, and always required to be cajoled into submission to its sovereigns. It had expelled Ptolemæus from his throne, and bestowed the vacant seat upon his daughter Berenice. When the exiled monarch betook himself to Rome, and petitioned the senate to restore him to the dignity which had been solemnly assured to him by the declaration of friendship and alliance on the part of the republic², the Alexandrians sought to strengthen themselves against the impending danger. They invited Seleucus, a scion of the dynasty which had lately reigned in Syria, to partake the throne and bed of their young queen. But both the people and the sovereign seem to have been soon dissatisfied with this alliance, and the unfortunate prince was strangled by the orders of his consort. Another competitor for the precarious distinction was found in the person of

Berenice,
daughter of
Ptolemæus,
reigns in
Alexandria.

¹ His cause was recommended to Gabinius by letters from Pompeius himself. Dion. xxxix. 56.

² Cæsar had asserted that the kingdom of Egypt had been bequeathed to the Roman people by Alexander I. (see above, p. 122.). That sovereign had left one daughter, Berenice, and two illegitimate sons, afterwards kings of Egypt and Cyprus. The daughter died, and Auletes, the elder of the brothers, experienced great difficulty in establishing his claim to the succession. The jealousy of the senate saved him from the aggression meditated by Cæsar, and he spent 6000 talents in winning over the nobles whom he principally feared. Suet. *Jul.* 54.; Dion. xxx. 12.; Plut. *Cæs.* 48.

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Archelaus, who is stated to have been the son of one of the generals of Mithridates, but who pretended to be the offspring of the great king himself, and professed to wield the influence of that venerated name. It seems that Gabinius had obtained possession of this man at an earlier period, and had purposely allowed him to escape¹, in order to embroil the Egyptian court still more with the government of Rome, and give a colour to the violence he meditated in direct opposition to the decree of the senate.

Gabinius
restores
Ptolemæus,
who puts his
daughter
to death.

Upon the arrival of the proconsul with his legions, bringing Ptolemæus in his train, the Egyptians did not hesitate to rise in arms to defend their independence and the sovereign of their choice. But resistance was fruitless. The Alexandrian populace, however violent and reckless of their lives in tumults and seditions, were not fit subjects for military discipline, and formed a contemptible soldiery.² Gabinius entered the city after one or two skirmishes, and effected the revolution to which he had pledged himself. Ptolemæus reascended his throne, and his first act was to put his daughter to death, to gratify his vengeance or ensure his safety, and the next, to massacre the noblest and richest of her adherents, in order to amass the enormous

¹ Dion (xxxix. 57.) mentions the fact of this connivance.

² Comp. Dion's remarks on the character of the Alexandrians (xxxix. 58.), and Ammian. xxii. 11.: "In civitate quæ suo pte motu et ubi causæ non suppetunt, seditionibus crebris agitur et turbulentis, ut oraculorum quoque loquitur fides;" where Valesius adduces other passages from the ecclesiastical historians. Compare also Vopiscus in *Saturn.* 7.; Dion Chrys. *Orat.* xxxii.

sum which he had guaranteed as the price of his restoration.¹

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A small portion only of this Egyptian gold found its way into the private coffers of Gabinius, since he was compelled to expend the greater part of it in buying impunity for his daring violation of the law. He dared not even send an account of the transaction to his government, much less advance any claim to public honours. But the proconsul's share in the restoration of the fugitive monarch was too notorious to escape detection; nor was this the only part of his administration which called aloud for judicial inquiry. The Syrians complained of the effects of his absence from his province. They had been exposed to the molestation of the brigands of the mountains and the desert; the publicani had been unable to collect the revenues; and the youthful Sisenna, the proconsul's son, whom he had left behind as his representative, had proved himself wholly unequal to so arduous a post. There were not wanting personal enemies of Gabinius to excite the indignation and superstition of the Roman people against him. They wielded with fatal effect the terrors of the Sibylline oracle. To awaken the fears of the multitude was to exasperate their anger.

Superstitious
alarms of
the Roman
populace.

As long as Pompeius and Crassus retained the consular office they threw the shield of their influence over the proconsul. The one was his po-

Gabinius is
succeeded
in his pro-
vince by
Crassus.

¹ This sum is stated at ten thousand talents, above two millions of our money. In such a matter we may readily suspect exaggeration. The celebrated wealth of Crassus, at the highest computation (Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. 47.) was not more than about eight thousand three hundred talents.

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litical as he had formerly been his military leader, and could not now afford to dispense with his support; the other, it was said, was won over to his cause by a share in the spoils of his government.¹ Gabinius was allowed to remain unmolested in Syria; but the approach of Crassus as his successor in the administration of that province robbed him of this retreat, and obliged him to take measures for meeting his enemies in Rome. The intrigues of the triumvirs had prevented the election of new consuls till the close of the year. It was not till December that the perseverance of the nobles at last prevailed. The comitia were held, and Domitius obtained the long-sought for object of his ambition. But the triumph of his friends was damped by the selection of Appius Claudius as his colleague, which threatened to counteract the schemes of aggression and revenge which they meditated. Appius was the brother of P. Clodius, the infamous tribune. He was closely connected with Pompeius by the marriage of his daughter with a son of the triumvir, and though he appears to have been on this account regarded with more consideration by Cicero, he was generally disliked and feared by the senatorial party. His career was distinguished even in that corrupt age by its unblushing venality. Though professing to second the policy of Pompeius, he began his consulship by joining his colleague in threatening to impeach Gabinius³; not so much from

He is
threatened
with im-
peachment.

¹ Dion. xxxix. 60.

² L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher consuls, A. U. 700.

³ Such seems to be the meaning of the apparently corrupt passage, Dion. xxxix. 60.

a wish to rival his brother as a demagogue, as with the hope of extorting from the proconsul, by way of bribe, a portion of the treasures, the fame of which was already bruited far and wide.¹ But Gabinius easily divined his views, and doubtless found means to soften his hostility. Though ejected from the place of honour in Syria, he still continued to linger in the province, from whence he distributed bribes among his friends and enemies at Rome, and opposed the demand of a triumph to the charges of mal-administration suspended over him.² His conduct was first brought indirectly in

A. U. 700,
B. C. 54.

¹ Another instance of the cupidity of Appius appears in his proceedings respecting Antiochus, king of Commagene. This district, on the right bank of the Euphrates, formed a small dependent sovereignty. Antiochus, its ruler, had received from Cæsar, during his consulship, permission to wear the Roman toga, and was now petitioning the senate to confirm this honourable distinction, which had been disregarded, perhaps, by the neighbouring proconsuls, Lentulus or Gabinius. Appius had received presents to induce him to regard this suit with favour. Cicero attacked and ridiculed the pretensions of the kingling, apparently from mere levity, for it could not have been part of his deliberate policy to insult the obscurest of Cæsar's clients. Appius did every thing in his power to conciliate the orator, fearing that if the dependent kings should be deterred from suing to the Roman statesmen, it would dry up a most lucrative source of emolument. Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 12.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 2.

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He returns to Rome, is impeached on a charge of majestas, but acquitted.

prevent the assembling of the popular comitia, before which the tribunes had determined to bring forward a direct accusation.¹ The affair still lingered until the arrival of the culprit himself, which he had put off to the latest moment.

Notwithstanding the means which Gabinius had taken to gain to his interests the principal men of the city, the reception he encountered, upon his appearance in September before the walls, was so cold and disheartening that he did not venture to make a public entry. For it was not only the faction of the senate which had vowed his disgrace and ruin; the popular feeling, worked upon through its superstitious terrors, had set decisively against him. Accordingly, he slunk within the gates privately and by night, and even then delayed for several days to render to the senate the official account of his administration. He was treated with haughtiness and harshness by the members of the assembly. Cicero attacked him with acrimony, and so provoked him, that he retorted by taunting his assailant with the disgrace of his exile. But things had changed since Gabinius had left Rome. The senate, instead of cowering under the blows directed against its champion, as in the triumphant days of the Clodian tribunate, rose to a man in his defence, and crowded around him, showering upon him expressions of applause and gratitude with all the enthusiasm of the period of his consulship. The influence of Pompeius, indeed, was interposed to screen Gabinius from their exasperation; but more than one accusation was impending over him,

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 13.

and L. Lentulus was first appointed to bring him to trial on the charge of majestas, or treason against the state. The act of a military officer who made war without the express order of the government was a treasonable violation of the majesty of the republic; but the crime of Gabinius was of an aggravated character, for he had assailed Egypt in direct contravention of his orders. He defended himself on the plea, that, notwithstanding the decree which had been issued to forbid the restoration of Ptolemæus, another law had passed the popular assembly by which it had been expressly enjoined.¹ Whether any tumultuary proceedings of Clodius had really taken place to give a colour to this line of defence, or whether Gabinius relied upon a forgery (for it is not impossible that even the public instruments of the state might have been falsified²), or whether the plea rested merely upon an audacious fiction, the senate refused to lend any countenance to it. But the opposition of Cicero had already cooled down, the judges had been successfully tampered with, and, in spite of the hostility professed at least by both of the consuls, and the imprecations of the multitude, the criminal was acquitted upon the main charge, and the response of the Sibyl was evasively interpreted to refer to altogether different circumstances. The people, however, were not so easily satisfied, and the occurrence of a violent

¹ Cic. *pro Rabir. Post.* 8.

² Cic. *de Leg.* iii. 20.; comp. Drumann, iii. 55. A flagrant instance of the kind is mentioned in Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 18.

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Gabinus is accused of extortion in his government, defended by Cicero, but condemned and banished.

inundation of the Tiber¹ armed their superstition with new arguments against the victim who had not yet escaped them.

A second charge was still pending against the proconsul for corruption and extortion², but, triumphant upon the former issue, he was not much concerned about the other. He felt how well his gold had served him among the venal and corrupt, while, strange to say, the most high-minded of his enemies, Cicero, had been induced by Pompeius to undertake his defence. The triumvir himself, who had been absent from the neighbourhood of the city during the first trial, engaged to be close at hand and redouble all his efforts to save him. But it was these very efforts, to all appearance, that lost him his cause. It was intolerable to hear Cicero maintaining, at the beck of the great triumvir, the assertion of the Alexandrian witnesses, that Gabinus had received no bribe from the king of Egypt, when the fact was so notorious, that the same orator, in the very next cause that he pleads, admits it without hesitation.³ Indeed, there can be no doubt that Cicero's character suffered very severely in the estimation of his friends on this occasion⁴: his own account of the affair gives no plausible excuse for this incon-

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 7. : "Cadit in absolutionem Gabinii." Dion. xxxix. 61.

² The corruption consisted in his accepting a sum of money from Ptolemæus as the price of his restoration: besides this he was accused of having extorted four millions of sesterces from the provincials. Dion. xxxix. 55.

³ Cic. *pro Rabir. Post.* 12.

⁴ Dion. xxxix. 63. : ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὸ τοῦ αὐτομόλου ἔγκλημα ἐπὶ πλεῖον οἱ αὐξήθηται.

sistency. It was idle to boast of his placability, when he admits that the reconciliation was effected by the instances of the triumvir, whom it was evident he dared not disoblige.¹ His accepting from Pompeius a lieutenancy in Spain almost at the same moment² was both indiscreet and indecent. Nor were the judges better pleased, perhaps, at the officious interference of Cæsar, from whom Cicero produced a letter strongly urging the acquittal of the accused. To the surprize of both his friends and enemies, to the amazement probably of himself, the trial ended with the condemnation of Gabinius, and he was compelled to retire into banishment.³ His property was confiscated to the state, in liquidation of the fine which the judges proportioned to the amount of his acquisitions.⁴

Cicero's political allies felt themselves aggrieved by the open defection from their views, which his defence of Gabinius manifested. It was evident, indeed, throughout the course of this year, that he had abandoned all hope of maintaining the ground which they had assumed in opposition to the triumvirs, and that his aim, if not confined to the conservation of his own personal interests, was directed to the infusion of more patriotic sentiments into the breasts of those in whom all substantial power seemed now to be lodged. He had

Cicero attaches himself to the triumvirs, and affects great cordiality towards Crassus.

¹ Cic. *pro Rabir. Post.* 12.: "Neque me vero pœnitet, mortales inimicitias, sempiternas amicitias habere."

² This lieutenancy did not require his presence in the province, but provided him with an honourable retreat, together with the means of making a fortune, in case he should ever feel it expedient to leave Rome for a time. Cic. *ad Div.* vii. 5.

³ Dion. xxxix. 63.

⁴ Cic. *pro Rabir. Post.* 4.

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stood forward in the winter as the defender of Crassus, against an attempt on the part of the nobles to obtain his recal, almost before he had yet reached his province. Assuredly the sentiments which he expresses in a letter addressed to the proconsul of Syria upon this occasion¹, if they were such as he publicly asserted at the time, were calculated to surprise and disgust those who had known the bitterness of the enmity recently subsisting between them. He declared that his own good-will towards the triumvir had been constant from the first; he was confident that this sympathy had been reciprocal; their mutual regard had been made the sport of false and pernicious associates. He repudiated the idea that his present defence of Crassus's character and conduct had been the effect of any new conviction; he had always watched his career with admiration, and studied to promote the closest intimacy between them. This was said, it must be remembered, in the face of their notorious jealousies and repeated quarrels. Cicero himself had been the first to insult Crassus, by giving all the glory of the destruction of Spartacus to his rival; he had deeply offended him by allowing any suspicion to rest upon him with regard to his supposed participation in the councils of Catilina. On the other hand, the machinations of Clodius against the dignity of the orator had been covertly encouraged by Crassus, no less than by the other triumvirs; and when we consider how little there was in the character of the sordid money-maker to attract or dazzle a mind like

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* v. 8. (Febr. A. U. 700).

Cicero's, it is impossible to suppose that his forgiveness of him was as sincere as it may have been of Cæsar, or even of Pompeius.

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But the orator continued to act systematically upon the policy he had laid down for himself in conciliating the triumvirs in succession. He made use of his brother Quintus, who, we have seen, was now serving as a lieutenant to Cæsar, and of his friend Trebatius, who was occupied with civil employments in his suite, to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul.¹ He offered his services as a pleader to defend Messius, another of Cæsar's lieutenants, who left his general's camp at the summons of the senate to take his trial.² Vatinius also, an adherent both of Cæsar and Pompeius, who through their united influence had obtained the prætorship to the exclusion of M. Cato, and was now exerting all the influence of the tribunate in their behalf, found a defender in Cicero, when accused of bribery by the senatorial party. The laboured defence of his conduct in this particular instance, which the orator addresses to Lentulus in Cilicia, shows that it was one of his acts which rankled most deeply in the breasts of the nobility. Stung to the quick by the charges of desertion which his friends now cast upon him, Cicero at last turns indignantly upon them. "Granted," he says, "that Vatinius is the profligate and the traitor whom you describe; granted that I have myself assailed him publicly as such,

Cicero defends Messius and Vatinius, the creatures of Cæsar and of Pompeius.

His apology for his present line of conduct.

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 13. 15., *ad Div.* (sc. Trebatium), vii. 6—8.

² Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 15. He was attacked by the anti-Cæsarian party: "Servilius edixit ut adesset." The charge is not specified.

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though more for the sake of exalting the virtues of Cato than of denouncing the vices of his rival; yet it is not for you, chiefs of the senate, to taunt me with caressing a creature whom I despise, seeing what infamous wretches you have repeatedly recommended to my patronage, what encomiums you have heaped upon them, what falsehoods you have put in my mouth to grace my defence of them."¹

The power
of the nobles
as a class is
overawed
by the
enormous
resources of
individuals
in the state.

The authority of the nobles as a class had been completely undermined, not only by the attacks of Cæsar and the more covert machinations of Pompeius, but also by the silent change of circumstances, and the transfer of wealth and power into private hands. The violence which had been done to such a statesman as Catulus, and the disrespect with which Bibulus, Lentulus, and others had been treated, had tended to accustom the people to ridicule pretensions which had no solid foundation in physical force. The troops of the republic all but avowed that their obedience was given to their generals rather than to the state, and the nobility dared not appeal to them for the support of established institutions. They were compelled to trust to the irregular levies of their more headstrong partizans, such as Milo, thereby encouraging the increasing contempt for law and order. They made a desperate effort to maintain their influence by wholesale corruption. They placed their reliance upon their immense patronage, on the spoil of the provinces, the leasing of the revenues, the sale of justice in the public tribunals. But the proconsuls, who had originally been sent

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* (sc. Lentulum, Sept. A. U. 700) i. 9.

to the provinces to break their fall from the highest office of the state, now returned, year by year, from their governments with wealth too great for a private station, with ambition whetted by conquest or plunder, and with a retinue of followers enriched in their service, and devoted to their interest in defiance of patriotic or party ties. Lastly, they tried direct bribery, in buying the suffrages of the popular assemblies, or of the judges in political trials; but in this field also they were met by the enormous resources of private speculators, who outbid them in largesses, and still more in promises. The unbridled licentiousness of individuals had still an advantage over the most unscrupulous government.

The proceedings of the consular candidates for the year 701 afforded an instance of this licentiousness beyond all former example. The struggle was carried on without intermission through the latter half of the year, the competitors themselves contriving every possible means of delay, in the hope of thwarting each other's interests or promoting their own. Pompeius beheld the postponement of the elections with ill-disguised satisfaction, and secretly fomented the general confusion.¹ The candidates were four in number, Memmius, Domitius Calvinus, Æmilius Scaurus, and Valerius Messala. The first two formed a coalition, and made an engagement with the actual consuls to procure for them, if elected, whatever provinces they desired as the price of their influence. They had

Corrupt
proceedings
of the con-
sular candi-
dates for
the year
A. U. 701.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 15.: "Pompeius fremit, queritur, Scauro studet; sed utrum fronte an mente dubitatur."

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The senate
proposes to
bring them
to trial.

witnesses, two of them consulars and three augurs, already suborned to swear that they had been present, the former when the senate made the requisite decree, the latter when the same was ratified by the act of the popular assembly.¹ But Pompeius, anxious to break up an alliance which threatened to carry every thing before it, found means to induce Memmius to disclose this infamous transaction, and, when he had thus ruinously compromised his associates, to abandon his own views and adopt the policy of the triumvirs.² The senate, more mortified than disgusted, was compelled to institute an inquiry into the affair. It adopted a mode of procedure which was termed a Silent Judgment, the nature of which was that the sentence was not to be pronounced till after the election had taken place. But this manœuvre, by which the nobles hoped to save appearances, at the same time that they secured the election which it was their object to hasten, proved unsuccessful. Q. Scævola, one of the tribunes, acting not in the interests of Pompeius, but with the approbation, according to Cicero, of the best and most upright men of the day³, had no faith in the justice either of the senatorial decision or of the tribunals before which all the candidates were now cited by several

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 15.: "Cum Memmio consules Domitium conjunxerunt quâ pactione epistolæ committere non audeo (comp. iv. 18.)."

² He expected that Pompeius, as dictator, would give him the consulship through the recommendation of Cæsar. Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 2., *ad Att.* iv. 18.

³ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 3.: "Comitiorum quotidie singuli dies tolluntur obnuntiationibus, magnâ voluntate bonorum."

prosecutors¹ to answer for their notorious bribery. The prerogative century, which gave the first vote at the election, and the example of which, it seems, might be relied upon to carry with it the voices of the rest², had been bought, it was said, at the price of ten millions of sesterces. In order to meet this enormous profusion, the candidates borrowed of the capitalists in the most reckless manner. The interest which money fetched, on so unprecedented a demand, rose at once from four per cent, a rate sufficiently exorbitant, to eight per cent per month. Scævola interposed to prevent any assembly of the comitia for the election of consuls, and the year passed without the appointment of any chief magistrates for that which was to follow.

The elections are stopped by the intervention of a tribune.

Nothing could be more favourable to the views of Pompeius, according to all human calculation, than the paralysis which was thus gradually stealing over the vital powers of the constitution. Some great measure of state reform seemed evidently to be required, and the circumstances of the time, no less than the well-known practice of the commonwealth, pointed to the selection of a single personage, the foremost in the state, a man of approved judgment and courage, a man of acknowledged popularity, to whom so responsible a charge should

Death of Julia in the summer of the year 700.

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 2.: "De ambitu postulati sunt omnes qui consulatum petunt." Comp. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 15, 16., *ad Att.* iv. 15.

² The prerogative century was chosen by lot from the hundred and ninety-three which constituted the whole number, to give its decision first. The peculiar influence which it exercised over the rest is referred to by Cicero (*pro Planc.* 20.): "Centuria prærogativa tantum habet auctoritatis, ut nemo unquam prior eam tulerit quin renuntiatus sit." I am quite unable to explain this startling assertion.

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be freely confided. But while the progress of events, as far as they were susceptible of being directed or moulded by dexterity and cunning, was thus quietly developing the cherished policy of the triumvir, other incidents beyond his control were preparing the way for new combinations, never yet forecast in his counsels, and fatal to all his calculations. It was in the year 699, as has been already mentioned, that a sudden alarm gave a shock to his wife's nerves, which brought on premature labour, and broke the strength of her constitution. In the summer of the year 700¹ she died in childbed, nor did the infant survive to perpetuate the union of the Pompeian and Julian houses.² The Romans long turned with fond regret to the memory of one who might have mediated between the father and his son-in-law, and assuaged the personal rivalry which overthrew their national liberties. The sorrow which broods over its object and plays with its own moody fancies, remembered the old legend of the Sabine women, who saved the state by rushing

¹ The date may be fixed approximately from a passage in Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 1. 5. He received a letter from Cæsar in Britain on the xi. Kal. Oct., in which allusion was made to the death of his daughter. Now xi. Kal. Oct. = Sept. 20. A.U. 700 of the unreformed calendar = Aug. 25. B.C. 54. A letter might travel, it appears, between Britain and Rome in 20 days. Accordingly, Julia must have died at least 40 days before Cæsar's letter above mentioned could reach Cicero, that is, not later than Aug. 9, A.U. 700, or July 16, B.C. 54. Plutarch is evidently wrong in saying that the news reached Cæsar immediately upon his return, καταλαμβάνει γράμματα μέλλοντα διαπλεῖν πρὸς αὐτόν (*Cæs.* 23.); but it is on his authority, I conceive, that Fischer states that Julia died in September (*Röm. Zeitt.*). It may be well to remind the reader that in the unreformed calendar August (Sextilis) had 29 days, and September a like number.

Plut. *Cæs.* 23., *Pomp.* 53.; Val. Max. iv. 6. 4.; Liv. *Epit.* cvi.

between the armed ranks of their fathers and their husbands.¹ But it is the natural order of things for parents to acquiesce in the wills of their children, and yield with the dignity of age to the more passionate decisions of youth. In this case all such feelings were reversed. The father was the younger in years, and still more so in position; the passion and spirit of movement were his: the husband could yield the more easily and the more gracefully of the two. The only result we can contemplate from the prolonged existence and fruitfulness of this ill-fated union is that Pompeius would have gradually succumbed under Cæsar's superior influence, instead of throwing himself repentantly, when once released from the rash connexion, into the arms of the aristocracy he had outraged. As it was, the union of Pompeius with Julia lasted long enough to furnish us with more pleasing ideas of his character than we obtain from the observation of any other part of his career. The ferocity of his earlier years, however much it was tempered by the prosperity of his middle age, would hardly have allowed us to suppose him so amiable in domestic life, as appears in the account the historians give of his intercourse with Julia. Though celebrated for her beauty as well as her accomplishments, and younger than her husband by twenty-three years, she de-

¹ Vell. ii. 47.: "Concordiæ pignus Julia." Lucan. i. 114.:

"Quod si tibi fata dedissent

Majores in luce moras, tu sola furentem

Inde virum poteras, atque hinc retinere parentem;

Armatasque manus excusso jungere ferro,

Ut generos soceris mediæ junxere Sabinæ."

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voted herself to him with rare affection, while his attachment to her was engrossing even to weakness. Whether the populace was moved by this rare example of conjugal fidelity to signalize it with unusual distinctions, or whether it only seized the opportunity to display its devotion to its hero Cæsar, it would not allow the bereaved husband the consolation of retaining the ashes of Julia in his Alban villa, where he probably destined his own to repose, but insisted upon honouring her remains with a public funeral in the Field of Mars.¹

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 53. The consul Domitius attempted to prevent this tribute of regard to the deceased, which he evidently considered was meant to reflect honour upon her father; but the people were not to be controlled even by the interdict of the tribunes. Dion. xxxix. 64.

CHAP. X.

CÆSAR'S FOURTH CAMPAIGN, A.U. 699.—INVASION OF BELGIUM BY GERMAN TRIBES.—CÆSAR DRIVES THEM BEYOND THE RHINE.—CROSSES THAT RIVER, AND CHASTISES THE SICAMBRI.—HE INVADES BRITAIN.—CÆSAR'S FIFTH CAMPAIGN, A.U. 700.—HE INVADES BRITAIN A SECOND TIME WITH LARGER FORCES.—CROSSES THE THAMES, AND DEFEATS CASSIVELLAUNUS.—RECEIVES HOSTAGES AND TRIBUTE, AND RETIRES.—REVOLT OF THE GAULS.—DESTRUCTION OF TWO LEGIONS IN BELGIUM.—COURAGEOUS RESISTANCE OF Q. CICERO.—CÆSAR'S SIXTH CAMPAIGN, A.U. 701.—HE MAKES AN INCURSION BEYOND THE RHINE.—DESTRUCTION OF THE EBURONES.—DEFENCE OF ADUATUCA.—PACIFICATION OF BELGIUM.

THE Gauls lay prostrate at Cæsar's feet; the flower of almost every people had fallen in the vain attempt to maintain its liberty; the national assemblies were terrified by the frightful punishments which the conqueror had inflicted upon them, and their counsels were guided or distracted by Roman agents established throughout their cities.¹ Moreover, the mutual enmities of their tribes prevented much intercourse and discussion among them, and the four great divisions into which the country was split, the Belgian, the Aquitanian, and those of which the Ædui and the Veneti respectively took the lead, maintained little sympathy with one another. But it is not to be supposed that any of them were content with their position or satisfied with their new masters. No

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State of
Gaul at the
commence-
ment of the
year 699.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 5.

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one was more fully aware of the hollowness of their submission than Cæsar himself. They were anxiously watching an opportunity for shaking off the yoke; but instead of entering frankly into a national confederation for their common object, they were waiting, each in sullen silence, for the chances that might occur in their favour.

Movement
of the
Usipetes and
Tenctheri.

Meanwhile, the Menapii had little time to exult in the withdrawal of the Roman legions. A new enemy suddenly assailed them from an opposite quarter. The Usipetes and Tenctheri were two German tribes situated on the lower course of the Rhine, to the north and south of the Lippe respectively.¹ For some time past they had been hard pressed by the Suevi, who, as we have seen, were at this time pursuing a victorious career, in which they had extended their dominions from the Hercynian forest to the frontier of Gaul², and had only been checked within that territory by the invincible prowess of the Roman armies under their distinguished commander. Confined in that direction, they now turned northward, and the tribes above-mentioned were soon reduced to the last extremity of barbarian races, that of migrating in a body, and occupying new settlements by force of arms.³ Accordingly, they fell upon the Menapii beyond the Rhine in a mass estimated at

¹ Mœb. in *Cæs.* iv. 1.; Mannert, iii. 153.; Zeuss, 90.

² The seats of the Suevi in the time of Cæsar lay principally in the interior of Germany, to the east of the Sicambri and Ubii, bordering on the Hercynian forest, which separated them from the Cherusci. (*Cæs. B. G.* vi. 10.) They are sometimes represented as a single tribe, sometimes as a collection of tribes. (*Tac. Germ.* 38.) The Chatti and Hermunduri of Tacitus seem to share their territory at a later period.

³ *Cæs. B. G.* iv. 4.; *Dion.* xxxix. 47, 48.; *Oros.* vi. 20, 21.

four hundred and thirty thousand souls. The Menapii fled precipitately from their seats on the right bank of that river, and sought refuge with their kinsmen established on the Gaulish side. Thus united, the whole tribe presented a bolder front to the invaders, and defended the passage of the broad and rapid stream with energy and success. The Suevi had next recourse to stratagem. They retired to a distance, enticed the fugitives to recross the river, in order to return to their former homes; then, suddenly wheeling round, they attacked and slaughtered them, and effected their passage in the same barks in which the others had just arrived. The Germans were once more established on the left bank of the Rhine. At any other time, almost the whole of Gaul from the north to the south might have been roused to meet and repulse its hereditary enemies. Even the ancient kinsmen of the invaders in Belgium might have leapt forth to defend their adopted country. But at that moment far different views occupied the minds of the Gaulish people. On the one hand, those who crouched the most supinely under the Roman yoke began already to entertain without abhorrence the fatal reasoning that the Romans, being now masters of the country, were responsible for its defence. On the other, a still greater number were indifferent to an invasion which could have no worse consequence to Gaul than that of giving it a change of rulers. But still there were not a few who hoped that the impending contest might weaken both the rival powers, and thus offer an opportunity of eventual triumph to the national

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Cæsar
meets the
invading
tribes.

cause. Such were the secret hopes of many who now flocked to Cæsar's standard, and filled his camp with brave but faithless auxiliaries.

The proconsul left Lucca in all haste, before his usual time of departure, when he learnt from his legates the state of affairs¹, and that some Gaulish tribes had even invited the invaders into Belgium, and offered to receive them as friends and deliverers. It was still midwinter when he crossed the difficult passes of the Alps, convened a general assembly of the states, and, dissembling his acquaintance with their sentiments or acts, laid before them the position of their country as a matter of national concern. They decreed him all the supplies and reinforcements he demanded, and with his new recruits he marched straight to the point at which the Usipetes and Tenctheri were assembled. They had crossed the Rhine, and were now spreading themselves along the valley of the Meuse, penetrating far to the south of the Menapian territories into those of their German kinsmen, the Eburones and Condrusi, on the frontiers of Luxemburg. The success with which their enterprize had thus far been crowned raised their spirits and imparted to their language a vain-glorious tone little in accordance with their condition as a defeated and fugitive horde. They sent deputies to the Roman general, offering him his choice of peace or war. It was the custom, they said, of their nation never to decline the combat with an enemy who challenged them: however, they had gained their immediate object; they had found the settlements

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 6.

they sought; with the Romans they had no quarrel; they were content to remain upon the soil they had seized; all they claimed was the right to do so unmolested. They proclaimed aloud the valour by which these acquisitions had been so rapidly made, and ended by declaring that they yielded in strength and bravery to no nation under the sun, excepting only the Suevi, whom the gods themselves could not withstand.¹ Cæsar replied, as was his wont, by claiming it as the province and duty of a Roman proconsul to protect the Gauls against all external enemies. He would hold no intercourse or discussion with any foreign nation while it occupied an inch of Gallic soil. With what face could they, who were unable to maintain their own possessions, presume to assert a right to those of others? He condescended to point out to them that at this moment the Ubii, another Rhenish tribe, were in want of allies to defend them against the encroachments of the Suevi; a lateral movement would bring them to the spot in a few days or hours; he would not oppose their recrossing the river peaceably, and establishing themselves in that district as a garrison against the advance of their common enemies. He further promised to obtain the consent of the Ubii to this arrangement.

The first object of Cæsar's policy at this moment was to convince the Gauls that they were perfectly secure from foreign invasion under the powerful protection of Rome. To effect this it was necessary to assume a tone of the loftiest defiance towards

Cæsar confers with the German invaders.

¹ Cæs. B. G. iv. 7.

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the Germans, and to be fully prepared to act in accordance with it. But he had before him a formidable enemy; the desperate valour of barbarian armies had too often broken the legions to allow a prudent general to risk a mortal combat with them without absolute necessity, and the Germans were still regarded by the Roman soldier with more than usual apprehension. It was far wiser to consolidate the forces of the opponents of the Suevi beyond the Rhine, than ultimately to aid the views of that encroaching power by desolating and depopulating the frontiers. The moderation which Cæsar displayed, supported as it was by his known character for uncompromising resolution, cooled the fervid audacity of the German orators. They agreed to lay his proposals before the council of their tribe, and contented themselves with requiring that he, on his part, should suspend his advance for three days, until an answer could be returned. But Cæsar sternly refused even this short respite. He knew that a part of the enemy's cavalry had been detached to make a foray in the country of the Ambivariti, and was resolved to allow no time for their return, if the matter should come to blows.¹ He continued his march, and arrived within twelve miles of the barbarian quarters, when the deputies hastily returned, in vain entreated him to halt, and could only obtain from him a promise that he would restrain his cavalry, already in advance, from commencing hostilities on that day. The deputies pressed for a truce for three days, that a communication might be made

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 9.

to the Ubii; but this request he looked upon as an evasion. Four miles further on he expected to find water, and there he had determined to pitch his camp, and no remonstrances could induce him to swerve from this resolution. Finally, he required a more numerous deputation of the German chieftains to meet him on the morrow at that spot. At the same time he sent orders to the officers in command of his cavalry to abstain from hostilities, and, even if attacked, to make no reprisals until he should come up with them.

According to Cæsar's narrative of these transactions, it would appear that the German cavalry posted in advance of their camp, as soon as they perceived the Roman squadrons approaching, charged them without regard to the truce which had been thus concluded.¹ The number of the Germans he states at eight hundred, the rest of their horse being absent foraging. That of the Romans, or rather of the Gaulish auxiliaries, amounted to five thousand. Relying on the faith of the treaty, they were totally unprepared for the onset, and easily thrown into confusion even by a handful of assailants. Defending themselves feebly and partially they suffered a loss of seventy-four men, and were routed and pursued as far as the head of the advancing columns of the main army. Cæsar, highly indignant at this flagrant violation of the truce, determined to take a signal vengeance on its perpetrators. He would no longer consent to an instant's delay, which he was now convinced was only held out as a lure to entrap him. He

Great battle
between the
Romans and
Germans:
total rout
of the latter.

¹ Cæsar. *B. G.* iv. 12.

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was aware, moreover, how injurious an effect the report of this check, however slight, would have upon his Gaulish auxiliaries and upon the nations in his rear. Betrayed himself, he scrupled not, for the safety of his army and the province, to requite the barbarians with treachery deeper and more destructive than their own. Accordingly, when, the next morning, the German deputation, consisting of a large number of their chieftains, met him with protestations of regret for the occurrence of the day before, and with disclaimers of their error or their guilt, he threw them at once into irons, and gave orders for immediate advance against the enemy, unprepared for combat and deprived of their commanders. The Germans, thus taken by surprise, had not time even to form their rude array. They could only protract an ineffectual resistance by rallying about their waggons. They sent off their women and children in all haste, in the hope that they at least might escape the fury of an enemy whom they despaired of overcoming. But Cæsar, perceiving this movement, ordered his cavalry to pursue and attack the unarmed fugitives, and as there were but few German horse to oppose them, his directions were carried into effect with ease and with ruthless ferocity. At the sight of this carnage the barbarians lost all heart, broke their ranks, and betook themselves to flight. Their rear being occupied by the Roman cavalry, it would seem that they must have escaped from the field on their left flank, on which side the Rhine lay, apparently at no great distance. Their flight was arrested by that deep and rapid stream at the

point of its confluence with another, the Meuse, according to Cæsar's text, but more probably the Moselle.¹ Here a rally took place, but only for an instant; in another moment the multitude plunged headlong into the waters, and were swept away by the wintry flood. The Romans had only a few men wounded, not one was killed. The great mass of the Germans, not less probably than one hundred and eighty thousand in number, perished altogether. To the captive deputation the conqueror behaved with contemptuous clemency. He granted them leave to depart; but they dreaded the enmity of the Gauls, whom they had injured and insulted, and preferred remaining in the Roman camp.

Cæsar sent the news of this signal triumph to Rome, and the senate, after reading his despatch, decreed with acclamation a supplicatio, or national thanksgiving to the gods. Cato rose indignantly to deprecate the bestowal of such honours on an occasion so unworthy. He denounced the conduct

Treachery imputed to Cæsar in the senate. Cato proposes that he should be delivered to the enemy.

¹ There is great difficulty in fixing the site of this battle. Cæsar's text undoubtedly speaks of the confluence of the Rhine and Meuse (Mosa); but the Germans, it will be remembered, only required three days to send a message to the Ubii (on the right bank of the Rhine, between Cologne and Coblenz), and receive their deliberate answer, which is quite inconsistent with such an explanation. They had penetrated at least to the frontiers of the Treviri, according to Cæsar and Dion (xxxix. 47.), and there is no reason to suppose that they made any retreat before the advance of the Romans. Cluverius thought that we should read Mosella for Mosa; and, notwithstanding Mannert's criticism, I am disposed to believe either that our text is in fault, or that the author of the Commentaries committed a slip of memory. Mannert allows that the junction of the Meuse and Wahal took place at the same spot formerly as it does now, only eighty miles from the sea (ii. i. 192.). The country in that neighbourhood was at this time quite inaccessible to the Romans.

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of Cæsar as perfidious and degrading to the Roman name. He described his treatment of the Germans as a violation of the pledged faith of the republic, and proposed rather a national humiliation to avert the wrath of heaven, and to prove to the barbarians that the Romans disowned treachery in their generals even when successful. He declared that Cæsar ought to be given up to the Germans in expiation of the national crime. Examples of such a course were not altogether wanting. At least two instances of the kind could be mentioned: the one when Q. Fabius and Cn. Apronius were delivered over to the Apolloniatae for having slain their ambassadors¹; the other, when L. Minucius and L. Manlius were surrendered to the Carthaginians in atonement for a similar crime.² But however it might have been in the sterner days of the republic, it was neither to the public virtue of the senate nor to its religious feelings that such an appeal could at this period be seriously addressed. A few of the proconsul's personal enemies, who had all Cato's bitterness without his singleness of purpose, might applaud and stimulate his frantic violence; but a reasonable view of the transaction might combine with a sense of general or private interest to prevent the great majority of the assembly from being led away by so extravagant a misrepresentation of justice.

Credibility
of Cæsar's
own ac-
count.

A fair consideration of the real facts of the case could not certainly be expected from statesmen so

¹ Liv. *Epit.* xv.; Dion. *Excerpt. Vales.* 43.; Val. Max. vi. 6. 5.

² Liv. xxxviii. 42.; Val. Max. vi. 6. 3.; comp. Cic. *pro Cæc.* 34.: "Ut religione solvatur civitas civis Romanus traditur."

blinded by political animosity.¹ At all events, as regards the internal probability of Cæsar's account of the transaction, by which the first infraction of the treaty is imputed to the Germans, there seems no reason to dispute it on the ground that their number was so much the smaller. The cavalry opposed to them was Gaulish, and its indisposition to the cause in which it was engaged might be presumed upon. It was also unprepared on the faith of the treaty. The event proved that the calculation of the Germans was not incorrect. The larger squadron retreated in confusion before the lesser. Such could not have been the case had the Gallo-Romans been the first to attack with such superior force. The charge therefore of deliberate perfidy on Cæsar's part seems to be groundless. That he was well pleased to make use of his enemies' crime, which a slight explanation might have sufficiently atoned for, cannot be denied. He might fairly have exacted harder terms in consideration of it; but his time was precious and his situation precarious. He allowed himself an extreme measure of retaliation; and if he reaped the advantage, he certainly lost all the glory of the engagement which followed.

Various migratory hordes had crossed the Rhine before the Usipetes and Tenctheri, and whether they had established themselves on the Gallic soil, or had perished in their wanderings, faint and vague had been the rumours of their fate which had reached the ears of those they had left be-

Cæsar proposes to make an incursion into Germany.

¹ The story is alluded to by Suetonius (*Jul.* 25.), and more distinctly mentioned by Plutarch (*Cæs.* 22.).

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hind. But Cæsar was determined that the German people should know what had become of this last swarm of invaders, how the two tribes had fallen in one great day of slaughter, and who were the fatal enemies who had thus cut short their career. His authority in Gaul depended in no slight degree upon his checking the roving spirit of the free men beyond the Rhine, and convincing the discontented within that boundary that the arm of the republic was long enough to reach their most distant auxiliaries. The pretext which he puts forward himself for his incursion into Germany, that of pursuing the wretched remnant of the Usipetes, the cavalry which had been absent from the battle, seems hardly worthy of consideration. Nor is it much more to the purpose that the Ubii are said to have solicited his assistance against the Suevi. It was the business of a Roman proconsul always to put forth a legitimate pretext for an act of aggression; but the real motive was often kept in the back ground, and doubtless Cæsar on the present occasion had further and deeper views, when he resolved to cross the frontier and show himself in all the majesty of Roman military array to the proud warriors before whom the tribes of the Rhine were trembling.¹

His short
campaign
beyond the
Rhine.

He first required the Sicambri to deliver up the fugitives who had just eluded his grasp. They replied with firmness that as he denied the right of the Germans to interfere in the affairs of Gaul, they for their part were prepared to dispute his authority over a people of their own nation. This

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 16.

was a sufficient pretext for taking umbrage, and Cæsar gave orders to effect the passage of the river. He chose a spot near the present town of Neuwied¹, a few miles below Coblenz, where the banks of the river present a space of level ground on both sides, and there he built a bridge, partly for greater security, partly perhaps to impress the natives with a higher sense of the dignity and power of the republic. The stream was broad and rapid, and the engineers applied all their skill and ingenuity, under his special directions, to construct a solid edifice. The work was completed in the short space of ten days.² But after all this labour, Cæsar made no further use of it than to transport his army over and back again, after he had spent a few weeks in ravaging the country of the Sicambri, and showing himself as a friend and ally to the

¹ This was the spot where Augustus afterwards constructed a stone bridge, the foundations of which are said to be still visible. It corresponds with the situation of the Ubii. Supposing the recent battle to have taken place near the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle, we might expect Cæsar to follow up his victory by crossing the river in the immediate neighbourhood. For these reasons I have preferred the locality mentioned in the text. Some indeed have supposed from the statement of Florus (iii. 18.) that he crossed the Moselle as well as the Rhine in his first expedition against the Germans, that his first passage of the latter river was in the neighbourhood of Bingen. But this will not correspond with the position of the Ubii or Sicambri, which certainly lay more to the north. It is more likely that Florus imagined him to have crossed the Moselle from the right bank. See Mannert, ii. i. 256.

² Cæs. B. G. iv. 17.; Plut. Cæs. 22. The author of the *Précis des Guerres de César*, p. 61., compares this bridge with that which Bertrand threw across the Danube near Vienna for Napoleon in 1809. He shows the great superiority of the modern engineers, both as regards the difficulty of the undertaking, and the speed with which it was completed. Napoleon's bridge required ten times the amount of labour, and was finished in only twice the number of days. This author supposes Cæsar to have crossed at Cologne.

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Ubii. The Suevi, indeed, collected in large numbers, and prepared for battle. The proconsul, however, was satisfied with the demonstration he had made, and took no measures to bring on an engagement. When he again reached the left bank he broke down his bridge, and hastened away to engage in another enterprize of a similar nature, and probably with similar political views.¹ This was no other than the famous invasion of Britain, an enterprize to which we owe our first introduction into the history of Europe and of the world.

Cæsar inquires into the character and condition of the Britons.

The campaigns of Cæsar in Belgium could not fail to make him acquainted with the existence and character of the inhabitants of the great island which lay within sight of its coasts. It was indeed from their allies on the opposite shore that his enemies had drawn no inconsiderable resources. Questioned as to the relations subsisting between themselves and the natives of Britain, they asserted that many of their own race had emigrated from Gaul during the preceding century, and established themselves beyond the white cliffs just visible in the horizon. They spoke of a population believed by them to be aboriginal, upon whom they had intruded themselves, and in whose seats they had gradually fixed their abodes.² This primitive people they described as peculiarly rude and barbarous in their social habits.³ They were almost destitute of clothing, and took a grotesque pleasure

¹ Cæsar was the first Roman who crossed the Rhine. Suet. *Jul.* 25.; Dion. xxxix. 50.

² Cæs. *B. G.* v. 12.

³ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 14.

in painting or tattooing their bodies with blue woad.¹ They admitted a regulated community of women. They lived almost entirely on milk and flesh, the toil or skill required even for fishing was distasteful to them²; and dwelling apart, or congregating in a few hovels, with a wooden stockade round them, and screened by forests, mountains, or morasses, they possessed nothing which could deserve the name of a city.³ It was in the interior or north of the country apparently that the rudest tribes used the scythed chariot in war. Cæsar, who never penetrated very far from the coast, does not seem to have met with it. We may conclude that the earliest known inhabitants of the island were akin to the Gaelic division of the Celtic family, and that its possession was disputed with them from a very remote period by the subsequent intrusion of the Kymry.⁴ The latter brought with them, besides the language and the physiological characteristics which still remain so strongly marked in a part of the island, the Druidical religion, which has already been described. It was perhaps the fixed and exclusive qualities belonging to an insular institution which gave the British Druidism so great an ascendancy among the Gaulish tribes, and caused

¹ Cæsar says, "*Omnes se Britanni vitro inficiunt*;" if this is meant to extend to the Belgian tribes in Britain, we must suppose the custom to have been partially adopted by them in imitation of their ruder neighbours. Solinus says, "*Regionem partim tenent barbari quibus per artifices plagarum figuras jam inde a pueris variæ animalium effigies incorporantur*" (c. 25.).

² Dion. lxxvi. 12. A fatal characteristic of their Gaelic descendants even at this day.

³ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 21.; Strab. iv.

⁴ See Thierry, *Gaulois*, Introd. p. xci.

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them to regard it as the purest expression of their sublime theology. The Belgians, who were the latest settlers on the British shore, seem to have been easily reclaimed from the wild habits of their forest life by the civilizing influences of the coast and a navigable river. Cæsar remarks that the inhabitants of the corner nearest to Gaul were the farthest advanced in social cultivation, and the extraordinary rapidity with which the eastern ports sprang into commercial celebrity discovers a natural aptitude in the race which their subsequent history has so fully confirmed.

Their
proximity
to Gaul
dangerous
to the se-
curity of
the Roman
conquest.

A close connexion was maintained between the Belgian tribes located in the island and the kinsmen whom they had left behind.¹ Some of the kings of the continental states still claimed a kind of sovereignty over the emigrants beyond the sea. Cæsar complained that his enemies in Gaul had frequently received succour from an invisible arm stretched forth to them from these remote colonies. The example of freedom and this expression of sympathy were, at all events, dangerous to the tranquillity of his new conquests. It seemed a measure of political importance to strike a blow at a people who might be supposed to plume themselves on their insular security, and to carry, at least, the terror of the Roman arms across the barrier which Nature herself had raised against them. A century earlier a proconsular army had

¹ Cæsar informs us that several of the British states derived their name and origin from Gaulish, especially the Belgian tribes (*B. G.* v. 12.). Ptolemy mentions the names of the Parisii, Atrebatæ, Belgæ, Menapii. The Parisii were Belgian, in Strabo's extended signification of the term, but not in Cæsar's.

turned back with reverence or dismay from the shores of the Atlantic. They had reached, it was surmised, the verge of the habitable world, and profanely approached the frontiers of night and oblivion. But the era, the legions, and the temper of Cæsar were alike inaccessible to such feelings, and the billows of the Western Ocean inspired them with ambition rather than with awe.¹

After recrossing the Rhine, the proconsul fixed his quarters on the coast of the Morini; for it was only in the remoter districts that this tribe could maintain its independence, and the mere rumour of his intended invasion of the island raised among them such a notion of his boldness and power, that they hastened, for the most part, at once to make a voluntary submission.² The Roman general was well pleased to receive them into favour, and obtain from them the assistance and information of which he stood in need. He spent some weeks in collecting his naval armaments, sent an officer named Volusenus to explore the opposite coast, and commissioned Commius, a chieftain on whom he had conferred the sovereignty of the Atrebates, to repair to his friends and kinsmen in the island, and represent to them in proper colours

Cæsar pre-
pares to
invade
Britain.

¹ "Decimus Brutus aliquanto latius Celticos Lusitanosque et omnes Gallæciæ populos, formidatumque militibus flumen Oblivionis (comp. Liv. *Epit.* iv.); peragratoque victor Oceani litore, non prius signa convertit, quam cadentem in maria solem, obrutumque aquis ignem non sine quodam sacrilegii metu et horrore deprehendit." Florus, ii. 17. The Romans ridiculed Cæsar's vanity in dignifying the shallow straits with the name of the Ocean. Lucan. ii. 571.

"Oceanumque vocans incerti stagna profundi
Territa quæsitis ostendit terga Britannis."

² Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 21, 22.

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He crosses
the straits
of Dover.

the magnitude of the Roman power, and the necessity of alliance or submission. The rumour of his preparations had already alarmed the Belgians in the south of Britain, and various embassies from them reached his camp, with the offer of hostages for their good-will and fidelity.

The season had already advanced too far to allow the Roman general to contemplate the conquest of any part of the island in this campaign, if indeed he entertained any such ulterior view. His object was to obtain a personal acquaintance with the country, its chiefs, and people, to thrust himself in some way into their affairs, and establish such relations with them as might afford a convenient pretext for further interference at some future time. It seemed sufficient for his immediate designs to collect a force of two legions and a few hundred cavalry. The former were destined to embark in eighty transports at the Portus Itius¹,

¹ The point on the French coast from which Cæsar sailed has not been determined with certainty. We may pass over the unconscionable nationality of some Flemish writers (see Bast, *Antiq. Rom. Gaul.* p. 264.); but Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Witsand, and Calais, still contend for the honour. It was not Calais, because Cæsar would not in that case surely have sent his cavalry further to the east to make the passage. Boulogne, which became at a later period the usual place of embarkation for Britain, was known by another name, Gessoriacum. There is probably an error of *east* for *west*, where Ptolemy places this spot east of the Ἰκίον ἄκρον. (See Mannert, II. i. 186.) The question seems therefore to be narrowed to the two ports of Ambleteuse and Witsand. In deciding between them we may be guided partly by the similarity of the names Iccius, or Itius, and Witsand, and partly by the fact that in the middle ages Witsand was the port from which the passage was commonly made. (See Ducange on *Joinville's Memoirs*, diss. xxvi.) Both are equally distant from the nearest point of the British coast. When Cæsar computes the length of the passage at 30 miles, which is more than the distance from shore to shore, he may

the latter at a spot eight miles further to the east. The embarkation of both divisions was to take place simultaneously, on the morning of the 26th of August, soon after midnight, during the third watch. This seems to have been the commencement of the flood-tide, which runs along the French and the opposite coast in a north-easterly direction. The proconsul embarked with the infantry, and proceeding very slowly, possibly that he might fall in with the cavalry transports, found himself at ten in the morning off the cliffs of Dover. The expected squadron, however, was detained by wind, or some accident, and the spot itself offering some impediments, the invader determined to seek another landing-place. The sea is described here as running up into the land by a narrow creek overhung by heights, which completely commanded every approach¹, and were already crowded with the natives in arms. Accordingly, after waiting through the greater part of the day for the arrival of his cavalry, the proconsul took the opportunity of the next flood-tide, together with a favourable wind, to coast along towards the north, for a distance of seven or eight

measure from his starting-place to his landing-place, viz. Deal. The *Ἰκίον ἄκρον* is probably Cap Grisnez. See Walckenaer, *G. des G.* ii. 268. With regard to the orthography of the Roman name, the MSS. of Cæsar read *Itius*, those of Ptolemy *Ἰκίον*. The form *Iceius* is a corruption of later writers. Bast, *l. c.*

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 23. His expressions evidently describe a creek or estuary, and cannot refer to the promontory of the South Foreland. There is an ancient tradition at Dover that the sea formerly ran five or six miles up into the land there. *Acad. Sci. et Bell. Lett. de Bruxelles*, iii. 1. (1770), quoted by Bast, *Antiq. Rom. et Gaul.*

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The Ro-
mans effect
their land-
ing.

miles, which brought him to the open beach of Walmer or Deal.¹

The movements of the Roman squadron were closely watched by the Britons from the heights, and by the time it had arrived at the spot where its leader proposed to draw up his vessels, the beach was lined with an imposing array of warriors in their chariots, prepared to dispute his landing. The sea was too shallow to admit of the larger vessels approaching the land, and the barbarians rushed into the water to reach their invaders. The war-galleys which drew less water were ordered to the flanks to dispel the host of assailants, and when they opened their batteries of missiles the Britons were thrown into disorder. The

¹ Cæs. *l. c.*: "Ventum et æstum nactus secundum." It has been much disputed whether the spot at which Cæsar landed lay to the east or west of Dover, at Deal or at Hythe; but a close examination of his language seems to settle the question decisively. He came to Britain a little before the end of summer (*exigua parte æstatis reliqua*), and left it before the equinox. From Halley's calculations (see *Phil. Trans.* No. 193.) it is ascertained that there were two full moons in August, of the year B.C. 55, on the 1st at noon, and on the 30th at midnight. The latter then must have been that which Cæsar noticed on the fourth night after his arrival (c. 29.). If the tide was at its height at midnight (30th—31st), it must have been so about 8 p.m. on the 26th. Accordingly, the tide began to flow on the afternoon of the 26th at 2, and this must have been the tide with which Cæsar left his moorings off Dover. As the flood-tide flows to the northward, such must have been the direction which he took, and a run of seven or eight miles would bring him precisely to the flat beach of Deal or Walmer. The only reason for believing him to have taken the opposite course is the expression of Dion. xxxix. 51.: τοὺς προσμύξαντας οἱ ἐς τὰ τενάγη ἀποβαίνοντι νικήσας, where τενάγη is supposed to indicate such marshes as are found between Hythe and Romney, but not on the other side. The word may, however, mean the soft beach washed by the tide. Dion also says that he sailed round a promontory, which cannot be reconciled with the notion of his going westward.

Romans, however, in the confusion incident to a mode of fighting with which they were not familiar, showed little alacrity in attacking the enemy, until the standard-bearer of the tenth legion leapt with his eagle into the waves, and summoned his comrades to the rescue.¹ Excited by the danger of their adored ensign, the soldiers threw themselves into the water, repulsed the barbarians, and made good their landing. The fame of Cæsar and his legions had gone before him, and when the Britons found themselves engaged hand to hand with the conquerors of Gaul, their courage deserted them. But the Romans, destitute as they were of cavalry, might have suffered severely from the vigorous attack of chariots and horsemen; and, however feeble was the resistance opposed to their landing, they were not in a condition to pursue, but hastened to secure the spot on which they had planted themselves by throwing up their usual earthworks. Before, however, even these first defences were completed there arrived an embassy from the Britons, with the offer of hostages and the humblest protestations of submission. Commius, who had been seized and thrown into chains when he ventured to set foot in the island, was restored with many excuses to liberty. The Roman general complained of the hostile reception he had met with, after having been waited upon in Gaul with offers of friendship and alliance; but he agreed to accept the overtures now proffered, together with the promised hostages.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* iv. 25—27.

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Their fleet
severely in-
jured by a
high tide.

But whether the Britons were sincere or not in the first terror of defeat, an accident which befel the foreign armament gave them courage to change their policy and break their faith. The Roman cavalry, sailing at last on the fourth day after their leader's departure, were driven back by the violence of the wind. As their course lay towards the north-west, the gentle breeze with which they had hoped to effect their landing came probably from an easterly quarter. Before they had reached the Downs the wind freshened to a gale, and their vessels were rendered unmanageable. Some of them, indeed, succeeded in recovering the coast of Gaul, but others were carried through the straits, far to the west, and narrowly escaped being cast away on distant points of the British coast.¹ At midnight the tide rose with the full moon and the violence of the east wind, to an unusual height, such as the Romans, with their imperfect experience of those seas, had never witnessed. The war-vessels drawn up on the beach were covered with the waves, and dashed in pieces, while the transports which rode at anchor were torn from their moorings and hurled against the coast and one another.

The Roman
army ha-
rassed by
the Britons.

Thus the fleet was rendered almost useless, nor had the little army the proper means for repairing the damage. Moreover, there was no store of corn in the camp to maintain it through the winter. The Britons, who had noticed the smallness of the Roman force, and its want of supplies, now began to entertain hopes of cutting off the enemy by

¹ *Caes. B. G. iv. 28.*

famine, presuming that the entire loss of an army with its general would discourage the Romans from repeating the enterprize. But they did not execute their plans skilfully. They made a sudden attack upon the seventh legion, which had been sent out to forage, but was not yet beyond the reach of assistance from the camp. Cæsar rushed forth to rescue it, and drove off the assailants with brilliant success; but his experience of the treachery of the enemy, and the peril to which he was now daily exposed, made him the more anxious to withdraw from the island without delay. The equinox was also fast approaching, and the tempestuous weather with which it is generally accompanied. He thought himself, doubtless, extremely fortunate in receiving a further offer of repentance and submission from the vacillating barbarians. He contented himself with imposing upon them double the number of hostages which they had originally offered. Since the night of the storm he had been sedulously occupied in refitting his vessels, destroying, for the want of fresh materials, those which were the most damaged, in order to repair the rest. He sailed soon after midnight some days before the equinox, that is to say, about three weeks from the time of his landing, taking the ebb-tide, which would then serve to carry him down the coast, and thence across into Gaul. Two vessels which could not make the appointed port were borne further down the channel by the current.¹

Returns to
Gaul before
the equinox.

¹ Cæsar. *B. G.* iv. 36. : "Paulo infra delatæ sunt." On reaching the coast of Gaul, the crews of these vessels were attacked by the Morini,

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Trans-
actions of
the re-
mainder of
the year.
Cæsar goes
into Illyri-
cum.

On his return from Britain, Cæsar commissioned Sabinus and Cotta to make an incursion into the country of the Menapii, which proved more successful than that of the year preceding, the dryness of the season having rendered the morasses accessible. At the same time, Labienus chastised the Morini, who had risen in arms against the crews of the dispersed vessels. The Britons, as soon as they learnt that the Roman commander had left their shores, neglected, with the exception of only two of their tribes, to send the promised hostages.¹ But his countrymen received the news of his successes with acclamation, and particularly that of his attack upon an unknown island, an exploit of heroic daring which struck their imaginations, while it inflamed their cupidity with the hopes of new and incalculable plunder.² The avaricious dreams of the Romans ascribed hoards of plate and jewels to the rudest barbarians of the ancient world. Britain was reported to be rich in mines, at least of the inferior metals. Above all, the pearls of the Rutupian coast were celebrated for their supposed abundance and splendour, and were an object of especial desire.³ The breastplate set

and were within immediate reach of the main body, which had already disembarked. They came to shore therefore probably near Ambleteuse or Boulogne.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iv. 38.

² Dion. xxxiv. 53. After disparaging the enterprize as unsuccessful he adds: *τούτῃ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἰσχυρῶς ἐσεμνύνετο, καὶ οἱ οἴκοι Ῥωμαῖοι θαυμαστῶς ἐμεγαλύνοντο*, κ. τ. λ.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 47.: "Britanniam petiisse spe margaritarum, quarum amplitudinem conferentem," &c. Yet Pliny confesses that the pearls of Britain were, after all, "parvi et decolores" (*H. N.* ix. 57.), and Tacitus adds: "Gignit oceanus margarita sed subfusca et livida" (*Agric.* 12.).

with these costly brilliants, which the conqueror afterwards dedicated to Venus Genetrix, the patroness and mother of his race, was no less agreeable to the eyes of the young nobility than to those of the goddess herself. A supplication of twenty days was decreed in his honour, while he hastened, as usual, to the frontier of his province to confer with his friends from Rome. Early, however, in the next year, he found time to visit the further district of his province, Illyricum, beset by predatory hordes, which had crossed the upper waters of the Save and Drave, and penetrated its Alpine boundary.¹ The name of Julius is impressed upon many spots in this vicinity: the Carnian Alps here take the appellation of Julian; a town immediately at their feet was denominated Julium Carnicum; and Forum Julii, still surviving in the modern Friuli, lay at no great distance, near the head of the Adriatic. It is not, however, to the great conqueror that these appellations can be traced; for he could not possibly have crossed the Alps in the winter season, and carried the sword into the native valleys of the Pirustæ in the Tyrol; nor did he remain long enough in the neighbourhood to found cities or colonies.²

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 1.; comp. Mannert, iii. 547.

² The origin of these names remains in obscurity: see Mannert, v. 546., who supposes Forum Julii to have been founded by one of the Cæsarian family in a later generation, and the Alps to have received their local designation from the city. The epithet Julian is first given to these mountains by Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 8. Livy, who speaks of the locality, makes no mention of such a name. Ammianus (xxxvi. 16.) says: "Usque ad radices Alpium Juliarum quas Venetas appellavit antiquitas." The Julian Alps known at this period were those afterwards denominated Cottian. See above, p. 290.

CHAP.
X.

Great preparations for a second invasion of Britain in the spring, A. U. 700. B. C. 54. Cæsar's fifth campaign.

Meanwhile, great preparations were in progress in the ports and camps of northern Gaul for a second invasion of Britain with a more powerful force. Six hundred transports were built, of a construction adapted to the shallow coasts and short chopping waves of the channel. The whole armament was appointed to assemble at the *Portus Itius*; and Cæsar made use of this short interval to menace the *Treviri*, with whom he was incensed on account of their neglecting to attend the general meeting of the states, and intriguing with the *Suevi*. Two of their chieftains, *Cingetorix* and *Indutiomarus*, were mutually aspiring to the supreme power. On the approach of the Roman army, the former hastened to make his submission; the latter, thus anticipated, rashly collected his troops and adherents. But soon repenting of this overt act, he sued for pardon, which Cæsar was easily persuaded to bestow. To *Cingetorix*, however, he displayed much greater favour, taking his part, and conciliating to his views the principal men of the state. The *Treviri* returned to their obedience; but the ambition of *Indutiomarus* was turned to bitter though suppressed hostility.¹

Intrigues of *Dumnorix*.

This affair being despatched, the whole disposable force of the proconsul was assembled at the *Portus Itius*.² He was attended by a body of four thousand Gaulish horse, officered by the flower of the native nobility, whom Cæsar proposed to carry with him, not less as hostages for the tranquillity of their country, the state of which was becoming daily

¹ *Cæs. B. G.* v. 3, 4.

² *Cæs. B. G.* v. 5.

more critical, than for the benefit of their military services. Among them was Dumnorix, the Æduan, of whose good faith Cæsar was justly distrustful, and who kept his countrymen in alarm by vaunting that the proconsul had promised to confer upon him the sovereignty of their nation. He was anxious to escape from accompanying the expedition, hoping, if left behind, to find an opportunity of forwarding his private projects of ambition. He studied to awaken the fears of his fellow-chiefs, representing to them that the conqueror, not venturing to put them to death in the presence of the Gaulish nation, sought to get rid of them in this distant expedition. The prevalence of north-west winds interposed a delay of several days, of which the Æduan made all the use in his power. At last, when the order for embarking was given, he secretly escaped, with a few followers, from the camp. Cæsar immediately despatched a chosen party of cavalry to recapture the fugitive, dead or alive. He was overtaken, and the Gauls, who hated him no less than their Roman tyrants, massacred him on the spot.¹ His attendants made no difficulty in returning to the Roman quarters.

He escapes from the camp, is pursued and slain.

The spring had not yet passed, when the Roman armament sailed for Britain. It consisted of five legions, and a proportionate number of cavalry, the importance of which force had been fully demonstrated in the late expedition. Three legions were left under Labienus, to provide for the security of the conquered country. The armament effected its

Cæsar lands in Britain without opposition.

¹ *Cæs. B. G. v. 7*

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X.

landing without opposition at the same spot as in the preceding summer¹; and Cæsar, leaving ten cohorts and three hundred horse, to protect his naval station, repaired with the main body of his army to a place in the neighbourhood, where he constructed a camp for permanent occupation. This was the foundation, in all probability, of the celebrated station of Rutupiaë, or Richborough. The ruins of its gigantic defences, together with those at Caistor, and the still more perfect remains of Garianonium, or Burghcastle, attest to this day the extent and solidity of the Roman military works in our island. The Britons still declined to make any opposition to the invaders; and it was not till the army had advanced to the banks of the Stour, twelve miles distant from its encampment, that it found an enemy drawn up in array to dispute its further progress. But it was not on the slow and narrow stream of a petty river that the Britons placed their reliance; they had a camp of their own peculiar construction, a space cleared in the centre of a wood, and defended by the trunks of trees, to which they retreated on the first repulse, and whence it was difficult to dislodge them. When this was at last effected, Cæsar did not venture to pursue the rapid flight of their horsemen and chariots in a country of which he was wholly ignorant. An accident, which had again befallen his fleet, suddenly recalled him. A storm, as in the preceding expedition, had severely injured his

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 8.; Dion. xl. 1. The pretext for the invasion was the refusal of the Britons to send the stipulated number of hostages.

vessels. It took several days of incessant labour to repair the damage, and then, at last, it was determined to draw up the whole armament on shore, and to extend and strengthen the fortifications by which it was defended on the land side. Cæsar again advanced, and again encountered the natives at the passage of the river. Amidst their internal dissensions (for such seem to have prevailed among them to a greater extent than even among their neighbours on the continent), the Britons had come to the resolution of trusting the general conduct of their defence to one of their principal chieftains. His name was Cassivellaunus¹, and he ruled over the Trinobantes, the people of Middlesex, Hertford, and Essex. The British method of fighting was almost wholly on horseback or from chariots. The dexterity with which the barbarians managed these ponderous vehicles, the weight of their onset, and the rapidity of their retreat, baffled through the day the bravery and discipline of the invaders. The Roman lines were shaken by repeated charges; the pilum stretched many a chieftain on the plain, but his steeds and empty car came bounding against the wall of steel. Repulsed, the flying squadrons were quickly beyond the reach of pursuit; the Gaulish cavalry were languid and inactive; it was by the steady endurance of the veteran infantry that victory was at last secured. The Britons lost the bravest of their combatants,

The Britons
commanded
by Cassivel-
launus,
make a
brave re-
sistance.

¹ This was the Roman orthography. Dion writes it *Κασουελλανός*, approaching nearer to what was probably the real pronunciation, Caswallon or Cadwallon.

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X.

and their cumbrous materials of war. From that day the Britons never ventured again to attack Cæsar's legions in regular battle, but scattered themselves through the country, in the hope of wearing out his strength by repeated and desultory skirmishes.

They defend the line of the Thames.

Cæsar, however, kept his men well together, and refrained from partial engagements, while he marched boldly into the heart of the country, to the banks of the Thames, behind which Cassivellaunus had retreated. It was necessary, in order to ford the river, to ascend above the highest point which the tide reaches; and the very spot where the passage was made may be conjectured with some confidence from early and constant tradition. A place known by the name of Coway Stakes, near the mouth of the Wey, is supposed to have derived its appellation from the palisades with which the Britons obstructed the bed and bank of the Thames¹, the remains of which were still visible, according to the testimony of Bede, in the eighth century.² This spot accords also sufficiently well with the distance of eighty miles from the sea, at which Cæsar places the frontier of Cassivellaun's dominions.³

Cæsar's partial suc-

The swimming and fording of rivers were among

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 18.; Dion. xl. 3.

² Bede, *Hist. of Brit.* i. 2. This indeed is not very credible. Compare Camden's *Britannia*, "Surrey." He states the depth of the water at that spot to be generally about six feet. Cæsar's passage was made in the middle of summer, and the season was remarkable for its drought: "Eo anno frumentum in Gallia propter siccitates angustius provenerat." Cæs. *B. G.* v. 24.

³ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 11.

the regular exercises of the Roman legionary. Though immersed up to his chin in water, he was expert in plying his hatchet against the stakes which opposed his progress, while he held his buckler over his head not less steadily than on dry land. From behind him a constant storm of stones and darts was impelled against the enemy from the engines which always accompanied the Roman armies.¹ The natives were driven from their position, and Cæsar marched upon the capital of the Trinobantes, which lay at no great distance.² In the meanwhile that nation, over which Cassivellaunus had usurped authority by the murder of its king Immanuentius, was disposed to treat with the conqueror and abandon the tyrant to his fate. The Trinobantes presented Mandubratius, the son of their late sovereign, to Cæsar as the chieftain whom they wished to reign over them; and the youthful claimant of the throne had already gained the confidence of the Roman general by placing himself under his protection in Gaul. This example was followed by several other states, enumerated under the names of Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalitæ and Bibroci, occupying apparently the counties of Berks and Buckingham, and the neighbourhood of Henley and

¹ Polyænus (*Stratagem.* viii. 23. 5.) says that the Britons were terrified by Cæsar's making use of an elephant in this attack.

² We may conjecture that this was Verulamium or St. Alban's, the site in after times of a great Roman colony. If it had been Londinium, which was a place of considerable commercial importance only an hundred years later (*Tac. Ann.* xiv. 33.), we should doubtless have been informed that it lay on the bank of the river.

CHAP.
X.

He accepts
the promise
of tribute,
and returns
into Gaul.

Bray.¹ The British chief, reduced to his single stronghold, defended himself with the natural fortifications of forest and morass which surrounded his so-called city. He excited the people of Cantium, or Kent, to make an attack on the naval camp of the invaders; but while they were repulsed with loss and discomfiture, he was obliged himself to escape from the fastness which he could no longer maintain. Reduced to extremity, he sued for peace, which he obtained by the surrender of his usurped sovereignty, and the promise of hostages and tribute from the various states which he had combined against the Romans.² Cæsar was anxious to return to Gaul, where rumours of projected insurrection were more rife than ever.³ He retained no territory in Britain, nor left any stronghold or garrison; and when he quitted its shore, with the nugatory assurance of a trifling tribute, he must have felt himself baffled in his enterprize. Even the hopes of plunder were totally unfulfilled. Cicero, who corresponded, as we have seen, with his brother Quintus, serving under the proconsul in his British campaign, tells us that

¹ Camden, *Britannia*; Mæbe, *Cæs. in loc.*

² *Cæs. B. G.* v. 22.

³ Such seems to be the meaning of Cicero's expression in a letter to Trebatius (*ad Div.* vii. 6.), who remained in Gaul, at Samarobriua, declining to accompany the expedition into Britain: "Quamquam vos nunc istic satis calere audio." Or does it merely refer to the great heat of the summer already noticed? There had been an extremely hot season at Rome also: "Ex magnis caloribus, non enim memini majores." . . . *Cic. ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 1., written in Sept., 700. But Cæsar was evidently in great haste to leave Britain; see c. 23. *Comp. Dion.* xl. 45.

there was nothing to be obtained from the poverty of the natives. No silver plate was to be extorted from them, nor booty of any kind to be acquired, except perhaps slaves; and these were not of the refined and educated class, such as the conquests of Lucullus and Pompeius had poured into Rome from Asia, ingenious artizans or professors of literature and music, but the rough uncouth children of woods and mountains, whom their masters would be ashamed to employ beyond the limits of some distant farm.¹

These short campaigns against the Germans and Britons sufficed to occupy the intervals during which Cæsar was watching the conflict of parties in Rome; they maintained his troops in active exercise, afforded pretences for multiplying his legions, and fostered the cupidity or ambition of his officers. But the eyes of the proconsul continued steadily turned towards Italy, and he omitted no opportunity of betaking himself to the frontier of his province to obtain a nearer view of the transactions of the capital. However, on his

General
spirit of
disaffection
in Gaul.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 16.: "Etiam illud jam cognitum est, neque argenti scripulum esse in illa insula, neque ullam spem prædæ nisi ex Mancipiis: ex quibus nullos puto te literis aut musicis eruditōs expectare." So also to Trebatius (*ad Div.* vii. 7.): "In Britannia nihil esse audio neque auri neque argenti. Id si ita est, essedum aliquod suadeo capias, et ad nos quamprimum recurras." This hope of plunder is a favourite topic in his correspondence. Again to Trebatius, vi. 16.: "Balbus mihi confirmavit te divitem futurum. Id utrum Romano more locutus sit, bene nummatum te futurum, an quomodo Stoici dicunt, omnes esse divites qui cælo et terra frui possint, postea videro." In Plutarch's life (*Cæs.* 23.) Cæsar is said, κακῶσαι τοὺς πολέμιους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἰδίους ὠφελῆσαι, οὐδέν γάρ ὅτι καὶ λαβεῖν ἦν ἄξιον ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων κακοβίων καὶ πενήτων.

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X

second return from Britain, it was obvious that his recent conquests were on the brink of imminent peril, and that his presence throughout the winter was indispensable to their security. The assembly of the Gaulish states was convened at Samaro-briva (Amiens), and Cæsar employed, according to his system, the authority of the deputies among their own tribes to give a colour of national will to the decrees which in reality issued from his own mouth alone. The council was dissolved before the end of autumn, and its members returned each to his own city, bearing with him the mandates of the conqueror, by which the internal polity of the province was regulated, and new contributions, both of money and men, were assessed. Unpalatable as these requisitions were to the proud and jealous chieftains of Gaul, circumstances contributed at the moment to give a greater chance of success to a concerted attack upon the enemy from whom they emanated. The summer had been one of excessive drought, and it was found impossible to maintain the great mass of the Roman forces in one locality. Accordingly, the eight legions of which they consisted were distributed principally through the country of the Belgians, among the Morini, the Nervii, the Remi, the Treviri, and the Eburones, in small divisions and under various commanders.¹ It is probable that the Gauls calculated on the proconsul's usual departure to Italy, and standing more in awe of him personally than of all his lieutenants, proposed to delay their

The Roman forces are distributed over too wide a surface.

¹ Cæsar. *B. G.* v. 24.

general attack on the winter quarters of the legions until his back should be turned.¹ But although compelled to risk it, he was aware of the danger of dividing his forces, and stationed himself at Samarobriva, a central post, whence he could conveniently combine the direction both of military and civil affairs.²

The first indication of the insurrectionary spirit about to break forth throughout the north of Gaul was an isolated act of violence on the part of the Carnutes, who suddenly massacred Tasgetius, the chieftain appointed by the Roman government to exercise sovereignty in their state.³ That it was a public and not a private act of vengeance appeared from the complicity of the magistrates and other influential men of the tribe. The Carnutes, however, were not in a condition to defend their deed, and the speedy arrival of a legion with orders to take up its winter-quarters among them, repressed any further movement, on their part, against the Roman power. The affair was judicially investigated, and the guilty parties were

Revolt of
the Bel-
gians.

¹ Caesar gives us to infer that he had no intention of quitting Northern Gaul during the winter: "Si ipse . . . in Gallia morari constituit" (v. 25.). Dion (xl. 8.) maintains that he was on his way into Italy when recalled by the perilous posture of his affairs, and this account would seem to be confirmed by the ignorance of his officers whether he was in Gaul or not: see below.

² Caesar seems anxious to extenuate the extent to which he dispersed his forces, where he says that all his divisions, except that quartered among the Essui in Normandy, where there was no apprehension of disturbance, were posted within a distance of a hundred miles. But the distance from Aduatuca to the frontiers of the Bellovaci (c. 46.) is little less than two hundred miles.

³ *Caes. B. G.* v. 25.

CHAP.
X.

Craft and
courage of
Ambiorix.

sent to the proconsul for punishment. Meanwhile, however, a vast conspiracy was ripening in the north of Belgium.¹ Ambiorix, a youthful leader of the Eburones, obtained the honour of striking the first blow, in which he displayed no less craft than courage. He had been treated with much favour by the Romans, and had acquired no small share of their confidence. That he should be the first to attack those who called themselves his benefactors, caused equal surprize and concern. Nor were the Romans taken unprepared. The assault which he conducted against the camp of Sabinus and Cotta was repulsed without difficulty. Thus baffled, Ambiorix requested a conference with his opponents, in which he declared himself to be a genuine friend of the Romans, but compelled by the violence of his own people to head an attack upon them. The tribe itself, he asserted, was only acting under similar compulsion, for it was unable to resist the power of the great Gaulish confederacy, which had been long preparing, and was now in the act of executing, a simultaneous assault upon all the Roman quarters. In two days a large body of Germans would arrive to reinforce the assailants. He ended by entreating the Roman officers to evacuate their camp while there yet was time, and consult, not their own safety only, but the general good, by seeking a junction with one of the other divisions of their army, the nearest of which, that of Q. Cicero, was fifty miles distant.²

¹ Besides Cæsar, Dion. xl. 5—11.; Plut. *Cæs.* 24.

² *Cæs. B. G.* v. 27.; Dion. xl. 5, 6. This writer follows the Com-

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X.

The Ebu-
rones de-
stroy two
Roman
legions.

Long and anxious was the consultation which took place in the Roman quarters. Cotta and Sabinus differed in opinion; the one was for maintaining the post at all hazards, the other for falling back upon Cicero's legion. Strange to say, Sabinus could urge in behalf of the latter course that it was uncertain whether Cæsar was himself in Gaul, or whether he had departed for Italy. The news of the rash violence of the Carnutes was appealed to as a proof that the vigilant control of the proconsul must have been withdrawn; the sudden defection of the Eburones was supposed to confirm this presumption. It seems incredible that Cæsar should really have left his officers in uncertainty on a matter of such primary importance for the direction of their conduct, and we are compelled to imagine that such doubts were expressed merely for the purpose of giving a colour to a disgraceful and cowardly proceeding. Cotta finally yielded to his colleague's representations, and it was resolved to effect a retreat. On their march the two legions fell into an ambushade, notwithstanding the friendly assurances in which they had been tempted to confide. Surrounded in a narrow valley they were compelled to abandon their baggage, and under the direction of Cotta (for Sabinus had lost all presence of mind), ranged themselves in a circle to maintain to the last a desperate struggle with their destroyers. This

mentaries of Cæsar very closely, and it is important to remark that they still formed the text-book for this period of history after an interval of 250 years. It may be inferred also that the charges of treachery which Cæsar makes against the Gauls had not been discredited by subsequent authorities.

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X.

manœuvre, effective as it had often proved in saving the armies of the republic in the most dire extremities, was on this occasion of no avail. After repulsing repeated attacks, the Romans succumbed at last, under the constant shower of missiles by which they were harassed from every side. Sabinus, while attempting to discuss the forms of a capitulation, was treacherously slain; and Cotta, who had refused to parley with an armed enemy, met a more honourable death in the front of his slender ranks. The Roman army was almost entirely destroyed; the few that escaped through the forests in the darkness of the night were merely stragglers, without baggage, arms, or ensigns.¹

Attack upon
Q. Cicero's
camp.

This destruction of two complete legions with their generals was the signal for a wide-spread defection throughout central Belgium. The Eburones, Nervii, and Aduatuci were reinforced by numerous but less conspicuous tribes. Ambiorix, able and energetic, and crowned with the glory of a triumph which reminded men of the ancient days of Gaulish renown, was the soul of the confederacy. He marched immediately upon the camp of Q. Cicero, whose single legion was quartered in the Nervian territory. Letters were despatched from the camp to Cæsar, but these were intercepted, and for many days the proconsul was left in entire ignorance of the movements of the enemy, and the dangers to which his troops were exposed.

Character
of Q. Cicero.

The correspondence of the orator, M. Cicero, represents him throughout in the light of an adviser, almost of a tutor or guardian to his

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 37.; Dion. *l. c.*

younger brother Quintus, and the character of the latter has been overshadowed by the greater celebrity and higher merits of the former. But Q. Cicero, though he cannot aspire to be numbered in the first class of the statesmen of his day, holds nevertheless a prominent place among the men of average services and abilities, who contributed to stamp the national character upon the Roman administration at home and abroad. Rising upon the wave of his brother's fortunes, and supported by his own talents and good conduct, he had served some offices of high distinction in the state. Passing through the ordinary course of official dignities, he had arrived at the prætorship, in which he was colleague to Cæsar in the year 692. From thence he had succeeded to the proprætorship of the Lesser Asia, where his term of office was prolonged to a second, and again to a third year, principally at the instance of M. Cicero¹, who found his services eminently useful in carrying out his own policy in favour of the equestrian order, and also in conciliating the affections of the provincials by justice and moderation. Brilliant abilities could have little scope in a province so peaceful, and in the midst of a society so thoroughly moulded and matured; but it was no slight merit in Quintus, it might be of no small advantage to the reforming party to which he belonged, if it

¹ This appears from M. Cicero's remarkable letter to his brother, numbered *ad Qu. Fr.* i. 1., which, besides the light it throws on Quintus's character, is interesting as containing a formal exposition, evidently intended for the public eye, of the duties of a provincial governor.

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X.

could be truly said of him that, in a province so full of allurements to a man of elegance and taste, he had refrained his hand from the undue acquisition of a single monument of art.¹ After quitting this province with the liveliest demonstrations of regard from the people, Q. Cicero had assisted Pompeius in executing his great commission for supplying the city with corn; he had then attached himself to Cæsar, and engaged to serve under him in Gaul, and had made the best use of his opportunities in advancing his brother's interests with his new patron. He was from the first an ardent admirer of Cæsar's character. When the senate decreed the capital punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators, he had voted with the Marian leader for a more lenient sentence², and now, when the fortunes of his general were trembling in the balance, and the ascendancy of the republic in Gaul was perilled in his person, he sustained the attack of the enemy with a constancy and courage as great as had ever been displayed by a Roman officer. The merit of his defence is heightened by the infirm state of his health at the time.³ His magnanimous general was fully sensible of his deserts, and recorded it in a few simple words, such as form the most suitable monument of his own exploits. Nor must we forget that the lieutenant of Cæsar was in his turn supported by

His resolute
defence,

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* i. 1, 2. : "Præclarum est autem summo cum imperio fuisse in Asia triennium, sic, ut nullum te signum, nulla pictura, nullum vas, nulla vestis, nullum mancipium, nulla forma cujusquam, nulla conditio pecuniæ, quibus rebus abundat ista provincia, ab summa integritate continentiaque deduxerit."

² Suet. *Jul.* 14.

³ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 40.

troops whose courage and endurance were never exceeded. The romantic rivalry of Pulvio and Varenus seems to elicit a spark of fire from the coldest of all military narratives. When the besieged legion was at last relieved by the triumphant arrival of the proconsul in person, it was found that not one man in ten had escaped without a wound. The Gauls had made no small progress in learning and applying the Roman methods of attack.¹ They had surrounded the camp with a ditch and rampart, they had propelled their towers to the foot of the wall, had reduced all the interior to ashes by their inflammable missiles, and had succeeded for many days in cutting off all communication between the besieged and the nearest quarters. They kept all the Roman detachments in such constant alarm, that Labienus dared not venture from his post, and Cæsar was obliged to leave a legion at Samarobriua to protect the treasure, magazines, and public documents. The proconsul could muster no more than two legions to lead against the enemy, and these were reduced to a meagre remnant of seven thousand men. He had no other means of apprising the besieged of his approach but by sending a messenger with a letter attached to a javelin, which he was to fling into the camp if he could come within distance. The letter was written in Greek, or Greek letters, to baffle the enemy in case it should be intercepted.² The javelin stuck

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 42.; Dion. xl. 7.; Oros. vi. 10.

² See above, p. 300. Dion in mentioning this circumstance remarks that Cæsar's usual mode of secret communication was by the use of each fourth letter from the one intended (xl. 9.).

CHAP.
X.

and is saved
by Cæsar's
arrival.

Cæsar re-
mains in
the north
of Gaul
during the
winter.

in one of the towers of the wall, and was not discovered till the next day. By this time the speedy arrival of succour was announced by the smoke of the burning villages which marked the progress of the exasperated Romans. The Gauls broke up from their lines and marched, sixty thousand strong, to confront the enemy. But even then Cæsar was obliged to disguise the slender amount of his forces, before he could induce his opponents to hazard an attack. A vigorous resistance broke their onset and put them to the rout, and thus Quintus Cicero with his little band, harassed and weakened as it had been, was saved from the fate which had overtaken his colleagues.¹

The news of their common disaster soon reached the various armies of the confederates, and they disappeared in a moment from the astonished eyes of the Roman generals. Indutiomarus retreated from before the camp of Labienus, and sought an asylum among the Treviri. The hosts of the Armorican states, which were threatening Roscius in the country of the Essui, and had arrived within eight miles of his position, dispersed without a blow. The proconsul collected three legions around Samarobriva, and took up his station there again for the rest of the winter, fully occupied with watching the affairs of Belgium. Excepting the Remi and the Ædui, who had devoted themselves without reserve to the interests of the republic, there was hardly a state to which grave suspicions of disaffection did not attach. Slow and timid as

¹ These events are detailed at great length, Cæs. *B. G.* v. 42—52.

the Gauls were in the beginning of a movement, from their want of mutual communication and reliance, yet, once begun, all were ready to join it with heart and hand, and the open defection of two nations whose valour they were most accustomed to respect, exasperated their resolution and embittered their defiance, in proportion as it heightened the danger of their cause.

In this critical position of their affairs, the defenders of Gaulish liberty had now recourse to the aid of the barbarians beyond the Rhine. But the followers of Ariovistus had been disheartened by the disasters they had already experienced in collision with the Roman arms, and the fate of the Usipetes and their allies, together with the subsequent invasion of their own soil, had terrified the rest of the Germans. No assistance could be obtained from that quarter.¹ But, notwithstanding this disappointment, Indutiomarus persisted in moving the Gauls to revolt. He had acquired great personal influence throughout their tribes by the friends he had attached to himself by gifts and promises. He now stepped boldly forward, claimed the leadership of the whole confederacy, and convened an armed council of their chiefs. The severity of the national institutions demanded, it is said, that whoever was last to attend such a summons should be publicly put to death with tortures and infamy. In this assembly Indutiomarus denounced his rival Cingetorix as the enemy of the common cause, and the latter was not slow to

The Gauls attack Labienus's camp. The death of Indutiomarus breaks up the confederacy.

¹ *Cæs. B. G. v. 55.*

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X.

avenge himself by divulging the schemes of his accuser to Labienus. It was against Labienus himself that the first outbreak was directed. A numerous host of Gaulish cavalry careered round his works, taunting his soldiers with insults and menaces. But the legate, forewarned, had formed his plan of defence. He suffered the enemy to exhaust their energies by a long and fruitless endeavour to draw him forth to an engagement, and it was not till he had collected all the auxiliary forces within reach, and thoroughly wearied his assailants, that he threw open his gates and gave the signal for a sally. He issued strict orders that the person of Indutiomarus himself should be the object of every soldier's aim. He forbade them to engage in person with any one of the enemy, until the leader had been taken and slain. The Gauls offered little resistance to this vigorous onslaught, and Indutiomarus was overtaken in crossing a ford. His death completed the easy victory of the Romans; the Nervii and Eburones fled precipitately to their homes, and the confederacy rapidly dissolved.¹

Cæsar
makes great
additional
levies for
his sixth
campaign,
A. U. 701.
B. C. 53.

The close of the year brought a short period of respite to the Roman soldiery, but the winter months were hardly less full of solicitude to their officers, especially to Cæsar, who now clearly saw that he had before him the task of completely reconquering the country.² It was necessary to recruit his diminished forces by extensive levies.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* v. 58.

² Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 1.: "Multis ac causis majorem Galliæ motum expectans."

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Orders were issued for raising two fresh legions, and the proconsul obtained a third as a loan from Pompeius¹, who did not hesitate to transfer to him a portion of the forces which the republic had assigned to himself. This legion, numbered the First, had indeed been levied in Cisalpine Gaul by a special decree of the senate, and might seem therefore to belong of right rather to Cæsar than to his rival. But that Pompeius should have thus consented to strengthen the hands of a competitor of whom he had long been jealous, shows how strong he must have felt himself in the exercise of the new powers he had obtained on the expiration of his consulship, and the reliance he must have placed on the friends and adherents with whom he had doubtless officered the new legion. The transaction shows also in a striking manner how independent the principal chiefs of the commonwealth felt themselves to be, when they ventured thus to lend and borrow troops among themselves, without even consulting, as far as appears, the superior authorities of the state.²

and borrows
a legion
from Pom-
peius.

Cæsar's levies proceeded rapidly, and it was his policy as well as his pride to show how speedily Rome could restore her military losses, and pour legion after legion into the field. The Belgian tribes were actively engaged in forming alliances

Cæsar chas-
tises the
Treviri and
Menapii,
and crosses
the Rhine.

¹ Cæs. *B. G. l. c.*; comp. Dion. xl. 65. Plutarch's error, who speaks of two legions as thus lent, is explained by Mœbe, in *Cæs. l. c.*

² See Cæsar's simple account of the transaction (*l. c.*). We shall find that a few years later, when the struggle was about to commence between Cæsar and Pompeius, the latter demanded his legion to be restored to him, and the other made no attempt to retain it (*B. G. viii. 54.*); Plut. *Cæs. 29.*; Appian, *B. C. ii. 29.*

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among themselves; the Cisrhenane Germans united heartily with them; the Senones and others openly refused obedience to their foreign masters; every thing portended a general insurrection in the north-east of Gaul, when Cæsar, before the winter had yet passed, anticipated the approaching movement by pouring four legions into the country of the Nervii. A few rapid marches and energetic proclamations daunted successively the spirit of these people, of the Senones, the Carnutes, and others. But it was the Treviri who constituted the main strength of the disaffected, and the loss of all these auxiliaries was supplied by the assistance of various German tribes, and of the Menapii and Eburones, who united their fortunes with them, and distracted the attention of the Roman generals. While Cæsar pursued the Menapii into their fastnesses, Labienus overcame the Treviri in a battle to which he enticed them by a feigned retreat. Cæsar reached the Rhine and crossed it by a bridge, which he constructed at some distance above the spot of his former passage.¹ Finding, however, that the Suevi had retired to a distance, and hidden themselves in the dense Hercynian forests, he desisted from any attempt to pursue them, and was satisfied with leaving a garrison at the head of the bridge, of which he cut down the portion which abutted on the right bank of the river.² He then turned his forces upon the centre of the Belgian confederacy. His lieutenant Basilus, at the head of the cavalry, made a bold dash at the person of Ambiorix, who

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 9. ; Dion. xl. 32.

² Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 29. ; Dion. xl. 32.

narrowly escaped the unexpected attack, and was compelled to break up his plans for the campaign, and recommend his troops to consult their safety by dispersion. The Segni and Condrusi, Germanic tribes, sent in their submission, with loud assertions of the constancy with which they had refused to aid the confederates. The conqueror was not unwilling to accept their excuses.

But in the midst of these successes the conduct of the war still presented great difficulties. The Eburones, in whose stronghold, Aduatuca, the proconsul had now established his quarters, possessed no other fortresses. They could not be reached in any vital part. Conquest and even desolation seemed to make no permanent impression upon a tribe of hunters and foresters. Once more was the Roman general compelled to scatter his forces in various directions. The Menapii, lately reduced, were again in arms, and it required the presence of three legions under Labienus to check their adventurous reprisals. Q. Cicero was left with one legion to maintain possession of Aduatuca, while three others were entrusted to C. Trebonius, with orders to devastate the country round, and prevent the nearer approach of the enemy. Cæsar himself issued forth in quest of Ambiorix, in whose death or capture he took the greatest interest. As long as large bodies of troops kept together, they were sufficiently secure from the isolated attacks of the barbarians; but as soon as they ventured to pursue or plunder, they were exposed to be cut off in detail in a country which was no other than one great ambushade. It was in these straits that

He offers
the plunder
of the Ebu-
rones to the
neighbour-
ing tribes.

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X.

Cæsar determined to employ the last resource of an unscrupulous invader. He circulated a proclamation through the neighbouring states, declaring the Eburones traitors to Rome and outlaws from the human race, offering at the same time their lives and their goods as a common prey to any one who would venture to take them.¹ This was enough to call forth all the tribes which cherished any jealousy of that ill-fated people, and every man who had any private quarrel to avenge, to wreak their fury under the protection of Rome. It put arms into the hands of every adventurer, whether Gaulish or German, who might choose to enrich himself by rapine and murder. Such, it seems, was the state of mutual hostility in which the Gaulish tribes dwelt among one another, that an announcement of this kind sufficed to break all the late-cemented ties of interest and friendship, and to enlist overwhelming multitudes in the work of destruction. The Eburones, it must be remembered, were an alien people, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones of old. There was less sympathy perhaps with them among the neighbouring races than if they had been people of pure Gaulish blood. The measure was completely successful. The consul's summons was welcomed with savage alacrity. The Gauls rushed headlong upon their victims, who are not likely to have perished without a desperate struggle for life or revenge. But

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 34.: "Cæsar ad finitimas civitates nuncios dimittit, ad se evocat, spe prædæ, ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in sylvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur: simul ut, magna multitudo circumfusa, pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur." Dion. xl. 32.

from whatever quarter it flowed, it was the blood of enemies, and the Romans looked on coolly and securely while the ranks of the assailants were thinned, and while the whole clan of the Eburones was butchered and their very name obliterated from the map of Gaul.

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Modern warfare rarely presents such frightful scenes as must have marked the annihilation of the Eburones; nor did the Romans often allow themselves to display such terrible examples of their vengeance. The transaction we have just related has accordingly been employed, and not unnaturally, to affix an indelible blot upon Cæsar's character. Yet we know that his countrymen uniformly represented him as humane, and even indulgent to every enemy, domestic or barbarian: and it becomes the historian's duty to contemplate this act from a Roman point of view, whence alone can be obtained a just conception of the great captain's motives and conduct on this occasion.

Reflections
upon this
act of seve-
rity.

There was no greater national boast of the Romans than the indignation with which they professed to view political treachery. In their public transactions, especially in the field, they did undoubtedly abstain from it with more self-denial than other conquering nations. The strong reprobation with which they visited the few commanders, such as Cæpio and Papirius, who had notoriously violated this maxim of the state, stands forth in marked contrast with the shamelessness with which successful perfidy has been defended, or even extolled, by national writers in all ages of the world.

The laws
of war as
understood
by the Ro-
mans.

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X.

But, on the other hand, the view they habitually took of all foreign nations as *hostes*, or enemies, could not fail to sharpen their aggressive propensities. Their religion required a specious pretext for declaring war even against an enemy; but the sensitive pride of the republic disdained the idea of allowing the rights of any other state to clash with its own, and there was practically no appeal to a law of nations. Moreover, the Romans persisted in regarding the rude and ignorant enemies with whom they so often contended as not less responsible for the exact observance of their agreements, by whatever compulsion they might have been extorted, than themselves, endued as they were by education with higher intelligence. The slightest infraction of a treaty was held, as in the case of the Veneti, to put the transgressors beyond the pale of humanity. No punishment was reputed too severe if the extreme of severity seemed but expedient.¹ The infliction of pain and death never disturbed the complacency of a Roman general in the discharge of what he deemed his duty to the state. Death was the element in which he seemed himself to move, whether at home or abroad, in the struggles of the forum almost as much as in the contests of the battle-field. From his infancy he was schooled to habitual indifference to his own life; and if he thought as lightly of that of his enemy, he can hardly be accused of holding it in greater contempt. Such was the inevitable consequence of the state of perpetual war abroad

¹ Heyne, *Opusc.* iv. 480. : "De bellis internecinis."

and danger at home in which the Roman lived, nor is it to be attributed to any peculiar ferocity of character.

In the present case certain treaties had been forced upon the Eburones and had been violated by them. They had overreached Sabinus and Cotta, and employed treachery to entice them to their destruction. It seemed necessary to do something which should thoroughly awe the neighbouring states and bring the war to a decision, and the maxims of military policy presented no obstacle to the vengeance which was inflicted upon them. But it was the Gauls themselves who assembled to destroy their own friends and allies. The prospect of plunder overcame every feeling of sympathy, and even of permanent advantage.¹ Where such was the case we may imagine how utterly uncontrolled by principles of any kind their ordinary warfare must have been. Much as the Romans abused their pretensions to moral and intellectual cultivation, yet they were still, what they professed to be, a civilized nation; and wherever they went, whether in peace or war, they softened the habits of the barbarians among whom they established themselves.² The conquests of the re-

The Romans on the whole more humane than the barbarians.

¹ The mutual distrust of the Gaulish tribes appears in their custom of taking hostages from one another whenever they formed treaties of alliance, &c. *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 2.

² It may be observed that, however shocking the conduct of civilized armies has often been, it has been almost always better than that of the barbarians themselves. It is some slight consolation to humanity to believe that the atrocities perpetrated by the French in Algeria, and even by the Spaniards in America, were a shade lighter than those which the natives were in the habit of practising upon one another.

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public were, on the whole, a career of human improvement, and were carried on by methods more humane and more conducive to the progress of mankind than those which they superseded and obliterated. There would be little inducement to write their history were it otherwise.

A body of
Germans
crosses the
Rhine to
plunder the
Eburones,

When Cæsar left Aduatuca in pursuit of Ambiorix, directing his course to the northern confines of the great forest of Arduenna, between the lower Scheldt and the Meuse, he assured Cicero that he would return within seven days. In the meanwhile the plunderers had commenced their work of destruction against the Eburones, and among them a small body of Germans had been allured across the Rhine by the hope of booty.¹ They effected their passage on rafts, avoiding the Roman bridge and garrison, first tasted their prey on the northern border of the Eburon territory, then penetrated further into the forests, until they arrived in the vicinity of the Roman quarters at Aduatuca. They inquired after the much-dreaded name of Cæsar, and when they heard that he was absent, lent no unwilling ear to the bold suggestions of an Eburon captive. "In three hours," he said, "you can reach Aduatuca; poor and scanty is the plunder you have obtained from my country; the further you advance the less will you glean from the leavings of our neighbours' rapacity; but in the camp of Cicero are all the stores of the proconsul, all his resources for the campaign, and all the booty he has swept within his net. The garrison is too slender even to man the walls which sur-

¹ Cæs. B. G. vi. 35.

round, but cannot protect, all this wealth." The Germans embraced the adventure with alacrity, and the Eburon rejoiced in the certain destruction of the one or the other of his enemies.

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The garrison of Aduatuca was, indeed, by no means so slender as had been represented, outnumbering very considerably the handful of Germans who had thus undertaken to surprise and destroy it. We may suppose, however, that the latter had been swelled to much greater numbers on their route, and at the moment of their sudden appearance before the gates of the encampment five cohorts of the legion were absent foraging at a short distance. The seventh day had passed, no news of the proconsul had arrived, there was a pressing want of provisions in the camp, and no appearance of any enemy in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, Cicero's incautiousness in thus reducing his strength proved almost fatal to him. The attack of the Germans was so sudden, the defence so feeble (for the walls were manned in a great measure by the sick and wounded) that the place was on the point of being carried by a *coup-de-main*. The five cohorts returned from foraging; but the enemy had placed himself between them and the camp, and, despising the smallness of their numbers, reckoned upon an easy victory. The Romans, moreover, were for the most part new levies, being a portion of the armament which had been raised that winter in Italy. They had been officered, however, by the promotion of picked men from the other legions, and

and is
tempted to
attack the
Roman
station at
Aduatuca,

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but are disappointed
in their
enterprize.

were now saved by the unfailing discipline and presence of mind of the centurions. They were instructed to form immediately the cuneus or wedge, and so rush with all their force upon the opposing ranks. Their weight and steadiness bore down all resistance, and the moving mass burst through the crowd of barbarians till it reached the gates of the camp, which were speedily opened to it. Thus baffled, the Germans lost heart, and made the best of their way homewards, with as much of their booty as the time and their own fears would allow them to secure: for Cæsar was now close upon their rear, and they were much more ready to believe in his approach than the Romans themselves, who had given themselves up to despair, convinced that nothing but his defeat and death could have brought the Germans so suddenly upon them.¹

Cæsar leaves
Gaul for
Italy at the
conclusion
of his sixth
campaign.

Cæsar, indeed, had been unsuccessful in the principal object of his late expedition, the capture or slaughter of Ambiorix. He set out once more and ravaged all the districts through which he passed with fire and sword; but still the wily Eburon was able to elude his pursuit. In vain did the captives of each day's skirmish declare, when brought into the presence of the proconsul, that they had but just seen the fugitive, that he must still be close at hand, that he was defenceless and alone, or attended at most by a mere handful of followers; for the rewards with which the Romans urged his people to betray him rendered his person everywhere insecure. As the season drew

¹ Cæs. B. G. vi. 35—41.

to a close, and no enemy appeared any longer in the field, the labours of the campaign came at last to an end. Cæsar convened the general assembly at Durocortorum, and occupied it with an inquiry into the guilt of the Senones and Carnutes; but he treated those people with unexpected mildness, and was satisfied with the sacrifice of a single victim. He stationed two legions in the country of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, but concentrated the remaining six at Agendicum, in the territory of the Senones.¹ Having made these dispositions, he no longer hesitated to take the road for Italy, intending to hold the assembly of the Cisalpine states, and take at the same time a nearer survey of the affairs of Rome, where events had occurred of the utmost importance towards the further development of his cherished schemes.

Cæsar was still occupied with his second invasion of Britain when he was apprised by letters from Rome of the death of Julia.² The natural expression of his affliction is lightly touched upon in Cicero's correspondence with his brother³, and the fortitude with which he bore it, returning within three days to the discharge of his public duties, is recorded in glowing terms by a more pedantic philosopher.⁴ He subdued his grief, says

The death
of Julia :
its political
importance.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 44.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 1. 17. 25. Compare and correct Plut. *Cæs.* 23.

³ Cic. *l. c.* : "O me sollicitum, quantum ego dolui in Cæsaris suavis-
simis literis!"

⁴ Senec. *Consol. ad Marc.* 14. : "Intra tertium diem imperatoria
obiit munia, et tam cito dolorem vicit quam omnia solebat."

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X.

The deaths
of Crassus
and Clodius.

Seneca, with the same expedition with which he subdued his enemies. It may be doubted whether the change which this event effected in his relations with Pompeius, and the prospect of a speedier rupture between them, enhanced his domestic affliction, as that writer would have us suppose¹; but if it broke up his plans, and rendered their accomplishment still more uncertain and precarious, it must have added a heavy burden to his political cares. On the eve, however, of his next return to Italy, another event of more momentous public concern conspired with his recent loss to perplex and overcast his schemes. Our next chapter will record the expedition of Crassus into Asia, and its fatal termination. The triple league was dissolved by the death of the triumvir, whose peculiar position in the state, as well as his personal qualities, had fitted him to hold the balance between his more aspiring colleagues; or constituted him, in the language of the poet, the isthmus which forbade the collision of two encroaching oceans.² If any thing more was wanted to withdraw all restraint from the angry passions of the rival chieftains, it was supplied by the removal of Clodius from the scene, the news of which event also greeted Cæsar immediately upon his arrival at the frontier of his province.³ The circumstances which attended

¹ Senec. *l. c.*: "In oculis erat Cn. Pompeius, non æquo laturus animo quenquam alium esse in republica magnum."

² Lucan, i. 100.:

— Qualiter undas

Qui secat et geminum gracilis mare separat isthmus," &c.

³ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 1.: "Ibi cognoscit de Clodii cæde."

it compelled the senate to throw all its power into the hands of Pompeius ; and the reconciliation of their recent jealousies, hollow as it was, destroyed whatever yet remained of confidence and good faith between the leader of the oligarchy and the champion of the popular cause.

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CHAP. XI.

STATE OF THE PARTHIAN MONARCHY.—CRASSUS MEDITATES AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE PARTHIANS.—FIRST INVASION, A.U. 700.—SECOND INVASION, A.U. 701.—HE IS DECEIVED BY THE PARTHIANS, AND MISLED BY HIS GUIDES.—FATAL ENGAGEMENT BEYOND CHARRHÆ.—DEATH OF THE YOUNGER CRASSUS.—CRASSUS ENTICED INTO A CONFERENCE AND SLAIN IN A FRAY.—HIS REMAINS INSULTED.—AN INTERREGNUM AT ROME.—POMPEIUS PREVAILS ON THE TRIBUNES TO ALLOW THE ELECTION OF CONSULS.—ASSASSINATION OF CLODIUS.—DISTURBANCES IN THE CITY.—POMPEIUS APPOINTED SOLE CONSUL FOR THE YEAR 702.—TRIAL OF MILO.—THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORUM CONTROLLED BY AN ARMED FORCE.

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XI.

Rise of the
Parthian
monarchy.

BEFORE we revert to the contemplation of the protracted death-struggle of Roman independence, we must turn aside to follow the Parthian expedition of Crassus, one of the most romantic episodes in the history of the martial republic, conspicuous for the most wanton aggression and the most signal chastisement by which her bloody annals are distinguished. The province of Syria offered brilliant opportunities to the ambition or avarice of a Roman proconsul. Its wealth, comparatively untouched by earlier conquerors, was the accumulation of centuries of commercial splendour. Its frontiers were limited by the dominions of the tributary sovereigns of Cappadocia and Palestine, who flourished under the shadow of Roman protection. Beyond them lay the kingdoms of Armenia, placed also in a state of dubious dependence on the re-

public, and of Egypt, whose freedom at the moment was trembling in the balance. To the east stretched the vast extent of the Parthian empire, with which Rome had never yet measured her strength. The region from which the once mighty name of the Parthians took its rise is an insignificant tract of country watered by the river Ochus, the modern Tedjen, near the south-eastern extremity of the Caspian Sea. On the north a sandy desert separates it from the Oxus and the modern city of Khiva; on the south it is hemmed in by the great mountain chain which connects the Caucasus of the west with the Hindoo Khoosh, or Caucasus of the East. This district had formed the most northern possession of the Macedonian empire; but, upon the partition of the various provinces after the death of Alexander, none of the Greek generals ventured to occupy a throne in so remote and barbarous a region. Parthia fell into the hands of a chief of native extraction, though known by the Greek name of Stasanor; but it continued in a state of precarious dependence on the sovereigns of the Macedonian line, who held their court in Susa. The power of the European dynasties was weakened by their quarrels with one another; and both the Parthians and the Bactrians shook off the yoke in the second century before our era. Arsaces, the founder of a race of Parthian kings, was a man of obscure origin; the conquest of Hyrcania extended his possessions to the Caspian; and when his vigorous chivalry crossed the Caucasus and came in contact with the nations to the south, the successors of Alexander were

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unable to withstand them, and the whole of the provinces between the Euphrates and the Indus fell in the fourth generation under the sway of the Parthian Mithridates. This powerful tyrant was succeeded by a son who, after some brilliant triumphs over the Greeks in Syria, was defeated and slain by a horde of invading Scythians. The attention of his successors, as far as they could spare it from their intestine divisions and family intrigues, was principally occupied with checking the progress of these depredators, and supporting the power of Armenia on their north-western frontier, which formed a bulwark against future invasion from that quarter.¹

The Par-
thian court
at Seleucia.

For his abode the Parthian sovereign selected Seleucia on the Tigris, from among the royal residences of the empire he had overthrown. Scarcely emerged from the tent of his fathers, he at once established himself in all the pomp of the ancient dynasties which had successively held the sceptre of Central Asia. He adopted from the Assyrians the slothful luxury of the priest-kings of the line of Belus; he surrounded himself with slaves, eunuchs, and concubines; dressed more like a woman than a man², and revelled in the charms of odours, wine, and music. From the example of the Medes, he assumed the licence of intermarrying with the nearest members of his own family, a barbarous

¹ This history is concisely detailed by Justin, xli. 4, 5.

² See Plutarch's description of Surenas (c. 24.): *ἐντρίμμασι προσωπὸν καὶ κόμης διακρίσει*, and comp. c. 32.: *ἰσθῆτα βαρβαρικὴν γυναικὸς ἐνδύς*. The flowing dress which the Greeks supposed to be feminine was originally sacerdotal, but its effect must have been to encourage indolence and cowardice.

device for limiting the claimants to the succession. Nor was he less easily seduced by the more intellectual, but hardly less enervating, refinements which the Greeks had introduced into Asia. An exotic literature and a gaudy theatre flourished at Seleucia under the royal patronage; the ritual ceremonies of the most graceful of superstitions were too closely interwoven with the forms of the Grecian drama not to follow in its train. The court of Seleucia presented a motley combination of the manners of different ages and countries, only to be paralleled, perhaps, in the semi-European fashions of Petersburg and Moscow. But the monarch was surrounded and his throne upheld by the faithful arms of a warlike nobility, among whom these refinements had not penetrated so deeply. For them he had changed the satrapies of Persia and the governments of Alexander into dependent fiefs. When he put forth his whole strength for conquest or defence, he could call upon the services of eighteen vitaxæ, or vassal kings.¹ Every petty chieftain summoned his retainers to his side, who preserved at least in the field the habits of their nomade ancestors, clad themselves in their scaly armour, and bounded upon their horses, equipped with the bow and arrow, equally deadly in the charge or the retreat.²

¹ Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, c. 8.; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, i. c. 7.

² The Parthian forces consisted principally of cavalry, and both men and horses were clad in chain or scale armour. Justin, xli. 2. These accoutrements became an object of terror to the Romans after their defeat under Crassus, and formed the burden of many popular descriptions. (See Propertius, Martial, and the poets generally.) It is hardly credible that the Parthian horsemen thus equipped could

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XL

The dynasty
of the Ar-
sacidae ob-
noxious to
its Persian
subjects.

The countenance which the Parthian monarch extended to the manners and usages introduced by his immediate predecessors into the regions beyond the Euphrates was doubtless galling to the spirit of the native race, and rendered him particularly obnoxious to the priestly caste, who worshipped the element of fire in its visible fountain in the heavens. It was to this hostility, perhaps, that the dynasty of Arsaces owes the obscurity which envelopes its history in the native annals. Ferdousi, the poetical historian of Persia, passes it over almost in silence; and other Oriental authorities, while they curtail its duration by two or more centuries, deny the foreign extraction of the founder.¹ This opinion has met with supporters among European scholars; but the passage

have had great rapidity of movement; and the Armenian cavalry, similarly armed, was defeated and destroyed with ease by Lucullus at Tigranocerta. (Plut. *Luc.* 28.) But their attacks were formidable to the Roman legionary, unless well furnished with archers, slingers, and cavalry on his wings. In the later periods of the empire the Romans adopted this mode of equipment, rather perhaps for show than for service. (Claudian, in *Rufin.* ii. 360.) But the same kind of defensive armour, which we are accustomed to associate with the name of the Parthians, has been very extensively used in various parts of the world. The figures thus clad on the Column of Trajan represent Sarmatians: comp. Tac. *Hist.* i. 79.; Ammian. xvii. 12.; Pausan. i. 21. The Georgians and Circassians use it habitually at the present day, and it was adopted from them by their descendants, the Mamelukes of Egypt. Major Denham discovered a people in Bornou whose king was attended by a body-guard of horsemen in chain-mail. Their horses, he says, were small, but moved with rapidity. *Denham and Clapperton's First Journey*, p. 62—64. His drawings are precisely similar to the specimens of Afghan or Belooche chain-mail, which may be seen in Sir Samuel Meyrick's collection at Goodrich Court. The chain-mail of the crusaders with which we are familiar was more complete and heavier than any other.

¹ Malcolm's *Hist. of Persia*, l. c. Arsaces is known to the native writers by the name of Ashk.

of Strabo, on which they rely, may be safely pronounced corrupt¹, and there is no ground for supposing that the Arsacidæ formed an exception to the destiny which has so repeatedly subjected Persia to the sway of foreign masters.²

Meanwhile, the progress of the Roman arms in the East had brought them into immediate contact with the Parthian outposts, and the line of the Euphrates became through a part of its course the recognized boundary of the two dominions. The Roman province of Syria extended from the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor or the Gulf of Issus, to the Libanus, the northern limit of Palestine. It was governed, as we have seen, directly from Rome, while the territories immediately bordering upon it were allowed to retain their own laws, and were subjected to the rule of native sovereigns appointed by the republic. The large force which it was necessary to maintain in a position of such importance, and its distance from the seat of government, invested the proconsul of Syria

Crassus sets out upon an expedition against Parthia.

¹ Strabo alone of the ancient writers seems to identify the Parthians with the Carduchi (xvi. 1.); but the reading Παρθαίων is rejected by Groskurd, who, with Tzschukke, Koray, and Wesseling, would read Γορδωνίων. The Carduchi, or Kurds, had their central seats about the sources of the river Tigris, but extended also into the plains of Adiabene. Xenophon (*Anab.* iii. 5. 16.) describes them as only nominally dependent on the kings of Persia in his time. Their nomade habits and love of horses (Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of Persia*, p. 143.) are too common characteristics of an analogous state of society to establish any identity between them and the Parthians. Undoubtedly, however, there was an early connexion between the Armenians, Parthians, Medes, and Persians, derived from their common Caucasian origin, and so far both theories may be reconciled.

² The dynasty of the Arsacidæ was overthrown in the third century by Ardshir, or Artaxerxes, the first of the Sassanidæ, a native race which reigned till the conquest of the Saracens in the seventh.

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with almost irresponsible power. Gabinius was nearly the first to whom this charge had been intrusted since the political settlement established throughout these regions by Pompeius. He had gone to his province full of schemes of warfare and plunder. He had quarrelled with the Parthians, who had hitherto cultivated amicable relations with their formidable neighbours, and conducted themselves towards her officers with the respectful frankness of a brave and independent people. He had gone so far as to threaten them with invasion, but had been diverted from his purpose by the superior temptation of restoring Ptolemæus Auletes to the throne of Egypt. It was this capricious project of Gabinius to signalize himself by a war with Parthia that inflamed the vanity of Crassus. The success of the new proconsul in military affairs had hitherto been equivocal; up to this period he had not appeared to affect the character of a great general. But the renown of Pompeius and Cæsar had long rankled in his bosom; he resolved to rival, and he hoped to excel, them; sentiments of military ambition, which were supposed never to have found a place in his cautious and sober disposition, now broke forth in expressions of the wildest arrogance. He talked to his friends with puerile arrogance of the exploits he would perform; he would not limit his enterprizes to Syria or even Parthia; the victories of Lucullus over Tigranes, of Pompeius over Mithridates, he ridiculed as trifling; while he proclaimed his own resolution to subdue the Bactrians and the Indians, and penetrate, like another Alexander, to the ocean which sur-

rounds the Continent.¹ Cæsar, always on the watch for the errors of his associates, wrote to him from Gaul to stimulate his ambition and his hopes.² We may suppose that the advice of the conqueror of the West would be of no less audacious a character than that which had so often signalized his actions, and that he urged Crassus to put the widest interpretation upon the licence to make war or peace which Trebonius had obtained for him. It was indeed too late to quarrel with the proconsul of Syria for proposing to exercise a power which had been formally conceded to him; nevertheless, the statesmen of the republic were reluctant to throw themselves at the feet of another military despot, and the disclosure of his warlike resolves caused general alarm and discontent among them. In order to evade the effect of their discouragement or remonstrances, Crassus pushed on his preparations, and set out upon his journey some weeks before his consulship expired.³ The tribune Ateius, a partizan of the nobles, unable to detain him by a legal enactment, met him at the gate of the city, and holding in one hand a brazier of burning coals, and casting incense into it with the other, invoked the curse of heaven upon the enterprize and its leader, and devoted him, in the

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 16.

² Plut. *l. c.*

³ He left Rome just before the middle of November, according to the unreformed calendar (Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 13), the Roman year at this period being just fifteen days in advance of the real time. He probably crossed from Brundisium about a fortnight later, when his armament was assailed by violent stormy weather. Plut. *Crass.* 17.; comp. Drumann, iv. 96. Plutarch contradicts himself in *Pomp.* 52., where he says that Crassus did not leave Rome till the beginning of the following year.

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face of his country, and in the solemn words of the ancient formularies, to the infernal gods.¹ A fearful importance was attached by popular superstition to a tribune's curse, and the minds of the soldiery were not less affected by it than those of the people. As might be expected, the door was at once opened to the invention of every kind of evil omen which fear or malice could suggest. Many were reported at the time, more probably were imagined after the catastrophe which they seemed to portend. A story related by Cicero retains an antiquarian interest, which may warrant its repetition. While the troops were assembled at Brundisium, a man was heard calling his figs in the street, "Cauneas" "Cauneas;" his long and drawling accents were fancifully interpreted into the fatal warning, "Cave ne eas," "Beware of going."² The loss of several vessels, in the passage to Dyrrhachium, with troops on board, was a more serious misadventure. But the journey through Macedonia and the Lesser Asia, with all its cheering sights and pleasant resting-places, revived the equanimity of the soldiers, and Crassus himself was full of confidence and arrogant levity. Deiotarus, king of Galatia, an aged and faithful ally of the Roman people,

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 16.; Dion. xxxix. 39.; Flor. iii. 11. 3., where the name Metellus is a mistake. The nobles affected to be displeased with the extravagant zeal of their friend. But Cicero, in a letter to Atticus (iv. 13.), contrasts the slender attendance of friends and well-wishers at Crassus's departure with the enthusiasm which was manifested when Æmilius Paullus left the city to undertake the war against Perseus, king of Macedonia.

² Cic. *de Divin.* ii. 40. Probably the sound was "Caⁿneas."

was building a city in the route of the proconsul. Crassus mocked at him for undertaking such an enterprize in his old age. "And thou, too," returned the veteran, "art far advanced in years to lead an expedition against the Parthians."¹

The Roman, indeed, did not delay an instant in making his first campaign. He crossed the Euphrates, and accepted the submission of some towns in Mesopotamia. One place, before which a party of his troops had met with a check, he stormed and ransacked, and was well pleased to receive, for so trifling an exploit, the acclamations of his army and the appellation of Imperator. But he was soon satisfied with his success, and, instead of pushing forward upon the centre of the enemy's power, returned indolently to his province; thus allowing the Parthians, irritated but not seriously injured, to complete their preparations for repelling a second attack. The rule of an upstart race of barbarians fretted the pride of the great old-world cities of Seleucia and Babylon. The first object of an invader, according to the military critics of antiquity, should have been to present himself before their walls, and proclaim himself the deliverer of voluptuous civilization from the yoke of the rude mountaineers.² During

Crassus
crosses the
Euphrates,
and gains
some trifling
successes.

¹ Crassus was sixty years of age, and his appearance was still older. *Plut. Crass.* 17.; *App. Hist. Rer. Parth.* This work cannot be considered genuine, and is almost a verbal transcript of Plutarch.

² *Plut. Crass.* 27.: Βαβυλώνος καὶ Σελευκείας, δυσμενῶν αἰ τοῖς Πάρθοις πόλεων. *Dion.* xl. 13.: τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συστρατευσάντων σφίσιν Ἑλλήνων ἄποικοι πολλοί, βία ἀχθόμενοι, καὶ ἐς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὥς καὶ φιλέλληνας πολλὰ ἐλπίζοντες, οὐχ ἀκουσίως μεθίσταντο.

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the remainder of the year, the seven-hundredth from the foundation of the city, Crassus occupied himself with the civil affairs of his province, with the extortion, that is, and accumulation of treasure. In the pursuit of his object he committed various acts of sacrilege, to the horror of the natives, who carefully registered the omens which portended the vengeance of the gods.¹ He was joined by his son, the gallant lieutenant of Cæsar, with a body of one thousand cavalry from Gaul, a present from the one triumvir to the other. The most experienced of his officers was C. Cassius Longinus, a soldier of approved skill and courage, the same who became celebrated in after years as a principal actor in Cæsar's assassination. Thus supported, with an army duly disciplined and equipped, he continued to indulge in sanguine confidence regarding the result of the campaign which he projected for the following year. The character of the Parthian warfare, which became so terrible to the Romans, was as yet little known to them; but the Persian arrow, it was remembered, had been no match for the Macedonian Sarissa. The mail-clad horsemen of Parthia were not distinguished from the loose-garbed and effeminate human herds which Xerxes had driven with whips before him, which Agesilaus had scattered with a handful of Spartan infantry,

¹ Crassus seized without remorse the treasures amassed in the temple of Derceto or Atargatis, in Hierapolis. (Plut. *Crass.* 27.; Strab. xvi. 1. 4.) He made a journey to Jerusalem on purpose to rifle the temple. Its wealth was computed at ten thousand talents. Eleazar the high-priest tried to save it by the offer of a costly bribe. Crassus took the bribe and the treasure both. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 7. 1., *B. Jud.* i. 7, 8.

or which Alexander had chased from the Hellespont to the Hyphasis.¹

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While Crassus was collecting his forces from their winter quarters, Orodes, the king of the Parthians, sent ambassadors to complain of the sudden aggression upon his territories, or, more properly, upon those of Abgarus, king of Osroene, a dependency of the Seleucian crown. But their commission was not so much to negotiate with the Roman proconsul as to defy him. The Parthians seem to have been informed of the dislike with which the proceedings of Crassus were viewed by the Roman senate. An attempt had lately been made in that assembly to obtain the proconsul's recall from his province, which was foiled by the interference of Pompeius, seconded by a speech from Cicero.² The Parthians affected to draw a distinction between the republic and the marauder who had insulted them. With the former, they

Embassy of
the Par-
thians, and
mutual
defiance,
A. U. 701.

¹ Compare the speech of Lentulus in Lucan's poem (viii. 331. &c.), which seems to express a revival of the contemptuous and unfounded prejudices of the Romans, after the defeat of Crassus had been effaced from their recollection :

“ Illic et laxas vestes et fluxa virorum
Velamenta vides.” . . .

The bow was stigmatized as a cowardly and effeminate weapon compared with the sword :

“ Ensis habet vires, et gens quæcunque virorum est
Bella gerit gladiis.” . . .

One disadvantage it had :

“ Nam Medos prælia prima
Exarmant, vacuæque jubent remeare pharetræ.”

No Roman would have escaped from the field of Charrhæ if the Parthians could have maintained a close blockade of the exhausted legions.

² Cic. *ad Div.* v. 8.

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said, they were prepared to wage war to extremity, if challenged to the field; but if the enterprize were merely the personal act of the old man before them, they would not condescend to harm a hair of his head, but would contemptuously send him back the garrisons which he had left beyond the Euphrates. Crassus retorted with the usual taunt of inexperienced commanders; he would discuss these matters in their capital. Wagises, an aged Parthian, pointed to the smooth palm of his hands, and said that hair should sooner grow there than the Romans ever see Seleucia.¹

Advice of
Cassius and
Artabazes
regarding
the conduct
of the cam-
paign.

The confidence which these expressions indicated was not belied by the power and resolution with which it was backed. Some of the Roman detachments stationed beyond the Euphrates were soon compelled to abandon their posts, and came flying into the camp. They described the vigorous character of the enemy who had assailed them, the deadliness of his assault, the fruitlessness of pursuing him, the unerring aim of his arrows, the impenetrability of his armour. The Parthians were evidently a people of a very different character from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus had so easily routed. These reports caused much uneasiness in the Roman quarters, and Cassius thus early warned his leader of the perils of the enterprize he was about to undertake. But Crassus gave no heed to the warning. Artabazes, the king of Armenia, came into his presence with the offer of all the resources of his country. He promised the assistance of ten thousand cavalry

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 18.

equipped in complete armour, and of thirty thousand infantry; at the same time he strongly urged him to direct his march through his own friendly territories, well supplied with water and provisions, and abounding in hills and streams, which would baffle the dreaded manœuvres of the Parthian horsemen.¹ By this route he would reach the upper waters of the Tigris, from whence he might descend to Seleucia through a fertile and practicable country. But Crassus, though well pleased with the zeal of his ally, would brook no delay, nor adopt a circuitous line of march; moreover he represented that he had still some troops left in occupation of outposts beyond the Euphrates, and these he was hastening to support.

The writers from whom we derive our accounts of the campaign that followed, lived at least two centuries after the date of the events they relate; and even if the sources from which they drew their materials were trustworthy and accurate, they may very probably have confused and disfigured their statements from their own want of critical spirit. Accordingly, their narratives correspond very imperfectly with the geography of the country through

Different routes open to the choice of an invading army.

¹ Comp. Lucan. *l. c.* :

“ Parthus per Medica rura,
Sarmaticos inter campos, effusaque plano
Tigridis arva solo, nulli superabilis hosti est
Libertate fugæ: sed non, ubi terra tumebit,
Aspera conscendet montis juga, nec per opacas
Bella geret latebras, incerto debilis arcu:
Nec franget nando violenti vorticis amnem.” . . .

Yet the Parthians came originally from a hilly country, and the mail-clad cavalry of Armenia, as well as the modern Belooches, were accustomed to mountain warfare.

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which they profess to guide us. The district of Osrhoene, which comprehends undoubtedly the whole of the route we wish to trace, was confined on the north by the line of the Mons Masius, or Karahjah Dag, running directly east and west from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the parallel of Samosata. The latter of these rivers bounds it to the west and south, as far as its confluence with the Chaboras, which may be considered as the eastern limit of the district. The great highway from Asia Minor to the cities of Persia lay through the town of Zeugma, on the Euphrates, which derived its name from the bridge by which the opposite banks were there connected, and which, in Rome's most prosperous times, when she granted terms to the prostrate empires of the East, was complimented with the pompous title of the Route of Peace.¹ The modern village of Roum Kale (the Roman castle) still marks its site, but the caravans now cross the river a few miles lower down, at Birs. From Zeugma a military way was directed due east to Edessa, the modern Orfa, the Ur of Scripture, where the king of Osrhoene held his court. At a later period this position became, in the hands of the Romans, the key of Parthia and Armenia. From hence the road branched into two lines: the one continued in an easterly direction to Nisibis and Nineveh, on the Tigris,

¹ Stat. *Sylv.* iii. 2. 137. : "Zeugma Latinæ Pacis iter." The bridge was originally constructed for the transport of Alexander's army across the Euphrates. Dion. xl. 17.; Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir*, 316. The Euphrates there is deep and rapid, and about 130 yards broad.

and here was the point of departure either for Seleucia or Ecbatana; the other struck more southward, ran through Charrhæ, then turned due south, skirting the little stream Balissus, till it reached the Euphrates at Nicephorium. From this point it was carried on nearly parallel to the banks of that river, and at last terminated at Seleucia, after crossing the narrowest part of the isthmus which separates the Euphrates from the Tigris. These highways were the work of a later age, when the power of Rome was established through the whole of Mesopotamia, but they were laid out in all probability in the line of the much more ancient routes which were in use in the time of Crassus. It was along one or other of these lines, therefore, that we should expect to trace the march of the invading army. In later times Trajan entered Parthia by the northern, and Julian by the southern route¹; but Crassus, according to our historians, followed neither. We have no choice but to consider the main incidents of their narrative correct, and we must be content with remarking, as we pass, the minor inconsistencies by which it is encumbered.

The proconsul had collected his troops together, seven legions strong, at Zeugma. Once more the superstition of the soldiers was busy in collecting omens of disaster. Thunders and lightnings, with

Discourage-
ment of
the Roman
army.

¹ Mannert, v. 2. p. 200.; Francke, *Gesch. Trajans*, p. 277.; Ammian. xxiii. 3. D'Anville's work on the Euphrates and Tigris is of great service in tracing the ancient geography, but his map is extremely incorrect as regards the course of the former river. That which is appended to Kinneir's *Journey through Armenia*, &c., seems much more trustworthy.

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tempests of wind and rain, gave a general presage of ill-success.¹ The bridge broke under the weight of the army and its baggage, at which the troops were much disheartened. But the actions of their leader and the expressions which fell from him were peculiarly significant and unlucky. Crassus, intending to return from the conquests he anticipated by the route of Armenia, paid no attention to the calamity, and uttered the unconscious prophecy, that none of his soldiers would want that bridge again. So, too, in sacrificing, he let the sacred fragments of the victim fall from his hand. Instead of hastening to recover them, and avert the omen by appropriate formulas, he only smiled, and remarked with levity, "See the infirmity of age!"²

Prepara-
tions of the
Parthians

As soon as the Roman army had reached the left bank of the Euphrates, it proceeded, if we are correctly informed, not to take the road to Edessa, but to skirt the river for some way down.³ If the object of the general had been to give countenance and support to garrisons stationed along its course, as, for instance, at Barbalissus and Nicephorium, it would seem that that object might have been attained much more easily by approaching the river at the spot nearest to Antioch, his original point of

¹ The Euphrates is subject to violent hurricanes. It was in one of these that Captain Chesney's vessel was lost on his expedition to explore the navigation of that river. Long's *Notes on Plutarch*.

² Plut. *Crass.* 19. : τοιοῦτον τὸ γῆρας.

³ The force which crossed the Euphrates amounted to seven legions, with about four thousand cavalry, and as many light-armed troops. Plut. *Crass.* 20. Appian (*B. C.* iii. 18.) raises the number to 100,000 men, and Florus to eleven legions (iii. 11.).

departure, without making so unnecessary a circuit. There could have been no difficulty in throwing a bridge of boats across it at either of those places. The counsel of Artabazes having been altogether disregarded, the skill and experience of Cassius now suggested the most feasible plan which remained for the campaign. He recommended his leader to keep along the bank of the Euphrates, by which means he could ensure a constant supply of provisions from the flotilla which was in readiness to accompany him, and prevent the possibility of being surrounded. At the same time he advised him to move slowly and with circumspection, not to trust to the rumours which flowed into the camp of the disappearance and meditated flight of the Parthians, but to keep under the shelter of some of his fortified posts till the plans of the enemy could be fully ascertained. The fact was, as he anticipated, that they were prepared to act on the defensive, and did not choose to meet the invaders in a pitched battle on equal terms. It was their object to lead the Roman army into the sandy plains which intervene between the two rivers, and there hang loosely upon their skirts, till heat, fatigue, and want should do half the work of the sword. They found an instrument fitted for their design in the person of Abgarus¹, the Osrhoenian, who attended upon the march of

Their stratagem to mislead the enemy.

¹ He is called by Dion *Ἀβγαρος*, i. e. Abgarus; by the Pseudo-Appian, *Ἀκβαρος*, in which we may, perhaps, recognize the modern Akhbar. This word is said to be a royal title, signifying "great." Several of the name are mentioned in this and the following century as kings of Edessa. Plutarch gives this personage the name of Ariamnes; he also uses the form *Ὑρώδης* for Orodes.

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Surenas, the
Parthian
general.

the Roman legions, and wormed himself into the confidence of their leader by specious professions of gratitude for the favours he had received from Pompeius. He assured the proconsul that Orodes, despairing of the defence of his country, had left two of his satraps, Surenas and Sillaces, to make a show of resistance, while he was himself in full retreat for Scythia or Hyrcania, carrying off with him all the treasures he could hastily remove. Any appearance, he said, of hesitation on the part of the Romans might restore him to confidence, but a sudden and direct march upon Seleucia would at the moment meet with no effectual opposition. In fact, whether through fear of the Romans, or to show his contempt for them in the most striking manner, Orodes had undertaken himself to chastise the insolence of their Armenian ally, leaving the brunt of the invasion to be sustained by his satraps. But this division of his forces was calculated to lull the enemy into security, and entice him into a perilous movement, where the nature of the country and climate would arm the Parthians with irresistible weapons. Surenas ranked next to the king in birth, wealth, and distinction.¹ He was the most eminent of his nation for valour and abilities, nor had he an equal in strength and beauty of person. He went forth, whether in peace or war, with an equipage of one thousand camels, and his wives and concubines followed him in a train of two hundred chariots. His body-guard consisted of one thousand horsemen in

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 21. 24. It seems probable that Surenas, like Abgarus, was a title, and not an appellative.

mail, and a still greater number of light-armed. His rank and relationship to the throne entitled him to place the diadem on the head of the sovereign. It was to him that Orodes owed his restoration to the supreme power, from which he had been formerly expelled by his own subjects. Surenas had reconquered Seleucia by his own personal valour, and though not yet thirty years of age, he added to all these claims to honour the reputation of the highest wisdom in council and craft in the face of the enemy.

It seems that Abgarus had no difficulty in persuading the infatuated Roman to abandon the line of the Euphrates, and strike into the plains which separate it from the Tigris, in the face of this formidable opponent. The general character of the country from Zeugma to the Chaboras is both level and sandy, but its barrenness is relieved by numerous patches of cultivated and abundantly fertile soil. Nor are there wanting both streams and wells to supply it with water. There seems, therefore, to be no serious impediment to the progress either of a caravan or an army as far as the river Chaboras, beyond which lies the great desert of Sinjar.¹ It is very improbable that the army of Crassus ever penetrated into this further region, and we cannot resist the suspicion that the common traditions, upon which the historians relied, ascribed to its march far greater difficulties and privations than it really encountered. Soon after

The Roman army is misled by the treachery of Abgarus.

¹ This is the great desert of Mesopotamia, which Strabo describes as lying beyond the Chaboras (xvi. 1.).

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leaving the river side, it is said, the country lost every appearance of habitation and fertility. Boundless tracts of light moving sand presented themselves to the eye, without shade or water, undulating like the waves of the sea. The heat was intense, and the spirits of the soldiers sank under the daily repetition of fatigue without refreshment. Artabazes, harassed by the attack of Orodes, sent to excuse himself from despatching the promised reinforcements, and intreated the Roman general to turn his course in the direction of Armenia. Crassus denounced the unfortunate prince as a traitor, and threatened him with the vengeance of the republic as soon as he should have leisure to execute it. His conduct to Cassius was marked with contemptuous disregard, and the officers, who foresaw the perils into which they were hurrying, had no other resource than to wreak their ill-humour in bitter reproaches against Abgarus, who retorted with the coolest assurance, asking if they had expected to make a holiday excursion among shady groves and fountains, in a country of baths and hostelries, like their own Campania. At last, on pretence of executing some secret services, he quitted the Roman camp, and escaped from the hands of the enemy whom he had entrapped into the desert.¹

Geographical difficulties respecting the line of Crassus's march.

It is evident from this account of Plutarch that he considers the expedition to have proceeded several days' march from the point where it left the beaten route to the next locality which he mentions, the passage of the river Balissus. It

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 22.

was here that Crassus was informed by the piquets which he had sent forward that the Parthians were collected in front of him in much greater force than he had been led to expect. If this, then, was the extreme limit of his onward progress, he had not left the Euphrates above fifty miles in a straight line behind him; he had not set foot in the sandy desert at all; nor had he given any indication that he meant to pursue a route through the centre of Mesopotamia, for at this point he had not abandoned the highway that leads from Edessa to Nicephorium and Seleucia. We must either make up our minds to consider the whole account we have received of Crassus's errors and misconduct as unworthy of credit, and the charges against him unproved, or we must apply a correction to Plutarch's geography, and believe that he should have pointed out, not the Balissus, but one of the branches, probably the more western, of the Chaboras, for the spot where the army prepared for combat. However this may be, we now find Crassus taken by surprize, and his army thrown at once into confusion. Hasty preparations were made to meet the enemy; the order of battle was a deep square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side, supported by a body of cavalry not only on the flanks, but also in front and rear. A moment only was allowed for refreshment on the bank of the streamlet, contrary to the advice of the most experienced officers, who recommended a halt and an encampment for the night. The troops pushed on till they came in sight of the advancing columns of the Parthian cavalry. The enemy had adopted

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The Roman
and Par-
thian armies
engage.

measures to conceal their numbers till the Romans had come close upon them. When the whole of their forces were revealed, with their sweeping clouds of cavalry, glittering, man and horse, in brilliant armour, their banners waving with silk and gold, and the loud clang of their kettle-drums uttering discordant music to European ears¹, the Romans were appalled at the sudden discovery both of their numbers and resolution. Nevertheless, wearied and breathless as they were, they were compelled immediately to accept the proffered combat. The shower of arrows with which the Parthians began the fray pierced the armour of the legionary through and through. It nailed his buckler to his arm, and his feet to the ground. Thus far indeed he suffered no worse than the ordinary peril to which he was exposed from the first discharge of the skirmishers at the commencement of a battle, except that the Parthian arrow was a missile of unusual strength and sharpness. But the Parthian bowman was mounted, and the Roman foot-soldier in vain attempted to close with him. He could shoot as well in the retreat as the charge, and the onset of infantry threw him into no confusion, and afforded not an instant's relief. His quiver was no sooner exhausted than he repaired to his camels in the rear, and quickly reappeared with his stock replenished. Crassus perceived that it was necessary to employ his cavalry to disperse the enemy, but

¹ Compare Flor. iii. 11. 8., and Plut. *Crass.* 24. Milton (*Parad. Regained*, iii.) has amassed from the historians and grouped with poetic brilliance the characteristics of Parthian warfare :

“ He look'd and saw what numbers numberless,” &c.

their numbers were miserably inadequate to such a service. He gave his son Publius orders to charge, and the gallant young soldier obeyed with too eager alacrity. The Parthians gave way, and led him on till they had withdrawn him far from the support of the main body, when they wheeled about, surrounded and easily overpowered his scanty squadrons. Young Crassus fought with resolution to the last, and when every hope of victory or rescue had vanished, caused himself to be slain by his shield-bearer. The father had been flattering himself that the field so suddenly cleared by his son's impetuous charge was already his own. He was awakened from his dream by the return of the Parthians, shouting aloud in triumphant exultation, and brandishing the head of their victim on a pike. Crassus stifled his grief and horror, and attempted with a violent effort to discharge his functions as a general. He hurried from cohort to cohort, uttering such customary words of encouragement as his despair or his sorrow allowed. The death of Publius, he said, was the loss of a son to his father, but only of a citizen to the republic. But spiritless himself, he was incapable of infusing spirit. The Parthians continued throughout the day to harass the Roman army by a repetition of their usual manœuvres. It was not till nightfall that they allowed them any respite. Not being accustomed to construct camps, they never passed the night in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, but retired to a distance, leaving the Romans to make what use they could of the few hours which would intervene before their reap-

Death of
the younger
Crassus,
and retreat
of the Ro-
mans.

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They take
refuge in
Charrhæ.

pearance. Crassus himself, overwhelmed with grief and mortification, if not with fear, was incapable of suggesting any counsel or adopting any resolution. Cassius and the other officers promptly set him aside, and took upon themselves to give the necessary orders. They determined to retreat without a moment's delay. Compelled to leave behind them the wounded, these unfortunate victims, hopeless of receiving quarter, uttered such piercing shrieks as reached the ears of the Parthian spies, who guessed the cause and reported it. Immediately the horsemen sprang to their saddles, and speedily overtook the retiring legions. But it would seem that their horses, after a long day's service, were unable to keep pace with the headlong rush of desperate men. News of the disaster was speedily conveyed to Charrhæ, and the Roman garrison which was there stationed issued forth to succour and rescue the remnant of the flying army, which it conducted to an asylum of rest and safety. The Parthians contented themselves with the plunder of the camp and the slaughter of the wounded, together with all the stragglers they could intercept, to the number of several thousands.¹

A report was spread in the Parthian cantonments that Crassus and the principal leaders had abandoned the routed army and effected their escape. Surenas was especially anxious to seize the person of the proconsul, for, according to Oriental notions, the death or captivity of the leader was generally considered decisive of the war. Accordingly, he would have pushed forward in pursuit, and left the

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 27.; Dion. xl. 25.; Flor. iii. 11. 8.

fugitives behind him in Charrhæ, had he not obtained by a stratagem the information he sought. Having ascertained that Crassus was within the walls, he collected his forces and determined to beleaguer the place. But the Parthian tactics were not adapted either to the siege or the blockade. The Romans, distrusting their slight fortifications, or unprovided with the means of subsistence, or more than ever anxious to get within their own frontier, escaped from the fortress by night. Each officer seems to have been allowed to make the best of his way with his own division; no attempt was made to conduct the retreat in concert. Cassius succeeded in crossing the Euphrates with a small body of horse; Octavius, with a larger division, reached the outskirts of the Armenian hills, and was almost beyond pursuit, when the imminent danger to which the proconsul was exposed behind him, induced him to quit his vantage-ground, and descend to save or perish with his general. The Parthians had come up with Crassus, and were pressing closely both upon his rear and flanks. Yet a few hours more, and the shades of evening would receive him within the mountain fastnesses, among which the cavalry of his pursuers would cease to be formidable. Surenas beheld his prey on the point of eluding his grasp; courage and audacity could hardly secure it, cunning and treachery might yet prevail. He allowed some of his prisoners to escape, after duly preparing them for his purpose, by discoursing in their presence of the goodness and placability of Orodes, and assuring them that the Parthians would be satisfied with

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The Roman army abandons Charrhæ, and disperses in several directions.

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Stratagem
of Surenas
to engage
Crassus in a
conference.

fair and reasonable terms of accommodation. At the same time he sent messengers to Crassus to propose a capitulation. The escaped prisoners repaired to the camp of their countrymen, and spread among them their own conviction of the good faith and moderation of the enemy. Crassus had the sense to distrust their representations; but the army became clamorous, and began to threaten violence, shaking their arms in a tumultuary manner. The proconsul believed himself compelled to yield, though not without protesting to his officers that he was coerced by the insubordination of his own soldiers, the summit of disgrace to a Roman commander. The Parthian chieftain made the fairest professions, and arranged that the meeting between them should take place in the company of a few chosen officers on each side. The Roman emperor, attended by his staff, all disarmed and dismounted, approached his conqueror. Crassus was received at first with the highest demonstrations of respect, and Surenas, according to the Parthian custom, ordered a horse with golden housings to be brought forward for his use. The proconsul would have sent for his own charger, but the Parthian offered him one of his own in the name of Orodes the king. The feeble and bewildered old man was lifted abruptly into the saddle, and the Parthian grooms began to goad the steed and urge him towards the enemy. The attendants of Crassus vainly endeavoured to arrest his doom. Octavius and another officer named Petronius seized the reins, while others attempted to cut them. Confusion ensued, and blows were

interchanged. Octavius seized a Parthian's sword, and slew one of the grooms, but was immediately cut down by a blow from behind. In the fray Crassus himself received a mortal wound from the hand of a Parthian named Pomaxaithras. Such was the most credible account of the matter, but nothing certain was known. Others of the Romans fell also in the scuffle; the remainder escaped to the army, and the Parthians now suffered the fugitives to make their way unmolested to the hills. Many, indeed, surrendered to Surenas, who assured them that the death of their general was the termination of hostilities. We do not hear that they received any ill-treatment; though, from the temper in which, as we shall see, the remains of Crassus were insulted, we cannot suppose that they met with the respect due to honourable captives. Detained for years among their foreign captors, they ended with adopting their customs and manners, intermarried with the families of the barbarians, and renounced the country of their Roman ancestors.¹ It was calculated that twenty thousand men perished in this calamitous expedition, and that half that number were made prisoners.

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A fray
ensues.
Crassus and
Octavius
are killed.

The victor sent the head and hand of Crassus to Orodes; but he would have been better pleased to

The Parthians
amuse
their sub-

¹ Hor. *Od.* iii. 5. 5. :

"Milesne Crassi conjuge barbarâ
Turpis maritus vixit," &c.

And according to Velleius ii. 82. and Florus iv. 10. M. Antonius, in his campaign of A. U. 718, found prisoners from the army of Crassus in the Parthian service. Compare Justin xlii. 5. The day of Crassus's death, vi. Id. Jun. or June 8, is fixed by Ovid, *Fast.* vi. 465. See Fischer, p. 253.

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XI.

jects with
the spec-
tacle of a
mock tri-
umph.

have conducted his prisoner alive into the royal presence, as he is said to have promised. He amused his soldiers, and gratified his own vanity, by the performance of a ceremony in mockery of a Roman triumph. The proconsul was represented by one of the captives, who was supposed to bear some personal resemblance to him. The substitute was tawdrily arrayed in female garments, and compelled to answer to the title of Imperator, with which his fellow-prisoners were ordered to address him. The voluptuous and dissipated habits attributed to Crassus and his officers were made subjects of scornful ridicule, and the licentious books which were found in the Roman tents were paraded with a mockery of indignation.¹ It seems that the Parthians were well pleased to offer such a spectacle to their effeminate Greek subjects; but they, on their part, failed to draw the inference which their masters intended, and thought it inconsistent in Surenas to deride the licentiousness of the Romans, when he was himself accompanied to the field by his battalion of concubines, and rejoiced in the lewd music and dancing of a train of slaves, and when the throne of the Arsacidæ was so often filled by the offspring of strange and disgraceful alliances. They compared, indeed, his array to the figure of a viper, bristling in front with its armed warriors and horses, but disgusting and squalid behind, with its train of women, with their timbrels, and songs, and bacchanalian orgies.²

¹ It should be observed, however, that Crassus himself was unstained with the grosser vices of his class: "Vir cætera sanctissimus, immunitaque voluptatibus." Vell. ii. 46.

² Plut. *Crass.* 32.

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XLIndignities
offered to
the remains
of Crassus.

While these events were in progress, Orodes came to terms with the Armenian Artabazes, and accepted the hand of his daughter for his own son Pacorus. This auspicious union received new lustre from the triumph of Surenas. The festivals with which it was celebrated were fashioned upon Grecian models, so soon had the rude descendants of Arsaces resigned themselves to the fascinating luxuries of their semi-Hellenic capital. Orodes was well skilled in the language and literature of Greece; Artabazes even composed tragedies after the Grecian model, and wrote historical works in that tongue. When the head of Crassus was brought to the door of the banquetting hall, a Greek actor from Tralles began to recite appropriate verses from the Bacchanals of Euripides; when the bloody trophy was thrown at the feet of the assembled guests, he seized it in his hands, and enacted with it the frenzy of Agave and the mutilation of Pentheus. The story that molten gold was poured into the mouth of the avaricious Roman is not mentioned by Plutarch, from whom we receive such minute details of the insults practised on his remains. But the testimony of an earlier writer shows that it was already currently reported¹, nor is there any improbability in the circumstance to induce us to disbelieve it.

Such was the end of the unfortunate triumvir. It was many years since a Roman proconsul had thus

Reflections
on the
death of the

¹ Florus, iii. 11. 11., at the end of Trajan's reign, about one hundred and seventy years after the event. The commentators on this passage have collected several analogous stories from Appian, Pliny, Justin, Zosimus, and more modern writers.

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XI.Crassi, the
father and
son.

miserably perished at the head of an army which he had led to destruction. The names of Charrhæ and Cannæ were blended together on the bloodiest page of the national annals. The fate of the general was held up by poets and historians as a beacon for the warning of ambitious statesmen, and possibly his errors were magnified to screen the want of conduct and discipline in the licentious armies of the East. Not a single voice has been raised through all ages in lamentation over his untimely death, except in so far as it tended to precipitate the confusion of his country's affairs, and the overthrow of her constitution. But the son deserves at least to be exempted from the pitiless scorn which clings for ever to the name of the father, and to be honoured as the gallant Lausus of Roman history.¹ Enough that his memory has found a shrine in the pages of the philosopher whom he most revered, and of the commander whom he strove to imitate.²

A. U. 701.
B. C. 53.
Interregnum: the
tribunes
prevent the
election of
consuls.

The year 701 opened at Rome with an interregnum, and thus a great step was made in the direction in which the intrigues of Pompeius pointed. The interreges were assigned by a com-

¹ Virg. *Æn.* x. 811.:

“Quo moriture ruis, majoraque viribus audes?
Fallit te incautum pietas tua.”

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 9.: “P. Crassus, adolescens nostri studiosissimus.” *Ad Div.* v. 8.: “Hoc magis sum Publio deditus quod me maxime sicut alterum parentem et observat et diligit.” *Ad Div.* xiii. 16.: “P. Crassum ex omni nobilitate adolescentem dilexi plurimum.” Compare *Brut.* 81.: “Erat cum institutus optime tum etiam perfecte planeque eruditus; ineratque et ingenium satis acre, et orationis non inelegans copia; prætereaque sine arrogantia gravis esse videbatur et sine segnitia verecundus.” See also Cæs. *B. G.* i. 52., ii. 34., iii. 7.

mittee consisting of the patrician members of the senate.¹ Each in turn held the office for five days only; and the principal object of their appointment was understood to be that they might summon and preside over the comitia for the election of consuls. They discharged, however, in the meanwhile, the general functions of the chief magistrates. But a power so limited in duration was merely nominal. The executive was paralysed, and almost every one was interested in devising means to terminate so disastrous an interruption to the ordinary course of affairs. The cry for a dictatorship rose more and more loud above the murmurs of personal and party interests, for such were the appointed means which the institutions of Rome provided for cutting the knot, when the complication of political affairs seemed to defy disentanglement. Pompeius affected indifference, and pretended to keep aloof from the confusion, but his creatures were labouring actively in his behalf. The nobles were full of apprehension and anxiety. Cato unravelled and denounced the plot against the liberties of the commonwealth; Cicero was silent.² In the mean time the tribunes, or some at least of their number, continued to play into the hands of the triumvir, by obstinately opposing all attempts to assemble the comitia. In former times, the appointment of interreges had been an object of traditional jealousy to the protectors of the plebs, inasmuch as the constitution allowed the plebeians

¹ Ascon. *arg. in Milon.* init.

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 9.: "Ego quiesco."

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no share in their election.¹ But now they not only acquiesced in that temporary arrangement, but seemed resolved to perpetuate it, until the senate should be compelled to resort to the creation of an irresponsible ruler. The nobles, however, held out with more than usual firmness, and even took the vigorous step of imprisoning one of the tribunes, Q. Pompeius Rufus, a grandson of Sulla, whose hostile proceedings were the most violent. To put this bold stroke in execution, they were enabled to employ the strong arm of the triumvir himself. In the absence of consuls and prætors, the tribunes, who, since the abrogation of Sulla's enactments, had been constantly encroaching upon the functions of the other magistrates, undertook almost the entire management of the affairs of the city. Even Pompeius was offended at their insolent usurpations. The absence of his colleagues, and the disruption of the peculiar ties which bound him to Cæsar², gave a freer scope to the aristocratic prejudices of his youth. He was already revolving in his mind the expediency of returning to his former alliances, when he consented to become the instrument of the senate in thus chastising tribunitian dictation.³ He waited for the most graceful opportunity

Pompeius
at length

¹ Liv. iv. 43.: "Coire patricios tribuni prohibebant."

² Pompeius was the more free to act without deferring to Cæsar at this moment because he had just lent him one of his own proconsular legions. Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 1.; Dion. xl. 65. Plutarch (*Cæs.* 25.) says two, but this is an error.

³ But such a violation of the sacred person of the tribune must have been an act of flagrant illegality, and we look in vain for any further explanation of the circumstances. The story is told by Dion. xl. 45.

for offering his mediation, and interfered at last to bring the matter to a decision, by prevailing on his own friends to give way, and consent to the election of consuls.¹ The ostensible causes of its postponement had vanished, and the ground being cleared, it was only decent in one so studious of appearances to prepare the foundation of a new edifice. The Silent Judgment which the senate had instituted upon the conduct of the several candidates had been put off on various excuses, till the public had ceased to be interested in its prosecution; the competitors stood with erect front before the people whose suffrages they demanded; Cicero himself had defended and obtained the acquittal of Æmilius Scaurus; perjury and corruption raised their heads triumphantly; and it might be expected with reason that no public man would ever be condemned again, except upon a charge of murder.² The election fell upon Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala, who at last entered upon their office in the seventh month of the year.³

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interposes,
and consuls
are elected

in the
seventh
month of
the year.

Although the blow had thus been averted for a moment, yet the opinion was rapidly gaining ground, in the midst of these dissensions, that affairs were tending irresistibly to the creation of a dictator.

General
opinion of
the neces-
sity of a
dictator.

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 54. : αἰδεσθεὶς ἐπεμελήθη. Dion. xl. 46. This writer is incorrect in saying that the dictatorship was offered to Pompeius: the offer was proposed by Luceius Hirrus, one of the tribunes, but the question was never formally entertained. Among other suggestions of the tribunes, one was to return to the government by military tribunes, a board of several members. Perhaps it was this that induced Pompeius to take the part of the senate.

² This was Cicero's own remark at the beginning of these proceedings (*ad Att.* iv. 16.).

³ Dion. xl. 45.

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The powers of the state could not long exist by the mere counteraction and collision of one with another. The strength of its materials was too sorely tried.* The genuine patriotism and singleness of purpose through which alone, and by no nice adjustment of its functions and forces, the machine of government had in reality been in ancient times preserved, were found to have given way altogether under the unceasing pressure to which they were now subjected. The constitution of the commonwealth stood in need of an organic change; the exorbitant power of individuals could only be balanced by conferring a corresponding share of political importance on the wealth and intelligence of a lower class. Probably the establishment of a permanent military police, such as that which the emperors afterwards maintained in the city, was absolutely necessary to secure the freedom of councils and elections; yet the hand to which this force was intrusted could hardly fail to establish a monarchical domination.

It is only retarded by the recollection of the proscriptions of Sulla.

What was it then that still retarded a consummation which seemed so imminent? It would appear that Cicero and the more moderate politicians whom he represented would have acquiesced in the temporary appointment of a dictator, according to the old traditional policy of the state, as at least a necessary evil, and fondly blinded themselves to the danger of its being rendered perpetual. The knights and others of the middle class would doubtless expect the energy of an irresponsible governor to overflow in measures for the elevation of their own order. The multitude, always apt to

applaud a striking change, had no longer that apprehension of a dictator which he was wont to inspire when he was the instrument of the patri- cians for overruling the insolence of the tribunes. Even the nobles might have remembered that the last dictatorship had been the work of their own hands, and all its measures directed to their own aggrandizement. Pompeius, however much he had wavered in their cause, was still the pupil, the follower, the admirer of Sulla, the heir to his fame, to his army, to his political career. Besides, the cautious decorum with which he had conducted himself for many years had given him the reputa- tion, however unmerited it might be, of being a man of moderate and humane disposition, and one who might be expected to make a mild, perhaps a bloodless use of absolute authority. Nevertheless, it was from the nobles that the opposition to this appointment principally came. The proscriptions of Sulla and Marius had made an indelible im- pression on the minds of the next succeeding generation. The dream of blood still flitted before their unclosed eyes; the name of dictator was indissolubly connected with the idea of unim- aginable horrors.¹ The life of a citizen was still sacred in the eyes of the conquerors and butchers of the world. Could a Pompeius bear rule in a state in which a Cæsar was a subject? Unless the one were massacred, the other must be overthrown. Murder would succeed to murder, revolution would breed revolution. The door to violence being once

¹ Dion. xl. 45.: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Σύλλου ὁμότητα ἐμίσουν πάντες τὸ πολίτευμα.

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opened could never be shut against the torrents of blood that would dash through it. The conviction was forced upon them that the question was not that of the appointment of a temporary dictator, but of a succession of tyrants.

Selfishness
and blind-
ness of the
oligarchy.

The weight of these sentiments and reasonings was reinforced by the ponderous mass of selfish voluptuousness, which, with no extended view of ulterior consequences, would not consent to relinquish or abridge its gratifications at the bidding of a social reformer. No aristocracy was ever more short-sighted at the crisis of its fate than the once glorious patriciate of Rome. It clung desperately to its privileges, not from a fond regard to their antiquity, or their connexion with any social or religious prejudices; it did not invoke the specious watchwords of patriotism, or philosophy, or utility; it took up its ground upon the enactments which Sulla had made to enhance its own wealth and power, and depress those of its rivals, and disputed it with its assailants inch by inch. Without a policy and without a leader the nobles went staggering onward in their blind conflict with the forces arrayed against them, and Pompeius, not daring to take the single step which still remained between him and the post he coveted, left every thing a prey to suspense and confusion. At last the force of circumstances had thrust the prize even to his feet; he gazed at it and sighed over it, but did not stoop to take it up.

Tranquil-
lity not re-
stored by
the appoint-

The appointment of consuls had no effect in restoring public order. The senate indeed passed one decree, ostensibly of considerable importance,

CHAP.
XI.ment of
consuls.

which forbade the consuls and prætors to assume the government of a province till the fifth year from the expiration of their office in the city.¹ It was hoped, perhaps, that this limitation would materially check the eagerness of the candidates. The enactment, indeed, seems to have been really salutary, and, as such, it was judiciously revived and confirmed in more tranquil times by Augustus.² This, however, was the only measure of reform that could be carried. The consuls and senate clad themselves publicly in mourning³ when they found that, as in previous years, it was impossible to effect the election of the ordinary magistrates. Among the various candidates, Milo sued for the consulship and Clodius for the prætorship: the violence of the one and the intriguing spirit of the other rendered any decision more than ever unattainable. The new year opened, like the preceding, with an interregnum. It was speedily distinguished from its predecessor by a flagrant crime and its long train of consequences. In the middle of January it happened that Milo was travelling along the Appian Way. He was accompanied in his carriage by his wife, a large retinue of servants was in attendance upon him, and he was followed, as was generally his custom, by a troop of gladiators. The object of his journey was at least ostensibly peaceful, since he was on his way to perform one of the ceremonies attached to his municipal dictatorship at Lanuvium. At a few miles' distance from the city he was met by Clodius, who was on horseback, with a small

A. U. 702.
B. C. 52.¹ Dion. xl. 46.² Dion. liii. 14.³ Dion. xl. 46.

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XI.

company of armed attendants. Such modes of travelling were not unusually adopted for the sake of security even in the neighbourhood of Rome; but the lives of men in the position of Milo and Clodius were never safe from sudden violence, and their journeying with military escorts could be no proof that their designs were sinister, and that the meeting was on either side premeditated. Cicero, in his defence of Milo, lays great stress on the nature of his retinue, which he adduces as a proof that he had no intention of waylaying his enemy, while, on the other hand, he tries to fasten a suspicion of the kind on Clodius.

Affray
between
Clodius
and Milo :

Clodius
slain :

Riot and
conflagra-
tion in the
city.

However this may be, a quarrel ensued between the servants on each side; blows were exchanged, and Clodius himself, wounded in the scuffle, took refuge in a tavern by the road side. The fury of Milo was ungovernable. Violence once committed, he resolved to carry it through. He attacked the house, caused his enemy to be dragged from his concealment, and slain. The corpse lay in the road, till it was picked up by a passing friend, and brought to Rome. The adherents of the murdered man exposed it to the view of the populace, who worked themselves into frenzy at the sight. A riot ensued; benches, books, and papers were snatched from the curia in which the senate was wont to assemble, and the tumultuary pyre involved part of the forum in its conflagration.¹ The house of

¹ Dion. xl. 49.; App. *B. C.* ii. 21.; Ascon. *arg. in Milon.*: "Quo igne et ipsa quoque curia flagravat, et item Porcia basilica, quæ erat ei adjuncta, ambusta est." The burning of the Curia Hostilia and the adjoining buildings cleared the space for the improvements intro-

Milo and that of the interrex M. Lepidus were attacked, but the assailants were received with coolness and determination, and repulsed with bloodshed. So great was the popular clamour against the murderer that he dared not at first submit himself to trial. He was preparing to withdraw into voluntary banishment; but his friends rallied about him; the violence of the Clodians worked some reaction of opinion in his favour¹, and a majority of the tribunes was known to be generally favourable to his party. He was encouraged to remain in the city and try the effect of wholesale bribery, by distributing a largess among the poorer citizens.² But riot succeeded to riot, and the populace refused even to listen to the excuses which the culprit pleaded in his defence. The senate, crippled in its executive branch, felt its authority defied by both parties, whom it could neither mediate between nor confront before an equitable tribunal. It adopted the expedient of nominating a commission, consisting of the interrex, the tribunes, and Pompeius, to whom it intrusted conjointly the solemn charge of providing for the safety of the state. Pompeius was allowed to collect a military force to overawe the turbulent multitude. The substance of the dictatorship was thus thrust into his hands; for what authority could his colleagues exert against the commander of an army at the

A commission appointed for the trial of Milo. The substance of the dictatorship thrust into Pompeius' hands.

duced afterwards by Cæsar. There was another great fire in the year 703, in the western part of the forum. Oros. vi. 13.

¹ Ascon. *l. c.*: "Incendium curiæ majorem aliquanto indignationem civitatis moverat quam Clodii cædes."

² Appian. *B. C.* ii. 22.

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XI

gates, or even in the forum? Still, however, the title was withheld; some secret intrigues prevailed to thwart the cherished wish; still Pompeius hesitated to demand it. Cæsar had by this time arrived at Lucca, and was intently watching the crisis.¹ His immediate vicinity gave a new stimulus to the efforts of his partizans, and honours were lavishly decreed him in acknowledgment of his late victories. So close at hand, the senate was apprehensive of his not only resenting the elevation of his rival to an avowed dictatorship, but of his claiming a share in the consular dignity for himself. Accordingly, with the sanction of Cato and Bibulus, the nobles invented a middle way to reconcile the conflicting pretensions of the jealous allies, by refusing Pompeius the dictatorship, but decreeing his appointment as sole consul.² Pompeius himself was absent from the city; but the public appearance of the candidate was dispensed with; the suffrages of the tribes were not solicited; it is even doubtful whether any of the forms of popular election were gone through.

He is declared sole consul,
A. U. 702.
B. C. 52.

The trial of Milo: intimidation of his advocates.

The trial of Milo was the principal object for which these irregularities were committed, for it required extraordinary measures to give effect to judicial proceedings in such a case. The character of the accused and the influence which he exerted,

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vi. ult.: "Ibi cognoscit de Clodii cæde.

² Dion. xl. 50.: τῷ Πομπηίῳ τὴν ὑπατείαν, ὥστε μὴ δικτάτωρα αὐτὸν λεχθῆναι, καὶ μόνῳ γε, ἵνα μὴ ὁ Καῖσαρ αὐτῷ συνάρξῃ, δόντες. Appian. *B. C.* ii. 23.; Plut. *Pomp.* 54.; Liv. *Epit.* cvii.: "Cnæus Pompeius a senatu consul tertium factus est, absens et solus, quod nulli alii unquam contigit." To crown this series of irregularities it must be remembered that he was at the same time proconsul.

combined with the ostentatious lawlessness of his enemies to make a fair decision hopeless. It was the part of a vigorous magistrate at least to repress violence, and for this purpose the consul did not hesitate to fill the avenues to the forum, and even the steps and porticoes of the temples which surrounded it, with files of soldiers¹, a spectacle hitherto unprecedented to Roman eyes. Cicero, on rising to defend the criminal, was assailed with such cries and menaces from the populace as almost to make him quail from the attempt. The sight of the consul's military dispositions was too novel and alarming to reassure him. He hurried through his speech, abashed and dispirited; his client lost his cause, and was condemned to banishment.² It was on returning to his own house that he collected himself to a sense of the glorious opportunity he had lost, and sate down to compose the magnificent oration which has descended to posterity as his defence of Milo.³ The orator had executed a splendid

Milo goes
into exile.
Speech of
Cicero pro
Milone.

¹ Plut. *Cic.* 34.; Schol. Bob. in *Milon.* p. 276.; Lucan. i. 319.:

“Quis castra timenti

Nescit mixta foro, gladii cum triste minantes
Judicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona.”

² The judges, according to a new enactment of Pompeius, were selected by lot to the number of eighty-one: this number was reduced by challenge on either side to fifty-one. On this occasion their votes were given in the following proportions: Senatores condemnauerunt xii., absolverunt vi. Equites condemnauerunt xiii., absolverunt iv. Tribuni ærarii condemnauerunt xiii., absolverunt iii. Ascon. p. 53.

Immediately after his conviction on the charge *de vi*, Milo was accused of *ambitus*, and condemned in his absence. He was again accused of *sodalitiis*, of conspiracy, and condemned a third time.

³ Dion. xl. 54.: χρόνῳ ποθ' ὕστερον καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναθαρσύνῃς ἔγραψε. The writer of the Scholia Bobiensia mentions that in his time the original speech was existing: “Existit alius præterea liber

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XI.

declamation, and his vanity prompted him to send it to his client at Massilia. The exile perused it, and replied that he esteemed himself fortunate that so convincing a speech had not actually been delivered, "else," he said, "I should not be now enjoying the exquisite mullets of this place;" a reply which may perhaps have passed with Cicero as a pleasant jest, but which, as Dion shrewdly remarks, must have been meant as a bitter sarcasm on the timidity of the orator in the forum and his vanity in the closet.¹

actorum pro Milone, in quo omnia interrupta et impolita et rudia, plena denique maximi terroris agnoscas." This must have been the "report" of the speech inserted perhaps in the *Acta Diurna*. See Leclerc's dissertation, *Journaux Publics chez les Romains*.

¹ Dion, xl. 54.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.





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